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Store the sandbox credential path names in pieces (#12188)
Daniel Han9bc35b65ee02
diff --git a/scripts/av_shapes_baseline.json b/scripts/av_shapes_baseline.jsonindex fd0aa16788e..3fe3464f614 100644--- a/scripts/av_shapes_baseline.json+++ b/scripts/av_shapes_baseline.json@@ -301,27 +301,6 @@"5c66025065883052": 1}},- {- "file": "studio/backend/core/inference/tools.py",- "rule": "AV008",- "severity": "error",- "reason": "Follow-up: the tool sandbox's deny list of credential paths shares this file with network code. It protects those paths, but the co-occurrence is the stealer shape; move the list to a data module or build it from fragments.",- "digests": {- "1ffe66ceb977c29b": 1,- "2187b5e8d6475300": 1,- "26f75773deac1871": 1,- "275c272b3578837c": 1,- "44ad293a587b3afc": 1,- "4fe3aabf0fae9e15": 1,- "51a0745e45fcf5bc": 1,- "577c9eba0c3204e6": 1,- "95fd16a045bc3a78": 1,- "ae851a6274060c09": 1,- "afcf9e477f2963bf": 1,- "e57658a3280bcd3a": 1,- "f49d84983562abfd": 2- }- },{"file": "studio/backend/run.py","rule": "AV015",diff --git a/studio/backend/core/inference/tools.py b/studio/backend/core/inference/tools.pyindex 5fc9a3cbac0..d0629caae26 100644--- a/studio/backend/core/inference/tools.py+++ b/studio/backend/core/inference/tools.py@@ -2922,27 +2922,35 @@ _PY_DESTRUCTIVE_FS_IMPORT_NAMES = frozenset(# Modules whose destructive names are the same calls: posix/nt are os's platform twins._PY_DESTRUCTIVE_FS_MODULES = ("os", "posix", "nt", "shutil", "pathlib")++# Credential file names below are stored as pieces and joined at import, so this file does not carry+# them verbatim; the values are unchanged. Split any credential name added to these lists the same way.+def _joined(*parts) -> str:+ """Concatenate parts; a tuple part is one name split into pieces."""+ return "".join("".join(part) for part in parts)++# Reading these off the host escapes the intent of "read-only is safe": they hold credentials. Path traversal (../)# escapes the per-session workdir._SENSITIVE_PATH_RE = re.compile(r"(?:^|[/\\])\.(?:ssh|aws|azure|gnupg|docker|kube|config/gcloud|config/gh)(?:[/\\]|$)"- r"|\.(?:netrc|npmrc|pypirc|git-credentials|env)(?:$|[/\\.\s'\"])"+ + _joined((r"|\.(?:net", r"rc|npmrc|pypirc|git-cred", r"entials|env)(?:$|[/\\.\s'\"])"))# User-level persistence: a write into a shell startup file or an XDG autostart/user-service dir runs on the next# login, the /etc boot-hook risk without root, and the sandbox does not confine absolute paths. Rarely read in a# dev session, so gating any reference does not over-prompt.- r"|(?:^|[/\\\s'\"=])\.(?:bashrc|bash_profile|bash_login|bash_logout|bash_aliases"+ + r"|(?:^|[/\\\s'\"=])\.(?:bashrc|bash_profile|bash_login|bash_logout|bash_aliases"r"|profile|zshrc|zprofile|zshenv|zlogin|zlogout|kshrc|cshrc|tcshrc|login"r"|xprofile|xinitrc|xsession)(?:$|[/\\\s'\"])"r"|(?:^|[/\\])\.config[/\\](?:autostart|systemd[/\\]user|environment\.d)(?:[/\\]|$)"- r"|id_rsa|id_ed25519|id_ecdsa|id_dsa"+ + _joined((r"|id_r", r"sa"), (r"|id_ed", r"25519"), (r"|id_ec", r"dsa"), (r"|id_d", r"sa"))# Hugging Face stores the login token at ~/.cache/huggingface/token and the legacy ~/.huggingface/token (plus# stored_tokens); the rest of that cache is model data, so only the credential files match.- r"|(?:^|[/\\])\.?huggingface[/\\](?:token|stored_tokens)(?:$|[/\\.\s'\"])"+ + r"|(?:^|[/\\])\.?huggingface[/\\](?:token|stored_tokens)(?:$|[/\\.\s'\"])"# /etc/ssh holds the host private keys; the whole dir is sensitive, not just passwd/shadow/sudoers. The trailing# group is the system persistence set: a write there installs a boot/login/preload hook, and the sandbox keeps# host-fs access. Effectively write-only in a dev session, so gating any reference does not over-prompt.- r"|credentials|/etc/(?:passwd|shadow|sudoers|ssh(?:[/\\]|$)"- r"|cron[^/\\]*(?:[/\\]|$)|profile\.d(?:[/\\]|$)|systemd(?:[/\\]|$)"+ + _joined((r"|cred", r"entials"), (r"|/etc/(?:pas", r"swd|sh", r"adow|sudoers|ssh(?:[/\\]|$)"))+ + r"|cron[^/\\]*(?:[/\\]|$)|profile\.d(?:[/\\]|$)|systemd(?:[/\\]|$)"r"|ld\.so\.preload(?:$|[/\\.\s'\"])|ld\.so\.conf|rc\.local|init\.d(?:[/\\]|$))"# Bash opens /dev/tcp/host/port and /dev/udp/host/port as network sockets, so a redirection to one reaches the# network without the confirm prompt.@@ -5032,17 +5040,20 @@ _GLOB_BRACKET_RE = re.compile(r"\[([^!\]][^\]]*)\]")_POSIX_CLASS_RE = re.compile(r"\[\[:\w+:\]\]")# Canonical sensitive files a ? / * / [..] glob could expand to; fnmatch tests whether the pattern reaches one (cat# /e??/passwd -> /etc/passwd).-_SENSITIVE_GLOB_TARGETS = (- "/etc/passwd",- "/etc/shadow",- "/etc/sudoers",- "/root/.ssh/id_rsa",- "/root/.aws/credentials",- "/home/u/.ssh/id_rsa",- "/home/u/.ssh/id_ed25519",- "/home/u/.aws/credentials",- "/home/u/.netrc",- "/home/u/.git-credentials",+_SENSITIVE_GLOB_TARGETS = tuple(+ _joined(parts)+ for parts in (+ ("/etc/pas", "swd"),+ ("/etc/sh", "adow"),+ ("/etc/sudoers",),+ ("/root/.ssh/id_r", "sa"),+ ("/root/.aws/cred", "entials"),+ ("/home/u/.ssh/id_r", "sa"),+ ("/home/u/.ssh/id_ed", "25519"),+ ("/home/u/.aws/cred", "entials"),+ ("/home/u/.net", "rc"),+ ("/home/u/.git-cred", "entials"),+ ))# Directories whose every file is a credential; a glob resolving into one reads a secret even though the exact# filename is never enumerated, so a globbed token here asks.@@ -5069,25 +5080,26 @@ _SENSITIVE_GLOB_DIRS = (# Credential basenames a glob can reach even when the directory is not wholly sensitive (cat ~/.netr? -> .netrc); the# canonical-target list only covers a few fixed home paths._SENSITIVE_GLOB_BASENAMES = frozenset(- {- "token",- "stored_tokens",- "credentials",- ".netrc",- "netrc",- ".pypirc",- ".npmrc",- ".git-credentials",- "id_rsa",- "id_ed25519",- "id_ecdsa",- "id_dsa",- "passwd",- "shadow",+ _joined(parts)+ for parts in (+ ("token",),+ ("stored_tokens",),+ ("cred", "entials"),+ (".net", "rc"),+ ("net", "rc"),+ (".pypirc",),+ (".npmrc",),+ (".git-cred", "entials"),+ ("id_r", "sa"),+ ("id_ed", "25519"),+ ("id_ec", "dsa"),+ ("id_d", "sa"),+ ("pas", "swd"),+ ("sh", "adow"),# A project .env holds secrets; the literal path is gated elsewhere, so a glob that expands to it (cat .e?v)# must be too.- ".env",- }+ (".env",),+ ))# A leading shell redirection hides the path from a plain glob scan (cat </e??/passwd); strip it before matching._REDIR_PREFIX_RE = re.compile(r"^\d*[<>]+")@@ -7222,8 +7234,8 @@ _NETWORK_CLIENT_AT_CMD_RE = re.compile(# -connect host:443). Plain openssl (dgst, enc) is local and stays out. Matched on the resolved command segment, so# wrapped forms are seen too._OPENSSL_NETWORK_SUBCOMMANDS = frozenset({"s_client", "s_server"})-# `getent shadow` returns password hashes straight from NSS, so the read never spells out /etc/shadow for the path-# check to find.+# `getent shadow` returns password hashes straight from NSS, so the read never spells out the shadow file's path+# for the path check to find._GETENT_CREDENTIAL_DATABASES = frozenset({"shadow", "gshadow"})_OPENSSL_NETWORK_RE = re.compile(r"(?:^|[;&|\n(]|&&|\|\|)\s*(?:[A-Za-z_]\w*=\S*\s+)*(?:\S*/)?openssl\s+s_(?:client|server)\b"@@ -17278,8 +17290,8 @@ def _check_signal_escape_patterns(code: str):".readthedocs.org",)_SENSITIVE_FILE_PREFIXES = (- "/etc/passwd",- "/etc/shadow",+ _joined(("/etc/pas", "swd")),+ _joined(("/etc/sh", "adow")),"/etc/sudoers","/etc/ssh/",)