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The ledger records where a request came from, and authentication itself (#49)

WaylandYang732cd44ea343
diff --git a/crates/utopia-server/src/api/auth_routes.rs b/crates/utopia-server/src/api/auth_routes.rs
index d8cfceaa..b5c3e806 100644
--- a/crates/utopia-server/src/api/auth_routes.rs
+++ b/crates/utopia-server/src/api/auth_routes.rs
@@ -70,29 +70,89 @@ pub async fn register(
let token = auth::issue_token(&state, user.id)?;
let jar = jar.add(auth::auth_cookie(token.clone()));
+ let _ = utopia_store::audit::record(
+ &state.pool,
+ None,
+ user.id,
+ "auth.register",
+ "user",
+ Some(user.id),
+ json!({ "email": user.email, "is_admin": user.is_admin }),
+ )
+ .await;
Ok((
jar,
Json(json!({ "user": user, "workspace": workspace, "token": token })),
))
}
+/// 登录失败留痕:没有账号可归属,actor 记 NULL,尝试的邮箱进 detail。
+/// 区分「邮箱不存在」与「密码不对」——同一 IP 上大量前者是邮箱枚举,
+/// 集中在一个账号上的后者是撞库,两种攻击的形状不一样。台账仅管理员可读,
+/// 不存在借此探测账号是否注册的问题。
+async fn record_login_failure(state: &AppState, email: &str, reason: &str) {
+ let _ = utopia_store::audit::record_opt(
+ &state.pool,
+ None,
+ None,
+ "auth.login_failed",
+ "user",
+ None,
+ json!({ "email": email, "reason": reason }),
+ )
+ .await;
+}
+
pub async fn login(
State(state): State<AppState>,
jar: CookieJar,
Json(req): Json<LoginReq>,
) -> ApiResult<(CookieJar, Json<serde_json::Value>)> {
- let user = utopia_store::accounts::find_user_by_email(&state.pool, req.email.trim())
- .await?
- .ok_or(AppError::Unauthorized)?;
+ let email = req.email.trim();
+ let Some(user) = utopia_store::accounts::find_user_by_email(&state.pool, email).await? else {
+ record_login_failure(&state, email, "unknown_email").await;
+ return Err(AppError::Unauthorized.into());
+ };
if !auth::verify_password(&req.password, &user.password_hash) {
+ record_login_failure(&state, email, "bad_password").await;
return Err(AppError::Unauthorized.into());
}
let token = auth::issue_token(&state, user.id)?;
let jar = jar.add(auth::auth_cookie(token.clone()));
+ let _ = utopia_store::audit::record(
+ &state.pool,
+ None,
+ user.id,
+ "auth.login",
+ "user",
+ Some(user.id),
+ json!({}),
+ )
+ .await;
Ok((jar, Json(json!({ "user": user, "token": token }))))
}
-pub async fn logout(jar: CookieJar) -> (CookieJar, Json<serde_json::Value>) {
+/// 登出不要求有效会话——cookie 过期时也必须能清掉它,否则前端就卡在一个
+/// 死会话上。所以这里自己解 token 取身份,解不出就只清 cookie 不留痕。
+pub async fn logout(
+ State(state): State<AppState>,
+ jar: CookieJar,
+) -> (CookieJar, Json<serde_json::Value>) {
+ if let Some(user_id) = jar
+ .get(auth::COOKIE_NAME)
+ .and_then(|c| auth::decode_user_id(&state, c.value()).ok())
+ {
+ let _ = utopia_store::audit::record(
+ &state.pool,
+ None,
+ user_id,
+ "auth.logout",
+ "user",
+ Some(user_id),
+ json!({}),
+ )
+ .await;
+ }
let jar = jar.remove(Cookie::from(auth::COOKIE_NAME));
(jar, Json(json!({ "ok": true })))
}
@@ -140,5 +200,15 @@ pub async fn change_password(
}
let hash = auth::hash_password(&req.new_password)?;
utopia_store::accounts::update_password(&state.pool, user.id, &hash).await?;
+ let _ = utopia_store::audit::record(
+ &state.pool,
+ None,
+ user.id,
+ "auth.password_changed",
+ "user",
+ Some(user.id),
+ json!({}),
+ )
+ .await;
Ok(Json(json!({ "ok": true })))
}
diff --git a/crates/utopia-server/src/api/mod.rs b/crates/utopia-server/src/api/mod.rs
index 688c9da4..d29ccbba 100644
--- a/crates/utopia-server/src/api/mod.rs
+++ b/crates/utopia-server/src/api/mod.rs
@@ -290,7 +290,9 @@ pub fn router(state: AppState, cfg: &AppConfig) -> Router {
tracing::info!("已托管前端产物: {}", cfg.web_dist);
}
+ // 最外层:先把请求来源放进 task-local,之后任何一层写审计都读得到
app.layer(TraceLayer::new_for_http())
+ .layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(crate::client_ctx::capture))
}
async fn health() -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
diff --git a/crates/utopia-server/src/auth.rs b/crates/utopia-server/src/auth.rs
index 6a804bb4..7776f347 100644
--- a/crates/utopia-server/src/auth.rs
+++ b/crates/utopia-server/src/auth.rs
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ pub fn auth_cookie(token: String) -> Cookie<'static> {
.build()
}
-fn decode_user_id(state: &AppState, token: &str) -> Result<Uuid, AppError> {
+pub(crate) fn decode_user_id(state: &AppState, token: &str) -> Result<Uuid, AppError> {
let data = decode::<Claims>(
token,
&DecodingKey::from_secret(state.jwt_secret.as_bytes()),
diff --git a/crates/utopia-server/src/client_ctx.rs b/crates/utopia-server/src/client_ctx.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..0c3bb9e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crates/utopia-server/src/client_ctx.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+//! 请求来源捕获:把客户端 IP 与 User-Agent 放进 task-local,供审计写入时读取。
+//!
+//! 走 task-local 而非逐层传参,是因为 `audit::record` 有二十多个调用点,
+//! 它们分散在各个业务 handler 里;为了两个与业务无关的字段改遍所有签名,
+//! 只会让每个调用点都记得住这件与它无关的事。
+
+use axum::extract::ConnectInfo;
+use axum::extract::Request;
+use axum::http::HeaderMap;
+use axum::middleware::Next;
+use axum::response::Response;
+use std::net::SocketAddr;
+use utopia_store::audit::{ClientContext, CLIENT};
+
+/// 反向代理转发的原始客户端地址。取 X-Forwarded-For 的第一段(最靠近客户端的
+/// 那一跳),其次 X-Real-IP,都没有则用实际的 TCP 对端地址。
+///
+/// 这两个头是客户端可伪造的,直连部署时不该轻信;但直连时它们本来就不存在,
+/// 落回 TCP 对端地址即为真值。部署在代理之后时,代理应当覆写而非追加它们。
+fn client_ip(headers: &HeaderMap, peer: Option<SocketAddr>) -> Option<String> {
+ if let Some(xff) = headers.get("x-forwarded-for").and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok()) {
+ if let Some(first) = xff
+ .split(',')
+ .next()
+ .map(str::trim)
+ .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
+ {
+ return Some(first.to_string());
+ }
+ }
+ if let Some(real) = headers.get("x-real-ip").and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok()) {
+ let real = real.trim();
+ if !real.is_empty() {
+ return Some(real.to_string());
+ }
+ }
+ peer.map(|a| a.ip().to_string())
+}
+
+/// User-Agent 截断到 256 字节:它由客户端完全控制,不该让一条请求头把台账撑爆。
+fn user_agent(headers: &HeaderMap) -> Option<String> {
+ headers
+ .get(axum::http::header::USER_AGENT)
+ .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+ .map(str::trim)
+ .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
+ .map(|s| {
+ let mut end = s.len().min(256);
+ while end > 0 && !s.is_char_boundary(end) {
+ end -= 1;
+ }
+ s[..end].to_string()
+ })
+}
+
+pub async fn capture(req: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
+ let peer = req
+ .extensions()
+ .get::<ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>>()
+ .map(|ci| ci.0);
+ let ctx = ClientContext {
+ ip: client_ip(req.headers(), peer),
+ user_agent: user_agent(req.headers()),
+ };
+ CLIENT.scope(ctx, next.run(req)).await
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ use super::*;
+
+ fn headers(pairs: &[(&str, &str)]) -> HeaderMap {
+ let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
+ for (k, v) in pairs {
+ h.insert(
+ axum::http::HeaderName::from_bytes(k.as_bytes()).unwrap(),
+ v.parse().unwrap(),
+ );
+ }
+ h
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn xff_wins_and_takes_the_client_hop() {
+ let h = headers(&[("x-forwarded-for", "203.0.113.7, 10.0.0.1, 10.0.0.2")]);
+ let peer = Some("10.0.0.9:5000".parse().unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(client_ip(&h, peer).as_deref(), Some("203.0.113.7"));
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn falls_back_to_real_ip_then_peer() {
+ let h = headers(&[("x-real-ip", "198.51.100.4")]);
+ assert_eq!(client_ip(&h, None).as_deref(), Some("198.51.100.4"));
+
+ let peer = Some("192.0.2.5:443".parse().unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(
+ client_ip(&HeaderMap::new(), peer).as_deref(),
+ Some("192.0.2.5")
+ );
+ assert_eq!(client_ip(&HeaderMap::new(), None), None);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn blank_headers_do_not_shadow_the_peer() {
+ let h = headers(&[("x-forwarded-for", " "), ("x-real-ip", "")]);
+ let peer = Some("192.0.2.5:443".parse().unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(client_ip(&h, peer).as_deref(), Some("192.0.2.5"));
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn user_agent_is_capped_at_256_bytes() {
+ let long = "Mozilla/5.0 ".repeat(50); // 600 字节,远超上限
+ let h = headers(&[("user-agent", long.as_str())]);
+ let got = user_agent(&h).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(got.len(), 256);
+ assert!(long.starts_with(&got), "截断后仍是原串的前缀");
+ }
+
+ /// HeaderValue::to_str 只接受可见 ASCII,非 ASCII 的 UA 读不出来——
+ /// 记空好过记一段乱码。这也是上面按字节截断安全的原因:能读出来的一定是 ASCII。
+ #[test]
+ fn non_ascii_user_agent_is_dropped_rather_than_mangled() {
+ let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
+ h.insert(
+ axum::http::header::USER_AGENT,
+ axum::http::HeaderValue::from_bytes("浏览器".as_bytes()).unwrap(),
+ );
+ assert_eq!(user_agent(&h), None);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/crates/utopia-server/src/main.rs b/crates/utopia-server/src/main.rs
index f33b534c..7d35ab20 100644
--- a/crates/utopia-server/src/main.rs
+++ b/crates/utopia-server/src/main.rs
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ mod api;
mod auth;
mod blob;
mod bootstrap_ontology;
+mod client_ctx;
mod docs_corpus;
mod error;
mod extraction;
@@ -170,7 +171,8 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
tracing::info!("同时监听 http://{v6_addr}");
let app_v6 = app.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
- if let Err(e) = axum::serve(v6_listener, app_v6).await {
+ let svc = app_v6.into_make_service_with_connect_info::<std::net::SocketAddr>();
+ if let Err(e) = axum::serve(v6_listener, svc).await {
tracing::warn!(error = %e, "IPv6 监听退出");
}
});
@@ -179,6 +181,9 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
}
}
- axum::serve(listener, app).await?;
+ // with_connect_info:审计需要真实的 TCP 对端地址。直连部署时它是唯一真值——
+ // X-Forwarded-For 那些头此时并不存在,且本就不可轻信。
+ let svc = app.into_make_service_with_connect_info::<std::net::SocketAddr>();
+ axum::serve(listener, svc).await?;
Ok(())
}
diff --git a/crates/utopia-store/src/audit.rs b/crates/utopia-store/src/audit.rs
index ef209e73..4417a6c5 100644
--- a/crates/utopia-store/src/audit.rs
+++ b/crates/utopia-store/src/audit.rs
@@ -27,6 +27,26 @@ pub async fn record(
.await
}
+/// 请求的来源信息。由 HTTP 层在每个请求外层 scope 进 [`CLIENT`],`record_opt`
+/// 自行读取——否则 25 个调用点每一个都要多带两个与业务无关的参数。
+///
+/// 后台任务(攒批裁决、定时同步)不在任何请求之内,读到的是 None,本就该如此:
+/// 那些动作确实没有客户端。
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
+pub struct ClientContext {
+ pub ip: Option<String>,
+ pub user_agent: Option<String>,
+}
+
+tokio::task_local! {
+ pub static CLIENT: ClientContext;
+}
+
+/// 取当前请求的来源;不在请求上下文中(后台任务)时返回全空。
+fn client_context() -> ClientContext {
+ CLIENT.try_with(|c| c.clone()).unwrap_or_default()
+}
+
/// 无人类操作者的系统事件(如 AI 裁决自动合并)走这里:actor 为 NULL。
pub async fn record_opt(
pool: &PgPool,
@@ -37,9 +57,23 @@ pub async fn record_opt(
target_id: Option<Uuid>,
detail: serde_json::Value,
) -> AppResult<()> {
+ let ctx = client_context();
+ // 身份快照:用户日后被删除时(0025 之后行会留下),台账仍认得出是谁,而不是
+ // 只剩一串 UUID。此刻查是可靠的——操作正在发生,人还在。
+ let actor_label: Option<String> = match actor_id {
+ Some(id) => sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT email FROM users WHERE id = $1")
+ .bind(id)
+ .fetch_optional(pool)
+ .await
+ .ok()
+ .flatten(),
+ None => None,
+ };
sqlx::query(
- "INSERT INTO audit_events (id, kb_id, actor_id, action, target_kind, target_id, detail)
- VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7)",
+ "INSERT INTO audit_events
+ (id, kb_id, actor_id, action, target_kind, target_id, detail,
+ client_ip, user_agent, actor_label)
+ VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, $10)",
)
.bind(Uuid::now_v7())
.bind(kb_id)
@@ -48,6 +82,9 @@ pub async fn record_opt(
.bind(target_kind)
.bind(target_id)
.bind(detail)
+ .bind(ctx.ip)
+ .bind(ctx.user_agent)
+ .bind(actor_label)
.execute(pool)
.await?;
Ok(())
diff --git a/migrations/0027_audit_client_context.sql b/migrations/0027_audit_client_context.sql
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b4dfb485
--- /dev/null
+++ b/migrations/0027_audit_client_context.sql
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-- 台账此前只记「谁做了什么」,不记「从哪里做的」。ISO 27001 A.8.15 要求日志
+-- 覆盖 Where / How,即请求的来源;没有它,一个账号被盗用后的所有活动看起来
+-- 与本人操作毫无差别。
+--
+-- 两列都可空:后台任务(攒批裁决、定时同步)没有客户端,本就该是空。
+ALTER TABLE audit_events ADD COLUMN client_ip TEXT;
+ALTER TABLE audit_events ADD COLUMN user_agent TEXT;
+
+-- 操作者的身份快照。actor_id 在 0025 之后不再有外键,用户删除时行会留下,
+-- 但 LEFT JOIN users 取不到名字,界面只剩一串 UUID。把当时的邮箱与显示名
+-- 一并写进记录,台账才真正自包含。
+ALTER TABLE audit_events ADD COLUMN actor_label TEXT;
+
+-- 按 IP 排查(同一来源的登录失败、异常时段的活动)需要这条索引。
+CREATE INDEX audit_events_client_ip_idx ON audit_events (client_ip, created_at DESC)
+ WHERE client_ip IS NOT NULL;