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Security notes in English, and three things that changed since they were written (#150)
WaylandYang4a00776114a1
diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.mdindex ab79113a..30815ea4 100644--- a/SECURITY.md+++ b/SECURITY.md@@ -1,28 +1,49 @@-# 安全说明--Utopia 目前是 v0.1。下面这些是**已知的、尚未解决的**限制 —— 不是漏洞报告,是设计上还没走到的地方。把它们写在这里,是因为一个卖点是「每条结论都可追溯」的项目,没有理由对自己的短板含糊。--## 部署到公网之前--### 凭据在数据库里是明文的--界面里录入的 LLM API Key、以及问数功能注册的数据库连接串,都以明文存在 Postgres 里。--能读到库的人就能拿到它们。静态加密是 1.0 之前的硬化项 —— 在那之前,请把这套系统和它的数据库部署在可信网络内,并且给数据库单独的访问控制。--### 数据库默认口令--compose 里数据库默认口令是 `utopia`。默认配置下端口只绑回环(`127.0.0.1:1517`),外网连不上,所以这不是紧急问题;但如果你改了 `UTOPIA_DB_BIND` 把它暴露出去,先换掉 `.env` 里的 `UTOPIA_DB_PASSWORD`。--## 已经做了的--- **JWT 签名密钥自动生成**:首次启动生成 32 字节 CSPRNG 存入数据库,不再有「所有部署共用同一个默认密钥」这回事。-- **会话 cookie 在 TLS 后面自动打 Secure**:按请求的 `X-Forwarded-Proto` 判定,走 HTTPS 就打上,浏览器不会再把 token 经明文链路发出去。没有反向代理时不打,本地 HTTP 开发照常。代理不发那个头的话,用 `UTOPIA_COOKIE_SECURE=true` 强制打开。-- **数据库端口只绑回环**:`127.0.0.1:1517`,app 走 compose 内网连库,那个映射只服务本地开发。-- **可选的受限运行角色**:配置 `UTOPIA_APP_DB_PASSWORD` 与 `UTOPIA_MIGRATION_URL` 后,应用以只读写业务表、对台账只增不改的角色连库,迁移另走 owner 身份。-- **问数 SQL 只读闸**:解析白名单、只读事务、强制行数上限。-- **口令哈希用 argon2**。--## 报告漏洞--发现了上面没有列出的问题,请开一个 issue。如果涉及可被利用的细节,先只写复现的最小信息,我们再私下沟通完整内容。+# Security++*[中文版](SECURITY.zh-CN.md)*++Utopia is at v0.1. Below are the **known, unresolved** limits — not a vulnerability report,+but the places the design has not reached yet.++## Before you put this on a public network++**Credentials are stored in the clear.** LLM API keys and Ask-the-Data connection strings+are plain text in Postgres (`llm_settings.chat_api_key`, `data_sources.conn_string`). Anyone+who can read the database can read them. Encryption at rest is a 1.0 item; until then, keep+the system and its database inside a trusted network.++**The default database password is `utopia`.** By default the port binds to loopback+(`127.0.0.1:1517`), so nothing outside the host can connect. If you change `UTOPIA_DB_BIND`+to expose it, change `UTOPIA_DB_PASSWORD` in `.env` first.++**A data source is only as safe as its grants.** Registering one is a deployment-level+action, but the connection string reaches every workspace the source is granted to. Grant it+only where that database should be visible, and use a read-only database role in the string+itself — the SQL gate below is defence in depth, not a substitute for least privilege at the+source.++## What is in place++- **JWT signing key generated on first start** — 32 bytes from a CSPRNG, stored in the+ database. No deployment shares a default key.+- **`Secure` on session cookies behind TLS** — decided from `X-Forwarded-Proto`, so local+ HTTP development still works. Force it with `UTOPIA_COOKIE_SECURE=true` if your proxy+ omits the header.+- **Database port bound to loopback** — `127.0.0.1:1517`; the app reaches the database over+ the compose network.+- **Optional least-privilege runtime role** — set `UTOPIA_APP_DB_PASSWORD` and+ `UTOPIA_MIGRATION_URL`, and the app connects as a role that can only read and write+ business tables and append to the ledger, while migrations run as the owner.+- **Data sources reach only granted workspaces** — a registered database is mounted into a+ knowledge base only where an explicit grant exists. Before this, any base admin could+ mount any registered source, which crossed tenants.+- **Read-only gate on Ask-the-Data** — parser allowlist, read-only transaction, enforced row+ limit; three layers, so a statement past the parser still cannot write.+- **Accounts are deactivated, not deleted** — `users.deactivated_at` blocks sign-in while the+ ledger keeps that person's decisions attributable.+- **Passwords hashed with argon2.**++## Reporting a vulnerability++Open an issue. If it involves exploitable detail, start with the minimum needed to reproduce+and we will follow up privately.diff --git a/SECURITY.zh-CN.md b/SECURITY.zh-CN.mdnew file mode 100644index 00000000..274957a8--- /dev/null+++ b/SECURITY.zh-CN.md@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@+# 安全说明++*[English](SECURITY.md)*++Utopia 目前是 v0.1。下面是**已知的、尚未解决的**限制 —— 不是漏洞报告,是设计上还没走到的地方。++## 部署到公网之前++**凭据在数据库里是明文的。** LLM API Key 与问数的数据库连接串以明文存在 Postgres 里(`llm_settings.chat_api_key`、`data_sources.conn_string`)。能读到库的人就能拿到它们。静态加密是 1.0 之前的硬化项,在那之前请把这套系统和它的数据库放在可信网络内。++**数据库默认口令是 `utopia`。** 默认配置下端口只绑回环(`127.0.0.1:1517`),外网连不上。如果你改了 `UTOPIA_DB_BIND` 把它暴露出去,先换掉 `.env` 里的 `UTOPIA_DB_PASSWORD`。++**数据源的安全上限是它的授权。** 注册数据源是部署级动作,而它携带的连接串会到达每一个被授权的工作区。只把源授权给该看见那个库的工作区,并且在连接串里就用只读的数据库角色 —— 下面那道 SQL 闸是纵深防御,不能替代源头的最小权限。++## 已经做了的++- **JWT 签名密钥首次启动生成** —— 32 字节 CSPRNG 存入数据库,没有「所有部署共用默认密钥」这回事。+- **TLS 后面自动给会话 cookie 打 `Secure`** —— 按 `X-Forwarded-Proto` 判定,本地 HTTP 开发照常。代理不发那个头时用 `UTOPIA_COOKIE_SECURE=true` 强制打开。+- **数据库端口只绑回环** —— `127.0.0.1:1517`,应用走 compose 内网连库。+- **可选的受限运行角色** —— 配置 `UTOPIA_APP_DB_PASSWORD` 与 `UTOPIA_MIGRATION_URL` 后,应用以只读写业务表、对台账只增不改的角色连库,迁移另走 owner 身份。+- **数据源只到达被授权的工作区** —— 注册过的库只有在存在明确授权时才能挂进某个知识库。在此之前,任何知识库管理员都能挂进任意已注册数据源,多工作区部署下这是跨租户的。+- **问数走只读闸** —— 解析白名单、只读事务、强制行数上限,三层,语句绕过 parser 也写不进去。+- **账号是停用不是删除** —— `users.deactivated_at` 挡住登录,而这个人做过的决定仍可归属地留在台账里。+- **口令哈希用 argon2。**++## 报告漏洞++请开一个 issue。如果涉及可被利用的细节,先只写复现的最小信息,我们再私下沟通完整内容。