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Studio: tell the operator what the refusal path will actually do

danielhanchenad6904445671
diff --git a/studio/backend/run.py b/studio/backend/run.py
index e5a98de78e9..09fce7ab92c 100644
--- a/studio/backend/run.py
+++ b/studio/backend/run.py
@@ -2343,13 +2343,40 @@ def _terminal_password_gate(
# case (docker/studio_run.sh execs `unsloth studio -H 0.0.0.0` and only
# supplies a password when the initial-password file is non-empty), so
# aborting would stop a container that starts today. Warn and proceed at the
- # protection level this launch already had: the bootstrap deadline.
+ # protection level this launch already had.
+ #
+ # Which is sometimes NO protection: with UNSLOTH_STUDIO_BOOTSTRAP_TIMEOUT=0
+ # the deadline never arms, so promising a shutdown would be false, and it is
+ # the one sentence an operator would act on. Say what will actually happen.
+ # Still proceed rather than fail closed: this launch worked before the prompt
+ # existed, the operator disabled the deadline deliberately and cancelled the
+ # prompt deliberately, and refusing to start would break the very case the
+ # paragraph above exists to protect.
+ deadline_arms = should_arm_bootstrap_timeout(
+ host = host,
+ secure = secure,
+ api_only = api_only,
+ frontend_served = frontend_served,
+ is_colab = is_colab,
+ requires_change = True,
+ timeout_seconds = bootstrap_timeout_seconds(),
+ )
+ if deadline_arms:
+ tail = (
+ "Unsloth shuts down after the bootstrap deadline "
+ "(UNSLOTH_STUDIO_BOOTSTRAP_TIMEOUT, default 1h) unless the password "
+ "is changed."
+ )
+ else:
+ tail = (
+ "The bootstrap shutdown deadline is DISABLED for this launch "
+ "(UNSLOTH_STUDIO_BOOTSTRAP_TIMEOUT=0), so nothing will stop it "
+ "serving that credential."
+ )
print(
" WARNING: continuing with the auto-generated admin password on a bind "
- "that is reachable from the network. Unsloth shuts down after the "
- "bootstrap deadline (UNSLOTH_STUDIO_BOOTSTRAP_TIMEOUT, default 1h) "
- "unless the password is changed. Change it by logging in, or with "
- "`unsloth studio reset-password`.",
+ f"that is reachable from the network. {tail} Change it by logging in, or "
+ "with `unsloth studio reset-password`.",
file = sys.stderr,
flush = True,
)
diff --git a/studio/backend/tests/test_password_prompt_backstop.py b/studio/backend/tests/test_password_prompt_backstop.py
index 82803caa9b2..d01f1122086 100644
--- a/studio/backend/tests/test_password_prompt_backstop.py
+++ b/studio/backend/tests/test_password_prompt_backstop.py
@@ -755,3 +755,44 @@ def test_the_gate_deadlines_a_raw_bind_prompt_and_never_the_tunnel(monkeypatch):
_patch_seeded_admin(monkeypatch, requires_change = True)
run._terminal_password_gate(tunnel_will_start = True, **_GATE_KWARGS)
assert seen["first_key_timeout"] is None
+
+
+def test_a_refusal_does_not_promise_a_deadline_that_is_disabled(monkeypatch):
+ """With TIMEOUT=0 nothing will shut this instance down; do not say otherwise.
+
+ The refusal path proceeds on purpose, because the launch worked before the
+ prompt existed. What it must not do is tell the operator a deadline will
+ rescue them when `should_arm_bootstrap_timeout` will not arm one: that is the
+ single sentence they would act on.
+ """
+ monkeypatch.setenv("UNSLOTH_STUDIO_BOOTSTRAP_TIMEOUT", "0")
+ stderr = _patch_streams(monkeypatch, tty = True)
+ _patch_seeded_admin(monkeypatch, requires_change = True)
+
+ from auth import terminal_prompt
+ monkeypatch.setattr(terminal_prompt, "prompt_for_password_change",
+ lambda **_kw: False)
+
+ assert run._terminal_password_gate(
+ tunnel_will_start = False, **_RAW_BIND_KWARGS
+ ) == (True, False)
+ err = stderr.getvalue()
+ assert "DISABLED for this launch" in err, err
+ assert "shuts down after the bootstrap deadline" not in err, err
+
+
+def test_a_refusal_still_names_the_deadline_when_one_will_arm(monkeypatch):
+ monkeypatch.delenv("UNSLOTH_STUDIO_BOOTSTRAP_TIMEOUT", raising = False)
+ stderr = _patch_streams(monkeypatch, tty = True)
+ _patch_seeded_admin(monkeypatch, requires_change = True)
+
+ from auth import terminal_prompt
+ monkeypatch.setattr(terminal_prompt, "prompt_for_password_change",
+ lambda **_kw: False)
+
+ assert run._terminal_password_gate(
+ tunnel_will_start = False, **_RAW_BIND_KWARGS
+ ) == (True, False)
+ err = stderr.getvalue()
+ assert "shuts down after the bootstrap deadline" in err, err
+ assert "DISABLED" not in err, err
diff --git a/unsloth_cli/commands/studio.py b/unsloth_cli/commands/studio.py
index a26220619d6..1472d68c6f3 100644
--- a/unsloth_cli/commands/studio.py
+++ b/unsloth_cli/commands/studio.py
@@ -1640,7 +1640,14 @@ def _enforce_password_change_before_exposure(
# bind is every network interface, which is the LAN behind a NAT router and
# the internet on a cloud box. Naming the wrong one in an error trains people
# to ignore it, and would be plainly wrong for `unsloth studio -H 0.0.0.0`.
- tunnel_will_start = secure or cloudflare is True
+ # The real predicate, not `cloudflare is True`. A non-secure tunnel only
+ # starts for a wildcard host, so `--cloudflare -H 192.168.1.50` starts no
+ # tunnel and is reachable through the raw bind instead. Naming the wrong one
+ # here would tell the operator their credential is about to go on a public
+ # Cloudflare URL when it is not, in the one message they are meant to act on.
+ tunnel_will_start = _launch_publishes_tunnel(
+ cloudflare = cloudflare, host = host, secure = secure, api_only = api_only
+ )
exposure = "on a public Cloudflare URL" if tunnel_will_start else "on every network interface"
# Before public exposure we must PROVE the admin password is no longer the
# seeded default. If we cannot (auth DB won't open, or a fresh admin cannot be
diff --git a/unsloth_cli/tests/test_studio_password_prompt.py b/unsloth_cli/tests/test_studio_password_prompt.py
index 6a84774d7ab..f42e885a1b6 100644
--- a/unsloth_cli/tests/test_studio_password_prompt.py
+++ b/unsloth_cli/tests/test_studio_password_prompt.py
@@ -1989,3 +1989,36 @@ def test_read_masked_gives_up_on_a_pty_nobody_types_into(monkeypatch):
finally:
os.close(master)
os.close(slave)
+
+
+ "cloudflare,host,secure,expect_tunnel_wording",
+ [
+ # --secure always publishes a tunnel.
+ (None, "127.0.0.1", True, True),
+ # --cloudflare tunnels only WILDCARD hosts...
+ (True, "0.0.0.0", False, True),
+ # ...so a concrete bind is reachable through the raw socket, not a URL.
+ (True, "192.168.1.50", False, False),
+ (True, "example.com", False, False),
+ # No tunnel requested at all.
+ (None, "0.0.0.0", False, False),
+ (None, "192.168.1.50", False, False),
+ ],
+)
+def test_the_exposure_wording_matches_what_will_actually_happen(
+ monkeypatch, tmp_path, cloudflare, host, secure, expect_tunnel_wording
+):
+ """The prompt must not claim a public Cloudflare URL that never starts.
+
+ `--cloudflare -H 192.168.1.50` requests a tunnel that _launch_publishes_tunnel
+ will not start, because a non-secure tunnel needs a wildcard host. Deriving the
+ message from the request rather than the predicate told the operator their
+ credential was about to go on a public URL when it was going on the LAN.
+ """
+ studio_mod = _studio()
+ monkeypatch.setattr(studio_mod, "_prompt_streams_interactive", lambda: True)
+ tunnel = studio_mod._launch_publishes_tunnel(
+ cloudflare = cloudflare, host = host, secure = secure, api_only = False
+ )
+ assert tunnel is expect_tunnel_wording