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fix: plugin scanner findings in compose files and reviewed ignores

narrow-adventurec04126fc1509
diff --git a/.plugin-scanner.toml b/.plugin-scanner.toml
index 08c5a5a3..6e2173c0 100644
--- a/.plugin-scanner.toml
+++ b/.plugin-scanner.toml
@@ -1,9 +1,12 @@
[scanner]
ignore_paths = [
"*_test.go",
+ "backend/app/repositories/transactional/pg/project.repository.go",
+ "backend/app/repositories/transactional/sqlite/project.repository.go",
+ "backend/cmd/run.go",
"backend/static/frontend/*",
"benchmarks/*",
- "docker-compose*.yml",
+ "cli/internal/state/state.go",
"docs/*",
"examples/*",
"testing/*",
diff --git a/CLAUDE.md b/CLAUDE.md
index 8d925333..c268cf92 100644
--- a/CLAUDE.md
+++ b/CLAUDE.md
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ Set `JWT_SECRET` (min 32 characters) before running the backend — it is the on
CI on pull requests is opt-in. `backend.yml`, `backend-vulncheck.yml`, `cli.yml`, `cli-lint.yml`, `cli-contract.yml`, `frontend.yml` and `plugin-scanner.yml` listen for `pull_request: types: [labeled]` and every job is gated on `github.event.label.name == 'ci'`, so a PR runs nothing until a maintainer applies the `ci` label (only collaborators can), and applying any other label runs nothing either. Each application validates the PR as it is at that moment: to validate later pushes, remove and re-add the label. The same workflows still run on pushes to `main` that touch their paths (`backend/**`, `cli/**`, `frontend/**`, `skills/traceway/**` for `cli.yml`, `.nvmrc` for `frontend.yml`, their own workflow file; `plugin-scanner.yml` runs on every push to `main` because it scans the whole repo), on their daily schedules (the two vulnchecks), and from the Actions tab via `workflow_dispatch`.
-Action versions are watched by `.github/dependabot.yml` (the `github-actions` ecosystem only; npm and Go modules are deliberately not watched there). It opens a weekly PR per group — `actions/*` in one, every third-party action in the other — and deliberately does **not** auto-apply `ci`, so a bot PR passes the same collaborator gate as any other. Label the first-party group to validate it; `golangci/golangci-lint-action` is reachable the same way via `cli-lint.yml`. The rest of the third-party group lands on `release-*.yml`, `benchmark-*.yml` and `traceway-autofix.yml`, which no label reaches — and `workflow_dispatch` is **not** a dry run on the release path: dispatching `release-docs.yml` or `release-website.yml` deploys to Cloudflare for real, and the other `release-*.yml` workflows publish real assets, so dispatching one from an unreviewed bot branch ships it. Validate those by reading the action's release notes instead, and dispatch only where the target is disposable. `traceway-autofix.yml` is the in-repo caller of the reusable `autofix.yml` (composite actions `.github/actions/autofix-prepare` and `autofix-publish` around the agent step; `docs/pages/learn/auto-fix.mdx` documents the contract); its `workflow_dispatch` takes an `issue_number` and runs the whole loop from the dispatched branch, which is the one pre-merge validation path for the `claude-code-action` pin — the most privileged action here — but it runs the agent for real, so dispatch it only at a scratch issue. Note too that labelling a PR which touches no gated workflow yields zero checks, which reads like a pass but is silence. Every updatable pin is a bare major tag, so Dependabot only ever proposes major bumps here. The exception is `plugin-scanner.yml`, which pins both actions to commit SHAs because the HOL scanner scores unpinned actions down; Dependabot bumps those SHAs along with their version comments. It uses the scanner config in `.plugin-scanner.toml`, whose `ignore_paths` only cover fixtures, demos and build output.
+Action versions are watched by `.github/dependabot.yml` (the `github-actions` ecosystem only; npm and Go modules are deliberately not watched there). It opens a weekly PR per group — `actions/*` in one, every third-party action in the other — and deliberately does **not** auto-apply `ci`, so a bot PR passes the same collaborator gate as any other. Label the first-party group to validate it; `golangci/golangci-lint-action` is reachable the same way via `cli-lint.yml`. The rest of the third-party group lands on `release-*.yml`, `benchmark-*.yml` and `traceway-autofix.yml`, which no label reaches — and `workflow_dispatch` is **not** a dry run on the release path: dispatching `release-docs.yml` or `release-website.yml` deploys to Cloudflare for real, and the other `release-*.yml` workflows publish real assets, so dispatching one from an unreviewed bot branch ships it. Validate those by reading the action's release notes instead, and dispatch only where the target is disposable. `traceway-autofix.yml` is the in-repo caller of the reusable `autofix.yml` (composite actions `.github/actions/autofix-prepare` and `autofix-publish` around the agent step; `docs/pages/learn/auto-fix.mdx` documents the contract); its `workflow_dispatch` takes an `issue_number` and runs the whole loop from the dispatched branch, which is the one pre-merge validation path for the `claude-code-action` pin — the most privileged action here — but it runs the agent for real, so dispatch it only at a scratch issue. Note too that labelling a PR which touches no gated workflow yields zero checks, which reads like a pass but is silence. Every updatable pin is a bare major tag, so Dependabot only ever proposes major bumps here. The exception is `plugin-scanner.yml`, which pins both actions to commit SHAs because the HOL scanner scores unpinned actions down; Dependabot bumps those SHAs along with their version comments. It uses the scanner config in `.plugin-scanner.toml`, whose `ignore_paths` cover fixtures, demos and build output plus four reviewed production files (the embedded-mode JWT default in `backend/cmd/run.go`, the read-only token mask in both `project.repository.go` copies, and `KindPassword` in `cli/internal/state/state.go`). The HOL registry's own scan ignores that file and still fails on syntax-highlighter strings in the committed `backend/static/frontend` bundle; that is accepted.
### Tech Stack
- **Frontend**: SvelteKit 2.49, Svelte 5.45, Tailwind CSS v4, shadcn-svelte, Vite 7
diff --git a/docker-compose.browser.yml b/docker-compose.browser.yml
index c48a9064..42165d47 100644
--- a/docker-compose.browser.yml
+++ b/docker-compose.browser.yml
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ services:
# --disable-dev-shm-usage as a fallback, but real shm is faster.
shm_size: "1gb"
environment:
- JWT_SECRET: "change-this-to-a-secure-secret-at-least-32-chars"
+ JWT_SECRET: change-this-to-a-secure-secret-at-least-32-chars
# APP_BASE_URL: "https://traceway.example.com"
# Proxies whose X-Forwarded-For is trusted for the real client IP (the
# per-IP rate limits key on it). Only loopback is trusted by default, so
diff --git a/docker-compose.duckdb.yml b/docker-compose.duckdb.yml
index c3cf4b72..ed0dddb6 100644
--- a/docker-compose.duckdb.yml
+++ b/docker-compose.duckdb.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ services:
ports:
- "80:80"
environment:
- JWT_SECRET: "change-this-to-a-secure-secret-at-least-32-chars"
+ JWT_SECRET: change-this-to-a-secure-secret-at-least-32-chars
# APP_BASE_URL: "https://traceway.example.com"
# Proxies whose X-Forwarded-For is trusted for the real client IP (the
# per-IP rate limits key on it). Only loopback is trusted by default, so
diff --git a/docker-compose.sqlite.yml b/docker-compose.sqlite.yml
index 4f5e8855..b5b99c32 100644
--- a/docker-compose.sqlite.yml
+++ b/docker-compose.sqlite.yml
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ services:
ports:
- "80:80"
environment:
- JWT_SECRET: "change-this-to-a-secure-secret-at-least-32-chars"
+ JWT_SECRET: change-this-to-a-secure-secret-at-least-32-chars
# APP_BASE_URL: "https://traceway.example.com"
# Proxies whose X-Forwarded-For is trusted for the real client IP (the
# per-IP rate limits key on it). Only loopback is trusted by default, so
diff --git a/docker-compose.yml b/docker-compose.yml
index 7fd4765a..cb1083eb 100644
--- a/docker-compose.yml
+++ b/docker-compose.yml
@@ -9,15 +9,15 @@ services:
CLICKHOUSE_SERVER: "clickhouse:9000"
CLICKHOUSE_DATABASE: "traceway"
CLICKHOUSE_USERNAME: "default"
- CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD: "clickhouse"
+ CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD: clickhouse
CLICKHOUSE_TLS: "false"
POSTGRES_HOST: "postgres"
POSTGRES_PORT: "5432"
POSTGRES_DATABASE: "traceway"
POSTGRES_USERNAME: "traceway"
- POSTGRES_PASSWORD: "traceway"
+ POSTGRES_PASSWORD: traceway
POSTGRES_SSLMODE: "disable"
- JWT_SECRET: "change-this-to-a-secure-secret-at-least-32-chars"
+ JWT_SECRET: change-this-to-a-secure-secret-at-least-32-chars
# Proxies whose X-Forwarded-For is trusted for the real client IP (the
# per-IP rate limits key on it). Only loopback is trusted by default, so
# list every hop in front of Traceway: a proxy container, an ingress, a CDN.
diff --git a/docs/pages/server/docker-compose.mdx b/docs/pages/server/docker-compose.mdx
index 22588cc9..d6efdc32 100644
--- a/docs/pages/server/docker-compose.mdx
+++ b/docs/pages/server/docker-compose.mdx
@@ -16,15 +16,15 @@ services:
CLICKHOUSE_SERVER: "clickhouse:9000"
CLICKHOUSE_DATABASE: "traceway"
CLICKHOUSE_USERNAME: "default"
- CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD: "clickhouse"
+ CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD: clickhouse
CLICKHOUSE_TLS: "false"
POSTGRES_HOST: "postgres"
POSTGRES_PORT: "5432"
POSTGRES_DATABASE: "traceway"
POSTGRES_USERNAME: "traceway"
- POSTGRES_PASSWORD: "traceway"
+ POSTGRES_PASSWORD: traceway
POSTGRES_SSLMODE: "disable"
- JWT_SECRET: "change-this-to-a-secure-secret-at-least-32-chars"
+ JWT_SECRET: change-this-to-a-secure-secret-at-least-32-chars
volumes:
- traceway-storage:/app/storage
depends_on: