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fix(home): stop an account deletion forging a confirmation-integrity Sev 1
nirholasb730a85a36c7
diff --git a/api/_lib/home/privacy.js b/api/_lib/home/privacy.jsindex f1abf6aa9..0957aa191 100644--- a/api/_lib/home/privacy.js+++ b/api/_lib/home/privacy.js@@ -662,7 +662,20 @@ export async function deleteAllHomeDataForUser(userId, { email = null } = {}) {// those rows is entitled to its own history, and it does not need to keep a// pointer to a person who left.await sql`update home_action_log set user_id = null where user_id = ${userId}`;- await sql`update home_action_log set confirmed_by = null where confirmed_by = ${userId}`;++ // Removing WHO confirmed must not erase THAT it was confirmed. A guarded+ // physical action with no confirmation and no grant behind it is the+ // subsystem's zero-budget Sev 1 (api/_lib/ops/home-health.js), and a bare+ // `confirmed_by = null` would forge exactly that shape out of a lawful,+ // properly confirmed unlock every time somebody exercised their right to+ // erasure. The marker keeps the household's record honest and keeps the+ // integrity alert reading the truth.+ await sql`+ update home_action_log+ set confirmed_by = null,+ detail = coalesce(detail, '{}'::jsonb) || '{"confirmation_scrubbed":true}'::jsonb+ where confirmed_by = ${userId}+ `;const after = await countUserRows(userId, email);return { before, after, homes: homeIds.length };diff --git a/api/_lib/ops/home-health.js b/api/_lib/ops/home-health.jsindex 4a559f932..811aec4b6 100644--- a/api/_lib/ops/home-health.js+++ b/api/_lib/ops/home-health.js@@ -247,13 +247,27 @@ export async function readHomeSignals({ windowMinutes = WINDOW_MINUTES } = {}) {// allow list and stamps `detail.allowed_by_grant`. Those rows are counted// and reported, never paged.//+ // The second lawful null is an erased account. Deleting a user scrubs the+ // pointer to who confirmed an action on a household they have left+ // (api/_lib/home/privacy.js), which removes the name and not the yes. That+ // path stamps `detail.confirmation_scrubbed`, so the row reports as+ // confirmed-by-someone-departed rather than forging a violation out of a+ // person exercising their right to erasure.+ //// What remains a violation is the shape with no yes behind it at all:- // guarded, executed, nobody confirmed it, and no grant claimed.+ // guarded, executed, nobody confirmed it, no grant claimed and no+ // confirmation scrubbed.withTimeout(sql`select- count(*) filter (where coalesce(detail->>'allowed_by_grant', 'false') <> 'true')::int as violations,- max(created_at) filter (where coalesce(detail->>'allowed_by_grant', 'false') <> 'true') as last_at,+ count(*) filter (+ where coalesce(detail->>'allowed_by_grant', 'false') <> 'true'+ and coalesce(detail->>'confirmation_scrubbed', 'false') <> 'true'+ )::int as violations,+ max(created_at) filter (+ where coalesce(detail->>'allowed_by_grant', 'false') <> 'true'+ and coalesce(detail->>'confirmation_scrubbed', 'false') <> 'true'+ ) as last_at,count(*) filter (where detail->>'allowed_by_grant' = 'true')::int as grant_backed,count(*) filter (where detail->>'allowed_by_grant' = 'true'@@ -262,7 +276,8 @@ export async function readHomeSignals({ windowMinutes = WINDOW_MINUTES } = {}) {where g.home_id = home_action_log.home_idand g.entity_id = any(home_action_log.entity_ids))- )::int as grant_backed_without_grant+ )::int as grant_backed_without_grant,+ count(*) filter (where detail->>'confirmation_scrubbed' = 'true')::int as confirmation_scrubbedfrom home_action_logwhere guarded = true and confirmed_by is null and outcome = 'ok'and created_at > now() - interval '24 hours'@@ -329,6 +344,10 @@ export async function readHomeSignals({ windowMinutes = WINDOW_MINUTES } = {}) {// alerts. A number that climbs while nobody is revoking anything is// worth reading.grantBackedWithoutGrant: v.grant_backed_without_grant ?? 0,+ // Guarded actions that WERE confirmed by a person who has since deleted+ // their account. Reported so the number is visible, never scored: the+ // yes happened, and only the pointer to who gave it was erased.+ confirmationScrubbed: v.confirmation_scrubbed ?? 0,},pool,leak,@@ -448,6 +467,7 @@ export function homeHealthVerdict(s) {+ (decidedConfirmations >= MIN_CONFIRMATIONS_FOR_A_VERDICT ? '' : ` (under the ${MIN_CONFIRMATIONS_FOR_A_VERDICT}-confirmation floor, reported not scored)`): 'no confirmations in window',s.integrity.grantBacked ? `${s.integrity.grantBacked} guarded action(s) cleared by a standing grant` : null,+ s.integrity.confirmationScrubbed ? `${s.integrity.confirmationScrubbed} guarded action(s) confirmed by a since-deleted account` : null,`pool ${s.pool.open} open, ${s.pool.subscribers} subscribers` + (s.pool.streams === null ? '' : ` across ${s.pool.streams} streams`) + `, ${s.pool.breakersOpen} breakers open` + (s.pool.rung && s.pool.rung !== 'normal' ? `, admission ${s.pool.rung}` : ''),];diff --git a/docs/ops/home-operations.md b/docs/ops/home-operations.mdindex 7d6d7ceae..73360a8fd 100644--- a/docs/ops/home-operations.md+++ b/docs/ops/home-operations.md@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ expired of 4 (under the 10-confirmation floor, reported not scored); ...| Breaker-open homes | `runtime.stats()` | under 2% | 2 to 10% | over 10% || p95 action latency (our leg) | `home_action_log.detail->>'latencyMs'` | under 1.5 s | 1.5 to 4 s | over 4 s || Subscriber leak | `stats().subscribers` over three checks | flat or falling | climbing with flat connections | climbing with flat connections |-| Confirmation integrity | `home_action_log`, excluding standing grants | zero rows | n/a | any row |+| Confirmation integrity | `home_action_log`, excluding standing grants and scrubbed confirmations | zero rows | n/a | any row |A **refused** action counts as a success. The safety gate refusing to open afront door is the product working, not a failure to deliver, and scoring it as an@@ -70,9 +70,18 @@ every legitimate unlock. A standing per-entity allowance in `home_entity_grants`is a yes the user already gave, recorded once rather than re-asked every time, sothe act path clears the gate through the allow list and stamps`detail.allowed_by_grant`. Those rows are counted and reported-(`integrity.grantBacked`), never paged. What remains a Sev 1 is the shape with no-yes behind it at all: guarded, executed, nobody confirmed it, and no grant-claimed.+(`integrity.grantBacked`), never paged.++The second lawful null is an **erased account**. Deleting a user scrubs the+pointer to who confirmed an action on a household they have left+([`api/_lib/home/privacy.js`](../../api/_lib/home/privacy.js)), which removes the+name and not the yes, so that path stamps `detail.confirmation_scrubbed` and+those rows report as `integrity.confirmationScrubbed` rather than paging. Without+that marker every right-to-erasure request would forge this Sev 1 out of a+lawful, properly confirmed unlock.++What remains a Sev 1 is the shape with no yes behind it at all: guarded,+executed, nobody confirmed it, no grant claimed and no confirmation scrubbed.### Why one broken house scores `ok` and not `degraded`@@ -717,6 +726,7 @@ select id, home_id, user_id, actor, channel, action, entity_ids, risk, detail, cfrom home_action_logwhere guarded = true and confirmed_by is null and outcome = 'ok'and coalesce(detail->>'allowed_by_grant', 'false') <> 'true'+ and coalesce(detail->>'confirmation_scrubbed', 'false') <> 'true'and created_at > now() - interval '24 hours'order by created_at desc;```@@ -724,7 +734,8 @@ order by created_at desc;Drop the `allowed_by_grant` line to see the grant-backed actions alongside them.Those are legitimate and are the reason that line is there: without it, thisquery returns every standing-grant unlock in the fleet and the alert becomes-noise within a day.+noise within a day. Drop the `confirmation_scrubbed` line to see the actions+whose confirmer has since deleted their account, for the same reason.**Then, in this order:**@@ -747,6 +758,10 @@ noise within a day.`integrity.grantBackedWithoutGrant` on the health block counts rows thatclaimed a grant that no longer exists; that is usually a grant the userrevoked afterwards, which is why it reports rather than pages.+5. **Check the scrub claim.** The alert also excludes rows stamped+ `detail.confirmation_scrubbed`, which is an account deletion removing the+ pointer to a confirmer. A row that reached you claimed neither a grant nor a+ scrub, so somebody's yes is genuinely missing rather than merely anonymous.**Rollback:** yes. Roll back to the last revision known to gate correctly beforediagnosing further.diff --git a/tests/home-integrity.test.js b/tests/home-integrity.test.jsindex baf3220ab..2d36a5f2b 100644--- a/tests/home-integrity.test.js+++ b/tests/home-integrity.test.js@@ -68,6 +68,19 @@ describe('confirmation integrity is a zero-budget invariant', () => {expect(verdict.status).toBe('ok');});+ it('does not fire on an action confirmed by an account that has since been deleted', () => {+ // Erasure removes WHO said yes, not THAT somebody did: deleting a user+ // nulls `confirmed_by` on a household they have left. Without the marker+ // the scrub stamps, every right-to-erasure request would forge this Sev 1+ // out of a lawful, properly confirmed unlock and send an operator to tell+ // an innocent household their house was opened without permission.+ const verdict = homeHealthVerdict(+ healthy({ integrity: { violations: 0, lastAt: null, grantBacked: 0, grantBackedWithoutGrant: 0, confirmationScrubbed: 2 } }),+ );+ expect(verdict.status).toBe('ok');+ expect(verdict.detail).toContain('2 guarded action(s) confirmed by a since-deleted account');+ });+it('outranks every other signal, so it is never masked by a busy platform', () => {const verdict = homeHealthVerdict(healthy({diff --git a/tests/home-privacy.test.js b/tests/home-privacy.test.jsindex 87e52e944..10735b89c 100644--- a/tests/home-privacy.test.js+++ b/tests/home-privacy.test.js@@ -496,10 +496,16 @@ describe.skipIf(!LIVE)('home privacy: deletion and purge against the real databa// who is gone.const [{ n }] = await sql`select count(*)::int as n from home_action_log where home_id = ${theirs}`;expect(n).toBe(1);- const [row] = await sql`select user_id, confirmed_by from home_action_log where home_id = ${theirs}`;+ const [row] = await sql`select user_id, confirmed_by, detail from home_action_log where home_id = ${theirs}`;expect(row.user_id).toBeNull();expect(row.confirmed_by).toBeNull();+ // Removing the name must not forge a safety violation. A guarded action+ // with a null `confirmed_by` and nothing else on it is the subsystem's+ // zero-budget Sev 1, so the scrub records that the yes happened while+ // dropping who gave it.+ expect(row.detail?.confirmation_scrubbed).toBe(true);+// And the account row itself can now actually be deleted, which the// pre-migration granted_by foreign key made impossible.await expect(sql`delete from users where id = ${owner.id}`).resolves.toBeDefined();@@ -608,8 +614,8 @@ describe.skipIf(!LIVE)('home privacy: deletion and purge against the real databaconst data = await privacy.exportHomeData(owner.id);expect(Object.keys(data).sort()).toEqual(['action_log', 'confirmations', 'generated_at', 'grants', 'homes_you_own',- 'inventory', 'invites', 'members', 'memberships', 'notice', 'plan_override',- 'relay_pairings', 'satellite_codes', 'satellites',+ 'inventory', 'invites', 'layouts', 'members', 'memberships', 'notice',+ 'plan_override', 'relay_pairings', 'satellite_codes', 'satellites',]);expect(data.homes_you_own).toHaveLength(1);expect(data.grants).toHaveLength(1);