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UN-3586 [FEAT] Allow platform API key rotation via API (#2133)

Deepak K219b7e2bbd1e
diff --git a/backend/platform_api/permissions.py b/backend/platform_api/permissions.py
index 12f23e63d..32d6de2f3 100644
--- a/backend/platform_api/permissions.py
+++ b/backend/platform_api/permissions.py
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ import logging
from account_v2.authentication_controller import AuthenticationController
from rest_framework.permissions import BasePermission
+from platform_api.models import ApiKeyPermission
+
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -21,3 +23,43 @@ class IsOrganizationAdmin(BasePermission):
except Exception:
logger.exception("Error checking admin role for user %s", request.user.id)
return False
+
+
+class CanRotatePlatformApiKey(BasePermission):
+ """Permission for the ``rotate`` action (UN-3586).
+
+ - **Session callers** must be organization admins (an admin may rotate any
+ key in their org).
+ - **Platform API key callers** must present a ``full_access`` key — the
+ API/automation path that the admin-only ``IsOrganizationAdmin`` gate
+ otherwise blocks (it rejects service accounts). ``full_access`` is the
+ admin-equivalent tier (it already permits DELETE), so key management
+ belongs there.
+
+ Why ``full_access`` only (not any bearer key): ``rotate`` returns the new
+ key value in its response, so allowing a lower-tier ``read_write`` key to
+ rotate a ``full_access`` key would let it read that key's new secret and
+ escalate its privileges. Requiring ``full_access`` closes that path — a
+ ``full_access`` caller rotating any key gains no privilege (it is already
+ the top tier), matching what a session admin can do.
+
+ Rotation stays confined to the caller's own organization via the auth
+ middleware (URL org must match the key's org) and the org-scoped queryset.
+ """
+
+ message = (
+ "Rotating platform API keys requires an organization admin session or "
+ "a full_access platform API key."
+ )
+
+ def has_permission(self, request, view):
+ if not request.user or not request.user.is_authenticated:
+ return False
+ platform_key = getattr(request, "platform_api_key", None)
+ if platform_key is not None:
+ # Key-based caller: only a full_access key may rotate. Prevents a
+ # read_write key from rotating a full_access key and reading its new
+ # secret from the response (privilege escalation) — see docstring.
+ return platform_key.permission == ApiKeyPermission.FULL_ACCESS
+ # Session caller: must be an org admin (may rotate any key in the org).
+ return IsOrganizationAdmin().has_permission(request, view)
diff --git a/backend/platform_api/views.py b/backend/platform_api/views.py
index 2abf49812..6886e51dd 100644
--- a/backend/platform_api/views.py
+++ b/backend/platform_api/views.py
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ from rest_framework.response import Response
from utils.user_context import UserContext
from platform_api.models import PlatformApiKey
-from platform_api.permissions import IsOrganizationAdmin
+from platform_api.permissions import CanRotatePlatformApiKey, IsOrganizationAdmin
from platform_api.serializers import (
PlatformApiKeyCreateSerializer,
PlatformApiKeyDetailSerializer,
@@ -20,6 +20,13 @@ from platform_api.services import create_api_user_for_key
class PlatformApiKeyViewSet(viewsets.ModelViewSet):
permission_classes = [IsAuthenticated, IsOrganizationAdmin]
+ def get_permissions(self):
+ # Rotate allows self-service rotation by a platform API key (UN-3586);
+ # all other key-management actions stay admin/session-only.
+ if self.action == "rotate":
+ return [IsAuthenticated(), CanRotatePlatformApiKey()]
+ return super().get_permissions()
+
def get_queryset(self):
return PlatformApiKey.objects.filter(
organization=UserContext.get_organization(),