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feat: HOL plugin scanner CI and SECURITY.md

narrow-adventureafab522632dc
diff --git a/.github/workflows/plugin-scanner.yml b/.github/workflows/plugin-scanner.yml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3ad39fc1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/workflows/plugin-scanner.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+name: Plugin Scanner
+
+# HOL plugin scanner over the whole repo, which is what the `tw` Claude plugin
+# installs (.claude-plugin/marketplace.json sources "./"). awesome-ai-plugins
+# counts this workflow as maintained scanner CI only while it triggers on push
+# or pull_request and uses hashgraph-online/ai-plugin-scanner-action.
+#
+# Both actions are SHA-pinned, unlike the rest of this repo: the scanner scores
+# unpinned actions down, and its own guide pins them this way.
+on:
+ push:
+ branches: [main]
+ pull_request:
+ types: [labeled]
+ workflow_dispatch:
+
+permissions:
+ contents: read
+
+concurrency:
+ group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
+ cancel-in-progress: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' }}
+
+jobs:
+ scan:
+ if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' || github.event.label.name == 'ci'
+ runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+ timeout-minutes: 15
+ steps:
+ - name: Checkout
+ uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
+ with:
+ persist-credentials: false
+
+ - name: Scan
+ uses: hashgraph-online/ai-plugin-scanner-action@edbeb3f8f350b65cc350830b44cb3a7ff5d9bdc4 # v1.2.699
+ with:
+ plugin_dir: "."
+ config: ".plugin-scanner.toml"
+ trust_repository_policy: "true"
+ min_score: 80
+ fail_on_severity: high
diff --git a/.plugin-scanner.toml b/.plugin-scanner.toml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..08c5a5a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.plugin-scanner.toml
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+[scanner]
+ignore_paths = [
+ "*_test.go",
+ "backend/static/frontend/*",
+ "benchmarks/*",
+ "docker-compose*.yml",
+ "docs/*",
+ "examples/*",
+ "testing/*",
+]
diff --git a/CLAUDE.md b/CLAUDE.md
index fef85dc9..8d925333 100644
--- a/CLAUDE.md
+++ b/CLAUDE.md
@@ -41,9 +41,9 @@ Traceway is an error tracking and monitoring platform consisting of:
Set `JWT_SECRET` (min 32 characters) before running the backend — it is the one variable with no default in the standalone binary (the all-in-one Docker image bakes a public one in via `backend/.env.docker`, which must be overridden in production). `SQLITE_PATH` sets the database location, defaulting to `./traceway.db` in the working directory.
-CI on pull requests is opt-in. `backend.yml`, `backend-vulncheck.yml`, `cli.yml`, `cli-lint.yml`, `cli-contract.yml` and `frontend.yml` listen for `pull_request: types: [labeled]` and every job is gated on `github.event.label.name == 'ci'`, so a PR runs nothing until a maintainer applies the `ci` label (only collaborators can), and applying any other label runs nothing either. Each application validates the PR as it is at that moment: to validate later pushes, remove and re-add the label. The same workflows still run on pushes to `main` that touch their paths (`backend/**`, `cli/**`, `frontend/**`, `skills/traceway/**` for `cli.yml`, `.nvmrc` for `frontend.yml`, their own workflow file), on their daily schedules (the two vulnchecks), and from the Actions tab via `workflow_dispatch`.
+CI on pull requests is opt-in. `backend.yml`, `backend-vulncheck.yml`, `cli.yml`, `cli-lint.yml`, `cli-contract.yml`, `frontend.yml` and `plugin-scanner.yml` listen for `pull_request: types: [labeled]` and every job is gated on `github.event.label.name == 'ci'`, so a PR runs nothing until a maintainer applies the `ci` label (only collaborators can), and applying any other label runs nothing either. Each application validates the PR as it is at that moment: to validate later pushes, remove and re-add the label. The same workflows still run on pushes to `main` that touch their paths (`backend/**`, `cli/**`, `frontend/**`, `skills/traceway/**` for `cli.yml`, `.nvmrc` for `frontend.yml`, their own workflow file; `plugin-scanner.yml` runs on every push to `main` because it scans the whole repo), on their daily schedules (the two vulnchecks), and from the Actions tab via `workflow_dispatch`.
-Action versions are watched by `.github/dependabot.yml` (the `github-actions` ecosystem only; npm and Go modules are deliberately not watched there). It opens a weekly PR per group — `actions/*` in one, every third-party action in the other — and deliberately does **not** auto-apply `ci`, so a bot PR passes the same collaborator gate as any other. Label the first-party group to validate it; `golangci/golangci-lint-action` is reachable the same way via `cli-lint.yml`. The rest of the third-party group lands on `release-*.yml`, `benchmark-*.yml` and `traceway-autofix.yml`, which no label reaches — and `workflow_dispatch` is **not** a dry run on the release path: dispatching `release-docs.yml` or `release-website.yml` deploys to Cloudflare for real, and the other `release-*.yml` workflows publish real assets, so dispatching one from an unreviewed bot branch ships it. Validate those by reading the action's release notes instead, and dispatch only where the target is disposable. `traceway-autofix.yml` is the in-repo caller of the reusable `autofix.yml` (composite actions `.github/actions/autofix-prepare` and `autofix-publish` around the agent step; `docs/pages/learn/auto-fix.mdx` documents the contract); its `workflow_dispatch` takes an `issue_number` and runs the whole loop from the dispatched branch, which is the one pre-merge validation path for the `claude-code-action` pin — the most privileged action here — but it runs the agent for real, so dispatch it only at a scratch issue. Note too that labelling a PR which touches no gated workflow yields zero checks, which reads like a pass but is silence. Every updatable pin is a bare major tag, so Dependabot only ever proposes major bumps here.
+Action versions are watched by `.github/dependabot.yml` (the `github-actions` ecosystem only; npm and Go modules are deliberately not watched there). It opens a weekly PR per group — `actions/*` in one, every third-party action in the other — and deliberately does **not** auto-apply `ci`, so a bot PR passes the same collaborator gate as any other. Label the first-party group to validate it; `golangci/golangci-lint-action` is reachable the same way via `cli-lint.yml`. The rest of the third-party group lands on `release-*.yml`, `benchmark-*.yml` and `traceway-autofix.yml`, which no label reaches — and `workflow_dispatch` is **not** a dry run on the release path: dispatching `release-docs.yml` or `release-website.yml` deploys to Cloudflare for real, and the other `release-*.yml` workflows publish real assets, so dispatching one from an unreviewed bot branch ships it. Validate those by reading the action's release notes instead, and dispatch only where the target is disposable. `traceway-autofix.yml` is the in-repo caller of the reusable `autofix.yml` (composite actions `.github/actions/autofix-prepare` and `autofix-publish` around the agent step; `docs/pages/learn/auto-fix.mdx` documents the contract); its `workflow_dispatch` takes an `issue_number` and runs the whole loop from the dispatched branch, which is the one pre-merge validation path for the `claude-code-action` pin — the most privileged action here — but it runs the agent for real, so dispatch it only at a scratch issue. Note too that labelling a PR which touches no gated workflow yields zero checks, which reads like a pass but is silence. Every updatable pin is a bare major tag, so Dependabot only ever proposes major bumps here. The exception is `plugin-scanner.yml`, which pins both actions to commit SHAs because the HOL scanner scores unpinned actions down; Dependabot bumps those SHAs along with their version comments. It uses the scanner config in `.plugin-scanner.toml`, whose `ignore_paths` only cover fixtures, demos and build output.
### Tech Stack
- **Frontend**: SvelteKit 2.49, Svelte 5.45, Tailwind CSS v4, shadcn-svelte, Vite 7
diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..4a0e418c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SECURITY.md
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# Security Policy
+
+## Supported Versions
+
+Security fixes land on `main` and ship in the next release. Only the latest release of each component is supported:
+
+| Component | Supported |
+| ------------------------------------------------- | -------------- |
+| Traceway server (Docker images, binaries, Helm) | Latest release |
+| `traceway` CLI | Latest release |
+| Agent skills (`skills/`, `.claude-plugin/`) | `main` |
+
+Older versions do not receive backports. Upgrade to the latest release to get a fix.
+
+## Reporting a Vulnerability
+
+Please do not open a public issue for a security problem.
+
+Email **[email protected]** with:
+
+- the affected component and version
+- steps to reproduce, or a proof of concept
+- the impact you expect
+
+You will get an acknowledgement within 3 business days. We will keep you updated while we work on a fix and credit you in the release notes unless you ask us not to.
+
+## Scope
+
+In scope: the backend API, the dashboard, the CLI, the OAuth and device flows, ingest endpoints, and the agent skills in this repository.
+
+Out of scope: the placeholder credentials in `docker-compose*.yml`, `examples/`, `testing/`, `benchmarks/` and test files. They exist for local development and must be replaced in production, as the docs say.