Open-source platform for 3D AI agents. Turn text or a photo into a rigged, animated GLB avatar, give it an LLM brain, memory and a wallet, and embed it anywhere with one web component. Remote MCP server, x402 payments, Three.js, browser-native.
JavaScript 3d-generationai-agentsanimationavatardigital-humangenerative-aiglbgltfimage-to-3dllmmcpmcp-servermodel-context-protocolsolanatext-to-3dthreejsweb-componentswebglwebxrx402
docs(security): add the 2026-10-25 audit report, detailed findings and items still needing validation
nirholasf2b08f8d056f
diff --git a/docs/security/audit-2026-10-25/FINDINGS-DETAIL.md b/docs/security/audit-2026-10-25/FINDINGS-DETAIL.mdnew file mode 100644index 000000000..fd3c7fb80--- /dev/null+++ b/docs/security/audit-2026-10-25/FINDINGS-DETAIL.md@@ -0,0 +1,353 @@+# Findings detail++All records are `needs_validation` (source-only run, nothing executed).++## Agent update accepts an avatar_id the caller does not own; public manifest emits its CDN URL++Fingerprint: `agents-access-control-agent-update-unowned-avatar-id-public-manifest-body-uri`++api/agents.js handleUpdate sets avatar_id = COALESCE(body.avatar_id, avatar_id) with no avatars.owner_id check (handleCreate checks at 308-312). Unauthenticated manifest/registration in api/agents/_id/_sub.js join the avatar and call resolveAvatarUrl with visibility hardcoded 'public', emitting the private avatar CDN URL in body.uri and registration. Verifier assessment: Source path holds: handleUpdate writes avatar_id with no owner check; public manifest/registration emit the CDN URL. Attacker needs the victim's random avatar UUID and the CDN may already be public. Non-binding priority hint: low. Suggested fix: Validate UUID and require avatars.owner_id = caller in handleUpdate as handleCreate does; in public manifest/registration only emit URLs for public or unlisted avatars owned by the agent owner.++Claimed root cause: Missing ownership check on update; public resolver forces public visibility.++Trace:+- entrypoint: api/agents.js:447+- propagation: api/agents.js:533+- propagation: api/agents/_id/_sub.js:378+- propagation: api/_lib/avatars.js:545+- propagation: api/_lib/r2.js:439+- sink: api/agents/_id/_sub.js:441++Evidence:+- api/agents.js:308: create path checks avatar ownership+- api/agents/_id/_sub.js:401: visibility hardcoded public+- api/agents/_id/_sub.js:515: registration emits URL++## Anonymous agent-ask visitors write working-tier memories injected into the owner's chat prompt++Fingerprint: `ai-llm-agent-ask-anonymous-working-memory-poisoning`++agent-ask saveTurn (agent-ask.js:191, called 311) stores visitor question (<=1000 chars) and answer as agent_memories tier 'working', salience 0.2, 2h TTL. memory-store.js:481 computeContext selects all non-expired pinned or working rows; chat.js:2120 recallForChat merges them; chat.js:2198 appends '- (type) snippet' (160 char) to system prompt with no untrusted fence. Chat tools include sendSol (chat.js:402); Guardian inspects only user message. Funds impact depends on api/agent/send-sol.js:83 AVATAR_LOCK_RECIPIENT/AVATAR_DEMO_TOKEN config. Verifier assessment: Anonymous agent-ask writes visitor text to the working memory tier, which reaches the owner's chat system prompt unfenced. Rows default to non-public, sendSol is capped and guarded, so impact is bounded to the owner's own chat. Non-binding priority hint: low. Suggested fix: Do not write anonymous turns to the working tier; fence recalled snippets as untrusted data; require the user message to authorize sendSol.++Claimed root cause: Public unauthenticated write path stores attacker text in a tier the owner chat trusts; recall unfenced.++Trace:+- entrypoint: api/agent-ask.js:248+- propagation: api/agent-ask.js:311+- propagation: api/agent-ask.js:191+- propagation: api/_lib/memory-store.js:481+- propagation: api/chat.js:2120+- sink: api/chat.js:2198++Evidence:+- api/agent-ask.js:16: comment claims lowest tier avoids polluting+- api/_lib/memory-store.js:473: working = in-context-now set+- api/chat.js:402: sendSol tool offered+- api/agent/send-sol.js:83: recipient lock depends on env++## agent-ask serves unpublished agents' private persona, system prompt and custom skills to anonymous callers++Fingerprint: `ai-llm-agent-ask-unpublished-persona-skills-disclosure`++POST /api/agent-ask (agent-ask.js:248) selects agent by id and deleted_at only (261), loads agentSkillsForPrompt (289), builds system prompt with persona/system_prompt and skills (70, 290) for anonymous asker. api/chat.js:546 requires is_published OR owner; chat.js:632 says persona prompts are private IP; 685 skills only when agentVisible. Anonymous caller knowing an unpublished agent UUID can have the model reveal persona/skills. Prompt instruction not to reveal is not deterministic. Verifier assessment: agent-ask looks up agents without an is_published/owner filter and injects persona and skills into the prompt; chat.js gates the same data. Needs an unpublished agent UUID. Non-binding priority hint: low. Suggested fix: Add AND (is_published = true OR user_id = caller) to the lookup at agent-ask.js:261 and load skills only for visible agents.++Claimed root cause: Missing visibility predicate on sibling path.++Trace:+- entrypoint: api/agent-ask.js:248+- propagation: api/agent-ask.js:261+- propagation: api/agent-ask.js:289+- sink: api/agent-ask.js:290++Evidence:+- api/chat.js:546: sibling control+- api/chat.js:632: comment: private IP+- api/chat.js:685: skills gated by agentVisible+- api/agent-ask.js:70: persona and skills inserted verbatim++## Sign-in completion endpoints issue a session without binding to the initiating browser (login CSRF)++Fingerprint: `api-auth-login-csrf-unbound-signin-completion`++Handoff exchange GET (api/auth/handoff.js:98,131-132) redeems bearer code, destroySession then createSession for code owner, no origin/cookie binding (mint side line 69 requires isSameSiteOrigin). Telegram widget callback (telegram/[action].js:119 default {i:'login'} when flow cookie absent; signIn 70,180) creates session for payload identity. SAML ACS (saml/[action].js:72,119-120) accepts unsolicited POST. Attacker with own code/payload/assertion makes victim browser sign in as attacker; victim data saved under attacker account. privy/verify.js:40 enforces isSameSiteOrigin as comparable control. Session cookie SameSite=Lax (auth.js:144) so top-level GET carries/sets. Verifier assessment: Handoff exchange GET, Telegram callback without a flow cookie, and SAML ACS complete sign-in with no browser binding, so a victim can be signed in as the attacker (login CSRF). No account takeover; needs victim interaction. Non-binding priority hint: low. Suggested fix: Require the signed flow cookie on Telegram, enforce InResponseTo and bind RelayState for SAML, and add a confirm step or Sec-Fetch-Site check before the handoff replaces a session.++Claimed root cause: Completion handlers set session cookie with no per-flow browser binding.++Trace:+- entrypoint: api/auth/handoff.js:98+- propagation: api/auth/handoff.js:131+- propagation: api/auth/telegram/[action].js:119+- propagation: api/auth/telegram/[action].js:180+- propagation: api/auth/saml/[action].js:72+- sink: api/auth/saml/[action].js:120++Evidence:+- api/auth/handoff.js:69: mint side has same-site check+- api/auth/privy/verify.js:40: comparable endpoint enforces guard+- api/auth/telegram/[action].js:107: flow cookie exists but absence tolerated at 119+- api/_lib/auth.js:144: SameSite=Lax++## Unauthenticated /api/tty SSRF guard bypassed by redirect-following, unpinned fetch++Fingerprint: `api-ssrf-tty-guard-bypass-redirect-follow-unpinned-fetch`++GET /api/tty?src=<url> is unauthenticated and only IP-rate-limited. It validates src once with assertSafePublicUrl (DNS check only), then passes the URL string to packages/tty-3d loadModel, which calls global fetch with redirect:'follow' and no dispatcher pin. A public URL that 302s to an internal/metadata address passes the guard and is followed with no re-validation; DNS rebinding also works. The avatar branch passes avatar.model_url to loadModel with no SSRF check at all. Error message `could not read that model: ${err.message}` is returned to the caller. Verifier assessment: /api/tty validates the URL once then fetches with default fetch and redirect follow, so a public URL redirecting to an internal address or a rebinding host reaches internal targets. Mostly blind: the body must parse as GLB, but the error text leaks status. Non-binding priority hint: medium. Suggested fix: Pass the pinned per-hop fetcher with redirect manual to loadModel for both src and avatar.model_url branches; return a generic error.++Claimed root cause: tty.js uses assertSafePublicUrl as a one-shot pre-check and then delegates the fetch to loadModel with default global fetch and redirect:'follow', instead of the repo's pinned per-hop fetcher (fetchModel / fetchSafePublicUrlPinned).++Trace:+- entrypoint: api/tty.js:111+- propagation: api/tty.js:85+- propagation: api/_lib/ssrf-guard.js:111+- propagation: api/tty.js:144+- sink: packages/tty-3d/src/index.js:30++Evidence:+- api/tty.js:85: Guard is a pre-check only.+- packages/tty-3d/src/index.js:30: redirect:'follow', global fetch, no pin.+- api/tty.js:95: avatar.model_url passed to loadModel with no SSRF validation.+- api/_lib/fetch-model.js:79: Contrast: sibling proxies use redirect:'manual' with per-hop resolvePublicHost and pinned dispatcher.++## Oracle follower subscriptions are unauthenticated and keyed by caller-supplied Telegram chat_id++Fingerprint: `business-logic-oracle-follow-unauthenticated-chat-subscription-tamper`++api/oracle/follow.js:14 documents no auth; POST (94,131) inserts oracle_followers, DELETE (139) removes, GET (158) lists, keyed by caller-supplied (agent_id, chat_id, network); only IP rate limits. Third party can unsubscribe victim chat, subscribe chats to platform bot messages (alerts.js:349 reads same table), enumerate follows. Verifier assessment: api/oracle/follow has no auth and keys subscriptions on caller-supplied chat_id, so anyone can unsubscribe or subscribe arbitrary chats. GET is a single-pair check, not a list. Content is public signals; delivery needs the chat to have started the bot. Non-binding priority hint: low. Suggested fix: Require proof of chat control, for example a signed /start deep-link nonce bound to chat_id and agent_id, on POST and DELETE.++Claimed root cause: chat_id used as identity with no proof of chat control.++Trace:+- entrypoint: api/oracle/follow.js:14+- propagation: api/oracle/follow.js:59+- propagation: api/oracle/follow.js:94+- propagation: api/oracle/follow.js:131+- sink: api/_lib/oracle/alerts.js:349++Evidence:+- api/oracle/follow.js:158: anonymous list+- api/_lib/oracle/alerts.js:349: dispatch reads same table++## Oracle test-alert sends unescaped owner-controlled HTML to an arbitrary chat from the platform bot++Fingerprint: `business-logic-oracle-test-alert-arbitrary-chat-html-injection`++api/oracle/test-alert.js: chat_id format-validated only (22); ownership of agent only not destination (49); agentName from owner agent record (60) interpolated unescaped (61) in parse_mode HTML message (80). Low confidence: auth exists, Telegram delivers only to chats that started the bot. Verifier assessment: test-alert lets any signed-in user send a bot message with raw agent.name in HTML parse mode to any chat_id. Telegram's tag subset limits it to links and formatting; needs a chat that started the bot. Non-binding priority hint: low. Suggested fix: HTML-escape agentName; bind chat_id to a chat the caller verified.++Claimed root cause: Unescaped interpolation and unrestricted destination.++Trace:+- entrypoint: api/oracle/test-alert.js:22+- propagation: api/oracle/test-alert.js:47+- propagation: api/oracle/test-alert.js:50+- propagation: api/oracle/test-alert.js:64+- sink: api/oracle/test-alert.js:80++Evidence:+- api/oracle/test-alert.js:61: agentName unescaped+- api/oracle/test-alert.js:80: parse_mode HTML++## Vault deposit can mint zero shares after an outside donation inflates NAV++Fingerprint: `business-logic-vault-deposit-zero-share-mint-donation-inflation`++depositToVault (vault-transfer.js:99 transfers USDC first, 114 navBefore, 115 minted=sharesForDeposit with no minted>0 guard). vault-accounting.js:122 par only when shares or navBefore zero else floor(deposit*shares/navBefore). vault-wallet.js:101,124 NAV includes live on-chain USDC of public vault_address (donation-manipulable). deposit.js:44 only checks real-funds agreement; no minimum. First depositor with tiny shares donates to inflate; later smaller deposit mints 0, funds kept by existing holders. Verifier assessment: Vault deposits mint floor(deposit*shares/NAV) with NAV read from the on-chain balance, no minted>0 check, no virtual shares, no min_shares. A first-depositor donation can make a later deposit mint zero shares. Non-binding priority hint: medium. Suggested fix: Reject minted<=0 and refund; add min_shares_out; seed dead or virtual shares; require a minimum first deposit; track accounted balance.++Claimed root cause: Share pricing from donation-manipulable live balance with no zero-mint guard or virtual shares.++Trace:+- entrypoint: api/vaults/deposit.js:44+- propagation: api/vaults/deposit.js:52+- propagation: api/_lib/vault-transfer.js:99+- propagation: api/_lib/vault-transfer.js:115+- propagation: api/_lib/vault-accounting.js:122+- sink: api/_lib/vault-wallet.js:101++Evidence:+- api/_lib/vault-transfer.js:115: no positive-share guard+- api/_lib/vault-accounting.js:122: floor division+- api/_lib/vault-wallet.js:124: NAV from on-chain balance++## Anonymous chat proxy forwards full request body to OpenRouter on platform key; extra fields can reach non-free models/paid features++Fingerprint: `chat-proxy-openrouter-body-passthrough-bypasses-free-model-gate`++POST /api/chat/proxy unauthenticated, per-IP limit only. isFreeModelId (openrouter-free.js:46) checks only body.model ends ':free' (proxy.js:84). proxy.js:128 sends JSON.stringify({...body, model: activeModel}) with platform Bearer key, passing 'models' fallback, 'plugins', 'provider', large max_tokens. Billing effect unobserved. Verifier assessment: /api/chat/proxy gates only on a :free model suffix and then spreads the whole client body upstream with the platform key, so models, plugins, provider and max_tokens pass through. Billing effect depends on OpenRouter behavior. Non-binding priority hint: medium. Suggested fix: Build the upstream payload from an explicit allowlist; clamp max_tokens; cap message size.++Claimed root cause: Allowlist on one field but upstream payload built by spreading untrusted body.++Trace:+- entrypoint: api/chat/proxy.js:65+- propagation: api/chat/proxy.js:84+- propagation: api/_lib/openrouter-free.js:46+- sink: api/chat/proxy.js:128++Evidence:+- api/chat/proxy.js:84: only :free suffix check+- api/chat/proxy.js:128: whole body spread, only model overridden+- api/_lib/openrouter-free.js:46: pure string suffix test++## Go chat tool server exposes shell, file write and arbitrary file read with no auth by default, all interfaces, wildcard CORS++Fingerprint: `chat-server-tool-server-unauthenticated-shell-default`++chat/server/main.go: Addr :8081 (53), CORS origin * headers * (33), authMiddleware only when *password != "" (112) default empty (25). POST /tool InvokeTool (148) runs Shell via mvdan interp (toolfns/shell.go:214, real processes) and Edit (toolfns.go:112 arbitrary file write); GET /read_file reads any path (files.go:83). Web page in browser can hit localhost:8081; LAN host directly. Password compare is raw string 'Basic '+password, not constant-time. Request body (tool args) tee'd to stdout. Verifier assessment: The Go chat tool server defaults to no password, wildcard CORS and a listen address on all interfaces, and exposes shell, edit and file read. Any web page or LAN host could reach it if run with defaults. Non-binding priority hint: high. Suggested fix: Bind 127.0.0.1 by default; refuse to start without a password or generate a token; constant-time compare; restrict CORS; confine read_file and Edit; stop logging bodies.++Claimed root cause: Fail-open auth, non-loopback bind, wildcard CORS in front of OS command and file write surface.++Trace:+- entrypoint: chat/server/main.go:33+- propagation: chat/server/main.go:53+- propagation: chat/server/main.go:112+- propagation: chat/server/main.go:148+- propagation: chat/server/toolfns/shell.go:214+- sink: chat/server/files.go:83++Evidence:+- chat/server/main.go:25: password default empty+- chat/server/main.go:53: :8081 all interfaces+- chat/server/files.go:83: ReadFile no confinement+- chat/server/toolfns/toolfns.go:112: Edit arbitrary write++## Published agent's third-party persona/skills share a prompt with a signed-in visitor's home tools, executed under visitor authority++Fingerprint: `chat-third-party-persona-drives-visitor-home-tools`++POST /api/chat loads any published agent persona (chat.js:545,641), custom skills (688), public memories; offers home tools whenever caller has a home membership (706); model-emitted home calls run via runHomeRound/runHomeTool with visitor userId (1130,1346). Confirmation gate covers only unlock/open/disarm-class services (home/tools.js:528); other write services (lock, close, arm, scenes) execute immediately. sendSol gate applies only to gated imported skills. Verifier assessment: A published agent's persona and skills run for any visitor, and home tools are added for visitors with a home membership, so a malicious owner could try to prompt-inject unrequested home actions. Depends on model compliance and which services the classifier guards. Non-binding priority hint: medium. Suggested fix: Withhold home tools or require confirmation for every write when the agent owner differs from the caller and carries a persona or custom skills; mark persona content untrusted.++Claimed root cause: Visitor authority and untrusted third-party prompt content combined in one turn; no check that a home write was requested in the visitor message or withholding of tools for non-owned persona.++Trace:+- entrypoint: api/chat.js:545+- propagation: api/chat.js:641+- propagation: api/chat.js:688+- propagation: api/chat.js:706+- propagation: api/chat.js:1130+- propagation: api/chat.js:1346+- sink: api/_lib/home/tools.js:528++Evidence:+- api/chat.js:545: any published agent loadable+- api/chat.js:706: tool set depends only on homeCount+- api/chat.js:1346: runs with visitor identity+- api/_lib/home/tools.js:528: confirmation gate only guarded classes++## createAgent authority gate is vacuous, letting the first caller squat any agentToken++Fingerprint: `contracts-agentpayments-createagent-caller-chosen-authority-token-squat`++contracts/src/AgentPayments.sol:136-140 requires msg.sender to be owner or the caller-supplied agentAuthority, so a caller satisfies it by naming themself. First caller squats any agentToken; AgentExists blocks the real owner; acceptPayment (152) and withdraw (306) pay the squatter. Verifier assessment: createAgent accepts msg.sender == the caller-supplied agentAuthority, so any address can register any agentToken and block the real owner with AgentExists; payments then settle to the squatter. Non-binding priority hint: high. Suggested fix: Bind registration to proof of token control (owner-signed EIP-712, token owner check, or owner-only), and add an owner reassign or remove function.++Claimed root cause: Authority is taken from caller input rather than proven.++Trace:+- entrypoint: contracts/src/AgentPayments.sol:136+- propagation: contracts/src/AgentPayments.sol:139+- propagation: contracts/src/AgentPayments.sol:142+- propagation: contracts/src/AgentPayments.sol:152+- sink: contracts/src/AgentPayments.sol:306++Evidence:+- contracts/src/AgentPayments.sol:136: msg.sender == agentAuthority accepted++## Portfolio creator can propose unbounded rebalance targets and drain via open fillRebalance++Fingerprint: `contracts-hood-portfolios-rebalance-targets-unbounded-creator-drain`++Portfolio.sol:440 proposeRebalance checks only targetUnits length. Constructor (198) sets no floor on rebalanceDelay/rebalanceInterval and PortfolioFactory.sol:49 forwards creator Config. quoteFill (312) prices from creator targets and fillRebalance (473) is open to any caller, so a creator-controlled fill can extract value. Verifier assessment: Portfolio proposeRebalance bounds only the targets length and the constructor sets no minimum delay or interval, so a creator can skew targets and let fillRebalance trade at off-market prices. Depositors can redeem during a nonzero delay. Real path is contracts/hood-portfolios/src, not contracts/src/hood. Non-binding priority hint: medium. Suggested fix: Add minimum delay and interval; cap per-leg target change; add an oracle or NAV-loss limit in quoteFill.++Claimed root cause: No bounds on creator-set targets or timing parameters.++Trace:+- entrypoint: contracts/hood-portfolios/src/Portfolio.sol:440+- propagation: contracts/hood-portfolios/src/Portfolio.sol:447+- propagation: contracts/hood-portfolios/src/Portfolio.sol:198+- propagation: contracts/hood-portfolios/src/PortfolioFactory.sol:49+- propagation: contracts/hood-portfolios/src/Portfolio.sol:312+- sink: contracts/hood-portfolios/src/Portfolio.sol:473++Evidence:+- contracts/src/hood/Portfolio.sol:440: length-only check++## Strategy-run buys count as zero toward the agent daily SOL cap++Fingerprint: `custody-spend-policy-daily-cap-ignores-strategy-run-buys`++handleStrategyRun reaches pump-fun-trade handler which persists agent_actions pumpfun.buy with payload {mint, amountSol, sig}; agent-spend-policy.js:78 sums payload->>'solAmount', so strategy buys contribute zero to daily_sol_cap (default 5 SOL). Strategy path uses non-atomic checkBuyAllowed, not reserveSpend, and loadWallet without audit context, skipping assertPlatformSigningAllowed. Verifier assessment: Strategy buys persist payload key amountSol while the daily cap sums solAmount, so they count as zero toward daily_sol_cap. Only the per-tx cap applies. Principal is the agent owner or a spend-scoped key, so this bypasses the owner's cap rather than crossing tenants. The loadWallet audit-context point is not a separate bug. Non-binding priority hint: medium. Suggested fix: Write solAmount in the note or COALESCE(solAmount, amountSol) in the SUM; use atomic reserveSpend in the strategy path.++Claimed root cause: Cap sums a payload key the strategy path never writes.++Trace:+- entrypoint: api/pump/[action].js:3761+- propagation: api/pump/[action].js:3866+- propagation: examples/skills/pump-fun-trade/handlers.js:55+- propagation: api/_lib/skill-runtime.js:135+- sink: api/_lib/agent-spend-policy.js:78++Evidence:+- api/pump/[action].js:3869: checkBuyAllowed instead of reserveSpend+- api/_lib/solana-wallet.js:15: loadWallet without audit context++## Walk Avatar extension stores any token from a three.ws auth-callback URL (login CSRF / session fixation)++Fingerprint: `extensions-walk-avatar-auth-callback-token-injection-no-state-binding`++background.js tabs.onUpdated persists the token query/hash param of any top-level tab whose URL starts with https://three.ws/extension/auth-callback into chrome.storage.local.threews_session, then closes the tab. No state/nonce ties it to a sign-in the user started; no check the token belongs to the current user; callback page treats any ?token= as success. Attacker mints own extension token (POST /api/auth/extension-token) and navigates victim to /extension/auth-callback?token=<attacker token>; extension then holds attacker identity (scope avatars:read). For a victim signed out of three.ws, popup avatar lists and narrator /api/tts/speak run as attacker account. Impact limited: tts/speak.js prefers cookie session over bearer, avatars/mine.js likely too. Verifier assessment: The extension accepts any auth-callback URL token with no state binding and overwrites its stored session (login CSRF). Token has extension scope only; cookie session takes precedence in speak.js. Non-binding priority hint: low. Suggested fix: Add a per-sign-in nonce in chrome.storage.session and accept the token only with a matching state, or deliver the token via runtime messaging.++Claimed root cause: Auth-callback capture is trust-on-navigation: token accepted from URL with no binding to a locally initiated login.++Trace:+- entrypoint: extensions/walk-avatar/background.js:224+- propagation: extensions/walk-avatar/background.js:226+- propagation: extensions/walk-avatar/background.js:231+- propagation: extensions/walk-avatar/background.js:237+- propagation: api/tts/speak.js:67+- sink: api/auth/extension-token.js:76++Evidence:+- extensions/walk-avatar/background.js:226: prefix-only check, no state+- extensions/walk-avatar/background.js:237: unconditional overwrite+- public/extension-auth-callback.html:80: any non-empty token treated as success+- api/auth/extension-token.js:76: any account can mint a token+- api/tts/speak.js:67: cookie session takes precedence over bearer++## CAD Forge parent reads child-controlled artifact paths with symlink-following open++Fingerprint: `glb-media-cad-forge-collect-follows-child-symlink`++main._collect trusts child-written result.json 'files' list; checks name against ARTIFACT_KEYS and os.path.isfile then open(path,'rb') following symlinks. Workdir chowned to nobody; child can create symlinks (seccomp deny list lacks symlink/symlinkat). Symlink part.glb -> /proc/1/environ makes the root parent base64 it into the response; getsize on /proc reports 0 so 24MB cap does not bound it. Needs a child-side primitive (companion candidate). Verifier assessment: cad-forge _collect opens child-named files following symlinks, a conditional privilege gain only if submitted code can already create a symlink in the child. The policy exposes no such primitive on its own, so this is defense in depth. Non-binding priority hint: low. Suggested fix: Open with O_NOFOLLOW, fstat for a regular file, bounded read from the fd; add symlink, symlinkat, link and linkat to SECCOMP_DENY.++Claimed root cause: Privileged parent opens files from a child-controlled dir without lstat/O_NOFOLLOW/realpath confinement.++Trace:+- entrypoint: workers/cad-forge/main.py:311+- propagation: workers/cad-forge/sandbox_child.py:185+- propagation: workers/cad-forge/main.py:264+- propagation: workers/cad-forge/main.py:218+- sink: workers/cad-forge/main.py:228++Evidence:+- workers/cad-forge/main.py:97: workdir chowned to nobody+- workers/cad-forge/sandbox_child.py:49: SECCOMP_DENY lacks symlink/symlinkat+- workers/cad-forge/Dockerfile:22: comment: tests run as root like Cloud Run++## CAD Forge static policy does not block frame/code-object attributes (generator frame walk to real globals/builtins)++Fingerprint: `glb-media-cad-forge-policy-frame-attribute-escape`++workers/cad-forge/cad_policy.py check_source rejects only underscore-prefixed attributes plus format/format_map/vformat/mro. gi_frame, f_back, f_globals, f_builtins, f_locals, gi_code, cr_frame, tb_frame pass. `def g(): yield x.gi_frame.f_back.f_back.f_globals` could reach sandbox_child's globals (os, sys) and real builtins (open, eval, __import__). Program text comes from an LLM prompted by an arbitrary user of api/cad.js and MCP cad tool. If the walk works the AST/builtins layer is void; seccomp, nobody uid, rlimits remain. Verifier assessment: cad_policy blocks only underscore and a few attribute names, so generator and frame attributes such as gi_frame, f_back and f_globals pass and may reach the sandbox_child module globals (os, real builtins). Python behavior inferred; seccomp and uid drop remain. Non-binding priority hint: medium. Suggested fix: Switch to an attribute allowlist or deny gi_*, cr_*, ag_*, f_*, tb_* and co_*; reject Yield and GeneratorExp if unneeded; exec from a module whose frames reach nothing sensitive.++Claimed root cause: Attribute denylist is underscore-prefix based and omits non-underscore frame/generator/traceback introspection attributes.++Trace:+- entrypoint: workers/cad-forge/main.py:311+- propagation: workers/cad-forge/cad_policy.py:58+- propagation: workers/cad-forge/cad_policy.py:118+- propagation: workers/cad-forge/sandbox_child.py:172+- sink: workers/cad-forge/sandbox_child.py:185++Evidence:+- workers/cad-forge/cad_policy.py:58: BANNED_ATTRIBUTES only format,format_map,vformat,mro+- workers/cad-forge/cad_policy.py:130: underscore check only other control+- workers/cad-forge/cad_policy.py:60: safe builtins keep iter,next,super,isinstance; def/yield allowed ~141+- workers/cad-forge/sandbox_child.py:172: run_program frame f_globals is module namespace with os/sys at 22-31+diff --git a/docs/security/audit-2026-10-25/NEEDS-VALIDATION.md b/docs/security/audit-2026-10-25/NEEDS-VALIDATION.mdnew file mode 100644index 000000000..2dfcfd829--- /dev/null+++ b/docs/security/audit-2026-10-25/NEEDS-VALIDATION.md@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@+# Needs validation++Each item lists the exact blocker and the safe check that resolves it.++## Agent update accepts an avatar_id the caller does not own; public manifest emits its CDN URL++`agents-access-control-agent-update-unowned-avatar-id-public-manifest-body-uri`++Blockers:+- Attacker needs the victim's unguessable avatar UUID; no leak source confirmed.+- Whether /cdn/<key> or r2.dev serves private-visibility keys without auth (api/cdn-object.js suggests the bucket is public).+- Not executed.++Local check: Two dummy users: A PATCHes own agent with B's private avatar_id, then fetch the public manifest and registration unauthenticated and check for B's CDN URL; test whether the URL serves bytes without auth.++Deployment check: Owner checks whether private avatar keys are fetchable without auth and whether avatar UUIDs leak.++## Anonymous agent-ask visitors write working-tier memories injected into the owner's chat prompt++`ai-llm-agent-ask-anonymous-working-memory-poisoning`++Blockers:+- Model compliance with injected text unobserved.+- Production send-sol env (recipient lock, demo token, caps) and GUARDIAN_DISABLE unknown.+- Memories are not public by default, so only the owner chat is exposed.++Local check: POST anonymous /api/agent-ask with a marker instruction, then chat as owner and check the marker appears in recalled memory and the system prompt but not for a non-owner.++Deployment check: Owner checks prod send-sol env and counts anon-originated working rows on a test agent.++## agent-ask serves unpublished agents' private persona, system prompt and custom skills to anonymous callers++`ai-llm-agent-ask-unpublished-persona-skills-disclosure`++Blockers:+- Leak reliability against the model unproven.+- Needs an unpublished agent UUID; check whether any public surface leaks it.+- Product intent for agent-ask on unpublished agents unclear.++Local check: Dummy DB with unpublished agent holding marker strings; anonymous POST /api/agent-ask asking to repeat instructions; compare with /api/chat.++Deployment check: Owner tests own unpublished agent unauthenticated; checks public exposure of unpublished UUIDs.++## Sign-in completion endpoints issue a session without binding to the initiating browser (login CSRF)++`api-auth-login-csrf-unbound-signin-completion`++Blockers:+- Telegram and SAML may not be enabled in production.+- SAML InResponseTo handling untraced.+- Handoff GET is bearer by design for iOS; any fix must keep that flow.+- Attacker needs an account and a victim click.++Local check: Mint a handoff code as A, open the exchange GET in a session signed in as B and confirm the session switches to A; repeat Telegram callback without tgflow cookie and SAML with an unsolicited response.++Deployment check: Confirm Telegram/SAML enabled in prod; any edge origin check on handoff exchange.++## Unauthenticated /api/tty SSRF guard bypassed by redirect-following, unpinned fetch++`api-ssrf-tty-guard-bypass-redirect-follow-unpinned-fetch`++Blockers:+- Redirect following and rebinding not exercised.+- Whether Cloud Run egress reaches useful internal services.+- GCP metadata needs a header this fetch cannot send.+- Response must be a valid GLB to render.++Local check: Two loopback fixtures, first 302s to second; with a test DNS allowance call resolveSource and loadModel and confirm the second is hit; add a regression test.++Deployment check: Staging: point ?src at owned public host redirecting to an internal canary; check canary log and Cloud Run egress reachability.++## Oracle follower subscriptions are unauthenticated and keyed by caller-supplied Telegram chat_id++`business-logic-oracle-follow-unauthenticated-chat-subscription-tamper`++Blockers:+- Telegram delivers only to chats that started the bot.+- Production rate-limit values unknown.+- Unauthenticated access is documented as intended.++Local check: Anonymous POST, GET, DELETE with a chat_id the caller does not control on a test DB and bot; confirm rows change and alertFollowers delivers.++Deployment check: Staging: anonymous POST/DELETE/GET with arbitrary chat_id.++## Oracle test-alert sends unescaped owner-controlled HTML to an arbitrary chat from the platform bot++`business-logic-oracle-test-alert-arbitrary-chat-html-injection`++Blockers:+- Agent-name write path may restrict characters (not traced).+- Delivery needs the target chat to have started the bot.+- oracleTelegramTestIp ceiling not checked.++Local check: With Telegram stubbed, create an agent named with an anchor tag, POST test-alert with another chat_id and inspect the sendMessage payload.++## Vault deposit can mint zero shares after an outside donation inflates NAV++`business-logic-vault-deposit-zero-share-mint-donation-inflation`++Blockers:+- Not executed.+- transferUsdcGuarded spend policy may impose a minimum amount.+- Vault creation gating not examined.+- No min_shares parameter makes loss silent.++Local check: Unit test sharesForDeposit(1n, 1_000_000_000n, 1n) returns 0n; then on devnet or mocks: deposit 1 atomic, donate USDC to vault_address, second deposit mints 0 shares.++Deployment check: Check transferUsdcGuarded and prod config for minimum deposit.++## Anonymous chat proxy forwards full request body to OpenRouter on platform key; extra fields can reach non-free models/paid features++`chat-proxy-openrouter-body-passthrough-bypasses-free-model-gate`++Blockers:+- OpenRouter handling of models/plugins/provider with a :free primary and whether the key is charged.+- Whether the key has paid credits.+- Actual chatIp limit values.++Local check: Stub fetch, POST a :free model with models, plugins and a large max_tokens, assert the upstream body contains them, then add an allowlist and assert they are dropped.++Deployment check: Owner reviews OpenRouter activity for non-:free generations/plugin charges on the proxy key; test with spend-capped staging key.++## Go chat tool server exposes shell, file write and arbitrary file read with no auth by default, all interfaces, wildcard CORS++`chat-server-tool-server-unauthenticated-shell-default`++Blockers:+- Launch mode of the shipped binary (password flag, firewall, loopback proxy) unknown.+- shell.go and toolfns.go sinks not independently re-read.++Local check: In an isolated VM run with no flags; send a preflight and POST /tool Shell id with a foreign Origin from another host; GET /read_file; repeat with -password set.++Deployment check: Check released docs/commands for omitted -password.++## Published agent's third-party persona/skills share a prompt with a signed-in visitor's home tools, executed under visitor authority++`chat-third-party-persona-drives-visitor-home-tools`++Blockers:+- Model compliance with the injected persona unobserved.+- Classifier guarded verdict per service not read.+- Role scoping may limit guest targets.++Local check: Stub the LLM to return a home tool call; owner A publishes an agent, visitor B has a home membership and mock bridge; confirm an unguarded service executes with B's userId and no confirmation; dump classifier verdicts.++Deployment check: Owner reviews home action logs for agent-actor actions in turns where visitor did not request them and agent not owned by visitor.++## createAgent authority gate is vacuous, letting the first caller squat any agentToken++`contracts-agentpayments-createagent-caller-chosen-authority-token-squat`++Blockers:+- Not executed.+- Deployment status and whether funds are held.+- Whether the platform owner pre-registers legitimate tokens.+- Whether an owner-side reassign or remove function exists (not checked).++Local check: Foundry test: attacker createAgent(token, attacker, 0); real creator call reverts AgentExists; payer acceptPayment; attacker withdraws.++Deployment check: Owner checks deployment and registered agents.++## Portfolio creator can propose unbounded rebalance targets and drain via open fillRebalance++`contracts-hood-portfolios-rebalance-targets-unbounded-creator-drain`++Blockers:+- Not executed.+- Deployed portfolios, delay values and third-party TVL unknown.+- Depositors may redeem during the timelock.+- Constituents are creator-chosen and visible before deposit.++Local check: Foundry test in contracts/hood-portfolios/test: zero delay, valuable and worthless constituents, targets [0, huge], fill by a colluder, assert depositor loss; repeat with a nonzero delay and redeem early.++Deployment check: Owner checks deployed portfolios and balances.++## Strategy-run buys count as zero toward the agent daily SOL cap++`custody-spend-policy-daily-cap-ignores-strategy-run-buys`++Blockers:+- Not executed.+- Whether strategy-run is deployed and reachable.+- Whether delegated or scoped keys are constrained by daily_sol_cap.++Local check: Run a mocked live strategy buy through makeRuntime, confirm payload has amountSol and no solAmount, then checkBuyAllowed with 4.9 SOL spent and expect a block.++Deployment check: Owner sums strategy-run buys per agent per day against daily_sol_cap.++## Walk Avatar extension stores any token from a three.ws auth-callback URL (login CSRF / session fixation)++`extensions-walk-avatar-auth-callback-token-injection-no-state-binding`++Blockers:+- Extension not loaded; storage overwrite unconfirmed.+- Whether APIs attribute to the bearer user when no cookie is present.+- Victim must be induced to navigate to the crafted URL.++Local check: In a throwaway Chrome profile load the extension, mint B's token, open the callback URL while signed out and confirm threews_session is overwritten; repeat while signed in as A.++Deployment check: Two test accounts; victim signed out; check attribution of /api/avatars/mine and /api/tts/speak and whether attacker can see text.++## CAD Forge parent reads child-controlled artifact paths with symlink-following open++`glb-media-cad-forge-collect-follows-child-symlink`++Blockers:+- Needs a companion policy-escape or native primitive in the child.+- Whether production runs as uid 0 and what /proc/1/environ holds.+- Whether getsize on /proc files bypasses the cap.++Local check: As root in the built image run main.run_build with a test-double child that writes part.glb as a symlink to a root-only dummy file; expect _collect to return its bytes.++Deployment check: Owner: confirm container uid 0 and /proc/1/environ contents.++## CAD Forge static policy does not block frame/code-object attributes (generator frame walk to real globals/builtins)++`glb-media-cad-forge-policy-frame-attribute-escape`++Blockers:+- Code not executed; the frame chain on the deployed Python version is inferred.+- Whether the program text can be steered by the user or is only LLM-generated.+- Seccomp, uid drop and rlimit effectiveness under Cloud Run.+- Whether secrets are readable by the sandbox uid.++Local check: Feed sandbox_child.py via test_sandbox.py a generator-based program that reads f_back.f_back.f_globals['os'] and f_builtins['open']; expect a policy refusal; if it runs, add a test to test_cad_policy.py.++Deployment check: Owner: confirm /health seccomp_required true, root->nobody drop, canary build refused.+diff --git a/docs/security/audit-2026-10-25/REPORT.md b/docs/security/audit-2026-10-25/REPORT.mdnew file mode 100644index 000000000..c65364182--- /dev/null+++ b/docs/security/audit-2026-10-25/REPORT.md@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@+# Security audit report: three.ws (run-1)++**Candidate validation is incomplete.** The 50-agent budget ran out after 17 of 32 candidates were independently re-checked. These 15 fingerprints were reported by hunters but never independently verified. They are kept out of findings.json and listed in their ledger units as unresolved:++- home-call-gate-first-entity-only-bypass+- home-call-scope-ignores-area-device-targets+- mcp-automation-spend-confirm-unbound-write-tier+- mcp-bridge-url-guard-dns-rebinding-toctou+- mcp-domain-register-contact-not-bound-to-quote+- mcp-persona-spend-session-cap-keyed-by-caller-session-id+- multiplayer-studio-room-owner-id-client-asserted-and-broadcast+- rate-limit-client-ip-xff-spoof-direct-cloud-run+- skill-import-github-server-token-private-readme-disclosure+- upload-presign-anon-declared-size-not-enforced-public-bucket+- upload-presign-content-type-prototype-lookup-bypass-siblings+- webhooks-delivery-claim-before-apply-no-release-shopify-shop-redact+- webhooks-discord-activity-session-unbound-room-and-token-audience+- x402-modal-merchant-402-challenge-fields-unescaped-innerhtml+- x402-pay-execute-budget-rollback-on-402-after-signed-transfer-handed-to-host++## Scope and method+- Profile: quick (one hunter wave of 26 coarse units, one final coverage critic). This is a partial pass. It does not say the rest of the repo is safe.+- Source-only. No OS sandbox was available, so no target code was run and nothing was probed on the network. Because of that, no finding is `confirmed` and none has a severity. The 17 records are `needs_validation`.+- Agents spent: 50 of 50 (6 recon, 26 hunters, 1 critic, 17 verifiers).+- No prior runs exist for this repo.+- Deviation: hunters read the skill files by path instead of receiving the blocks pasted into their prompts.+- Hunter results for covered units did not record per-file review lists, so a covered unit's reviewed paths are its assigned starting paths plus any traced files. Treat "covered" as "sampled by one hunter", not "audited".+- Source ref: see run-metadata.json.++## Coverage counts+{'deferred': 47, 'candidate': 20, 'covered': 1} units in coverage-ledger.json (68 total). Deferred units are hunter-reported gaps, 7 surfaces the critic found, and 5 covered units the critic reopened (h01, h03, h04, h15, h18). Under the quick profile they were not hunted.++## Critic-found surfaces not examined+AWS Marketplace linking and SNS events; inference node operators; agent commerce and A2A mandates; account and credential CRUD; plugin and LobeHub registry; paid upstream RPC/SDP/pinning proxies; teams runtime and social seed ingestion.++## Needs-validation records (17), highest verifier priority hint first+- [high] chat-server-tool-server-unauthenticated-shell-default: Go chat tool server exposes shell, file write and arbitrary file read with no auth by default, all interfaces, wildcard CORS+- [high] contracts-agentpayments-createagent-caller-chosen-authority-token-squat: createAgent authority gate is vacuous, letting the first caller squat any agentToken+- [medium] api-ssrf-tty-guard-bypass-redirect-follow-unpinned-fetch: Unauthenticated /api/tty SSRF guard bypassed by redirect-following, unpinned fetch+- [medium] business-logic-vault-deposit-zero-share-mint-donation-inflation: Vault deposit can mint zero shares after an outside donation inflates NAV+- [medium] chat-proxy-openrouter-body-passthrough-bypasses-free-model-gate: Anonymous chat proxy forwards full request body to OpenRouter on platform key; extra fields can reach non-free models/paid features+- [medium] chat-third-party-persona-drives-visitor-home-tools: Published agent's third-party persona/skills share a prompt with a signed-in visitor's home tools, executed under visitor authority+- [medium] contracts-hood-portfolios-rebalance-targets-unbounded-creator-drain: Portfolio creator can propose unbounded rebalance targets and drain via open fillRebalance+- [medium] custody-spend-policy-daily-cap-ignores-strategy-run-buys: Strategy-run buys count as zero toward the agent daily SOL cap+- [medium] glb-media-cad-forge-policy-frame-attribute-escape: CAD Forge static policy does not block frame/code-object attributes (generator frame walk to real globals/builtins)+- [low] agents-access-control-agent-update-unowned-avatar-id-public-manifest-body-uri: Agent update accepts an avatar_id the caller does not own; public manifest emits its CDN URL+- [low] ai-llm-agent-ask-anonymous-working-memory-poisoning: Anonymous agent-ask visitors write working-tier memories injected into the owner's chat prompt+- [low] ai-llm-agent-ask-unpublished-persona-skills-disclosure: agent-ask serves unpublished agents' private persona, system prompt and custom skills to anonymous callers+- [low] api-auth-login-csrf-unbound-signin-completion: Sign-in completion endpoints issue a session without binding to the initiating browser (login CSRF)+- [low] business-logic-oracle-follow-unauthenticated-chat-subscription-tamper: Oracle follower subscriptions are unauthenticated and keyed by caller-supplied Telegram chat_id+- [low] business-logic-oracle-test-alert-arbitrary-chat-html-injection: Oracle test-alert sends unescaped owner-controlled HTML to an arbitrary chat from the platform bot+- [low] extensions-walk-avatar-auth-callback-token-injection-no-state-binding: Walk Avatar extension stores any token from a three.ws auth-callback URL (login CSRF / session fixation)+- [low] glb-media-cad-forge-collect-follows-child-symlink: CAD Forge parent reads child-controlled artifact paths with symlink-following open++Priority hints are the verifiers' non-binding opinion, not severity.++## Hardening notes+Recorded per unit as hardening_notes in coverage-ledger.json. Examples: agent-wallet get-or-create is not atomic; createApprovalRequest does not compare payload hashes; ThreeWSFactory CREATE2 is permissionless; marketplace versions and analytics lack publish filters; global CSP allows unsafe-inline and unsafe-eval.++## Reading order+Start with chat chat/server shell default (high hint), AgentPayments createAgent squat (high hint), then the medium hints. Each record in NEEDS-VALIDATION.md has a local test plan.diff --git a/docs/security/audit-2026-10-25/findings.json b/docs/security/audit-2026-10-25/findings.jsonnew file mode 100644index 000000000..7a61c885f--- /dev/null+++ b/docs/security/audit-2026-10-25/findings.json@@ -0,0 +1,1255 @@+[+ {+ "verdict": "needs_validation",+ "fingerprint": "agents-access-control-agent-update-unowned-avatar-id-public-manifest-body-uri",+ "title": "Agent update accepts an avatar_id the caller does not own; public manifest emits its CDN URL",+ "description": "api/agents.js handleUpdate sets avatar_id = COALESCE(body.avatar_id, avatar_id) with no avatars.owner_id check (handleCreate checks at 308-312). Unauthenticated manifest/registration in api/agents/_id/_sub.js join the avatar and call resolveAvatarUrl with visibility hardcoded 'public', emitting the private avatar CDN URL in body.uri and registration. Verifier assessment: Source path holds: handleUpdate writes avatar_id with no owner check; public manifest/registration emit the CDN URL. Attacker needs the victim's random avatar UUID and the CDN may already be public. Non-binding priority hint: low. Suggested fix: Validate UUID and require avatars.owner_id = caller in handleUpdate as handleCreate does; in public manifest/registration only emit URLs for public or unlisted avatars owned by the agent owner.",+ "claimed_root_cause": "Missing ownership check on update; public resolver forces public visibility.",+ "trace": [+ {+ "kind": "entrypoint",+ "file": "api/agents.js",+ "line": 447,+ "scope": "agents.js:447",+ "description": "entrypoint step in agents.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "api/agents.js",+ "line": 533,+ "scope": "agents.js:533",+ "description": "propagation step in agents.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "api/agents/_id/_sub.js",+ "line": 378,+ "scope": "_sub.js:378",+ "description": "propagation step in _sub.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "api/_lib/avatars.js",+ "line": 545,+ "scope": "avatars.js:545",+ "description": "propagation step in avatars.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "api/_lib/r2.js",+ "line": 439,+ "scope": "r2.js:439",+ "description": "propagation step in r2.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "sink",+ "file": "api/agents/_id/_sub.js",+ "line": 441,+ "scope": "_sub.js:441",+ "description": "sink step in _sub.js"+ }+ ],+ "evidence": [+ {+ "file": "api/agents.js",+ "line": 308,+ "description": "create path checks avatar ownership"+ },+ {+ "file": "api/agents/_id/_sub.js",+ "line": 401,+ "description": "visibility hardcoded public"+ },+ {+ "file": "api/agents/_id/_sub.js",+ "line": 515,+ "description": "registration emits URL"+ }+ ],+ "blockers": [+ "Attacker needs the victim's unguessable avatar UUID; no leak source confirmed.",+ "Whether /cdn/<key> or r2.dev serves private-visibility keys without auth (api/cdn-object.js suggests the bucket is public).",+ "Not executed."+ ],+ "validation_plan": {+ "local": "Two dummy users: A PATCHes own agent with B's private avatar_id, then fetch the public manifest and registration unauthenticated and check for B's CDN URL; test whether the URL serves bytes without auth.",+ "deployment": "Owner checks whether private avatar keys are fetchable without auth and whether avatar UUIDs leak."+ }+ },+ {+ "verdict": "needs_validation",+ "fingerprint": "ai-llm-agent-ask-anonymous-working-memory-poisoning",+ "title": "Anonymous agent-ask visitors write working-tier memories injected into the owner's chat prompt",+ "description": "agent-ask saveTurn (agent-ask.js:191, called 311) stores visitor question (<=1000 chars) and answer as agent_memories tier 'working', salience 0.2, 2h TTL. memory-store.js:481 computeContext selects all non-expired pinned or working rows; chat.js:2120 recallForChat merges them; chat.js:2198 appends '- (type) snippet' (160 char) to system prompt with no untrusted fence. Chat tools include sendSol (chat.js:402); Guardian inspects only user message. Funds impact depends on api/agent/send-sol.js:83 AVATAR_LOCK_RECIPIENT/AVATAR_DEMO_TOKEN config. Verifier assessment: Anonymous agent-ask writes visitor text to the working memory tier, which reaches the owner's chat system prompt unfenced. Rows default to non-public, sendSol is capped and guarded, so impact is bounded to the owner's own chat. Non-binding priority hint: low. Suggested fix: Do not write anonymous turns to the working tier; fence recalled snippets as untrusted data; require the user message to authorize sendSol.",+ "claimed_root_cause": "Public unauthenticated write path stores attacker text in a tier the owner chat trusts; recall unfenced.",+ "trace": [+ {+ "kind": "entrypoint",+ "file": "api/agent-ask.js",+ "line": 248,+ "scope": "agent-ask.js:248",+ "description": "entrypoint step in agent-ask.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "api/agent-ask.js",+ "line": 311,+ "scope": "agent-ask.js:311",+ "description": "propagation step in agent-ask.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "api/agent-ask.js",+ "line": 191,+ "scope": "agent-ask.js:191",+ "description": "propagation step in agent-ask.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "api/_lib/memory-store.js",+ "line": 481,+ "scope": "memory-store.js:481",+ "description": "propagation step in memory-store.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "api/chat.js",+ "line": 2120,+ "scope": "chat.js:2120",+ "description": "propagation step in chat.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "sink",+ "file": "api/chat.js",+ "line": 2198,+ "scope": "chat.js:2198",+ "description": "sink step in chat.js"+ }+ ],+ "evidence": [+ {+ "file": "api/agent-ask.js",+ "line": 16,+ "description": "comment claims lowest tier avoids polluting"+ },+ {+ "file": "api/_lib/memory-store.js",+ "line": 473,+ "description": "working = in-context-now set"+ },+ {+ "file": "api/chat.js",+ "line": 402,+ "description": "sendSol tool offered"+ },+ {+ "file": "api/agent/send-sol.js",+ "line": 83,+ "description": "recipient lock depends on env"+ }+ ],+ "blockers": [+ "Model compliance with injected text unobserved.",+ "Production send-sol env (recipient lock, demo token, caps) and GUARDIAN_DISABLE unknown.",+ "Memories are not public by default, so only the owner chat is exposed."+ ],+ "validation_plan": {+ "local": "POST anonymous /api/agent-ask with a marker instruction, then chat as owner and check the marker appears in recalled memory and the system prompt but not for a non-owner.",+ "deployment": "Owner checks prod send-sol env and counts anon-originated working rows on a test agent."+ }+ },+ {+ "verdict": "needs_validation",+ "fingerprint": "ai-llm-agent-ask-unpublished-persona-skills-disclosure",+ "title": "agent-ask serves unpublished agents' private persona, system prompt and custom skills to anonymous callers",+ "description": "POST /api/agent-ask (agent-ask.js:248) selects agent by id and deleted_at only (261), loads agentSkillsForPrompt (289), builds system prompt with persona/system_prompt and skills (70, 290) for anonymous asker. api/chat.js:546 requires is_published OR owner; chat.js:632 says persona prompts are private IP; 685 skills only when agentVisible. Anonymous caller knowing an unpublished agent UUID can have the model reveal persona/skills. Prompt instruction not to reveal is not deterministic. Verifier assessment: agent-ask looks up agents without an is_published/owner filter and injects persona and skills into the prompt; chat.js gates the same data. Needs an unpublished agent UUID. Non-binding priority hint: low. Suggested fix: Add AND (is_published = true OR user_id = caller) to the lookup at agent-ask.js:261 and load skills only for visible agents.",+ "claimed_root_cause": "Missing visibility predicate on sibling path.",+ "trace": [+ {+ "kind": "entrypoint",+ "file": "api/agent-ask.js",+ "line": 248,+ "scope": "agent-ask.js:248",+ "description": "entrypoint step in agent-ask.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "api/agent-ask.js",+ "line": 261,+ "scope": "agent-ask.js:261",+ "description": "propagation step in agent-ask.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "api/agent-ask.js",+ "line": 289,+ "scope": "agent-ask.js:289",+ "description": "propagation step in agent-ask.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "sink",+ "file": "api/agent-ask.js",+ "line": 290,+ "scope": "agent-ask.js:290",+ "description": "sink step in agent-ask.js"+ }+ ],+ "evidence": [+ {+ "file": "api/chat.js",+ "line": 546,+ "description": "sibling control"+ },+ {+ "file": "api/chat.js",+ "line": 632,+ "description": "comment: private IP"+ },+ {+ "file": "api/chat.js",+ "line": 685,+ "description": "skills gated by agentVisible"+ },+ {+ "file": "api/agent-ask.js",+ "line": 70,+ "description": "persona and skills inserted verbatim"+ }+ ],+ "blockers": [+ "Leak reliability against the model unproven.",+ "Needs an unpublished agent UUID; check whether any public surface leaks it.",+ "Product intent for agent-ask on unpublished agents unclear."+ ],+ "validation_plan": {+ "local": "Dummy DB with unpublished agent holding marker strings; anonymous POST /api/agent-ask asking to repeat instructions; compare with /api/chat.",+ "deployment": "Owner tests own unpublished agent unauthenticated; checks public exposure of unpublished UUIDs."+ }+ },+ {+ "verdict": "needs_validation",+ "fingerprint": "api-auth-login-csrf-unbound-signin-completion",+ "title": "Sign-in completion endpoints issue a session without binding to the initiating browser (login CSRF)",+ "description": "Handoff exchange GET (api/auth/handoff.js:98,131-132) redeems bearer code, destroySession then createSession for code owner, no origin/cookie binding (mint side line 69 requires isSameSiteOrigin). Telegram widget callback (telegram/[action].js:119 default {i:'login'} when flow cookie absent; signIn 70,180) creates session for payload identity. SAML ACS (saml/[action].js:72,119-120) accepts unsolicited POST. Attacker with own code/payload/assertion makes victim browser sign in as attacker; victim data saved under attacker account. privy/verify.js:40 enforces isSameSiteOrigin as comparable control. Session cookie SameSite=Lax (auth.js:144) so top-level GET carries/sets. Verifier assessment: Handoff exchange GET, Telegram callback without a flow cookie, and SAML ACS complete sign-in with no browser binding, so a victim can be signed in as the attacker (login CSRF). No account takeover; needs victim interaction. Non-binding priority hint: low. Suggested fix: Require the signed flow cookie on Telegram, enforce InResponseTo and bind RelayState for SAML, and add a confirm step or Sec-Fetch-Site check before the handoff replaces a session.",+ "claimed_root_cause": "Completion handlers set session cookie with no per-flow browser binding.",+ "trace": [+ {+ "kind": "entrypoint",+ "file": "api/auth/handoff.js",+ "line": 98,+ "scope": "handoff.js:98",+ "description": "entrypoint step in handoff.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "api/auth/handoff.js",+ "line": 131,+ "scope": "handoff.js:131",+ "description": "propagation step in handoff.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "api/auth/telegram/[action].js",+ "line": 119,+ "scope": "[action].js:119",+ "description": "propagation step in [action].js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "api/auth/telegram/[action].js",+ "line": 180,+ "scope": "[action].js:180",+ "description": "propagation step in [action].js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "api/auth/saml/[action].js",+ "line": 72,+ "scope": "[action].js:72",+ "description": "propagation step in [action].js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "sink",+ "file": "api/auth/saml/[action].js",+ "line": 120,+ "scope": "[action].js:120",+ "description": "sink step in [action].js"+ }+ ],+ "evidence": [+ {+ "file": "api/auth/handoff.js",+ "line": 69,+ "description": "mint side has same-site check"+ },+ {+ "file": "api/auth/privy/verify.js",+ "line": 40,+ "description": "comparable endpoint enforces guard"+ },+ {+ "file": "api/auth/telegram/[action].js",+ "line": 107,+ "description": "flow cookie exists but absence tolerated at 119"+ },+ {+ "file": "api/_lib/auth.js",+ "line": 144,+ "description": "SameSite=Lax"+ }+ ],+ "blockers": [+ "Telegram and SAML may not be enabled in production.",+ "SAML InResponseTo handling untraced.",+ "Handoff GET is bearer by design for iOS; any fix must keep that flow.",+ "Attacker needs an account and a victim click."+ ],+ "validation_plan": {+ "local": "Mint a handoff code as A, open the exchange GET in a session signed in as B and confirm the session switches to A; repeat Telegram callback without tgflow cookie and SAML with an unsolicited response.",+ "deployment": "Confirm Telegram/SAML enabled in prod; any edge origin check on handoff exchange."+ }+ },+ {+ "verdict": "needs_validation",+ "fingerprint": "api-ssrf-tty-guard-bypass-redirect-follow-unpinned-fetch",+ "title": "Unauthenticated /api/tty SSRF guard bypassed by redirect-following, unpinned fetch",+ "description": "GET /api/tty?src=<url> is unauthenticated and only IP-rate-limited. It validates src once with assertSafePublicUrl (DNS check only), then passes the URL string to packages/tty-3d loadModel, which calls global fetch with redirect:'follow' and no dispatcher pin. A public URL that 302s to an internal/metadata address passes the guard and is followed with no re-validation; DNS rebinding also works. The avatar branch passes avatar.model_url to loadModel with no SSRF check at all. Error message `could not read that model: ${err.message}` is returned to the caller. Verifier assessment: /api/tty validates the URL once then fetches with default fetch and redirect follow, so a public URL redirecting to an internal address or a rebinding host reaches internal targets. Mostly blind: the body must parse as GLB, but the error text leaks status. Non-binding priority hint: medium. Suggested fix: Pass the pinned per-hop fetcher with redirect manual to loadModel for both src and avatar.model_url branches; return a generic error.",+ "claimed_root_cause": "tty.js uses assertSafePublicUrl as a one-shot pre-check and then delegates the fetch to loadModel with default global fetch and redirect:'follow', instead of the repo's pinned per-hop fetcher (fetchModel / fetchSafePublicUrlPinned).",+ "trace": [+ {+ "kind": "entrypoint",+ "file": "api/tty.js",+ "line": 111,+ "scope": "tty.js:111",+ "description": "entrypoint step in tty.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "api/tty.js",+ "line": 85,+ "scope": "tty.js:85",+ "description": "propagation step in tty.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "api/_lib/ssrf-guard.js",+ "line": 111,+ "scope": "ssrf-guard.js:111",+ "description": "propagation step in ssrf-guard.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "api/tty.js",+ "line": 144,+ "scope": "tty.js:144",+ "description": "propagation step in tty.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "sink",+ "file": "packages/tty-3d/src/index.js",+ "line": 30,+ "scope": "index.js:30",+ "description": "sink step in index.js"+ }+ ],+ "evidence": [+ {+ "file": "api/tty.js",+ "line": 85,+ "description": "Guard is a pre-check only."+ },+ {+ "file": "packages/tty-3d/src/index.js",+ "line": 30,+ "description": "redirect:'follow', global fetch, no pin."+ },+ {+ "file": "api/tty.js",+ "line": 95,+ "description": "avatar.model_url passed to loadModel with no SSRF validation."+ },+ {+ "file": "api/_lib/fetch-model.js",+ "line": 79,+ "description": "Contrast: sibling proxies use redirect:'manual' with per-hop resolvePublicHost and pinned dispatcher."+ }+ ],+ "blockers": [+ "Redirect following and rebinding not exercised.",+ "Whether Cloud Run egress reaches useful internal services.",+ "GCP metadata needs a header this fetch cannot send.",+ "Response must be a valid GLB to render."+ ],+ "validation_plan": {+ "local": "Two loopback fixtures, first 302s to second; with a test DNS allowance call resolveSource and loadModel and confirm the second is hit; add a regression test.",+ "deployment": "Staging: point ?src at owned public host redirecting to an internal canary; check canary log and Cloud Run egress reachability."+ }+ },+ {+ "verdict": "needs_validation",+ "fingerprint": "business-logic-oracle-follow-unauthenticated-chat-subscription-tamper",+ "title": "Oracle follower subscriptions are unauthenticated and keyed by caller-supplied Telegram chat_id",+ "description": "api/oracle/follow.js:14 documents no auth; POST (94,131) inserts oracle_followers, DELETE (139) removes, GET (158) lists, keyed by caller-supplied (agent_id, chat_id, network); only IP rate limits. Third party can unsubscribe victim chat, subscribe chats to platform bot messages (alerts.js:349 reads same table), enumerate follows. Verifier assessment: api/oracle/follow has no auth and keys subscriptions on caller-supplied chat_id, so anyone can unsubscribe or subscribe arbitrary chats. GET is a single-pair check, not a list. Content is public signals; delivery needs the chat to have started the bot. Non-binding priority hint: low. Suggested fix: Require proof of chat control, for example a signed /start deep-link nonce bound to chat_id and agent_id, on POST and DELETE.",+ "claimed_root_cause": "chat_id used as identity with no proof of chat control.",+ "trace": [+ {+ "kind": "entrypoint",+ "file": "api/oracle/follow.js",+ "line": 14,+ "scope": "follow.js:14",+ "description": "entrypoint step in follow.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "api/oracle/follow.js",+ "line": 59,+ "scope": "follow.js:59",+ "description": "propagation step in follow.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "api/oracle/follow.js",+ "line": 94,+ "scope": "follow.js:94",+ "description": "propagation step in follow.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "api/oracle/follow.js",+ "line": 131,+ "scope": "follow.js:131",+ "description": "propagation step in follow.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "sink",+ "file": "api/_lib/oracle/alerts.js",+ "line": 349,+ "scope": "alerts.js:349",+ "description": "sink step in alerts.js"+ }+ ],+ "evidence": [+ {+ "file": "api/oracle/follow.js",+ "line": 158,+ "description": "anonymous list"+ },+ {+ "file": "api/_lib/oracle/alerts.js",+ "line": 349,+ "description": "dispatch reads same table"+ }+ ],+ "blockers": [+ "Telegram delivers only to chats that started the bot.",+ "Production rate-limit values unknown.",+ "Unauthenticated access is documented as intended."+ ],+ "validation_plan": {+ "local": "Anonymous POST, GET, DELETE with a chat_id the caller does not control on a test DB and bot; confirm rows change and alertFollowers delivers.",+ "deployment": "Staging: anonymous POST/DELETE/GET with arbitrary chat_id."+ }+ },+ {+ "verdict": "needs_validation",+ "fingerprint": "business-logic-oracle-test-alert-arbitrary-chat-html-injection",+ "title": "Oracle test-alert sends unescaped owner-controlled HTML to an arbitrary chat from the platform bot",+ "description": "api/oracle/test-alert.js: chat_id format-validated only (22); ownership of agent only not destination (49); agentName from owner agent record (60) interpolated unescaped (61) in parse_mode HTML message (80). Low confidence: auth exists, Telegram delivers only to chats that started the bot. Verifier assessment: test-alert lets any signed-in user send a bot message with raw agent.name in HTML parse mode to any chat_id. Telegram's tag subset limits it to links and formatting; needs a chat that started the bot. Non-binding priority hint: low. Suggested fix: HTML-escape agentName; bind chat_id to a chat the caller verified.",+ "claimed_root_cause": "Unescaped interpolation and unrestricted destination.",+ "trace": [+ {+ "kind": "entrypoint",+ "file": "api/oracle/test-alert.js",+ "line": 22,+ "scope": "test-alert.js:22",+ "description": "entrypoint step in test-alert.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "api/oracle/test-alert.js",+ "line": 47,+ "scope": "test-alert.js:47",+ "description": "propagation step in test-alert.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "api/oracle/test-alert.js",+ "line": 50,+ "scope": "test-alert.js:50",+ "description": "propagation step in test-alert.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "api/oracle/test-alert.js",+ "line": 64,+ "scope": "test-alert.js:64",+ "description": "propagation step in test-alert.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "sink",+ "file": "api/oracle/test-alert.js",+ "line": 80,+ "scope": "test-alert.js:80",+ "description": "sink step in test-alert.js"+ }+ ],+ "evidence": [+ {+ "file": "api/oracle/test-alert.js",+ "line": 61,+ "description": "agentName unescaped"+ },+ {+ "file": "api/oracle/test-alert.js",+ "line": 80,+ "description": "parse_mode HTML"+ }+ ],+ "blockers": [+ "Agent-name write path may restrict characters (not traced).",+ "Delivery needs the target chat to have started the bot.",+ "oracleTelegramTestIp ceiling not checked."+ ],+ "validation_plan": {+ "local": "With Telegram stubbed, create an agent named with an anchor tag, POST test-alert with another chat_id and inspect the sendMessage payload."+ }+ },+ {+ "verdict": "needs_validation",+ "fingerprint": "business-logic-vault-deposit-zero-share-mint-donation-inflation",+ "title": "Vault deposit can mint zero shares after an outside donation inflates NAV",+ "description": "depositToVault (vault-transfer.js:99 transfers USDC first, 114 navBefore, 115 minted=sharesForDeposit with no minted>0 guard). vault-accounting.js:122 par only when shares or navBefore zero else floor(deposit*shares/navBefore). vault-wallet.js:101,124 NAV includes live on-chain USDC of public vault_address (donation-manipulable). deposit.js:44 only checks real-funds agreement; no minimum. First depositor with tiny shares donates to inflate; later smaller deposit mints 0, funds kept by existing holders. Verifier assessment: Vault deposits mint floor(deposit*shares/NAV) with NAV read from the on-chain balance, no minted>0 check, no virtual shares, no min_shares. A first-depositor donation can make a later deposit mint zero shares. Non-binding priority hint: medium. Suggested fix: Reject minted<=0 and refund; add min_shares_out; seed dead or virtual shares; require a minimum first deposit; track accounted balance.",+ "claimed_root_cause": "Share pricing from donation-manipulable live balance with no zero-mint guard or virtual shares.",+ "trace": [+ {+ "kind": "entrypoint",+ "file": "api/vaults/deposit.js",+ "line": 44,+ "scope": "deposit.js:44",+ "description": "entrypoint step in deposit.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "api/vaults/deposit.js",+ "line": 52,+ "scope": "deposit.js:52",+ "description": "propagation step in deposit.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "api/_lib/vault-transfer.js",+ "line": 99,+ "scope": "vault-transfer.js:99",+ "description": "propagation step in vault-transfer.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "api/_lib/vault-transfer.js",+ "line": 115,+ "scope": "vault-transfer.js:115",+ "description": "propagation step in vault-transfer.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "api/_lib/vault-accounting.js",+ "line": 122,+ "scope": "vault-accounting.js:122",+ "description": "propagation step in vault-accounting.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "sink",+ "file": "api/_lib/vault-wallet.js",+ "line": 101,+ "scope": "vault-wallet.js:101",+ "description": "sink step in vault-wallet.js"+ }+ ],+ "evidence": [+ {+ "file": "api/_lib/vault-transfer.js",+ "line": 115,+ "description": "no positive-share guard"+ },+ {+ "file": "api/_lib/vault-accounting.js",+ "line": 122,+ "description": "floor division"+ },+ {+ "file": "api/_lib/vault-wallet.js",+ "line": 124,+ "description": "NAV from on-chain balance"+ }+ ],+ "blockers": [+ "Not executed.",+ "transferUsdcGuarded spend policy may impose a minimum amount.",+ "Vault creation gating not examined.",+ "No min_shares parameter makes loss silent."+ ],+ "validation_plan": {+ "local": "Unit test sharesForDeposit(1n, 1_000_000_000n, 1n) returns 0n; then on devnet or mocks: deposit 1 atomic, donate USDC to vault_address, second deposit mints 0 shares.",+ "deployment": "Check transferUsdcGuarded and prod config for minimum deposit."+ }+ },+ {+ "verdict": "needs_validation",+ "fingerprint": "chat-proxy-openrouter-body-passthrough-bypasses-free-model-gate",+ "title": "Anonymous chat proxy forwards full request body to OpenRouter on platform key; extra fields can reach non-free models/paid features",+ "description": "POST /api/chat/proxy unauthenticated, per-IP limit only. isFreeModelId (openrouter-free.js:46) checks only body.model ends ':free' (proxy.js:84). proxy.js:128 sends JSON.stringify({...body, model: activeModel}) with platform Bearer key, passing 'models' fallback, 'plugins', 'provider', large max_tokens. Billing effect unobserved. Verifier assessment: /api/chat/proxy gates only on a :free model suffix and then spreads the whole client body upstream with the platform key, so models, plugins, provider and max_tokens pass through. Billing effect depends on OpenRouter behavior. Non-binding priority hint: medium. Suggested fix: Build the upstream payload from an explicit allowlist; clamp max_tokens; cap message size.",+ "claimed_root_cause": "Allowlist on one field but upstream payload built by spreading untrusted body.",+ "trace": [+ {+ "kind": "entrypoint",+ "file": "api/chat/proxy.js",+ "line": 65,+ "scope": "proxy.js:65",+ "description": "entrypoint step in proxy.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "api/chat/proxy.js",+ "line": 84,+ "scope": "proxy.js:84",+ "description": "propagation step in proxy.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "api/_lib/openrouter-free.js",+ "line": 46,+ "scope": "openrouter-free.js:46",+ "description": "propagation step in openrouter-free.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "sink",+ "file": "api/chat/proxy.js",+ "line": 128,+ "scope": "proxy.js:128",+ "description": "sink step in proxy.js"+ }+ ],+ "evidence": [+ {+ "file": "api/chat/proxy.js",+ "line": 84,+ "description": "only :free suffix check"+ },+ {+ "file": "api/chat/proxy.js",+ "line": 128,+ "description": "whole body spread, only model overridden"+ },+ {+ "file": "api/_lib/openrouter-free.js",+ "line": 46,+ "description": "pure string suffix test"+ }+ ],+ "blockers": [+ "OpenRouter handling of models/plugins/provider with a :free primary and whether the key is charged.",+ "Whether the key has paid credits.",+ "Actual chatIp limit values."+ ],+ "validation_plan": {+ "local": "Stub fetch, POST a :free model with models, plugins and a large max_tokens, assert the upstream body contains them, then add an allowlist and assert they are dropped.",+ "deployment": "Owner reviews OpenRouter activity for non-:free generations/plugin charges on the proxy key; test with spend-capped staging key."+ }+ },+ {+ "verdict": "needs_validation",+ "fingerprint": "chat-server-tool-server-unauthenticated-shell-default",+ "title": "Go chat tool server exposes shell, file write and arbitrary file read with no auth by default, all interfaces, wildcard CORS",+ "description": "chat/server/main.go: Addr :8081 (53), CORS origin * headers * (33), authMiddleware only when *password != \"\" (112) default empty (25). POST /tool InvokeTool (148) runs Shell via mvdan interp (toolfns/shell.go:214, real processes) and Edit (toolfns.go:112 arbitrary file write); GET /read_file reads any path (files.go:83). Web page in browser can hit localhost:8081; LAN host directly. Password compare is raw string 'Basic '+password, not constant-time. Request body (tool args) tee'd to stdout. Verifier assessment: The Go chat tool server defaults to no password, wildcard CORS and a listen address on all interfaces, and exposes shell, edit and file read. Any web page or LAN host could reach it if run with defaults. Non-binding priority hint: high. Suggested fix: Bind 127.0.0.1 by default; refuse to start without a password or generate a token; constant-time compare; restrict CORS; confine read_file and Edit; stop logging bodies.",+ "claimed_root_cause": "Fail-open auth, non-loopback bind, wildcard CORS in front of OS command and file write surface.",+ "trace": [+ {+ "kind": "entrypoint",+ "file": "chat/server/main.go",+ "line": 33,+ "scope": "main.go:33",+ "description": "entrypoint step in main.go"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "chat/server/main.go",+ "line": 53,+ "scope": "main.go:53",+ "description": "propagation step in main.go"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "chat/server/main.go",+ "line": 112,+ "scope": "main.go:112",+ "description": "propagation step in main.go"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "chat/server/main.go",+ "line": 148,+ "scope": "main.go:148",+ "description": "propagation step in main.go"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "chat/server/toolfns/shell.go",+ "line": 214,+ "scope": "shell.go:214",+ "description": "propagation step in shell.go"+ },+ {+ "kind": "sink",+ "file": "chat/server/files.go",+ "line": 83,+ "scope": "files.go:83",+ "description": "sink step in files.go"+ }+ ],+ "evidence": [+ {+ "file": "chat/server/main.go",+ "line": 25,+ "description": "password default empty"+ },+ {+ "file": "chat/server/main.go",+ "line": 53,+ "description": ":8081 all interfaces"+ },+ {+ "file": "chat/server/files.go",+ "line": 83,+ "description": "ReadFile no confinement"+ },+ {+ "file": "chat/server/toolfns/toolfns.go",+ "line": 112,+ "description": "Edit arbitrary write"+ }+ ],+ "blockers": [+ "Launch mode of the shipped binary (password flag, firewall, loopback proxy) unknown.",+ "shell.go and toolfns.go sinks not independently re-read."+ ],+ "validation_plan": {+ "local": "In an isolated VM run with no flags; send a preflight and POST /tool Shell id with a foreign Origin from another host; GET /read_file; repeat with -password set.",+ "deployment": "Check released docs/commands for omitted -password."+ }+ },+ {+ "verdict": "needs_validation",+ "fingerprint": "chat-third-party-persona-drives-visitor-home-tools",+ "title": "Published agent's third-party persona/skills share a prompt with a signed-in visitor's home tools, executed under visitor authority",+ "description": "POST /api/chat loads any published agent persona (chat.js:545,641), custom skills (688), public memories; offers home tools whenever caller has a home membership (706); model-emitted home calls run via runHomeRound/runHomeTool with visitor userId (1130,1346). Confirmation gate covers only unlock/open/disarm-class services (home/tools.js:528); other write services (lock, close, arm, scenes) execute immediately. sendSol gate applies only to gated imported skills. Verifier assessment: A published agent's persona and skills run for any visitor, and home tools are added for visitors with a home membership, so a malicious owner could try to prompt-inject unrequested home actions. Depends on model compliance and which services the classifier guards. Non-binding priority hint: medium. Suggested fix: Withhold home tools or require confirmation for every write when the agent owner differs from the caller and carries a persona or custom skills; mark persona content untrusted.",+ "claimed_root_cause": "Visitor authority and untrusted third-party prompt content combined in one turn; no check that a home write was requested in the visitor message or withholding of tools for non-owned persona.",+ "trace": [+ {+ "kind": "entrypoint",+ "file": "api/chat.js",+ "line": 545,+ "scope": "chat.js:545",+ "description": "entrypoint step in chat.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "api/chat.js",+ "line": 641,+ "scope": "chat.js:641",+ "description": "propagation step in chat.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "api/chat.js",+ "line": 688,+ "scope": "chat.js:688",+ "description": "propagation step in chat.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "api/chat.js",+ "line": 706,+ "scope": "chat.js:706",+ "description": "propagation step in chat.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "api/chat.js",+ "line": 1130,+ "scope": "chat.js:1130",+ "description": "propagation step in chat.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "api/chat.js",+ "line": 1346,+ "scope": "chat.js:1346",+ "description": "propagation step in chat.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "sink",+ "file": "api/_lib/home/tools.js",+ "line": 528,+ "scope": "tools.js:528",+ "description": "sink step in tools.js"+ }+ ],+ "evidence": [+ {+ "file": "api/chat.js",+ "line": 545,+ "description": "any published agent loadable"+ },+ {+ "file": "api/chat.js",+ "line": 706,+ "description": "tool set depends only on homeCount"+ },+ {+ "file": "api/chat.js",+ "line": 1346,+ "description": "runs with visitor identity"+ },+ {+ "file": "api/_lib/home/tools.js",+ "line": 528,+ "description": "confirmation gate only guarded classes"+ }+ ],+ "blockers": [+ "Model compliance with the injected persona unobserved.",+ "Classifier guarded verdict per service not read.",+ "Role scoping may limit guest targets."+ ],+ "validation_plan": {+ "local": "Stub the LLM to return a home tool call; owner A publishes an agent, visitor B has a home membership and mock bridge; confirm an unguarded service executes with B's userId and no confirmation; dump classifier verdicts.",+ "deployment": "Owner reviews home action logs for agent-actor actions in turns where visitor did not request them and agent not owned by visitor."+ }+ },+ {+ "verdict": "needs_validation",+ "fingerprint": "contracts-agentpayments-createagent-caller-chosen-authority-token-squat",+ "title": "createAgent authority gate is vacuous, letting the first caller squat any agentToken",+ "description": "contracts/src/AgentPayments.sol:136-140 requires msg.sender to be owner or the caller-supplied agentAuthority, so a caller satisfies it by naming themself. First caller squats any agentToken; AgentExists blocks the real owner; acceptPayment (152) and withdraw (306) pay the squatter. Verifier assessment: createAgent accepts msg.sender == the caller-supplied agentAuthority, so any address can register any agentToken and block the real owner with AgentExists; payments then settle to the squatter. Non-binding priority hint: high. Suggested fix: Bind registration to proof of token control (owner-signed EIP-712, token owner check, or owner-only), and add an owner reassign or remove function.",+ "claimed_root_cause": "Authority is taken from caller input rather than proven.",+ "trace": [+ {+ "kind": "entrypoint",+ "file": "contracts/src/AgentPayments.sol",+ "line": 136,+ "scope": "AgentPayments.sol:136",+ "description": "entrypoint step in AgentPayments.sol"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "contracts/src/AgentPayments.sol",+ "line": 139,+ "scope": "AgentPayments.sol:139",+ "description": "propagation step in AgentPayments.sol"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "contracts/src/AgentPayments.sol",+ "line": 142,+ "scope": "AgentPayments.sol:142",+ "description": "propagation step in AgentPayments.sol"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "contracts/src/AgentPayments.sol",+ "line": 152,+ "scope": "AgentPayments.sol:152",+ "description": "propagation step in AgentPayments.sol"+ },+ {+ "kind": "sink",+ "file": "contracts/src/AgentPayments.sol",+ "line": 306,+ "scope": "AgentPayments.sol:306",+ "description": "sink step in AgentPayments.sol"+ }+ ],+ "evidence": [+ {+ "file": "contracts/src/AgentPayments.sol",+ "line": 136,+ "description": "msg.sender == agentAuthority accepted"+ }+ ],+ "blockers": [+ "Not executed.",+ "Deployment status and whether funds are held.",+ "Whether the platform owner pre-registers legitimate tokens.",+ "Whether an owner-side reassign or remove function exists (not checked)."+ ],+ "validation_plan": {+ "local": "Foundry test: attacker createAgent(token, attacker, 0); real creator call reverts AgentExists; payer acceptPayment; attacker withdraws.",+ "deployment": "Owner checks deployment and registered agents."+ }+ },+ {+ "verdict": "needs_validation",+ "fingerprint": "contracts-hood-portfolios-rebalance-targets-unbounded-creator-drain",+ "title": "Portfolio creator can propose unbounded rebalance targets and drain via open fillRebalance",+ "description": "Portfolio.sol:440 proposeRebalance checks only targetUnits length. Constructor (198) sets no floor on rebalanceDelay/rebalanceInterval and PortfolioFactory.sol:49 forwards creator Config. quoteFill (312) prices from creator targets and fillRebalance (473) is open to any caller, so a creator-controlled fill can extract value. Verifier assessment: Portfolio proposeRebalance bounds only the targets length and the constructor sets no minimum delay or interval, so a creator can skew targets and let fillRebalance trade at off-market prices. Depositors can redeem during a nonzero delay. Real path is contracts/hood-portfolios/src, not contracts/src/hood. Non-binding priority hint: medium. Suggested fix: Add minimum delay and interval; cap per-leg target change; add an oracle or NAV-loss limit in quoteFill.",+ "claimed_root_cause": "No bounds on creator-set targets or timing parameters.",+ "trace": [+ {+ "kind": "entrypoint",+ "file": "contracts/hood-portfolios/src/Portfolio.sol",+ "line": 440,+ "scope": "Portfolio.sol:440",+ "description": "entrypoint step in Portfolio.sol"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "contracts/hood-portfolios/src/Portfolio.sol",+ "line": 447,+ "scope": "Portfolio.sol:447",+ "description": "propagation step in Portfolio.sol"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "contracts/hood-portfolios/src/Portfolio.sol",+ "line": 198,+ "scope": "Portfolio.sol:198",+ "description": "propagation step in Portfolio.sol"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "contracts/hood-portfolios/src/PortfolioFactory.sol",+ "line": 49,+ "scope": "PortfolioFactory.sol:49",+ "description": "propagation step in PortfolioFactory.sol"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "contracts/hood-portfolios/src/Portfolio.sol",+ "line": 312,+ "scope": "Portfolio.sol:312",+ "description": "propagation step in Portfolio.sol"+ },+ {+ "kind": "sink",+ "file": "contracts/hood-portfolios/src/Portfolio.sol",+ "line": 473,+ "scope": "Portfolio.sol:473",+ "description": "sink step in Portfolio.sol"+ }+ ],+ "evidence": [+ {+ "file": "contracts/src/hood/Portfolio.sol",+ "line": 440,+ "description": "length-only check"+ }+ ],+ "blockers": [+ "Not executed.",+ "Deployed portfolios, delay values and third-party TVL unknown.",+ "Depositors may redeem during the timelock.",+ "Constituents are creator-chosen and visible before deposit."+ ],+ "validation_plan": {+ "local": "Foundry test in contracts/hood-portfolios/test: zero delay, valuable and worthless constituents, targets [0, huge], fill by a colluder, assert depositor loss; repeat with a nonzero delay and redeem early.",+ "deployment": "Owner checks deployed portfolios and balances."+ }+ },+ {+ "verdict": "needs_validation",+ "fingerprint": "custody-spend-policy-daily-cap-ignores-strategy-run-buys",+ "title": "Strategy-run buys count as zero toward the agent daily SOL cap",+ "description": "handleStrategyRun reaches pump-fun-trade handler which persists agent_actions pumpfun.buy with payload {mint, amountSol, sig}; agent-spend-policy.js:78 sums payload->>'solAmount', so strategy buys contribute zero to daily_sol_cap (default 5 SOL). Strategy path uses non-atomic checkBuyAllowed, not reserveSpend, and loadWallet without audit context, skipping assertPlatformSigningAllowed. Verifier assessment: Strategy buys persist payload key amountSol while the daily cap sums solAmount, so they count as zero toward daily_sol_cap. Only the per-tx cap applies. Principal is the agent owner or a spend-scoped key, so this bypasses the owner's cap rather than crossing tenants. The loadWallet audit-context point is not a separate bug. Non-binding priority hint: medium. Suggested fix: Write solAmount in the note or COALESCE(solAmount, amountSol) in the SUM; use atomic reserveSpend in the strategy path.",+ "claimed_root_cause": "Cap sums a payload key the strategy path never writes.",+ "trace": [+ {+ "kind": "entrypoint",+ "file": "api/pump/[action].js",+ "line": 3761,+ "scope": "[action].js:3761",+ "description": "entrypoint step in [action].js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "api/pump/[action].js",+ "line": 3866,+ "scope": "[action].js:3866",+ "description": "propagation step in [action].js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "examples/skills/pump-fun-trade/handlers.js",+ "line": 55,+ "scope": "handlers.js:55",+ "description": "propagation step in handlers.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "api/_lib/skill-runtime.js",+ "line": 135,+ "scope": "skill-runtime.js:135",+ "description": "propagation step in skill-runtime.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "sink",+ "file": "api/_lib/agent-spend-policy.js",+ "line": 78,+ "scope": "agent-spend-policy.js:78",+ "description": "sink step in agent-spend-policy.js"+ }+ ],+ "evidence": [+ {+ "file": "api/pump/[action].js",+ "line": 3869,+ "description": "checkBuyAllowed instead of reserveSpend"+ },+ {+ "file": "api/_lib/solana-wallet.js",+ "line": 15,+ "description": "loadWallet without audit context"+ }+ ],+ "blockers": [+ "Not executed.",+ "Whether strategy-run is deployed and reachable.",+ "Whether delegated or scoped keys are constrained by daily_sol_cap."+ ],+ "validation_plan": {+ "local": "Run a mocked live strategy buy through makeRuntime, confirm payload has amountSol and no solAmount, then checkBuyAllowed with 4.9 SOL spent and expect a block.",+ "deployment": "Owner sums strategy-run buys per agent per day against daily_sol_cap."+ }+ },+ {+ "verdict": "needs_validation",+ "fingerprint": "extensions-walk-avatar-auth-callback-token-injection-no-state-binding",+ "title": "Walk Avatar extension stores any token from a three.ws auth-callback URL (login CSRF / session fixation)",+ "description": "background.js tabs.onUpdated persists the token query/hash param of any top-level tab whose URL starts with https://three.ws/extension/auth-callback into chrome.storage.local.threews_session, then closes the tab. No state/nonce ties it to a sign-in the user started; no check the token belongs to the current user; callback page treats any ?token= as success. Attacker mints own extension token (POST /api/auth/extension-token) and navigates victim to /extension/auth-callback?token=<attacker token>; extension then holds attacker identity (scope avatars:read). For a victim signed out of three.ws, popup avatar lists and narrator /api/tts/speak run as attacker account. Impact limited: tts/speak.js prefers cookie session over bearer, avatars/mine.js likely too. Verifier assessment: The extension accepts any auth-callback URL token with no state binding and overwrites its stored session (login CSRF). Token has extension scope only; cookie session takes precedence in speak.js. Non-binding priority hint: low. Suggested fix: Add a per-sign-in nonce in chrome.storage.session and accept the token only with a matching state, or deliver the token via runtime messaging.",+ "claimed_root_cause": "Auth-callback capture is trust-on-navigation: token accepted from URL with no binding to a locally initiated login.",+ "trace": [+ {+ "kind": "entrypoint",+ "file": "extensions/walk-avatar/background.js",+ "line": 224,+ "scope": "background.js:224",+ "description": "entrypoint step in background.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "extensions/walk-avatar/background.js",+ "line": 226,+ "scope": "background.js:226",+ "description": "propagation step in background.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "extensions/walk-avatar/background.js",+ "line": 231,+ "scope": "background.js:231",+ "description": "propagation step in background.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "extensions/walk-avatar/background.js",+ "line": 237,+ "scope": "background.js:237",+ "description": "propagation step in background.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "api/tts/speak.js",+ "line": 67,+ "scope": "speak.js:67",+ "description": "propagation step in speak.js"+ },+ {+ "kind": "sink",+ "file": "api/auth/extension-token.js",+ "line": 76,+ "scope": "extension-token.js:76",+ "description": "sink step in extension-token.js"+ }+ ],+ "evidence": [+ {+ "file": "extensions/walk-avatar/background.js",+ "line": 226,+ "description": "prefix-only check, no state"+ },+ {+ "file": "extensions/walk-avatar/background.js",+ "line": 237,+ "description": "unconditional overwrite"+ },+ {+ "file": "public/extension-auth-callback.html",+ "line": 80,+ "description": "any non-empty token treated as success"+ },+ {+ "file": "api/auth/extension-token.js",+ "line": 76,+ "description": "any account can mint a token"+ },+ {+ "file": "api/tts/speak.js",+ "line": 67,+ "description": "cookie session takes precedence over bearer"+ }+ ],+ "blockers": [+ "Extension not loaded; storage overwrite unconfirmed.",+ "Whether APIs attribute to the bearer user when no cookie is present.",+ "Victim must be induced to navigate to the crafted URL."+ ],+ "validation_plan": {+ "local": "In a throwaway Chrome profile load the extension, mint B's token, open the callback URL while signed out and confirm threews_session is overwritten; repeat while signed in as A.",+ "deployment": "Two test accounts; victim signed out; check attribution of /api/avatars/mine and /api/tts/speak and whether attacker can see text."+ }+ },+ {+ "verdict": "needs_validation",+ "fingerprint": "glb-media-cad-forge-collect-follows-child-symlink",+ "title": "CAD Forge parent reads child-controlled artifact paths with symlink-following open",+ "description": "main._collect trusts child-written result.json 'files' list; checks name against ARTIFACT_KEYS and os.path.isfile then open(path,'rb') following symlinks. Workdir chowned to nobody; child can create symlinks (seccomp deny list lacks symlink/symlinkat). Symlink part.glb -> /proc/1/environ makes the root parent base64 it into the response; getsize on /proc reports 0 so 24MB cap does not bound it. Needs a child-side primitive (companion candidate). Verifier assessment: cad-forge _collect opens child-named files following symlinks, a conditional privilege gain only if submitted code can already create a symlink in the child. The policy exposes no such primitive on its own, so this is defense in depth. Non-binding priority hint: low. Suggested fix: Open with O_NOFOLLOW, fstat for a regular file, bounded read from the fd; add symlink, symlinkat, link and linkat to SECCOMP_DENY.",+ "claimed_root_cause": "Privileged parent opens files from a child-controlled dir without lstat/O_NOFOLLOW/realpath confinement.",+ "trace": [+ {+ "kind": "entrypoint",+ "file": "workers/cad-forge/main.py",+ "line": 311,+ "scope": "main.py:311",+ "description": "entrypoint step in main.py"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "workers/cad-forge/sandbox_child.py",+ "line": 185,+ "scope": "sandbox_child.py:185",+ "description": "propagation step in sandbox_child.py"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "workers/cad-forge/main.py",+ "line": 264,+ "scope": "main.py:264",+ "description": "propagation step in main.py"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "workers/cad-forge/main.py",+ "line": 218,+ "scope": "main.py:218",+ "description": "propagation step in main.py"+ },+ {+ "kind": "sink",+ "file": "workers/cad-forge/main.py",+ "line": 228,+ "scope": "main.py:228",+ "description": "sink step in main.py"+ }+ ],+ "evidence": [+ {+ "file": "workers/cad-forge/main.py",+ "line": 97,+ "description": "workdir chowned to nobody"+ },+ {+ "file": "workers/cad-forge/sandbox_child.py",+ "line": 49,+ "description": "SECCOMP_DENY lacks symlink/symlinkat"+ },+ {+ "file": "workers/cad-forge/Dockerfile",+ "line": 22,+ "description": "comment: tests run as root like Cloud Run"+ }+ ],+ "blockers": [+ "Needs a companion policy-escape or native primitive in the child.",+ "Whether production runs as uid 0 and what /proc/1/environ holds.",+ "Whether getsize on /proc files bypasses the cap."+ ],+ "validation_plan": {+ "local": "As root in the built image run main.run_build with a test-double child that writes part.glb as a symlink to a root-only dummy file; expect _collect to return its bytes.",+ "deployment": "Owner: confirm container uid 0 and /proc/1/environ contents."+ }+ },+ {+ "verdict": "needs_validation",+ "fingerprint": "glb-media-cad-forge-policy-frame-attribute-escape",+ "title": "CAD Forge static policy does not block frame/code-object attributes (generator frame walk to real globals/builtins)",+ "description": "workers/cad-forge/cad_policy.py check_source rejects only underscore-prefixed attributes plus format/format_map/vformat/mro. gi_frame, f_back, f_globals, f_builtins, f_locals, gi_code, cr_frame, tb_frame pass. `def g(): yield x.gi_frame.f_back.f_back.f_globals` could reach sandbox_child's globals (os, sys) and real builtins (open, eval, __import__). Program text comes from an LLM prompted by an arbitrary user of api/cad.js and MCP cad tool. If the walk works the AST/builtins layer is void; seccomp, nobody uid, rlimits remain. Verifier assessment: cad_policy blocks only underscore and a few attribute names, so generator and frame attributes such as gi_frame, f_back and f_globals pass and may reach the sandbox_child module globals (os, real builtins). Python behavior inferred; seccomp and uid drop remain. Non-binding priority hint: medium. Suggested fix: Switch to an attribute allowlist or deny gi_*, cr_*, ag_*, f_*, tb_* and co_*; reject Yield and GeneratorExp if unneeded; exec from a module whose frames reach nothing sensitive.",+ "claimed_root_cause": "Attribute denylist is underscore-prefix based and omits non-underscore frame/generator/traceback introspection attributes.",+ "trace": [+ {+ "kind": "entrypoint",+ "file": "workers/cad-forge/main.py",+ "line": 311,+ "scope": "main.py:311",+ "description": "entrypoint step in main.py"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "workers/cad-forge/cad_policy.py",+ "line": 58,+ "scope": "cad_policy.py:58",+ "description": "propagation step in cad_policy.py"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "workers/cad-forge/cad_policy.py",+ "line": 118,+ "scope": "cad_policy.py:118",+ "description": "propagation step in cad_policy.py"+ },+ {+ "kind": "propagation",+ "file": "workers/cad-forge/sandbox_child.py",+ "line": 172,+ "scope": "sandbox_child.py:172",+ "description": "propagation step in sandbox_child.py"+ },+ {+ "kind": "sink",+ "file": "workers/cad-forge/sandbox_child.py",+ "line": 185,+ "scope": "sandbox_child.py:185",+ "description": "sink step in sandbox_child.py"+ }+ ],+ "evidence": [+ {+ "file": "workers/cad-forge/cad_policy.py",+ "line": 58,+ "description": "BANNED_ATTRIBUTES only format,format_map,vformat,mro"+ },+ {+ "file": "workers/cad-forge/cad_policy.py",+ "line": 130,+ "description": "underscore check only other control"+ },+ {+ "file": "workers/cad-forge/cad_policy.py",+ "line": 60,+ "description": "safe builtins keep iter,next,super,isinstance; def/yield allowed ~141"+ },+ {+ "file": "workers/cad-forge/sandbox_child.py",+ "line": 172,+ "description": "run_program frame f_globals is module namespace with os/sys at 22-31"+ }+ ],+ "blockers": [+ "Code not executed; the frame chain on the deployed Python version is inferred.",+ "Whether the program text can be steered by the user or is only LLM-generated.",+ "Seccomp, uid drop and rlimit effectiveness under Cloud Run.",+ "Whether secrets are readable by the sandbox uid."+ ],+ "validation_plan": {+ "local": "Feed sandbox_child.py via test_sandbox.py a generator-based program that reads f_back.f_back.f_globals['os'] and f_builtins['open']; expect a policy refusal; if it runs, add a test to test_cad_policy.py.",+ "deployment": "Owner: confirm /health seccomp_required true, root->nobody drop, canary build refused."+ }+ }+]\ No newline at end of file