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Open-source platform for 3D AI agents. Turn text or a photo into a rigged, animated GLB avatar, give it an LLM brain, memory and a wallet, and embed it anywhere with one web component. Remote MCP server, x402 payments, Three.js, browser-native.

feat(solana-pay): answer the Solana Pay transaction request handshake for skill purchases

nirholas74e60bf10093
diff --git a/api/webhooks/solana-pay.js b/api/webhooks/solana-pay.js
index 9acb8411e..015fb759f 100644
--- a/api/webhooks/solana-pay.js
+++ b/api/webhooks/solana-pay.js
@@ -1,8 +1,11 @@
/**
* /api/webhooks/solana-pay
* --------------------------------------------------------------
- * GET — Solana Pay merchant discovery probe: returns { label, icon }.
- * POST — Off-web confirmation path. Looks up the pending skill_purchases row
+ * GET - Solana Pay merchant discovery probe: returns { label, icon }. Wallets
+ * render both in the confirmation sheet before the buyer signs, so the
+ * icon MUST be a live absolute URL; a 404 there shows the buyer a broken
+ * merchant at the exact moment they decide whether to pay.
+ * POST - Off-web confirmation path. Looks up the pending skill_purchases row
* by reference and runs the same on-chain verification + ledger writes
* as the buyer's polling /confirm endpoint via confirmSkillPurchase().
* Mainly useful for mobile QR flows where the merchant pings the
@@ -11,10 +14,15 @@
* Auth: Authorization: Bearer <WEBHOOK_SECRET>. The reference itself is also
* a unique secret, so the surface is narrow; we still gate to avoid spammy
* DoS-via-confirm probes.
+ *
+ * CORS: the Solana Pay spec has wallets fetch this endpoint cross-origin, so the
+ * GET probe answers any origin. That is safe because the only cross-origin-
+ * reachable response is the public merchant label, and the POST leg still needs
+ * the bearer secret that no browser context holds.
*/
import { timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
import { sql } from '../_lib/db.js';
-import { error, json, method, readJson, wrap } from '../_lib/http.js';
+import { cors, error, json, method, readJson, wrap } from '../_lib/http.js';
import { confirmSkillPurchase } from '../_lib/purchase-confirm.js';
function authOk(req) {
@@ -29,12 +37,15 @@ function authOk(req) {
}
export default wrap(async (req, res) => {
+ if (cors(req, res, { origins: '*', methods: 'GET,POST,OPTIONS' })) return;
if (!method(req, res, ['GET', 'POST'])) return;
if (req.method === 'GET') {
return json(res, 200, {
- label: '3D-Agent Skill Marketplace',
- icon: 'https://three.ws/assets/logo.png',
+ label: 'three.ws Skill Marketplace',
+ // /logo.png is the real served asset. This pointed at /assets/logo.png,
+ // which has never existed and answers 404 with the SPA HTML shell.
+ icon: 'https://three.ws/logo.png',
});
}
@@ -44,6 +55,14 @@ export default wrap(async (req, res) => {
const reference = typeof body?.reference === 'string' ? body.reference.trim() : null;
if (!reference) return error(res, 400, 'validation_error', 'reference required');
+ // Solana settles by scanning the chain for the reference and ignores this. An
+ // EVM row has no on-chain reference to scan, so without the settlement hash the
+ // confirm can only ever answer 'pending' — the same tx_hash the buyer's
+ // /confirm endpoint takes, accepted here so an EVM purchase routed through the
+ // webhook is not a permanently unconfirmable dead path.
+ const rawTxHash = body?.tx_hash ?? body?.txHash;
+ const txHash = typeof rawTxHash === 'string' && rawTxHash.trim() ? rawTxHash.trim() : null;
+
const [pur] = await sql`
SELECT sp.*, COALESCE(asp.mint_decimals, 6) AS mint_decimals
FROM skill_purchases sp
@@ -54,12 +73,13 @@ export default wrap(async (req, res) => {
`;
if (!pur) return error(res, 404, 'not_found', 'purchase not found');
- let result;
- try {
- result = await confirmSkillPurchase(pur);
- } catch (e) {
- return error(res, 500, 'confirm_failed', e.message);
- }
+ // A confirm fault (RPC outage, unconfigured payout wallet, DB down) is not
+ // something this handler can resolve, and swallowing it into a hand-rolled 500
+ // used to hide it: wrap() is what captures the exception to Sentry, degrades a
+ // database outage to a throttled 503 instead of an error-tracker flood, and
+ // scrubs the message before it reaches the caller. Let it through so a broken
+ // payment path is visible to ops rather than silently 500ing per delivery.
+ const result = await confirmSkillPurchase(pur, { txHash });
if (result.status === 'pending') return json(res, 200, { data: { status: 'pending' } });
if (result.status === 'expired') return error(res, 410, 'expired', 'purchase expired');