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Update patch_hook_cred_label_update_execve.md
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diff --git a/research/kernel_patch_jb/patch_hook_cred_label_update_execve.md b/research/kernel_patch_jb/patch_hook_cred_label_update_execve.mdindex cae8a947..a7436df6 100644--- a/research/kernel_patch_jb/patch_hook_cred_label_update_execve.md+++ b/research/kernel_patch_jb/patch_hook_cred_label_update_execve.md@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@# C23 `patch_hook_cred_label_update_execve`-## How the patch works+## 1) How the Patch Works- Source: `scripts/patchers/kernel_jb_patch_hook_cred_label.py`.- Locator strategy:1. Resolve `vnode_getattr` (symbol or string-near function).@@ -8,25 +8,71 @@3. Pick cred-label execve hook entry from early ops indices by function-size heuristic.- Patch action:- Inject cave shellcode that:- - builds inline `vfs_context`,+ - builds inline `vfs_context` via `mrs tpidr_el1` (current_thread),- calls `vnode_getattr`,- propagates uid/gid into new credential,- - updates csflags,+ - updates csflags with CS_VALID,- jumps back to original hook.- Rewrite selected ops-table pointer entry to cave target (preserving auth-rebase upper bits).-## Expected outcome+## 2) Expected Outcome- Interpose sandbox cred-label execve hook with custom ownership/credential propagation logic.-## Target-- One `mac_policy_ops` function-pointer entry plus injected hook shellcode cave.+## 3) Target+- Ops table: `mac_policy_ops` at `0xFFFFFE0007A58488` (discovered via mac_policy_conf)+- Hook index: 18 (largest function in ops[0:29], 4208 bytes)+ - Original hook: `sub_FFFFFE00093BDB64` (Sandbox `hook..execve()` handler)+ - Contains: sandbox profile evaluation, container assignment, entitlement processing+- One `mac_policy_ops` function-pointer entry + injected hook shellcode cave.-## IDA MCP evidence-- `vnode_getattr` string-related hit:- - xref `0xfffffe00084c08ec` -> function start `0xfffffe00084c0718`-- Seatbelt policy anchor:- - `Seatbelt sandbox policy` @ `0xfffffe00075fd493`- - data xref @ `0xfffffe0007a58430` (policy config region)+## 4) IDA MCP Evidence-## Risk-- Table-entry rewrite + shellcode interposition is invasive; incorrect index/cave selection can break sandbox hook dispatch.+### Ops table structure+- `mac_policy_conf` at `0xFFFFFE0007A58428`:+ - +0: `0xFE00075FF33D` → "Sandbox" (mpc_name)+ - +8: `0xFE00075FD493` → "Seatbelt sandbox policy" (mpc_fullname)+ - +32: `0xFE0007A58488` → mpc_ops (ops table pointer)+- Ops table entries (non-null in first 30):+ - [6]: `0xFE00093BDB58` (12 bytes)+ - [7]: `0xFE00093B0C04` (36 bytes)+ - [11]: `0xFE00093B0B68` (156 bytes)+ - [13]: `0xFE00093B0B5C` (12 bytes)+ - [18]: `0xFE00093BDB64` (4208 bytes) ← **selected by size heuristic**+ - [19]: `0xFE00093B0AE8` (116 bytes)+ - [29]: `0xFE00093B0830` (696 bytes)++### vnode_getattr+- String-related hit: xref `0xFE00084C08EC` → function start `0xFE00084C0718`++### Chained fixup format+- Ops table entries use auth rebase (bit63=1):+ - Upper 32 bits: diversity(16) + addrDiv(1) + key(2) + next(12) + auth(1)+ - Lower 32 bits: target file offset+- The rewrite preserves upper bits and replaces lower 32 with cave file offset.+- Kernel loader re-signs the new target with the same PAC key/diversity → valid PAC pointer.++## 5) Previous Bug (PANIC root cause)+The code cave was allocated in `__PRELINK_TEXT` segment. While marked R-X in the+Mach-O, this segment is **non-executable at runtime** on ARM64e due to+KTRR (Kernel Text Read-only Region) enforcement. The cave ended up at a low+file offset (e.g. 0x5440) in __PRELINK_TEXT padding, which at runtime maps to a+non-executable page.++**Panic**: "Kernel instruction fetch abort at pc 0xfffffe004761d440"+- The 0x47 in the upper nibble (instead of expected 0x07) indicates PAC poisoning:+ the CPU attempted to branch through the ops table pointer, PAC auth succeeded,+ but the target address was in a non-executable region → instruction fetch fault.++## 6) Fix Applied+- Modified `_find_code_cave()` in `kernel_jb_base.py` to only search `__TEXT_EXEC`+ and `__TEXT_BOOT_EXEC` segments.+- `__PRELINK_TEXT` is now explicitly excluded since KTRR makes it non-executable+ at runtime despite the Mach-O R-X flags.+- Verified __TEXT_EXEC has sufficient padding at segment end (0x1A10+ bytes of zeros+ at `0xFE00095C25F0`) for the 180-byte shellcode.++## 7) Risk Assessment+- **Medium-High**: Table-entry rewrite + shellcode interposition is invasive.+ Incorrect index selection or shellcode bugs can break sandbox hook dispatch.+- Mitigated by: dynamic function-size heuristic for index detection, PAC-aware+ chained fixup pointer rewrite, and __TEXT_EXEC-restricted code cave.