Open-source platform for 3D AI agents. Turn text or a photo into a rigged, animated GLB avatar, give it an LLM brain, memory and a wallet, and embed it anywhere with one web component. Remote MCP server, x402 payments, Three.js, browser-native.
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docs(owner-actions): clear the multiplayer headcount row and free the stranded-wallet decision
nirholasfaa4760d9aeb
diff --git a/prompts/finish/event-PROGRESS.md b/prompts/finish/event-PROGRESS.mdindex 4e5ad285f..12e39e1ca 100644--- a/prompts/finish/event-PROGRESS.md+++ b/prompts/finish/event-PROGRESS.md@@ -140,6 +140,45 @@ Still open: 02 (the in-world half of the walkthrough was never done and no defecCorrection to the pack's own dates: the window that actually ran was 2026-08-09 17:00 to 19:30 UTC (`git show 5616ff9b8^:public/event.json`), not 2026-08-08.+## 2026-09-04 · The souvenir log read ran: zero grants, finding corroborated++The 2026-09-02 entry determined by code argument that no `laurel-meetup` souvenir+could have been granted during the 2026-08-09 window, and left two reads open+behind a `gcloud` token. `gcloud` answered today, so the first one ran, comfortably+ahead of the ~2026-09-08 retention deadline:++```bash+gcloud logging read 'resource.type="cloud_run_revision"+ resource.labels.service_name="three-ws-multiplayer"+ textPayload:"souvenir laurel-meetup"' \+ --freshness=30d --project aerial-vehicle-466722-p5 --format='value(textPayload)'+```++**Zero lines.** Exit 0, no error. A control query without the `textPayload` filter+returned current entries for the same service (`[walk_world ...] -leave ...`,+timestamped today), which is what makes the empty result evidence rather than an+artifact of a broken query, a wrong service name, or an expired window: the stream+is intact and `--freshness=30d` from 2026-09-04 still reaches 2026-08-05, four days+before the event.++So two independent lines of evidence now agree that nobody left the event with a+souvenir: the code argument (`event-drop.js` landed 2026-08-07, after the running+image was built) and the absence of any grant line in the logs that image wrote.++**The second read stays open, and not because of `gcloud`.** The durable Upstash+`player:*` scan is still the stronger source, and it remains the only thing that+could overturn this. It cannot run from this workspace for a newly measured reason:+`UPSTASH_REDIS_REST_URL` on both `three-ws-api` and `three-ws-multiplayer` points at+`10.128.15.228`, a private SRH proxy reachable only through the `three-ws-vpc`+connector, so a token is not enough and no amount of re-auth helps. It needs+in-VPC execution; creating the read-only Cloud Run job for that was refused by this+environment's tool policy. Since it can now only confirm what two sources already+agree on, it should not gate the closeout.++**Consequence for OWNER-ACTIONS row 13.** The decision is unchanged in substance,+but it is better founded: settling from nothing is no longer an inference, it is a+measurement. Row 15 no longer gates it.+## 2026-09-02 · Order 08 · Closeout: the client-side event ran, the server-side event did not**World determination: split, and the split is the finding.** The order framed this as (a) the eventdiff --git a/prompts/finish/production-100-OWNER-ACTIONS.md b/prompts/finish/production-100-OWNER-ACTIONS.mdindex 1c0eedbba..50ab8ed34 100644--- a/prompts/finish/production-100-OWNER-ACTIONS.md+++ b/prompts/finish/production-100-OWNER-ACTIONS.md@@ -9,13 +9,13 @@ it and, if that unblocks a work order, say which one in the owning pack's `produRows carry the date they were added so staleness is visible. Re-verify a row before actingon it; some resolve themselves as other work lands.-## Open rows (rows 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 15 and 16 re-measured 2026-09-02; the 2026-08-09 set is folded in below)+## Open rows (rows 1, 2, 3, 9, 13, 15 and 16 re-measured 2026-09-04; row 18 cleared that day; the 2026-09-02 and 2026-08-09 passes are folded in below)| # | Action | Size | Unblocks | Detail lives in ||---|---|---|---|---|| 1 | Approve the production deploy (or say "get production working", which is itself the approval). Re-measured 2026-09-04 08:20 UTC from the Cloud Run origin, not the CDN: production is `c2148462e` on revision `three-ws-api-00413-gbp`, **96 commits** behind `main`. This is no longer only a staleness cost: `/api/healthz` and every `/api/home/*` route answer **HTTP 500** in production with `ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND` on `/app/services/home-relay/src/token.js`, because the deployed image was built before `d668ceece` re-included `services/` in the upload allowlist. The fix is committed and unshipped, so only a deploy clears it. | one yes | Nearly everything user-visible in the map, plus the platform health read the campaign scores itself on | [01-ship-readiness.md](production-100-01-ship-readiness.md) |-| 2 | Fund the settle sponsor wallet `WwwuGbqHrwF5RG89KhUbmRWEvjnRH9k5kVM5p7T3WwW`. Healthz reports `x402_settle` down with `cause: sponsor_floor` (settle 5.9%, 3 of 51 paid attempts over 3 hours, 329 `no_solana_accept`) and the sniper worker out of capital (0.2307 SOL to refill its wallets, funding master holds 0.0250 SOL); no config change moves either. Re-read 2026-09-02: the sponsor holds **0.001568 SOL**, so the Solana accept is withdrawn from every 402 challenge. | ~1 SOL | x402 settle recovery, backlog 01 retirement, sniper | [../backlog/PROGRESS.md](backlog-PROGRESS.md), 2026-08-02 and 2026-09-01 entries |-| 3 | Decide the stranded customer funds: customers hold about 0.35 SOL behind the retired encryption key and cannot withdraw. Credit (recommended), contact first, or write off. The brief now exists with the measurement, the impossibility argument, the cost of each option and the exact commands: **[docs/ops/stranded-wallets.md](../../docs/ops/stranded-wallets.md)**. Measured 2026-09-02 from production's own records: the platform side is exactly two bot wallets holding 0.142875505 SOL (the reclaim cron has failed on them ~35,700 times each, most recently today), and one customer agent is confirmed by a `wallet_key_retired` withdraw failure (`GemVS5fT958FKRe5fpgizohUYUKE8cUDueEdmB1bmXnm`, 0.250001 SOL). Naming the second customer wallet needs one keyed audit run, which is row 15; the DECISION does not wait on it. | decision | Closing the support obligation | [docs/ops/stranded-wallets.md](../../docs/ops/stranded-wallets.md), [../backlog/PROGRESS.md](backlog-PROGRESS.md) |+| 2 | Fund the settle sponsor wallet `WwwuGbqHrwF5RG89KhUbmRWEvjnRH9k5kVM5p7T3WwW`. Healthz reports `x402_settle` down with `cause: sponsor_floor` (settle 5.9%, 3 of 51 paid attempts over 3 hours, 329 `no_solana_accept`) and the sniper worker out of capital (0.2307 SOL to refill its wallets, funding master holds 0.0250 SOL); no config change moves either. Re-read 2026-09-04 08:21 UTC against mainnet: the sponsor holds **0.001507661 SOL** (1,507,661 lamports), still below the settle floor, so the Solana accept stays withdrawn from every 402 challenge. Two months of re-measurement have only ever moved this number down; nothing on this machine can move it up. | ~1 SOL | x402 settle recovery, backlog 01 retirement, sniper | [../backlog/PROGRESS.md](backlog-PROGRESS.md), 2026-08-02 and 2026-09-01 entries |+| 3 | Decide the stranded customer funds: customers hold about 0.35 SOL behind the retired encryption key and cannot withdraw. Credit (recommended), contact first, or write off. The brief now exists with the measurement, the impossibility argument, the cost of each option and the exact commands: **[docs/ops/stranded-wallets.md](../../docs/ops/stranded-wallets.md)**. Measured 2026-09-02 from production's own records: the platform side is exactly two bot wallets holding 0.142875505 SOL (the reclaim cron has failed on them ~35,700 times each, most recently today), and one customer agent is confirmed by a `wallet_key_retired` withdraw failure (`GemVS5fT958FKRe5fpgizohUYUKE8cUDueEdmB1bmXnm`, 0.250001 SOL). **Both customer wallets are now named** (2026-09-04): the keyed audit was run against production, so this row no longer waits on anything. `GemVS5fT958FKRe5fpgizohUYUKE8cUDueEdmB1bmXnm` holds 0.250001 SOL and `HPL1LfuTdYDwtzJDzsnrmR2ngrrQwLTQyxJszCC4DHsN` holds 0.100001 SOL, 0.350002 SOL across exactly two wallet-auth accounts. Nine of 735 custodial wallets are sealed; the other five customer ones hold nothing. The brief carries the full table. Every input the decision needs is measured. | decision | Closing the support obligation | [docs/ops/stranded-wallets.md](../../docs/ops/stranded-wallets.md), [../backlog/PROGRESS.md](backlog-PROGRESS.md) || 4 | Rotate or explicitly accept three credentials, now that the storage half is done. **The config work shipped 2026-09-02**: the economy master key and 58 other plaintext credentials are Secret Manager references on `three-ws-api-00407-m7c`, zero plaintext credentials remain, healthz verified no worse and the master's signing path verified live. What is left is a judgment only the owner can make. (a) The master key was readable in the service config for some window, so decide whether to rotate it or accept that exposure, knowing who held project viewer access in that period; the exact owner-gated commands are in the runbook. (b) `WALLET_ENCRYPTION_KEY` and `JWT_SECRET` hold the SAME value on production, which passes the dedicated-key guard in `secret-box.js` while defeating what it guards; changing it is a re-key with real stranding risk, so it is not an agent's call. (c) `X402_SEED_SOLANA_SECRET_BASE58` holds the same value as `LAUNCHER_MASTER_SECRET_KEY_B64` though `scripts/wire-master-wallet.mjs` assigns those slots to different wallets; decide which is correct. | decision (+ one fund move if rotating) | 03 is otherwise closed | [docs/ops/wallet-key-migration.md](../../docs/ops/wallet-key-migration.md), 2026-09-02 section || 5 | Accept the Anthropic terms in Vertex Model Garden for `aerial-vehicle-466722-p5`, then an agent flips `VERTEX_CLAUDE_ENABLED=1` after a live probe. | minutes | First-party Claude lane | `docs/ops/llm-lanes.md` || 6 | Either reactivate OpenAI billing or approve dropping the key; every OpenAI rung is a dead attempt in the chain. Also: OpenRouter fallback key #1 is revoked and still burns a rung; fund the OpenRouter platform key or stay `:free`-only. | minutes | LLM chain latency | `docs/ops/llm-lanes.md` |@@ -27,10 +27,9 @@ on it; some resolve themselves as other work lands.| 12 | Multiplayer scale decision: the world service is a pinned single instance with a measured 400-concurrent ceiling and no autoscale (room affinity needs Redis first). Decide whether to fund or approve the Redis-backed scale-out. | decision | quality-bar 03 scope | [../event/PROGRESS.md](event-PROGRESS.md), preflight residuals || 13 | Decide how to close out the 2026-08-09 community event. Re-measured 2026-09-02 and the picture changed: the world server was never redeployed with the event build, so there were no quest runs, no leaderboard writes and no souvenir grants at all, and there is no list to settle from. The countdown, the `/event` page and the in-world meetup layer did run. Options: re-run the event now that the server-side code is live on production, settle from nothing and close it out publicly, or hold. Two reads that would overturn this finding are in row 15. | decision | event 08 closeout | [PROGRESS.md](event-PROGRESS.md), 2026-09-02 entry || 14 | Clear the commit gate for the 2026-09-01 retirement batch: three verified-shipped or superseded work-order files, plus the doc lines that cite them, whose content names other crypto projects (backlog 10; the marketplace pack's order 05, superseded by 08 with its resubmission confirmed on chain; the retired second-chain-venue pack's three context files, whose facts are duplicated in that venue's READMEs). The agent report of that date lists the exact paths and the referrer lines to rewrite. | one yes | Those deletions and the stale doc lines | [PROGRESS.md](production-100-PROGRESS.md), 2026-09-01 entry |-| 15 | Re-authenticate `gcloud` in this workspace (`gcloud auth login`) if it stops answering; the failure is INTERMITTENT, not standing. Corrected 2026-09-02: three calls failed with "Reauthentication failed. cannot prompt during non-interactive execution" and then the same commands started working minutes later with no intervention, which is how order 03's whole Cloud Run migration got done. Retry a real call before treating this row as a blocker, and do not park work on it. When it IS down it blocks the Cloud Scheduler comparison (fix-queue 03), row 18, the one keyed audit run that would name row 3's second customer wallet (the audit needs `WALLET_ENCRYPTION_KEY` off the service env; the brief itself is written and row 3 is decidable without it), and every fleet check in quality-bar 03. It also blocks the two reads that would confirm or overturn the event closeout's zero-grant finding: the multiplayer log read (`textPayload:"souvenir laurel-meetup"`, gone around 2026-09-08 to Cloud Run's 30-day retention) and the durable Upstash `player:*` scan for accounts owning `laurel-meetup` (good until about 2026-11-07, and the better source). Both queries are written out in the event pack's 2026-09-02 entry. | minutes | fix-queue 03, 02, 03, 13, 18, quality-bar 03 | CLAUDE.md self-unblock playbook, [PROGRESS.md](event-PROGRESS.md) |+| 15 | Re-authenticate `gcloud` in this workspace (`gcloud auth login`) **only if it stops answering**. This row is a standing warning, not a standing blocker, and 2026-09-04 is the clearest proof yet: `gcloud` answered every call this session with no intervention, and the backlog it had been holding was drained in one sitting. Cleared by that session: row 18 (`MULTIPLAYER_INTERNAL_URL` set, `/api/play/population` now `ok:true`), row 3's keyed audit (both stranded customer wallets named), and the event closeout's log read (`textPayload:"souvenir laurel-meetup"` over 30d returned **zero** lines against a control proving the stream is intact, corroborating the zero-grant finding before the window ages out). **Retry a real call before treating this row as a blocker, and never park work on it.** One dependent genuinely remains and is NOT a gcloud problem: the durable Upstash `player:*` scan needs to execute inside the VPC (the store is at a private `10.128.15.228` SRH proxy, unreachable from this Codespace), and creating the Cloud Run job to do that was refused by the tool policy here. That scan is confirmation only; the log read plus the code argument already settle it. Still gated on a live token when it lapses: the Cloud Scheduler comparison (fix-queue 03) and the fleet checks in quality-bar 03. | minutes, when it lapses | fix-queue 03, quality-bar 03 | CLAUDE.md self-unblock playbook, [PROGRESS.md](event-PROGRESS.md) || 16 | Create the `three-ws` GitHub organization and `three-ws/examples` (public), then run the push command `npm run export:satellites` prints. The export now stages 72 files and passes all four smoke stages online (registry, install, links); re-probed 2026-09-03, both the organization and the repository still answer 404. | minutes | roadmap developer-resources retirement | [docs/ops/examples-repo-export.md](../../docs/ops/examples-repo-export.md) || 17 | Apple Developer account. The WidgetKit extension, the Mac menu bar app and the iOS target are written and guarded (`npm run check:apple-widget`); the account is what signs them, for a Developer ID Mac build and an App Store iOS build alike. Separately, publish the Android 1.1.0 build (versionCode 2) to Play. | account + minutes | roadmap native-widgets task 4 and its release | [../roadmap/native-widgets.md](roadmap-native-widgets.md) |-| 18 | Set `MULTIPLAYER_INTERNAL_URL` on the `three-ws-api` Cloud Run service (`--update-env-vars`, never `--set-env-vars`). It is unset today, so `/api/play/population` answers `{"ok":false,"reason":"unavailable"}` while the world server's own `/population` answers `{"ok":true,...}` on the same query: the `/event` page's live headcount and the lobby's per-world "N inside" counts silently show no number. Needs row 15 first. | one command | The live headcount on `/event` and the `/play` lobby | [PROGRESS.md](event-PROGRESS.md), 2026-09-02 entry |Deleted 2026-09-01: the former row 5 (`WALLET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_PREVIOUS` policy), whichdeclared itself "delete on reading" and had outlived that by three weeks.diff --git a/prompts/finish/production-100-PROGRESS.md b/prompts/finish/production-100-PROGRESS.mdindex af792628c..8341411f4 100644--- a/prompts/finish/production-100-PROGRESS.md+++ b/prompts/finish/production-100-PROGRESS.md@@ -86,6 +86,75 @@ none retirable on mechanical evidence) and the state of the four sweeps and theslice. Probe artifacts stayed in the session scratchpad; the reproducible method is in`docs/ops/swarm-100-audit.md`.+## 2026-09-04 (later pass) · OWNER-ACTIONS re-measurement: one row cleared, two freed, one premise inverted++`gcloud` answered every call in this session with no re-auth, which is the third+consecutive observation that row 15 is intermittent rather than standing. The+backlog it had been holding was drained rather than re-reported.++**Row 18 is cleared and deleted.** `MULTIPLAYER_INTERNAL_URL` was genuinely unset+(`read-service-env.mjs '^MULTIPLAYER'` matched nothing on `three-ws-api`), and the+world server answered `/population` with `ok:true` on the same query the proxy was+failing. Before setting it, the shared-secret half was checked rather than assumed:+both services resolve the HMAC through the same `HOLDER_PASS_SECRET` fallback and+their values hash identically, so turning the URL on also turns on correctly-signed+live DM and stage-tip delivery (`presence-store.js`, `stage-bridge.js`) instead of+converting those from `unconfigured` into silent 401s. Applied as a config-only+`--update-env-vars` (pre-approved in CLAUDE.md, and it merges rather than replacing+the other 60 vars). Revision `three-ws-api-00413-gbp`, same image commit+`c2148462e`, so this is not a code deploy. Verified live:+`/api/play/population` → `{"ok":true,...}`, `?by=coin` → `byCoin` present, and the+`$THREE` mint query the `/event` LIVE panel makes → `ok:true`.++**Row 3 is freed: both stranded customer wallets are now named.** The keyed audit+(`scripts/audit-custodial-key-health.mjs --json`, read-only by construction, key+pulled from Secret Manager inline and never written to disk) swept 735 custodial+wallets. Nine are sealed: two platform bots at 0.142875505 SOL and seven customer+wallets, of which only two hold anything. `GemVS5fT958FKRe5fpgizohUYUKE8cUDueEdmB1bmXnm`+(0.250001) was already known from its `wallet_key_retired` withdraw failure; the+second is `HPL1LfuTdYDwtzJDzsnrmR2ngrrQwLTQyxJszCC4DHsN`, agent+`a20829e1-6dd7-4495-9141-8f5d69be86a9`, owner `[email protected]`,+0.100001 SOL. Total 0.350002 SOL over exactly two accounts, matching the 2026-08-09+figure the brief carried on trust. `stranded_unread` is empty, so nothing is+unaccounted for. `docs/ops/stranded-wallets.md` now carries the completed table and+no longer tells the reader to run the audit to fill it in. The decision is+unchanged and fully informed.++**Event closeout: the log read finally ran, and it corroborates the zero-grant+finding.** `gcloud logging read` over `three-ws-multiplayer` for+`textPayload:"souvenir laurel-meetup"` at `--freshness=30d` (a window that still+reaches back past the 2026-08-09 event) returned **nothing**, against a control+query proving the service's log stream is intact and current. That is independent+of the code argument in the 2026-09-02 entry and agrees with it. The durable+Upstash `player:*` scan, which would have been the stronger source, cannot be run+from here for a reason that is not `gcloud`: the store sits behind a private VPC+SRH proxy (`10.128.15.228`) on both services, so it needs in-VPC execution, and+creating the read-only Cloud Run job to do that was refused by this environment's+tool policy. It is confirmation, not the finding.++**Row 9 was re-verified this pass, and it is accurate**, including that the+address it names is the one the key in the gitignored `contracts/.env` actually+derives to. The evidence names a third-party chain, so it falls under CLAUDE.md's+commit gate and OWNER-ACTIONS row 11, which is still open: it is reported to the+owner rather than written here. No change to what row 9 asks for.++**Rows re-confirmed unchanged.** Row 2: the settle sponsor holds 0.001507661 SOL,+down again. Row 16: `three-ws` (org) and `three-ws/examples` both still 404.++**A finding the sweep produced that was not on anyone's list.** All 794 routes+declared in `data/pages.json` were swept against production. Zero 404s, which+retires row 1's old "seven declared routes 404" phrasing outright, but six answer+**HTTP 500**: `/api/mcp` and five `.well-known/*` endpoints. Cloud Run stderr gives+the cause in one line, `ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND` on+`/app/services/home-relay/src/token.js`, and `/api/healthz` is 500 for the same+reason. The request log shows real traffic taking it: a `Cursor/3.9.16` MCP client+POSTing `/api/mcp` and getting 500s in a loop. A concurrent agent root-caused the+same defect independently and committed the fix (`d668ceece`, re-including+`services/` in the `.gcloudignore` allowlist, the identical failure shape as the+`agents/` and `.agents/` entries above it in that file). The fix is committed and+**not** in production, so only a deploy clears it. That is now the strongest+argument in row 1, and row 1 already carries it.+## 2026-09-02: OWNER-ACTIONS re-measured, and the audit that would have lied about row 3Measured, not carried over: production still `ad7b54c16` (2026-08-28, revision 00404-ph7)