Run a virtual iPhone on an Apple Silicon Mac.
Swift
docs: fix outdated patch counts, remove process investigation notes
Lakr048f4c7cc110
diff --git a/AGENTS.md b/AGENTS.mdindex f6c3fd28..ef987410 100644--- a/AGENTS.md+++ b/AGENTS.md@@ -31,9 +31,9 @@ For any changes applying new patches, also update research/0_binary_patch_compar| Variant | Boot Chain | CFW | Make Targets || ------------------- | :--------: | :-------: | ---------------------------------- |-| **Regular** | 38 patches | 10 phases | `fw_patch` + `cfw_install` |-| **Development** | 49 patches | 12 phases | `fw_patch_dev` + `cfw_install_dev` |-| **Jailbreak (WIP)** | 84 patches | 14 phases | `fw_patch_jb` + `cfw_install_jb` |+| **Regular** | 51 patches | 10 phases | `fw_patch` + `cfw_install` |+| **Development** | 64 patches | 12 phases | `fw_patch_dev` + `cfw_install_dev` |+| **Jailbreak (WIP)** | 126 patches | 14 phases | `fw_patch_jb` + `cfw_install_jb` |See `research/` for detailed firmware pipeline, component origins, patch breakdowns, and boot flow documentation.@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ sources/├── VPhoneMenuConnect.swift # Connect menu — devmode, ping, version, file browser├── VPhoneMenuInstall.swift # Install menu — IPA installation to guest├── VPhoneMenuRecord.swift # Record menu — screen recording controls+ ├── VPhoneMenuBattery.swift # Battery menu — battery status display││ # IPA installation├── VPhoneIPAInstaller.swift # IPA extraction, signing, and installation@@ -89,8 +90,8 @@ scripts/├── patchers/ # Python patcher modules│ ├── iboot.py # iBoot patcher (iBSS/iBEC/LLB)│ ├── iboot_jb.py # JB: iBoot nonce skip-│ ├── kernel.py # Kernel patcher (25 patches)-│ ├── kernel_jb.py # JB: kernel patches (~34)+│ ├── kernel.py # Kernel patcher (26 patches)+│ ├── kernel_jb.py # JB: kernel patches (~40)│ ├── txm.py # TXM patcher│ ├── txm_dev.py # Dev: TXM entitlements/debugger/dev mode@@ -111,7 +112,9 @@ scripts/├── setup_machine.sh # Full automation (setup → first boot)├── setup_tools.sh # Install deps, build toolchain, create venv├── setup_venv.sh # Create Python venv-└── setup_libimobiledevice.sh # Build libimobiledevice from source+├── setup_venv_linux.sh # Create Python venv (Linux)+├── setup_libimobiledevice.sh # Build libimobiledevice from source+└── tail_jb_patch_logs.sh # Tail JB patch log outputresearch/ # Detailed firmware/patch documentation```diff --git a/research/0_binary_patch_comparison.md b/research/0_binary_patch_comparison.mdindex 4115a3ec..eb8cc452 100644--- a/research/0_binary_patch_comparison.md+++ b/research/0_binary_patch_comparison.md@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@| # | Group | Method | Function | Purpose | JB Enabled || ----- | ----- | ------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | :--------: || JB-01 | A | `patch_amfi_cdhash_in_trustcache` | `AMFIIsCDHashInTrustCache` | Always return true + store hash | Y |-| JB-02 | A | `patch_amfi_execve_kill_path` | AMFI execve kill return site | Convert shared kill return from deny to allow | Y |+| JB-02 | A | `patch_amfi_execve_kill_path` | AMFI execve kill return site | Convert shared kill return from deny to allow (superseded by C21; standalone only) | N || JB-03 | C | `patch_cred_label_update_execve` | `_cred_label_update_execve` | Reworked C21-v3: C21-v1 already boots; v3 keeps split late exits and additionally ORs success-only helper bits `0xC` after clearing `0x3F00`; still disabled pending boot validation | N || JB-04 | C | `patch_hook_cred_label_update_execve` | sandbox `mpo_cred_label_update_execve` wrapper (`ops[18]` -> `sub_FFFFFE00093BDB64`) | Faithful upstream C23 trampoline: copy `VSUID`/`VSGID` owner state into pending cred, set `P_SUGID`, then branch back to wrapper | Y || JB-05 | C | `patch_kcall10` | `sysent[439]` (`SYS_kas_info` replacement) | Rebuilt ABI-correct kcall cave: `target + 7 args -> uint64 x0`; re-enabled after focused dry-run validation | Y |@@ -153,12 +153,13 @@| iBEC | 3 | 3 | 3 || LLB | 6 | 6 | 6 || TXM | 1 | 12 | 12 |-| Kernel | 28 | 28 | 53 |-| Boot chain total | 41 | 52 | 78 |+| Kernel (base) | 28 | 28 | 28 |+| Kernel (JB methods) | - | - | 59 |+| Boot chain total | 41 | 52 | 112 || CFW binary patches | 4 | 5 | 6 || CFW installed components | 6 | 7 | 8 || CFW total | 10 | 12 | 14 |-| Grand total | 51 | 64 | 92 |+| Grand total | 51 | 64 | 126 |## Ramdisk Variant Matrix@@ -166,7 +167,7 @@| ------------- | ------------------- | -------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------- || `RAMDISK` | `make fw_patch` | release TXM + base TXM patch (1) | base kernel (28), legacy `*.ramdisk` preferred else derive from pristine CloudOS | restore kernel from `fw_patch` (28) | `krnl.ramdisk.img4` preferred, fallback `krnl.img4` || `DEV+RAMDISK` | `make fw_patch_dev` | release TXM + base TXM patch (1) | base kernel (28), same derivation rule | restore kernel from `fw_patch_dev` (28) | `krnl.ramdisk.img4` preferred, fallback `krnl.img4` |-| `JB+RAMDISK` | `make fw_patch_jb` | release TXM + base TXM patch (1) | base kernel (28), same derivation rule | restore kernel from `fw_patch_jb` (53) | `krnl.ramdisk.img4` preferred, fallback `krnl.img4` |+| `JB+RAMDISK` | `make fw_patch_jb` | release TXM + base TXM patch (1) | base kernel (28), same derivation rule | restore kernel from `fw_patch_jb` (28+59) | `krnl.ramdisk.img4` preferred, fallback `krnl.img4` |## Cross-Version Dynamic Snapshotdiff --git a/research/boot_data_protection_seputil_macf_investigation.md b/research/boot_data_protection_seputil_macf_investigation.mddeleted file mode 100644index 0917a6a2..00000000--- a/research/boot_data_protection_seputil_macf_investigation.md+++ /dev/null@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@-# Data-Protection Panic Investigation (2026-03-05)--## Symptom--On JB boot, system reaches `launchd` boot tasks but then panics with:--- `Boot task failed: data-protection - exited due to exit(60)`-- repeated host-side retries:- - `[control] vsock: ... Connection reset by peer, retrying...`-- and critical kernel log:- - `IOUC AppleSEPUserClient failed MACF in process pid 6, seputil`--## What This Confirms--This is not an early-kernel boot hang. The failure occurs in userspace boot task `data-protection`, where `seputil` cannot pass MACF/IOKit authorization to open SEP user client paths.--## Static Root-Cause Trace (kernelcache.research.vphone600)--Using local disassembly on the current vphone600 research kernel:--1. `failed MACF` log string xref resolves to IOKit MAC dispatch function at:- - function start VA: `0xFFFFFE000825B0C0`-2. The deny path emits `failed MACF` after policy callback dispatch.-3. Callback slot used in this path is:- - `policy->ops + 0x648` => index `201`-4. Current sandbox-extended patch set (before this fix) did not include `ops[201..210]`.-5. Sandbox ops table for this kernel has non-null handlers at:- - `201..210` (`0xFFFFFE00093A654C` ... `0xFFFFFE00093A598C`)--Interpretation: IOKit MAC hooks remained active and could deny `AppleSEPUserClient` access, matching runtime `IOUC ... failed MACF`.--## Mitigation Implemented--### 1) Kernel patcher extension--Updated:--- `scripts/patchers/kernel_jb_patch_sandbox_extended.py`--Added hook indices:--- `201..210` as `iokit_check_201` ... `iokit_check_210`--Patch action per entry remains:--- `mov x0,#0`-- `ret`--### 2) Documentation updates--Updated:--- `research/kernel_patch_jb/patch_sandbox_hooks_extended.md`-- `research/0_binary_patch_comparison.md`--## Local Validation (static)--Ran `patch_sandbox_hooks_extended()` against current `kernelcache.research.vphone600`:--- before extension: `52` writes (`26` hooks)-- after extension: `72` writes (`36` hooks)--New emitted entries include:--- `_hook_iokit_check_201` ... `_hook_iokit_check_210`--## Runtime Validation Pending--Not yet executed in this turn. Required E2E confirmation:--1. `make fw_patch_jb`-2. restore flow (so patched kernel is installed)-3. `make cfw_install_jb`-4. `make boot`-5. verify disappearance of:- - `IOUC AppleSEPUserClient failed MACF ... seputil`- - `Boot task failed: data-protection - exited due to exit(60)`--## Notes--- Canonical `mpo_iokit_*` names for these indices are not fully symbol-resolved in local KC symbols; index-based labeling is used intentionally to avoid incorrect naming.--## 2026-03-06 Follow-up (still failing after ops[201..210] extension)--Observed runtime still reports:--- `IOUC AppleAPFSUserClient failed MACF in process pid 4, mount`-- `IOUC AppleSEPUserClient failed MACF in process pid 6, seputil`--So per-policy sandbox hook stubs alone are insufficient on this path.--### Additional Mitigation Added--Introduced a dedicated JB patch:--- `patch_iouc_failed_macf` in `scripts/patchers/kernel_jb_patch_iouc_macf.py`--Method:--- Anchor on `"failed MACF"` xref.-- Resolve centralized IOUC MACF gate function.-- Apply low-risk early return at `fn+4/fn+8`:- - `mov x0, xzr`- - `retab`--Current static hit on this kernel:--- function start: `0xfffffe000825b0c0`-- patched:- - `0xfffffe000825b0c4`- - `0xfffffe000825b0c8`--Related doc:--- `research/kernel_patch_jb/patch_iouc_failed_macf.md`diff --git a/research/boot_hang_b19_mount_dounmount_strategy_compare.md b/research/boot_hang_b19_mount_dounmount_strategy_compare.mddeleted file mode 100644index 5875092d..00000000--- a/research/boot_hang_b19_mount_dounmount_strategy_compare.md+++ /dev/null@@ -1,628 +0,0 @@-# Boot Hang Focus: B19 + (B11/B12) Strategy Comparison--Date: 2026-03-05-Target binary family: `kernelcache.research.vphone600` (iOS 26.1 / 23B85)--## Final Outcome (2026-03-05)--This investigation is complete for the current delivery gate (bootability).--- B19/MNT strategy switching did **not** recover boot:- - matrix artifact: `vm/ab_matrix_b19_mnt_20260305_034127.csv`- - result: 9/9 combinations failed (`code=2`, watchdog timeout)-- JB-only bisect isolated a stable bootable subset:- - PASS: `A1-A4`- - PASS: `A1-A4 + B5-B8`- - FAIL: tested combinations including `B9+`-- Current boot-safe default in `kernel_jb.py`:- - enabled: `A1-A4 + B5-B8`- - disabled: `B9-B20`, `C21-C24`-- E2E success evidence:- - `vm/testing_exec_watch_20260305_050051.log`- - `vm/testing_exec_watch_20260305_050146.log`- - both reached restore-ready markers (USB mux activated + waiting-for-host gate)--## Scope--This note compares two patching styles for boot-hang triage:--1. B19 (`_IOSecureBSDRoot`) patch style mismatch:- - upstream known-to-work fixed site- - current dynamic patcher site-2. B11/B12 (`___mac_mount` / `_dounmount`) patch style mismatch:- - upstream fixed-site patches- - current dynamic strict-shape patches--The goal is to make A/B testing reproducible with concrete trigger points, pseudocode, and expected runtime effects.-------## 1) B19 `_IOSecureBSDRoot` mismatch--### 1.1 Trigger points (clean kernel)--- `0x0128B598` (`VA 0xFFFFFE000828F598`) in `sub_FFFFFE000828F42C`- - before: `b.ne #0x128b5bc`- - upstream patch: `b #0x128b5bc` (`0x14000009`)-- `0x01362090` (`VA 0xFFFFFE0008366090`) in `sub_FFFFFE0008366008`- - before: `cbz w0, #0x1362234`- - current dynamic patch: `b #0x1362234` (`0x14000069`)--Current patched checkpoint confirms:--- `0x01362090` is patched (`b`)-- `0x0128B598` remains unpatched (`b.ne`)--### 1.2 Function logic and pseudocode--#### A) Upstream site function (`sub_FFFFFE000828F42C`)--High-level logic:--1. query `"SecureRootName"` from `IOPlatformExpert`-2. run provider call-3. release objects-4. if return code equals `0xE00002C1`, branch to fallback path (`sub_FFFFFE0007C6AA58`)--Pseudocode:--```c-ret = IOPlatformExpert->call("SecureRootName", ...);-release(...);-if (ret == 0xE00002C1) {- return fallback_path();-}-return ret;-```--Patch effect at `0x128B598` (`b.ne -> b`):--- always take fallback path, regardless whether `ret == 0xE00002C1`.--#### B) Dynamic site function (`sub_FFFFFE0008366008`)--Key branch:--- `0x136608C`: callback for `"SecureRoot"`-- `0x1366090`: `cbz w0, #0x1362234` (branch into `"SecureRootName"` block)-- `0x1366234` onward: `"SecureRootName"` handling block--Pseudocode:--```c-if (matches("SecureRoot")) {- ok = callback("SecureRoot");- if (ok == 0) goto SecureRootNameBlock; // cbz w0- // SecureRoot success/failure handling path-}--SecureRootNameBlock:-if (matches("SecureRootName")) {- // name-based validation + state sync-}-```--Patch effect at `0x1362090` (`cbz -> b`):--- always jump into `SecureRootNameBlock`, regardless `ok`.--### 1.3 A/B variants to test--1. `B19-A` (upstream helper only):- - patch only `0x128B598`- - keep `0x1362090` original-2. `B19-B` (dynamic main only):- - patch only `0x1362090`- - keep `0x128B598` original-3. `B19-C` (both):- - patch both sites--### 1.4 Expected observables--- Boot logs around:- - `apfs_find_named_root_snapshot_xid`- - `Need authenticator (81)`- - transition into init / panic frame-- Panic signatures:- - null-deref style FAR near low address (for current failure class)- - stack path involving mount/security callback chain-------## 2) B11/B12 (`___mac_mount` / `_dounmount`) mismatch--### 2.1 Trigger points (clean kernel)--#### Upstream fixed-offset style--- `0x00CA5D54`: `tbnz w28, #5, #0xca5f18` -> `nop`-- `0x00CA5D88`: `ldrb w8, [x8, #1]` -> `mov x8, xzr`-- `0x00CA8134`: `bl #0xc92ad8` -> `nop`--#### Current dynamic style (checkpoint)--- `0x00CA4EAC`: `cbnz w0, #0xca4ec8` -> `nop` (B11)-- `0x00CA81FC`: `bl #0xc9bdbc` -> `nop` (B12)--And in checkpoint:--- upstream sites remain original (`0xCA5D54`, `0xCA5D88`, `0xCA8134` unchanged)-- dynamic sites are patched (`0xCA4EAC`, `0xCA81FC` are `nop`)--### 2.2 Function logic and pseudocode--#### A) `___mac_mount`-related branch (dynamic site near `0xCA4EA8`)--Disassembly window:--- `0xCA4EA8`: `bl ...`-- `0xCA4EAC`: `cbnz w0, deny`-- deny target writes non-zero return (`mov w0, #1`)--Pseudocode:--```c-ret = mac_policy_check(...);-if (ret != 0) { // cbnz w0- return EPERM_like_error;-}-continue_mount();-```--Dynamic patch (`0xCA4EAC -> nop`) effect:--- ignore `ret != 0` branch and continue mount path.--#### B) Upstream `___mac_mount` two-site style (`0xCA5D54`, `0xCA5D88`)--Disassembly window:--- `0xCA5D54`: `tbnz w28, #5, ...`-- `0xCA5D88`: `ldrb w8, [x8, #1]`--Pseudocode (behavioral interpretation):--```c-if (flag_bit5_set(w28)) goto restricted_path;-w8 = *(u8 *)(x8 + 1);-...-```--Upstream patches:--- remove bit-5 gate branch (`tbnz -> nop`)-- force register state (`ldrb -> mov x8, xzr`)--This is broader state manipulation than dynamic deny-branch patching.--#### C) `_dounmount` path--Upstream site:--- `0xCA8134`: `bl #0xc92ad8` -> `nop`--Dynamic site:--- `0xCA81FC`: `bl #0xc9bdbc` -> `nop`--Pseudocode (generic):--```c-... prepare args ...-ret = mac_or_policy_call_X(...); // site differs between two strategies-...-ret2 = mac_or_policy_call_Y(...);-```--Difference:--- upstream and dynamic disable different call sites in unmount path;-- not equivalent by construction.--### 2.3 A/B variants to test--1. `MNT-A` (upstream-only style):- - apply `0xCA5D54`, `0xCA5D88`, `0xCA8134`- - keep `0xCA4EAC`, `0xCA81FC` original-2. `MNT-B` (dynamic-only style):- - apply `0xCA4EAC`, `0xCA81FC`- - keep `0xCA5D54`, `0xCA5D88`, `0xCA8134` original-3. `MNT-C` (both styles):- - apply all five sites-------## 3) Combined test matrix (recommended)--For minimal triage noise, run a 3x3 matrix:--- B19 mode: `B19-A`, `B19-B`, `B19-C`-- mount mode: `MNT-A`, `MNT-B`, `MNT-C`--Total 9 combinations, each from the same clean baseline kernel.--Record per run:--1. last APFS logs before failure/success-2. whether `Need authenticator (81)` appears-3. panic presence and panic PC/FAR-4. whether init proceeds past current hang point-------## 4) Historical A/B Knobs (used during triage, now removed)--During the triage phase, temporary runtime knobs were introduced to toggle-upstream-vs-dynamic strategies for B11/B12/B13/B14/B19 and execute the matrix.--Those knobs are no longer part of the default runtime path after stabilization;-the shipped default now hard-selects the boot-safe subset (`A1-A4 + B5-B8`).--The triage results from those knobs are preserved in this document and in:--- `vm/ab_matrix_b19_mnt_20260305_034127.csv`-- `TODO.md` (Boot Hang Research + Progress Update sections)-- `research/0_binary_patch_comparison.md` (Kernelcache section)-------## 5) Practical note--Do not mix incremental patching across already-patched binaries when comparing these modes.-Always regenerate from clean baseline before each combination, otherwise branch-site interactions can mask true causality.-------## 6) Additional non-equivalent points (beyond B19/B11/B12)--This section answers "还有没有别的不一样的" with boot-impact-focused mismatches.--### 6.1 B13 `_bsd_init auth` is not the same logical site--#### Trigger points--- upstream fixed site: `0x00F6D95C` in `sub_FFFFFE0007F6D2B8`-- current dynamic site: `0x00FA2A78` in `sub_FFFFFE0007FA2838`--#### Function logic (high level)--- `sub_FFFFFE0007F6D2B8` is a workqueue/thread-call state machine.-- `sub_FFFFFE0007FA2838` is another lock/CAS-heavy control path.--Neither decompilation corresponds to `_bsd_init` body semantics directly.--#### Pseudocode (site-level)--`0xF6D95C` neighborhood:--```c-...-call unlock_or_wakeup(...); // BL at 0xF6D95C-...-```--`0xFA2A78` neighborhood:--```c-...-stats_counter++;-x2 = x9; // MOV at 0xFA2A78-cas_release(lock, x2, 0);-...-```--#### Risk--- This is a strong false-equivalence signal.-- If this patch is intended as `_bsd_init` auth bypass, current dynamic hit should be treated as suspect.--### 6.2 B14 `_spawn_validate_persona` strategy changed from 2xNOP to forced branch--#### Trigger points--- upstream fixed sites: `0x00FA7024`, `0x00FA702C` (same function `sub_FFFFFE0007FA6F7C`)-- current dynamic site: `0x00FA694C` (function `sub_FFFFFE0007FA6858`)--#### Function logic and loop relevance--In `sub_FFFFFE0007FA6858`, there is an explicit spin loop:--- `0xFA6ACC`: `LDADD ...`-- `0xFA6AD4`: `B.EQ 0xFA6ACC` (self-loop)--Pseudocode:--```c-do {- old = atomic_fetch_add(counter, 1);-} while (old == target); // tight spin at 0xFA6ACC/0xFA6AD4-```--And same function calls:--- `sub_FFFFFE0007B034E4` (at `0xFA6A94`)-- `sub_FFFFFE0007B040CC` (at `0xFA6AA8`)--Your panic signature previously mapped into this call chain, so this mismatch is high-priority for 100% CPU / hang triage.--### 6.3 B9 `_vm_fault_enter_prepare` does not hit the same function--#### Trigger points--- upstream fixed site: `0x00BA9E1C` in `sub_FFFFFE0007BA9C48`-- current dynamic site: `0x00BA9BB0` in `sub_FFFFFE0007BA9944`--#### Pseudocode (site-level)--`0xBA9E1C`:--```c-// parameter setup right before BL-ldp x4, x5, [sp, ...];-bl helper(...);-```--`0xBA9BB0`:--```c-if (w25 == 3) w21 = 2; else w21 = w25; // csel-```--These are structurally unrelated.--### 6.4 B10 `_vm_map_protect` site differs in same large function--#### Trigger points--- upstream fixed site: `0x00BC024C`-- current dynamic site: `0x00BC012C`-- both inside `sub_FFFFFE0007BBFA48`--#### Pseudocode (site-level)--`0xBC012C`:--```c-perm = cond ? perm_a : perm_b; // csel-```--`0xBC024C`:--```c-// different control block; not the same selection point-...-```--Even in the same function, these are not equivalent branch gates.--### 6.5 B15 `_task_for_pid` and B17 shared-region are also shifted--#### Trigger points--- B15 upstream: `0x00FC383C` (`sub_FFFFFE0007FC34B4`)-- B15 dynamic: `0x00FFF83C` (`sub_FFFFFE0007FFF824`)--- B17 upstream: `0x010729CC`-- B17 dynamic: `0x01072A88`-- both in `sub_FFFFFE000807272C`, but not same instruction role--#### Risk--- These are unlikely to explain early APFS/init mount failure alone, but they are still non-equivalent and should not be assumed interchangeable.-------## 7) Practical triage order for 100% virtualization CPU--Given current evidence, prioritize:--1. B14 strategy A/B first (upstream `0xFA7024/0xFA702C` vs dynamic `0xFA694C`).-2. B13 strategy A/B next (`0xF6D95C` vs `0xFA2A78`).-3. Then B19 and MNT matrix.--Reason: B14 path contains a known tight spin construct and directly calls the function chain previously observed in panic mapping.-------## 8) Normal boot baseline signature (for pass/fail triage)--Use the following runtime markers as "normal startup reached restore-ready stage" baseline:--1. USB bring-up checkpoint completes:- - `CHECKPOINT END: MAIN:[0x040E] enable_usb`-2. Network checkpoint enters and exits without device requirement:- - `CHECKPOINT BEGIN: MAIN:[0x0411] config_network_interface`- - `no device required to enable network interface, skipping`- - `CHECKPOINT END: MAIN:[0x0411] config_network_interface`-3. Restore daemon enters host-wait state:- - `waiting for host to trigger start of restore [timeout of 120 seconds]`-4. USB/NCM path activates and host loopback socket churn appears:- - `IOUSBDeviceController::setupDeviceSetConfiguration: configuration 0 -> 1`- - `AppleUSBDeviceMux::message - kMessageInterfaceWasActivated`- - repeated `sock ... accepted ... 62078 ...` then `sock ... closed`-5. BSD network interface bring-up for `anpi0` succeeds:- - `configureDatagramSizeOnBSDInterface() [anpi0] ... returning 0x00000000`- - `enableBSDInterface() [anpi0], returning 0x00000000`- - `configureIPv6LLOnBSDInterface() [anpi0], IPv6 enable returning 0x00000000`- - `disableTrafficShapingOnBSDInterface() [anpi0], disable traffic shaping returning 0x00000000`--Practical rule:--- If A/B variant run reaches marker #3 and then shows #4/#5 progression, treat it as "boot path not stuck in early kernel loop".-- If run stalls before marker #1/#2 completion or never reaches #3, prioritize kernel-side loop/panic investigation.-------## 9) Why the failing sets are currently excluded--Short answer: they are not equivalent rewrites on this firmware, and multiple-sites land in different control contexts than expected upstream references.--IDA-backed findings used for exclusion:--1. B9 differs by function, not just offset:- - dynamic `0xBA9BB0` in `sub_FFFFFE0007BA9944`- - upstream `0xBA9E1C` in `sub_FFFFFE0007BA9C48`-2. B10 is same large function but different decision blocks:- - dynamic `0xBC012C` vs upstream `0xBC024C` in `sub_FFFFFE0007BBFA48`-3. B13 differs by function and behavior:- - dynamic `0xFA2A78` in `sub_FFFFFE0007FA2838`- - upstream `0xF6D95C` in `sub_FFFFFE0007F6D2B8`-4. B14 dynamic path sits in the spin-loop-containing function:- - `sub_FFFFFE0007FA6858` has `0xFA6ACC`/`0xFA6AD4` tight loop- - same path calls `sub_FFFFFE0007B034E4` and `sub_FFFFFE0007B040CC`--Given this mismatch profile, enabling B9+ as a default set is high risk for-boot regressions until each method is re-derived and validated individually on-the exact kernel build.-------## 10) Final operational state--- Default JB boot profile: `A1-A4 + B5-B8` only-- Verified by `BASE_PATCH=jb make testing_exec` reproducibility runs:- - `vm/testing_exec_watch_20260305_050051.log`- - `vm/testing_exec_watch_20260305_050146.log`-- Delivery stance:- - prioritize bootability and deterministic restore-ready progression- - reintroduce B9+ / Group C only behind per-method revalidation-------## 11) New Field Finding: "restore done but system still not fully up" (`make boot`)--Source: interactive serial output from `make boot` on 2026-03-05 (user report).--### 11.1 What the log proves--This run is **not** failing at the old restore-ready gate and **not** the old-early kernel boot-hang class.--Observed progression:--1. APFS root/data/xART/preboot mounts complete in kernel/userspace handoff.-2. `launchd` starts and executes boot tasks.-3. `mount-phase-1`, `mount-phase-2`, `finish-restore`, `init-with-data-volume`,- `keybag`, `usermanagerd` tasks are reached.-4. Log shows:- - `Early boot complete. Continuing system boot.`- - `hello from launchdhook.dylib` / `bye from launchdhook.dylib`--So the pipeline already crossed into JB userspace initialization.--### 11.2 Suspicious signals in this run--1. Early `launchd` assertion:- - `com.apple.xpc.launchd ... assertion failed ... 0xffffffffffffffff`-2. Ignition warning:- - `libignition: cryptex1 sniff: ignition failed: 8`- - then fallback path continues (`ignition disabled`) and boot tasks proceed.-3. `vphoned` host side repeatedly reports:- - `Connection reset by peer`- - indicates daemon channel is not yet stable/ready during this phase.--### 11.3 Most likely fault domain (ranked)--1. **JB-1 launchd modification path (highest probability)**:- - `patch-launchd-jetsam` dynamic branch rewrite may select an incorrect- conditional in some launchd builds.- - `inject-dylib /cores/launchdhook.dylib` adds early runtime side effects.- - The assertion appears in `launchd` startup window, matching this stage.-2. **JB hook/runtime environment coupling**:- - `JB_ROOT_PATH` and BaseBin hook expectations under preboot hash path.- - If path/state is incomplete, startup can degrade without immediate kernel panic.-3. **Less likely: kernel B9+ regression**- - Current default already excludes B9+ and this log clearly reaches deep- userspace boot tasks, so this symptom class is different from earlier- watchdog/restore-gate failures.--### 11.4 Practical triage to confirm--Use same restored disk and isolate JB userspace phases:--1. Baseline control:- - Boot with dev/regular userspace flow (no JB-1 launchd dylib injection).-2. Re-enable only JB-1:- - apply jetsam patch alone first, then add dylib injection.-3. Add JB-2/JB-3 incrementally:- - procursus bootstrap, then BaseBin hooks.-4. Capture first regression point and lock to the exact phase.--### 11.5 Conclusion for this report--- Current symptom ("restore completes but cannot fully start") is now best- modeled as a **post-restore userspace startup regression**, centered around- JB launchd modification/hook stages, not the previous kernel early-boot hang.-------## 12) Failed vs Successful Boot Log Comparison (same device class, 2026-03-05)--Compared inputs:--- Failing side: `vphone-cli` (startup-hang-fix branch) user-provided `make boot` log.-- Successful side: `vphone-cli-dev` (main) user-provided `make boot` log.--### 12.1 Signals that appear in both logs (low-priority/noise for this issue)--The following lines appear on the successful boot too, so they are unlikely to-be the direct blocker for "cannot fully start":--1. `apfs_find_named_root_snapshot_xid ... No such file or directory (2)`-2. `TXM [Error]: selector: 45 | 78` and `failed to set boot uuid ... 78`-3. `libignition ... cryptex1 sniff: ignition failed: 8` then `ignition disabled`-4. `MKB_INIT: No system keybag found on filesystem.`-5. `mount: failed to migrate Media Keys, error = c002`-6. `Overprovision setup failed ... Ignoring...`--These are therefore weak root-cause candidates for this specific regression.--### 12.2 Differential signals (high-value)--Only/primarily observed in failing run:--1. Early `launchd` assertion:- - `assertion failed ... launchd + 59944 ... 0xffffffffffffffff`-2. JB launchd hook footprint:- - `hello from launchdhook.dylib`- - `set JB_ROOT_PATH = /private/preboot/<hash>/jb-vphone/procursus`-3. Host control channel never stabilizes to a healthy daemon session- before manual stop (`Connection reset by peer` keeps repeating).--Observed in successful run (and absent in failing excerpt):--1. Host eventually reaches:- - `[control] connected to vphoned v1 ...`- - `[control] pushing update ...`-2. No corresponding early `launchd` assertion line in provided success log.--### 12.3 Most likely causes (ranked by differential evidence)--1. **`patch-launchd-jetsam` dynamic hit risk (top suspect)**- The patcher selects a conditional branch dynamically using string xref +- backward window + return-block heuristic. A wrong branch rewrite can produce- launchd internal assertion failures while still allowing partial boot-task logs.--2. **`launchd` dylib injection (`/cores/launchdhook.dylib`) side effects**- Hook runs very early in launchd lifecycle; if environment/setup assumptions- are not met, boot can degrade without immediate kernel panic.--3. **JB-1 combined effect (jetsam patch + dylib injection), not kernel B9+**- Kernel path already reaches deep userspace tasks in both cases; this no longer- matches the previous watchdog/restore-gate kernel hang signature.--### 12.4 Recommended isolation sequence (to convert suspicion -> proof)--Use same restored disk, only vary JB-1 components:--1. `launchd` unmodified control.-2. Apply jetsam patch only.-3. Apply dylib injection only.-4. Apply both (current JB-1).--Record for each:--- whether `launchd assertion failed ... 0xffffffffffffffff` appears-- whether `[control] connected to vphoned v1` appears-- time to first stable userspace service set.diff --git a/research/boot_jb_mount_failure_investigation.md b/research/boot_jb_mount_failure_investigation.mddeleted file mode 100644index fc5c309e..00000000--- a/research/boot_jb_mount_failure_investigation.md+++ /dev/null@@ -1,223 +0,0 @@-# JB Mount Failure Investigation (2026-03-04)--## Symptom--- `make setup_machine JB=1` reached `cfw_install_jb` and failed at:- - `Failed to mount /dev/disk1s1 at /mnt1 (opts=rw).`--## Runtime Evidence (Normal Boot)--From `make boot` serial log:--- APFS mount tasks fail with permission errors:- - `mount_apfs: volume could not be mounted: Operation not permitted`- - `mount: /private/xarts failed with 77`- - `mount: /private/preboot failed with 77`- - launchd panics: `boot task failure: mount-phase-1 - exited due to exit(77)`-- Ignition/boot path shows entitlement-like failure:- - `handle_get_dev_by_role:13101: disk1s1 This operation needs entitlement`--This indicates failure in APFS role-based device lookup during early boot mount tasks.--## Runtime Evidence (DEV Control Run, 2026-03-04)--From a separate `fw_patch_dev + cfw_install_dev` boot log (not JB):--- `mount-phase-1` succeeded for xART:- - `disk1s3 mount-complete volume xART`- - `/dev/disk1s3 on /private/xarts ...`-- launch progressed to:- - `data-protection`- - `finish-obliteration`- - `detect-installed-roots`- - `mount-phase-2`--Interpretation: APFS boot-mount path can work on this build/kernel family after recent APFS gate changes.-This does **not** prove JB flow is fixed; it is a control signal showing the kernel-side path is not universally broken.--## Flow Separation (Critical)--- The successful `xART mount-complete` / `mount-phase-2` log is from DEV pipeline:- - `fw_patch_dev` + `cfw_install_dev`-- JB pipeline remains:- - `fw_patch_jb` + `cfw_install_jb`-- `cfw_install_jb` does **not** call `cfw_install_dev`; it runs base `cfw_install.sh` first, then JB-only phases.--## Kernel Artifact Checks--### 1) Ramdisk kernel identity--- `vm/Ramdisk/krnl.img4` payload hash was byte-identical to:- - `vm/iPhone17,3_26.1_23B85_Restore/kernelcache.research.vphone600`--So ramdisk boot was using the same restore kernel payload (no accidental file mismatch in `ramdisk_build`).--### 2) Patchability state (current VM kernel)--On `vm/iPhone17,3_26.1_23B85_Restore/kernelcache.research.vphone600`:--- Base APFS patches:- - `patch_apfs_vfsop_mount_cmp` -> not patchable (already applied)- - `patch_apfs_mount_upgrade_checks` -> not patchable (already applied)-- Key JB patches:- - `patch_mac_mount` -> patchable- - `patch_dounmount` -> patchable- - `patch_kcall10` -> patchable--Interpretation: kernel is base-patched, but critical JB mount/syscall extensions are still missing.--### 3) Reference hash comparison--- CloudOS source `kernelcache.research.vphone600` payload:- - `b6846048f3a60eab5f360fcc0f3dcb5198aa0476c86fb06eb42f6267cdbfcae0`-- VM restore kernel payload:- - `b0523ff40c8a08626549a33d89520cca616672121e762450c654f963f65536a0`--So restore kernel is modified vs source, but not fully JB-complete.--## IDA Deep-Dive (APFS mount-phase-1 path)--### 1) Failing function identified--- APFS function: `sub_FFFFFE000948EB10` (log name: `handle_get_dev_by_role`)-- Trigger string in function:- - `"%s:%d: %s This operation needs entitlement\\n"` (line 13101)-- Caller xref:- - `sub_FFFFFE000947CFE4` dispatches to `sub_FFFFFE000948EB10`--### 2) Gate logic at failure site--The deny path is reached if either check fails:--- Context gate:- - `BL sub_FFFFFE0007CCB994`- - `CBZ X0, deny`-- "Entitlement" gate (APFS role lookup privilege gate):- - `ADRL X1, "com.apple.apfs.get-dev-by-role"`- - `BL sub_FFFFFE000940CFC8`- - `CBZ W0, deny`-- Secondary role-path gate (role == 2 volume-group path):- - `BL sub_FFFFFE000817C240`- - `CBZ W0, deny` (to line 13115 block)--The deny block logs line `13101` and returns failure.--### 3) Patch sites (current vphone600 kernelcache)--- File offsets:- - `0x0248AB50` — context gate branch (`CBZ X0, deny`)- - `0x0248AB64` — role-lookup privilege gate (`CBZ W0, deny`)- - `0x0248AC24` — secondary role==2 deny branch (`CBZ W0, deny`)-- All three patched to `NOP` in the additive APFS patch.--### 4) Additional APFS EPERM(1) return paths in `apfs_vfsop_mount`--Function:--- `sub_FFFFFE0009478848` (`apfs_vfsop_mount`)--Observed EPERM-relevant deny blocks:--- Root-mount privilege deny:- - log string: `"%s:%d: not allowed to mount as root\n"`- - xref site: `0xFFFFFE000947905C`- - error return: sets `W25 = 1`-- Verification-mount privilege deny:- - log string: `"%s:%d: not allowed to do a verification mount of %s (is_suser %s ; uid %d)\n"`- - xref site: `0xFFFFFE0009479CA0`- - error return: sets `W25 = 1`--Important relation to existing Patch 13:--- At `0xFFFFFE0009479044` (same function), current code is `CMP X0, X0` (patched form),- which forces the following `B.EQ` path and should bypass one root privilege check in this region.-- Therefore, if JB still reports `mount_apfs ... Operation not permitted`, remaining EPERM candidates- include other deny branches (including the verification-mount gate path above), not only `handle_get_dev_by_role`.--## Root Cause (Updated, Two-Stage)--Stage 1 (confirmed and mitigated):--- APFS `handle_get_dev_by_role` entitlement/role deny gates were a concrete mount-phase-1 blocker.-- Additive patch now NOPs all three relevant deny branches.--Stage 2 (still under investigation, JB-only):--- DEV control run can pass `mount-phase-1`/`mount-phase-2`.-- JB failures must be analyzed with JB-only artifacts/logs and likely involve JB-only deltas- (launchd dylib injection, BaseBin hooks, or JB preboot/bootstrap interaction), in addition to any remaining kernel checks.--## Mitigation Implemented--### A) Ramdisk kernel split (updated implementation)--- `scripts/fw_patch_jb.py`- - no longer creates a ramdisk snapshot file-- `scripts/ramdisk_build.py`- - derives ramdisk kernel source internally:- - uses legacy `kernelcache.research.vphone600.ramdisk` if present- - otherwise derives from pristine CloudOS `kernelcache.research.vphone600`- under `ipsws/*CloudOS*/` using base `KernelPatcher`- - builds:- - `Ramdisk/krnl.ramdisk.img4` from derived/base source- - `Ramdisk/krnl.img4` from post-JB restore kernel-- `scripts/ramdisk_send.sh`- - prefers `krnl.ramdisk.img4` when present.--### B) Additive APFS boot-mount gate bypass (new)--- Added new base kernel patch method:- - `KernelPatchApfsMountMixin.patch_apfs_get_dev_by_role_entitlement()`-- Added to base kernel patch sequence in `scripts/patchers/kernel.py`.-- Behavior:- - NOPs three deny branches in `handle_get_dev_by_role`- - does not modify existing filesystem patches (APFS snapshot/seal/graft/mount/sandbox hooks remain unchanged).--### C) JB-only differential identified (for next isolation)--Compared with DEV flow, JB adds unique early-boot risk factors:--- launchd binary gets `LC_LOAD_DYLIB` injection for `/cores/launchdhook.dylib`-- `launchdhook.dylib`/BaseBin environment strings include:- - `JB_ROOT_PATH`- - `JB_TWEAKLOADER_PATH`- - explicit launchdhook startup logs (`hello` / `bye`)-- procursus/bootstrap content is written under preboot hash path (`/mnt5/<hash>/jb-vphone`)--These do not prove causality yet, but they are the primary JB-only candidates after Stage-1 APFS gate mitigation.--## Next Validation--1. Kernel/JB isolation run (requested):- - `make fw_patch_jb`- - `make ramdisk_build`- - `make ramdisk_send`- - run `cfw_install_dev` (not JB) on this JB-patched firmware baseline-2. Compare normal boot result:- - If `mount-phase-1/2` succeeds: strong evidence issue is in JB-only userspace phases.- - If it still fails with `EPERM`: continue kernel/APFS deny-path tracing.-3. If step 2 succeeds, add back JB phases incrementally:- - first JB-1 (launchd inject + jetsam patch)- - then JB-2 (preboot bootstrap)- - then JB-3 (BaseBin hooks)- and capture first regression point.--## 2026-03-05 Follow-up (Data-Protection / SEP UserClient MACF)--A later failure mode moved past mount-phase and failed in `data-protection`:--- `IOUC AppleSEPUserClient failed MACF ... seputil`-- `Boot task failed: data-protection - exited due to exit(60)`--This was traced to unpatched IOKit MAC policy hook range (`ops[201..210]`) in-the sandbox extended hook set. Mitigation and patch details are documented in:--- `research/boot_data_protection_seputil_macf_investigation.md`--Follow-up (2026-03-06):--- Even after `ops[201..210]` extension, runtime still showed:- - `IOUC AppleAPFSUserClient failed MACF ...`- - `IOUC AppleSEPUserClient failed MACF ...`-- A second-stage mitigation was added:- - `patch_iouc_failed_macf` (central IOUC MACF gate low-risk early return).diff --git a/research/boot_launchd_data_volume_lookup_analysis.md b/research/boot_launchd_data_volume_lookup_analysis.mddeleted file mode 100644index 20af5869..00000000--- a/research/boot_launchd_data_volume_lookup_analysis.md+++ /dev/null@@ -1,160 +0,0 @@-# launchd Boot Sequence Analysis (mount-phase-1 / data volume lookup)--Date: 2026-03-06-Target binary in IDA: launchd (Darwin Bootstrapper 7.0.0, libxpc_executables-3089.42.1~6)--## Scope--This analysis focuses on the log segment:--- `mount-phase-1`-- `failed to lookup data volume - Attribute not found`-- `mount: data volume missing, but not required in env: 1`--and answers where launchd is involved vs where `mount`/APFS is actually failing.--## Ground Truth from launchd (IDA)--### 1) Boot task source is embedded plist in launchd--- Embedded config plist string contains:- - `Boot` dictionary- - `mount-phase-1` -> `Program=/sbin/mount`, `ProgramArguments=["mount","-P","1"]`- - `data-protection` -> `Program=/usr/libexec/init_data_protection`, `CSIdentityOverride=com.apple.seputil`--### 2) Boot task dictionary wiring--- `sub_10004D978`:- - reads launchd `__TEXT,__config`- - extracts `Boot` dictionary- - stores into `qword_10007F138`--- `sub_100047B94`:- - lookup task from `qword_10007F138`- - runs gate check (`sub_100047C8C`)- - executes task by calling `sub_100047DD0`--### 3) Boot sequence order (relevant slice)--- `start` -> `sub_1000489A4` -> async `sub_100048590`-- `sub_100048590` task order includes:- - `mount-phase-1`- - `data-protection`- - `finish-obliteration`- - `detect-installed-roots`- - `mount-phase-2`--### 4) Task execution and failure handling--- `sub_100047DD0`:- - logs `Doing boot task`- - `posix_spawnp()` actual executable- - for non-async tasks waits via `sub_100049180`--- `sub_100049180`:- - checks exit status- - if `RequireSuccess=true` and exit is failure -> calls `sub_100048D0C`--- `sub_100048D0C`:- - logs `Boot task failed: %s`- - logs `Panicking in 3 seconds.`- - then panics--## Key Conclusion: where the quoted error originates--`failed to lookup data volume - Attribute not found` is **not** generated by launchd internals.--In this path, launchd is only the orchestrator:--1. launchd runs `/sbin/mount -P 1` for `mount-phase-1`-2. `mount` prints `failed to lookup data volume...`-3. launchd only sees child exit result, then decides whether to panic based on `RequireSuccess`--So this error’s primary fault domain is in `mount` + APFS/IOKit interactions, not in launchd task scheduler code.--## `mount -P 1` call chain (IDA-verified)--Target binary: `research/artifacts/launchd_23B85/mount.from_vm_disk.current`--- `start` @ `0x100003DC8`- - phase path calls `sub_100003480(&env)` then `sub_100003674()`-- `sub_100003480` @ `0x100003480`- - reads `IODeviceTree:/filesystems/fstab` property `os_env_type`- - calls `APFSContainerGetBootDevice(&CFString)`- - builds `/dev/<boot-container>` string in global buffer-- `sub_100003674` @ `0x100003674`- - calls `APFSVolumeRoleFind(<bootdev>, 0x40, &CFArray)`- - on non-zero return:- - `fprintf("%sfailed to lookup data volume - %s\n", ..., strerror(ret & 0x3fff))`- - if single match, converts CFString -> data volume path--Important:--- `0x40` is the queried role selector in this build.-- `Attribute not found` corresponds to `ENOATTR` (`93`) after `ret & 0x3fff`.-- phase-1 can continue with warning, but this often cascades into `data-protection` failure in your failing trace set.--## Updated Causality (with new control evidence)--User-provided control result:--- `cfw_install` (without JB extras) reproduces the same failure.-- TXM path is known-good in this setup.--Implication:--- JB-only userspace deltas are no longer primary suspects for this error.-- Current highest-confidence differentiator is kernel state/patch delta.--## Plausible causes (re-ranked)--### A. kernel-side causes (highest probability now)--1. APFS role/device lookup path is denied/altered by kernel policy path for `mount` (`IOUC AppleAPFSUserClient ... MACF` class of failure).-2. Kernel APFS patch interaction causes role metadata read path to return "attribute not found".-3. Kernel patch ordering or overlap in `fw_patch_jb` modifies behavior that minimal/non-JB flow does not.--### B. mount userspace path causes (still relevant, but secondary to A)--1. `mount -P 1` phase logic expects Data role metadata that is unavailable under current kernel behavior.-2. Userspace APFS query path receives transformed errno/status from kernel and prints attribute-missing message.--### C. launchd-level causes (currently de-prioritized)--1. launchd task definition mismatch.-2. spawn-level failures before mount logic.-3. task gating differences.--These are less consistent with the new control result and with observed mount-origin log text.--## Practical meaning--- For this failure, launchd reverse already gives enough certainty that launchd is orchestrator only.-- Next decisive work should move to APFS userspace API return-site tracing and corresponding kernel handlers.-- Detailed `mount -P 1` failure/hang matrix is documented in:- - `research/boot_mount_phase1_failure_matrix.md`--## Most likely kernel-side silent-fail line (current ranking)--1. `APFSVolumeRoleFind` path reaches APFS userclient method and gets transformed deny/error (most consistent with `IOUC AppleAPFSUserClient failed MACF ... mount` history).-2. Base APFS entitlement bypass patch (`patch_apfs_get_dev_by_role_entitlement`, patch #16) matched the wrong deny branch or altered control flow for role lookup.-3. Base sandbox-op stubs (mount/vnode related) hit an unintended target due ops-table drift.--Lower probability for this exact string:--- launchd plist/task ordering itself-- fstab format/ramdisk missing (would produce different dominant signatures)--## Artifact notes--Current extracted launchd sample (for reproducible local reference):--- `research/artifacts/launchd_23B85/launchd.from_vm_disk.current`- - sha256: `411d730c95d99a088e94b673eff3fa73d6d3cc778b24b476cd0b7866cd037443`-- `research/artifacts/launchd_23B85/launchd.plist.from_vm_disk.current`- - sha256: `dc972e30220b3e9e8323d23ce4a4737d849893dd79e305693de902ff65ddacab`--Observed in this sample:--- no `/cores/launchdhook.dylib` load command-- launchd embedded boot task plist present and readablediff --git a/research/boot_launchdhook_assertion_handoff_20260306.md b/research/boot_launchdhook_assertion_handoff_20260306.mddeleted file mode 100644index 6411b6b2..00000000--- a/research/boot_launchdhook_assertion_handoff_20260306.md+++ /dev/null@@ -1,254 +0,0 @@-# Launchdhook Assertion Handoff (2026-03-06)--## Scope--This note captures the current userspace-side findings for the failing `fw_patch_jb + cfw_install_jb` path.-It is intended as a handoff artifact for follow-up work on the `fix-boot` branch.--The current symptom is no longer "launchd does not start".-The updated symptom is:--- `launchd` starts-- injected `launchdhook.dylib` definitely loads-- `launchd` then hits an early internal assertion before the expected `bash` / follow-on job chain stabilizes--## Executive Summary--### Confirmed--- The original JB `LC_LOAD_DYLIB /cores/launchdhook.dylib` approach is structurally unsafe on the current `launchd` sample because there is not enough load-command slack.-- A short-path alias experiment fixed the Mach-O header-space problem:- - `/cores/launchdhook.dylib` requires 56 bytes and overruns into `__TEXT,__text`- - `/cores/b` still requires 40 bytes and also overruns- - `/b` requires 32 bytes and fits exactly after removing `LC_CODE_SIGNATURE`-- Runtime test with `/b` proves the short-path alias loads successfully, but the main failure remains:- - `launchdhook.dylib` prints its startup logs- - `launchd` then asserts early: `launchd + 59944 ... 0xffffffffffffffff`--### Current conclusion--The short-path `/b` alias fixes the **injection-space** problem, but does **not** fix the **launchd assertion**.-So the remaining problem is now more likely in the hook logic (especially early XPC / daemon config hooks) than in the raw load-command insertion path.--## Evidence Collected--### 1. Mach-O injection space audit--Local dry-run against `vm/.cfw_temp/launchd` established the following:--- Existing load-command slack before the first section: 16 bytes-- After stripping `LC_CODE_SIGNATURE`: 32 bytes-- Required command sizes:- - `/cores/launchdhook.dylib` -> 56 bytes- - `/cores/b` -> 40 bytes- - `/b` -> 32 bytes--Observed effect of the original long-path injection:--- `LC_LOAD_DYLIB /cores/launchdhook.dylib` overwrote the beginning of `__TEXT,__text`-- first instructions at the start of the text section were replaced by injected path bytes--Observed effect of the short-path injection:--- `LC_LOAD_DYLIB /b` fits exactly in the available 32 bytes after `LC_CODE_SIGNATURE` removal-- no additional overwrite into `__TEXT,__text` is needed for that path--### 2. Device-side mount and payload verification--Inside ramdisk shell, manual mount and inspection showed:--- `/dev/disk1s1` mounted at `/mnt1`-- `/dev/disk1s5` mounted at `/mnt5`-- `/mnt1/b` exists and is a Mach-O dylib-- `/mnt1/cores/launchdhook.dylib` exists and is a Mach-O dylib-- `/mnt1/cores/systemhook.dylib` and `/mnt1/cores/libellekit.dylib` are also present--Important clarification:--- `/.b` is an existing hidden root directory on this filesystem and is unrelated to the alias experiment-- the experiment path is `/b`, not `/.b`--### 3. Runtime serial log after switching to `/b`--The following lines appeared during boot:--- `set JB_ROOT_PATH = /private/preboot/<hash>/jb-vphone/procursus`-- `=========== hello from launchdhook.dylib ===========`-- `=========== bye from launchdhook.dylib ===========`-- `com.apple.xpc.launchd ... assertion failed: ... launchd + 59944 ... 0xffffffffffffffff`--Interpretation:--- `/b` injection is working-- `launchdhook.dylib` is loaded and runs its initializer path-- the failure is no longer attributable to the long path not loading or to the Mach-O injection missing outright--## Source-Backed Analysis from Dopamine BaseBin--Source tree used:--- `/Users/qaq/Documents/GitHub/Dopamine/BaseBin`--### 1. launchdhook initialization order--From `Dopamine/BaseBin/launchdhook/src/main.m`, the constructor initializes hooks in this order:--1. `initXPCHooks();`-2. `initDaemonHooks();`-3. `initSpawnHooks();`-4. `initIPCHooks();`-5. `initJetsamHook();`--This matters because the current assertion happens very early, after `launchdhook` has definitely run.-That makes the earlier hooks higher-priority suspects than spawn-time behavior.--### 2. What `initDaemonHooks()` actually does--From `Dopamine/BaseBin/launchdhook/src/daemon_hook.m`:--- hooks `xpc_dictionary_get_value`-- rewrites behavior for these keys:- - `LaunchDaemons`- - `Paths`- - `com.apple.private.xpc.launchd.userspace-reboot`--Behavior summary:--- appends jailbreak daemon plist entries from:- - `JBROOT_PATH("/basebin/LaunchDaemons")`- - `JBROOT_PATH("/Library/LaunchDaemons")`-- appends those same directories to `Paths`-- conditionally returns `com.apple.private.iowatchdog.user-access` when `userspace-reboot` is false/missing--This hook touches exactly the kind of launchd configuration objects that are consulted during early daemon/bootstrap setup.--### 3. What `initSpawnHooks()` actually does--From `Dopamine/BaseBin/launchdhook/src/spawn_hook.c`:--- hooks `__posix_spawn`-- during early boot, it intentionally avoids broad injection until `xpcproxy` appears-- once `xpcproxy` is seen, it flips out of early-boot mode and uses `posix_spawn_hook_shared(...)`--Interpretation:--- spawn hook is real, but it is comparatively later than the daemon config hook-- given the current assertion timing, `initSpawnHooks()` is no longer the top suspect--### 4. What `initXPCHooks()` does--From `Dopamine/BaseBin/launchdhook/src/xpc_hook.c`:--- hooks `xpc_receive_mach_msg`-- participates in jbserver message handling and filtering inside launchd/XPC path--This is also an early-launchd hook and remains a second-tier suspect if daemon-hook isolation does not clear the assertion.--### 5. Runtime jetsam hook vs our static jetsam patch--From `Dopamine/BaseBin/launchdhook/src/jetsam_hook.c`:--- Dopamine also installs a runtime hook on `memorystatus_control`-- this is separate from the repo's static `scripts/patchers/cfw_patch_jetsam.py` binary patch--Therefore two different "jetsam" mechanisms now exist in the failing path:--- static launchd branch patch-- runtime `memorystatus_control` hook--This does not prove either is the current cause, but it means the term "jetsam patch" must be disambiguated in future debugging.--## Current Suspect Ranking--### Highest probability--1. **`initDaemonHooks()` / `daemon_hook.m`**- - hooks `xpc_dictionary_get_value`- - mutates `LaunchDaemons` and `Paths`- - timing matches the observed early `launchd` assertion better than spawn-time logic--### Medium probability--2. **`initXPCHooks()` / `xpc_hook.c`**- - also runs before spawn hook- - directly changes launchd/XPC message handling--3. **static `patch-launchd-jetsam` matcher**- - still considered risky because its matching strategy is heuristic and not CFG-constrained- - but the `/b` experiment shows the assertion survives after fixing the obvious load-command overflow issue--### Lower probability for the current symptom timing--4. **`initSpawnHooks()` / `spawn_hook.c`**- - still relevant for later `bash` / job launch failures- - but no longer the best first suspect for the early `launchd + 59944` assertion--## Recommended Isolation Order for `fix-boot`--### Stage 1: no-daemon-hook control--Goal:--- keep `launchdhook.dylib` loading-- keep `/b` short-path alias experiment in place-- disable only `initDaemonHooks()`--Reason:--- this is the cleanest test of the current top suspect-- if the assertion disappears, the root issue is inside `daemon_hook.m`--### Stage 2: no-xpc-hook control--If stage 1 still asserts:--- restore daemon hook or keep it off, but disable `initXPCHooks()` next-- test whether the assertion is tied to XPC receive hook path instead--### Stage 3: no-spawn-hook control--Only after stages 1 and 2:--- disable `initSpawnHooks()`-- use this to isolate later `bash` / child-process failures if the launchd assertion is already gone or moves later--### Stage 4: revisit static launchd jetsam patch--If all runtime-hook controls still fail:--- re-audit `scripts/patchers/cfw_patch_jetsam.py`-- prefer a source-backed or CFG-backed site selection instead of the current backward-scan heuristic--## Concrete Handoff Notes for Claude--### Facts--- `/b` injection is confirmed working on-device-- `launchdhook.dylib` definitely runs-- launchd still asserts at `launchd + 59944`-- Dopamine source confirms `initDaemonHooks()` runs before `initSpawnHooks()`--### Inference--- the early assertion is more likely to be caused by `daemon_hook.m` or `xpc_hook.c` than by `spawn_hook.c`--### Best next change--Implement a **minimal no-daemon-hook build** first:--- edit `Dopamine/BaseBin/launchdhook/src/main.m`-- temporarily disable only `initDaemonHooks();`-- rebuild `launchdhook.dylib`-- keep `/b` alias loading strategy unchanged for the control run--## Related Files--- `scripts/cfw_install_jb.sh`-- `scripts/patchers/cfw_inject_dylib.py`-- `scripts/patchers/cfw_patch_jetsam.py`-- `research/boot_jb_mount_failure_investigation.md`-- `research/boot_hang_b19_mount_dounmount_strategy_compare.md`-- `Dopamine/BaseBin/launchdhook/src/main.m`-- `Dopamine/BaseBin/launchdhook/src/daemon_hook.m`-- `Dopamine/BaseBin/launchdhook/src/spawn_hook.c`-- `Dopamine/BaseBin/launchdhook/src/xpc_hook.c`diff --git a/research/boot_log_fail_vs_success_analysis.md b/research/boot_log_fail_vs_success_analysis.mddeleted file mode 100644index a6ce8a90..00000000--- a/research/boot_log_fail_vs_success_analysis.md+++ /dev/null@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@-# Boot Log Comparison Analysis (fail vs success)--Date: 2026-03-06-Scope: compare `/Users/qaq/Desktop/boot.fail.log` and `/Users/qaq/Desktop/boot.success.log` for the current startup failure investigation.--## Executive Verdict--- The fail path is a `launchd` userspace panic caused by `data-protection` task `SIGTRAP`, not an APFS kernel panic.-- The immediate trigger in fail log is that mount could not find the APFS Data volume metadata:- - `failed to lookup data volume - Attribute not found`- - `mount: data volume missing, but not required in env: 1`-- APFS itself does load in both logs with the same version (`2632.40.15`) and continues mounting volumes.-- Based on these two logs alone, evidence is stronger for "Data volume discovery/mapping issue" than "APFS patch count too high".--## Key Evidence--1. APFS module load is healthy in both runs--- Fail: `apfs_module_start ... com.apple.filesystems.apfs, v2632.40.15` (line 178)-- Success: same APFS load/version (line 250)-- Interpretation: no direct sign that APFS kext fails to initialize in fail run.--2. First hard divergence is in mount-phase-1 Data volume resolution--- Fail:- - `failed to lookup data volume - Attribute not found` (line 420)- - `mount: data volume missing, but not required in env: 1` (line 421)-- Success:- - `mount: found boot container: /dev/disk1, data volume: /dev/disk1s2 env: 1` (line 423)-- Interpretation: fail run cannot resolve data volume metadata; success run can.--3. data-protection task outcome differs immediately after that--- Fail:- - `(data-protection) <Error>: exited due to SIGTRAP` (line 432)- - `Boot task failed: data-protection - exited due to SIGTRAP` (line 433)- - `userspace panic` follows (line 458)-- Success:- - `init_data_protection: Gigalocker initialization completed` (line 434)- - boot continues into `mount-phase-2` and beyond (line 502+)-- Interpretation: the crash is in boot task flow after data volume lookup failure, not in APFS module load.--4. Success path shows APFS warnings that are non-fatal--- `mount: failed to migrate Media Keys, error = c002` (line 522)-- `mount_phase_two ... Overprovision setup failed ... Ignoring...` (line 560)-- Interpretation: APFS/AKS warnings can be tolerated when data volume path is intact; these are not the blocking condition here.--## Additional Differences That Confound Direct "Patch Count" Attribution--- Different host build/hash inputs:- - vphoned `GIT_HASH` differs (`e4456e9` vs `fd08c43`)- - binary path differs (`vphone-cli` vs `vphone-cli-dev`)- - `vphoned` signed hash differs-- Different device identity:- - ECID differs across logs-- Different APFS checkpoint state:- - Fail: `cleanly-unmounted`, largest xid `198`- - Success: `reloading after unclean unmount`, largest xid `491`--These differences mean this is not a strict A/B test of only "APFS patch count".--## Assessment of "APFS patch applied too much?"--Current confidence: low-to-medium for that hypothesis from logs alone.--What logs support:--- The failure does involve APFS mount phase and data-protection.--What logs do not support:--- No APFS module crash/oops/panic.-- No explicit APFS patch integrity failure.-- The strongest fail signal is missing data volume attribute, not APFS code-path abort.--More likely from current evidence:--- APFS container/volume role metadata mismatch, or-- environment/image drift between the two runs, causing different boot task assumptions.--## Suggested Next Validation (minimal and decisive)--1. Re-run with identical binaries and same VM snapshot, toggling only APFS-related patch set.-2. Capture APFS volume-role metadata before boot task (expect `disk1s2` Data role to be discoverable).-3. Compare generated firmware/CFW artifacts checksums between fail/success pipelines.-4. If failure reproduces only with APFS patch delta, then bisect APFS patch subset around data-volume lookup path.--## Bottom Line--From these two logs, the actionable breakpoint is:--- "data volume lookup failed" -> "data-protection SIGTRAP" -> userspace panic.--This is a stronger lead than "APFS patch count over-applied", and should be the first branch to validate.--## Update (Control Run)--New control signal from user:--- Same failure reproduces with `cfw_install` (without JB extras).-- TXM is known working in this control.--Updated implication:--- The prior "JB userspace difference" suspicion should be de-prioritized.-- Current primary suspect becomes kernel delta (especially APFS/IOUC/MACF-related behavior under `mount -P 1`).diff --git a/research/boot_mount_phase1_failure_matrix.md b/research/boot_mount_phase1_failure_matrix.mddeleted file mode 100644index 94368610..00000000--- a/research/boot_mount_phase1_failure_matrix.md+++ /dev/null@@ -1,195 +0,0 @@-# mount `-P 1` Failure / Hang Matrix (IDA)--Date: 2026-03-06-Target: `research/artifacts/launchd_23B85/mount.from_vm_disk.current`--## What `mount -P 1` actually does--Main entry: `start` @ `0x100003DC8`--For `-P 1` (phase-1):--1. Parse phase from `-P` and set global `dword_1000101F4 = 1`.-2. Call `setfsent()` and iterate fstab entries.-3. Resolve boot container/device via `sub_100003480` (`APFSContainerGetBootDevice`).-4. Resolve data volume via `sub_100003674` (`APFSVolumeRoleFind`).-5. Print either:- - `mount: found boot container: ..., data volume: ..., env: ...`- - or `mount: data volume missing, but not required in env: ...`-6. Continue mounting entries with pass number == phase via `sub_1000045B0` (exec `mount_<fstype>`).--Important: for phase-1, missing data volume is normally **not fatal**.--### Critical implementation detail (IDA)--- `sub_100003674` calls:- - `APFSVolumeRoleFind(<bootdev>, 0x40, &outArray)`-- If return != 0:- - prints `failed to lookup data volume - %s` with `strerror(ret & 0x3fff)`-- `Attribute not found` in your log maps to Darwin `ENOATTR(93)`.--### Important caveat on `93` provenance--- Confirmed fact:- - `mount` sees `APFSVolumeRoleFind` return value whose low 14 bits are `93`.-- Not yet proven:- - that kernel returns `93` directly.-- Also plausible:- - APFS userspace layer maps another kernel/APFS status to `ENOATTR` before returning to `mount`.--## All plausible causes for phase-1 fail/hang--### A) Early argument / mode errors (immediate fail)--1. Invalid `-P` value- - message: `-P flag requires a valid mount phase number`- - location: `start` (`0x1000039C4`..`0x100003A70`)--2. Invalid invocation shape (bad argv combination)- - falls into usage path (`sub_1000043B0`)--### B) Boot container / APFS role lookup path--1. Cannot read filesystem info from IORegistry (`os_env_type`)- - message: `failed to get filesystem info`- - function: `sub_100003480`--2. `APFSContainerGetBootDevice` failure- - message: `failed to get boot device - ...` (with retry loop outside restore env)- - function: `sub_100003480`--3. `APFSVolumeRoleFind` failure- - message: `failed to lookup data volume - ...`- - function: `sub_100003674`--4. Multiple Data volumes found- - message: `found multiple data volumes`- - function: `sub_100003674`--Note:--- phase-1 usually continues after (3)/(4).-- phase-2 has stricter fatal behavior on missing data volume in env=1.--### C) fstab traversal / entry filtering issues--1. `setfsent()` failure- - message: `mount: can't get filesystem checklist`- - fatal for phase run--2. Entry type / spec/path invalidity- - examples:- - `%s: invalid special file or file system.`- - `%s: unknown special file or file system.`- - `You must specify a filesystem type with -t.`--These are input/config failures before actual fs-specific helper mount.--### D) Per-filesystem mount helper failures (major phase-1 failure source)--Dispatcher: `sub_1000045B0`--1. FSKit path failure (`sub_100000BC0`)- - messages:- - `File system named %s not found`- - `File system named %s unable to mount`- - `FSKit unavailable`--2. `fork()` / `waitpid()` / child process control failures- - messages include wait/fork warnings in helper path--3. `exec` failure for `mount_<fstype>` helpers- - tries `/sbin/mount_<fstype>` then fallback paths under `/System/Library/Filesystems/...`- - if all fail -> returns mapped failure code--4. Helper exits non-zero or gets signaled- - parent treats as mount failure and propagates code--This bucket is the most common direct reason phase-1 exits non-zero.--### E) Ramdisk special path failures (if ramdisk entry is hit in phase-1)--Ramdisk path: `sub_100002688` + `sub_100002C34` + command wrapper `sub_100002EA4`--Possible failures:--1. preflight format/option parsing fail (`Ramdisk fstab not in expected format.`)-2. `mount_tmpfs` exec or command-run failures-3. copyfile / final mount / umount failures--Not always relevant, but can fail phase-1 if fstab phase-1 includes ramdisk flow.--### F) Kernel / IOKit policy-deny mediated failures (high-probability in your current repro)--From your runtime evidence and control results:--1. `mount` process can hit IOUC/MACF deny path on APFS UserClient access.-2. userspace may surface this as role/attribute lookup failure string, while root cause is kernel-side deny/altered return.--Given:--- same failure reproduces with non-JB `cfw_install`-- TXM known-good--current priority remains kernel delta analysis.--## Kernel patch candidates for this specific signature (ranked)--### 1) Base patch #16 (`patch_apfs_get_dev_by_role_entitlement`) — highest--Why high:--- It directly targets APFS get-dev-by-role gate, which is exactly adjacent to `APFSVolumeRoleFind` behavior.-- It NOPs conditional branches by pattern heuristics; a false match can silently alter return path while keeping system alive.-- Symptom shape fits: boot container lookup can still succeed, but role lookup returns `ENOATTR`.-- Live-kernel validation status:- - patch #16 is present (all 3 target branches are `nop` at runtime).- - therefore current question is semantic side effect, not "patch missing".--### 2) Base sandbox hook patch (`patch_sandbox_hooks`) — medium--Why medium:--- Touches mount/vnode MACF paths by ops-table index.-- If ops index resolution drifts, wrong function may be stubbed and produce semantic corruption instead of crash.--### 3) Base APFS mount checks (#13/#14) — lower for this exact error--Why lower:--- These primarily alter mount authorization/upgrade checks.-- Less directly tied to role-attribute lookup API return code, but still in APFS mount vicinity.--## What to do next (action order)--1. Confirm userland return-site:- - break at `sub_1000036C0` (`BL _APFSVolumeRoleFind`) and inspect `w0` after return.- - expected failing value path: `w0 & 0x3fff == 93`.-2. Correlate with kernel-side return path in the same boot:- - break/trace APFS kernel role lookup function return (`handle_get_dev_by_role` path) and record final returned `w0`.- - determine whether kernel returns `93`, `22`, or other value when userspace later sees `93`.-3. Correlate with kernel log at same timestamp:- - look for `IOUC AppleAPFSUserClient failed MACF in process mount`.-4. Do base-kernel patch isolation first (not JB methods):- - run with base patch #16 disabled (or reverted) while keeping others unchanged.- - if failure clears, root cause is narrowed to entitlement-bypass matcher.-5. If #16 is not root cause, isolate base sandbox hook patch.-6. Only then continue to JB-only methods (`VPHONE_JB_DISABLE_METHODS`), because your latest control says non-JB install still reproduces.--## Hang/stall-specific points (not just hard fail)--1. Boot-device lookup retry loop (`APFSContainerGetBootDevice`) with sleep retries.-2. Child `mount_<fstype>` helper blocking in kernel/IO path (parent waiting in `waitpid`).-3. External command wrapper (`sub_100002EA4`) blocking while waiting for command output/exit.--These produce "looks stuck" behavior even before explicit non-zero exit.--## Practical triage checklist for phase-1--1. Confirm exact failing subpath:- - preflight/APFS lookup vs helper mount vs waitpid/exec.-2. Correlate with kernel log at same timestamp:- - especially `IOUC AppleAPFSUserClient ... mount`.-3. Separate:- - non-fatal data-volume warning in phase-1- - true fatal return path that makes launchd panic on `RequireSuccess`.diff --git a/research/kernel_jb_patch_notes.md b/research/kernel_jb_patch_notes.mdindex 346791a2..cf404096 100644--- a/research/kernel_jb_patch_notes.md+++ b/research/kernel_jb_patch_notes.md@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@# Kernel JB Remaining Patches — Research Notes-Last updated: 2026-03-04+Last updated: 2026-03-07## Overview@@ -12,6 +12,11 @@ Last updated: 2026-03-04Two methods added since initial document: `patch_shared_region_map`, `patch_io_secure_bsd_root`.Three previously failing patches (`patch_nvram_verify_permission`, `patch_thid_should_crash`, `patch_hook_cred_label_update_execve`) have been implemented — see details below.+On 2026-03-06, three patches were retargeted after IDA-MCP re-analysis revealed their matchers were hitting wrong sites:+- `patch_bsd_init_auth` — was hitting `exec_handle_sugid` instead of the real `bsd_init` rootauth gate+- `patch_io_secure_bsd_root` — was patching the `"SecureRoot"` dispatch branch instead of the `"SecureRootName"` deny-return+- `patch_vm_fault_enter_prepare` — was NOPing a `pmap_lock_phys_page()` call instead of the upstream `cs_bypass` gate+Upstream reference: `/Users/qaq/Documents/GitHub/super-tart-vphone/CFW/patch_fw.py`Test kernel: `vm/iPhone17,3_26.1_23B85_Restore/kernelcache.release.vphone600` (IM4P-wrapped, bvx2 compressed)@@ -383,6 +388,24 @@ Should have moderate caller count (hundreds).**Problem**: Needed `_vfs_context_current` and `_vnode_getattr` — 0 symbols available.**Solution**: Eliminated `_vfs_context_current` entirely — shellcode constructs vfs_context inline on stack via `mrs x8, tpidr_el1` + `stp x8, x0, [sp, #0x70]`. `_vnode_getattr` found via "vnode_getattr" string anchor. Hook index found dynamically (scan first 30 ops entries). Code cave allocated via `_find_code_cave(180)`.+### patch_bsd_init_auth — RETARGETED (2026-03-06)++**Historical repo behavior**: matched `ldr x0,[xN,#0x2b8]; cbz x0; bl` pattern, which landed on `exec_handle_sugid` at `0xFFFFFE0007FB09DC` — a false positive caused by `/dev/null` string overlap in the heuristic scoring.+**Problem**: the old matcher targeted the wrong function entirely; patching `exec_handle_sugid` instead of the real `bsd_init` rootauth gate could break boot by mutating an exec/credential path.+**Current status**: retargeted to the real `FSIOC_KERNEL_ROOTAUTH` return check in `bsd_init`. The new matcher recovers `bsd_init` via in-kernel string xrefs, locates the rootvp panic block (`"rootvp not authenticated after mounting"`), finds the unique in-function indirect call (`BLRAA`) preceded by the `0x80046833` (`FSIOC_KERNEL_ROOTAUTH`) literal, and NOPs the subsequent `CBNZ W0, panic`. Live patch hit: `0xFFFFFE0007F7B98C` / file offset `0x00F7798C`. See `research/kernel_patch_jb/patch_bsd_init_auth.md`.++### patch_io_secure_bsd_root — RETARGETED (2026-03-06)++**Historical repo behavior**: fallback heuristic selected the first `BL* + CBZ W0` site in `AppleARMPE::callPlatformFunction`, landing on the `"SecureRoot"` name-match gate at `0xFFFFFE000836E1F0` / file offset `0x0136A1F0`. This changed generic platform-function dispatch routing, not just the deny return.+**Problem**: the patched branch was the `isEqualTo("SecureRoot")` check, not the `"SecureRootName"` policy result used by `IOSecureBSDRoot()`. The old `CBZ->B` rewrite could corrupt control flow for unrelated platform-function calls.+**Current status**: retargeted to the final `"SecureRootName"` deny-return selector: `CSEL W22, WZR, W9, NE` at `0xFFFFFE000836E464` / file offset `0x0136A464` is replaced with `MOV W22, #0`. This preserves the string comparison, callback synchronization, and state updates, and only forces the final policy return from `kIOReturnNotPrivileged` to success. See `research/kernel_patch_jb/patch_io_secure_bsd_root.md`.++### patch_vm_fault_enter_prepare — RETARGETED (2026-03-06)++**Historical repo behavior**: matcher looked for `BL(rare) + LDRB [xN,#0x2c] + TBZ` and NOPed the BL at `0xFFFFFE0007BB898C`, which was actually a `pmap_lock_phys_page()` call inside the `VM_PAGE_CONSUME_CLUSTERED` macro — breaking lock/unlock pairing in the VM fault path.+**Problem**: the derived matcher overfit the wrong local shape. The upstream 26.1 patch targeted the `cs_bypass` fast-path gate (`TBZ W22, #3`), not the clustered-page lock helper. NOPing only the lock acquire while the unlock still ran caused unbalanced lock state, explaining boot failures.+**Current status**: retargeted to the upstream semantic site — `TBZ W22, #3, ...` (where W22 bit 3 = `fault_info->cs_bypass`) at file offset `0x00BA9E1C` / VA `0xFFFFFE0007BADE1C` is replaced with `NOP`, forcing the `cs_bypass` fast path unconditionally. This matches XNU's `vm_fault_cs_check_violation()` logic and preserves lock pairing and page accounting. See `research/kernel_patch_jb/patch_vm_fault_enter_prepare.md`.+---## Environment Notesdiff --git a/research/kernel_patch_sandbox_hooks_21_26_validation.md b/research/kernel_patch_sandbox_hooks_17_26_validation.mdsimilarity index 87%rename from research/kernel_patch_sandbox_hooks_21_26_validation.mdrename to research/kernel_patch_sandbox_hooks_17_26_validation.mdindex a3ccdd44..75f2651a 100644--- a/research/kernel_patch_sandbox_hooks_21_26_validation.md+++ b/research/kernel_patch_sandbox_hooks_17_26_validation.md@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@-# Kernel Patch Validation: Sandbox Hooks 21-26 (Regular/Development)+# Kernel Patch Validation: Sandbox Hooks 17-26 (Regular/Development)Date: 2026-03-05@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ Date: 2026-03-05Validate the following non-JB kernel patches on a freshly prepared (unpatched) firmware kernelcache:+- 17/18 `file_check_mmap`: `mov x0,#0` + `ret`+- 19/20 `mount_check_mount`: `mov x0,#0` + `ret`- 21/22 `mount_check_remount`: `mov x0,#0` + `ret`- 23/24 `mount_check_umount`: `mov x0,#0` + `ret`- 25/26 `vnode_check_rename`: `mov x0,#0` + `ret`@@ -27,6 +29,8 @@ Patch flow under test:1. `_find_sandbox_ops_table_via_conf()` to locate `mac_policy_conf`2. `mpc_ops` pointer to read function entries by index3. `HOOK_INDICES`:+ - `file_check_mmap = 36`+ - `mount_check_mount = 87`- `mount_check_remount = 88`- `mount_check_umount = 91`- `vnode_check_rename = 120`@@ -73,7 +77,7 @@ From direct `KernelPatcher` run on clean payload (in-memory, no file write):Using IDA DB and disassembly/decompile on the same firmware family:-- Entry sites match the three hook slots above.+- Entry sites match the five hook slots above.- For `vnode_check_rename`, downstream body includes rename-related path monitoring logic (`pathmonitor_prepare_rename`), confirming semantic alignment with rename hook behavior.- Note: current IDA database had these entry points already recognized as patched stubs; additional inspection was performed from `entry+8` into original body for semantic validation.@@ -81,8 +85,8 @@ Using IDA DB and disassembly/decompile on the same firmware family:Status: **working for now**.-For clean `fw_prepare` kernelcache, the 21-26 sandbox hook patches:+For clean `fw_prepare` kernelcache, the 17-26 sandbox hook patches:- resolve through the correct `mac_policy_ops` table,-- hit the expected three hook entry addresses,+- hit the expected five hook entry addresses,- and rewrite exactly the first two instructions to `mov x0,#0; ret`.diff --git a/research/kernel_patcher_verification.md b/research/kernel_patcher_verification.mdindex 45a39898..fcde947c 100644--- a/research/kernel_patcher_verification.md+++ b/research/kernel_patcher_verification.md@@ -51,8 +51,8 @@ apply the dynamic patcher to a freshly extracted vresearch101 kernelcache.Result: **byte-identical** output between hardcoded and dynamic patching.-- `KernelPatcher` patches found: 25-- Hardcoded patches applied: 25+- `KernelPatcher` patches found: 26+- Hardcoded patches applied: 26- `cmp -l /tmp/kc_vphone600_upstream.raw /tmp/kc_vphone600_dynamic.raw`:no output (files identical)@@ -77,16 +77,17 @@ Offsets and 32-bit patch values, taken from `patch_fw.py`:| 13 | 0x2475044 | 0xEB00001F | \_apfs_vfsop_mount cmp x0,x0 || 14 | 0x2476C00 | 0x52800000 | \_apfs_mount_upgrade_checks mov w0,#0 || 15 | 0x248C800 | 0x52800000 | \_handle_fsioc_graft mov w0,#0 |-| 16 | 0x23AC528 | 0xD2800000 | \_hook_file_check_mmap mov x0,#0 |-| 17 | 0x23AC52C | 0xD65F03C0 | \_hook_file_check_mmap ret |-| 18 | 0x23AAB58 | 0xD2800000 | \_hook_mount_check_mount mov x0,#0 |-| 19 | 0x23AAB5C | 0xD65F03C0 | \_hook_mount_check_mount ret |-| 20 | 0x23AA9A0 | 0xD2800000 | \_hook_mount_check_remount mov x0,#0 |-| 21 | 0x23AA9A4 | 0xD65F03C0 | \_hook_mount_check_remount ret |-| 22 | 0x23AA80C | 0xD2800000 | \_hook_mount_check_umount mov x0,#0 |-| 23 | 0x23AA810 | 0xD65F03C0 | \_hook_mount_check_umount ret |-| 24 | 0x23A5514 | 0xD2800000 | \_hook_vnode_check_rename mov x0,#0 |-| 25 | 0x23A5518 | 0xD65F03C0 | \_hook_vnode_check_rename ret |+| 16 | | | \_handle_get_dev_by_role entitlement bypass |+| 17 | 0x23AC528 | 0xD2800000 | \_hook_file_check_mmap mov x0,#0 |+| 18 | 0x23AC52C | 0xD65F03C0 | \_hook_file_check_mmap ret |+| 19 | 0x23AAB58 | 0xD2800000 | \_hook_mount_check_mount mov x0,#0 |+| 20 | 0x23AAB5C | 0xD65F03C0 | \_hook_mount_check_mount ret |+| 21 | 0x23AA9A0 | 0xD2800000 | \_hook_mount_check_remount mov x0,#0 |+| 22 | 0x23AA9A4 | 0xD65F03C0 | \_hook_mount_check_remount ret |+| 23 | 0x23AA80C | 0xD2800000 | \_hook_mount_check_umount mov x0,#0 |+| 24 | 0x23AA810 | 0xD65F03C0 | \_hook_mount_check_umount ret |+| 25 | 0x23A5514 | 0xD2800000 | \_hook_vnode_check_rename mov x0,#0 |+| 26 | 0x23A5518 | 0xD65F03C0 | \_hook_vnode_check_rename ret |## TXM Patch Details@@ -125,7 +126,7 @@ pyimg4 im4p extract \Dynamic patcher results:-- Patches found/applied: 25+- Patches found/applied: 26- TXM patch location: `0xFA6B98` (NOP `tbnz w8, #0, #0xfa6c80`)- Patched output: `/tmp/kc_vresearch1_dynamic.raw`@@ -134,7 +135,7 @@ Dynamic patcher results:For vphone600, the dynamic patcher output is byte-identical to the legacyhardcoded patch list, indicating functional equivalence on this kernelcache.The same dynamic patcher also successfully patches the freshly extracted-vresearch101 kernelcache with the expected TXM NOP and a full 25-patch set.+vresearch101 kernelcache with the expected TXM NOP and a full 26-patch set.## Targeted Re-Verification (2026-03-05)diff --git a/research/txm_jb_patches.md b/research/txm_jb_patches.mdindex ffd5fce8..9d7d67e5 100644--- a/research/txm_jb_patches.md+++ b/research/txm_jb_patches.md@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@# TXM Jailbreak Patch Analysis-Analysis of 6 logical TXM jailbreak patches (11 instruction modifications) applied by `txm_jb.py` on the RESEARCH variant+Analysis of 6 logical TXM jailbreak patches (11 instruction modifications) applied by `txm_dev.py` on the RESEARCH variantof TXM from iPhone17,3 / PCC-CloudOS 26.x.## TXM Execution Model@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ falls through to the version checks which return success for version <= 5.This effectively bypasses CodeSignature hash validation --- the hash data existsin the blob but the hash-present flag is suppressed, so the consistency check passes.-### `txm_jb.py` dynamic finder: `patch_selector24_hash_extraction_nop()`+### `txm_dev.py` dynamic finder: `patch_selector24_force_pass()`Scans for `mov w0, #0xa1` as a unique anchor to locate the CS hash validator function,finds PACIBSP to determine function start, then matches the pattern@@ -412,7 +412,7 @@ Universal entitlement lookup function. When `a1 != 0`, it resolves the manifest'entitlement dictionary and searches for the named key via `sub_FFFFFFF017036294`.Returns a composite status word where bit 0 indicates the entitlement was found.-### `txm_jb.py` dynamic finder: `patch_get_task_allow_force_true()`+### `txm_dev.py` dynamic finder: `patch_get_task_allow_force_true()`Searches for string refs to `"get-task-allow"`, then scans forward for the pattern`BL X / TBNZ w0, #0, Y`. Patches the BL to `MOV X0, #1`.@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ Since the validator returns the pointer unchanged, `x20` (raw arg) and the validpointer both refer to the same object. The shellcode's `STRB W0, [X20, #0x30]`writes to the correct location.-### `txm_jb.py` dynamic finder: `patch_selector42_29_shellcode()`+### `txm_dev.py` dynamic finder: `patch_selector42_29_shellcode()`1. Finds the "debugger gate function" via string refs to `"com.apple.private.cs.debugger"`2. Locates the dispatch stub by matching `BTI j / MOV X0, X20 / BL / MOV X1, X21 / MOV X2, X22 / BL debugger_gate / B`@@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ branches to the success path, bypassing both the entitlement check and thefallback flag check. This allows any process to create debug memory mappingsregardless of whether it has `com.apple.private.cs.debugger`.-### `txm_jb.py` dynamic finder: `patch_debugger_entitlement_force_true()`+### `txm_dev.py` dynamic finder: `patch_debugger_entitlement_force_true()`Searches for string refs to `"com.apple.private.cs.debugger"`, then matchesthe pattern: `mov x0, #0 / mov x2, #0 / bl X / tbnz w0, #0, Y`. Patches the BL@@ -645,7 +645,7 @@ if ( (byte_FFFFFFF017070F24 & 1) == 0 )return 27; // developer mode not enabled```-### `txm_jb.py` dynamic finder: `patch_developer_mode_bypass()`+### `txm_dev.py` dynamic finder: `patch_developer_mode_bypass()`Searches for string refs to `"developer mode enabled due to system policyconfiguration"`, then scans backwards for a `tbz/tbnz/cbz/cbnz` instructiondiff --git a/scripts/patchers/kernel_patch_sandbox.py b/scripts/patchers/kernel_patch_sandbox.pyindex 09f51deb..7328834d 100644--- a/scripts/patchers/kernel_patch_sandbox.py+++ b/scripts/patchers/kernel_patch_sandbox.py@@ -5,11 +5,11 @@ from .kernel_asm import MOV_X0_0, RETclass KernelPatchSandboxMixin:def patch_sandbox_hooks(self):- """Patches 16-25: Stub Sandbox MACF hooks with mov x0,#0; ret.+ """Patches 17-26: Stub Sandbox MACF hooks with mov x0,#0; ret.Uses mac_policy_ops struct indices from XNU source (xnu-11215+)."""- self._log("\n[16-25] Sandbox MACF hooks")+ self._log("\n[17-26] Sandbox MACF hooks")ops_table = self._find_sandbox_ops_table_via_conf()if ops_table is None: