Run a virtual iPhone on an Apple Silicon Mac.
Swift
kernel: add patch 27 — disable thread_guard_violation (EXC_GUARD)
Angus24a9acdf71be
diff --git a/AGENTS.md b/AGENTS.mdindex 0ceef984..6a1241dc 100644--- a/AGENTS.md+++ b/AGENTS.md@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ For any changes applying new patches, also update research/0_binary_patch_compar| Variant | Boot Chain | CFW | Make Targets || --------------- | :---------: | :-------: | ---------------------------------- || **Regular** | 51 patches | 10 phases | `fw_patch` + `cfw_install` |-| **Development** | 64 patches | 12 phases | `fw_patch_dev` + `cfw_install_dev` |+| **Development** | 65 patches | 12 phases | `fw_patch_dev` + `cfw_install_dev` || **Jailbreak** | 126 patches | 14 phases | `fw_patch_jb` + `cfw_install_jb` |> JB finalization (symlinks, Sileo, apt, TrollStore) runs automatically on first boot via `/cores/vphone_jb_setup.sh` LaunchDaemon. Monitor progress: `/var/log/vphone_jb_setup.log`.diff --git a/research/0_binary_patch_comparison.md b/research/0_binary_patch_comparison.mdindex 1d27e02d..08d6d5b6 100644--- a/research/0_binary_patch_comparison.md+++ b/research/0_binary_patch_comparison.md@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@| 15 | `mov w0,#0` | `_handle_fsioc_graft` | Allow fsioc graft | Y | Y | Y || 16 | NOP (3x) | `handle_get_dev_by_role` | Bypass APFS role-lookup deny gates for boot mounts | Y | Y | Y || 17-26 | `mov x0,#0; ret` (5 hooks) | Sandbox MACF ops table | Stub 5 sandbox hooks | Y | Y | Y |+| 27 | `PACIBSP→RET` | `_thread_guard_violation` | Disable EXC_GUARD delivery (match production behavior) | - | Y | - |### JB-Only Kernel Methods (Reference List)@@ -155,20 +156,20 @@| iBEC | 3 | 3 | 3 || LLB | 6 | 6 | 6 || TXM | 1 | 12 | 12 |-| Kernel (base) | 28 | 28 | 28 |+| Kernel (base) | 28 | 29 | 28 || Kernel (JB methods) | - | - | 59 |-| Boot chain total | 41 | 52 | 112 |+| Boot chain total | 41 | 53 | 112 || CFW binary patches | 4 | 5 | 6 || CFW installed components | 6 | 7 | 9 || CFW total | 10 | 12 | 15 |-| Grand total | 51 | 64 | 127 |+| Grand total | 51 | 65 | 127 |## Ramdisk Variant Matrix| Variant | Pre-step | `Ramdisk/txm.img4` | `Ramdisk/krnl.ramdisk.img4` | `Ramdisk/krnl.img4` | Effective kernel used by `ramdisk_send.sh` || ------------- | ------------------- | -------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------- || `RAMDISK` | `make fw_patch` | release TXM + base TXM patch (1) | base kernel (28), legacy `*.ramdisk` preferred else derive from pristine CloudOS | restore kernel from `fw_patch` (28) | `krnl.ramdisk.img4` preferred, fallback `krnl.img4` |-| `DEV+RAMDISK` | `make fw_patch_dev` | release TXM + base TXM patch (1) | base kernel (28), same derivation rule | restore kernel from `fw_patch_dev` (28) | `krnl.ramdisk.img4` preferred, fallback `krnl.img4` |+| `DEV+RAMDISK` | `make fw_patch_dev` | release TXM + base TXM patch (1) | base kernel (28), same derivation rule | restore kernel from `fw_patch_dev` (29) | `krnl.ramdisk.img4` preferred, fallback `krnl.img4` || `JB+RAMDISK` | `make fw_patch_jb` | release TXM + base TXM patch (1) | base kernel (28), same derivation rule | restore kernel from `fw_patch_jb` (28+59) | `krnl.ramdisk.img4` preferred, fallback `krnl.img4` |## Cross-Version Dynamic Snapshotdiff --git a/sources/FirmwarePatcher/Kernel/KernelPatcher.swift b/sources/FirmwarePatcher/Kernel/KernelPatcher.swiftindex 6de004c7..699452ce 100644--- a/sources/FirmwarePatcher/Kernel/KernelPatcher.swift+++ b/sources/FirmwarePatcher/Kernel/KernelPatcher.swift@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@-// KernelPatcher.swift — Regular kernel patcher orchestrator (26 patches).+// KernelPatcher.swift — Regular kernel patcher orchestrator.//// Historical note: this file replaces the old Python firmware patcher implementation.// Each patch method is defined as an extension in its own file under Patches/.@@ -12,6 +12,14 @@ import Foundationpublic final class KernelPatcher: KernelPatcherBase, Patcher {public let component = "kernelcache"+ /// When true, includes dev-only kernel patches (e.g. EXC_GUARD disable).+ public var isDev: Bool = false++ public convenience init(data: Data, verbose: Bool = true, isDev: Bool) {+ self.init(data: data, verbose: verbose)+ self.isDev = isDev+ }+// MARK: - Find Allpublic func findAll() throws -> [PatchRecord] {@@ -36,6 +44,11 @@ public final class KernelPatcher: KernelPatcherBase, Patcher {patchApfsMount() // 13-15patchSandbox() // 16-25+ // Dev-only patches (not applied to regular or JB variants)+ if isDev {+ patchExcGuardBehavior() // 26 (dev only)+ }+return patches}diff --git a/sources/FirmwarePatcher/Kernel/Patches/KernelPatchExcGuard.swift b/sources/FirmwarePatcher/Kernel/Patches/KernelPatchExcGuard.swiftnew file mode 100644index 00000000..a6f83c3c--- /dev/null+++ b/sources/FirmwarePatcher/Kernel/Patches/KernelPatchExcGuard.swift@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@+// KernelPatchExcGuard.swift — Disable EXC_GUARD for Mach port guard violations.+//+// Research kernels enforce Mach port guard violations as fatal EXC_GUARD exceptions.+// Any app calling task_swap_exception_ports() on a guarded port is killed with+// EXC_GUARD. This commonly affects apps that install custom exception handlers.+// Production iOS kernels do not enforce these fatally.+//+// The enforcement path is: guard check → thread_guard_violation() → AST delivery.+// thread_guard_violation stores violation info in the thread struct and triggers an+// AST that delivers the fatal EXC_GUARD exception when the thread returns to userspace.+//+// Patch strategy: find thread_guard_violation via anchor chain and replace its first+// instruction with RET so it returns immediately without recording or delivering+// the violation. This disables ALL Mach port guard violations (acceptable for+// research VMs where guard enforcement is not needed).+//+// Anchor chain:+// 1. "com.apple.security.only-one-exception-port" string+// 2. → ADRP+ADD code ref in set_exception_behavior_allowed() [may be dead code]+// 3. → scan function body for BL to set_exception_behavior_violation()+// 4. → in that target, find BL to thread_guard_violation()+// 5. → patch thread_guard_violation prologue to RET++import Capstone+import Foundation++extension KernelPatcher {+ /// Disable Mach port guard violation enforcement (EXC_GUARD).+ ///+ /// Patches `thread_guard_violation` to return immediately, preventing+ /// all guard violations from being delivered as fatal exceptions.+ @discardableResult+ func patchExcGuardBehavior() -> Bool {+ log("\n[26] exc_guard: disable thread_guard_violation")++ // Step 1: locate the anchor string.+ guard let strOff = buffer.findString("com.apple.security.only-one-exception-port") else {+ log(" [-] anchor string not found")+ return false+ }++ // Step 2: find ADRP+ADD code reference (inside set_exception_behavior_allowed).+ let refs = findStringRefs(strOff)+ guard let (_, addOff) = refs.first else {+ log(" [-] no code ref to anchor string")+ return false+ }++ // Step 3: scan the surrounding function for BL instructions to find+ // set_exception_behavior_violation. It's the BL whose target starts with+ // PACIBSP and contains a TBZ/TBNZ within the first ~10 instructions+ // (the thid_should_crash check), followed by a BL (to thread_guard_violation).+ // Scan a wide window around the string ref (the function may be ~600 bytes)+ let scanStart = max(0, addOff - 200)+ let scanEnd = min(buffer.count - 4, addOff + 400)+ for off in stride(from: scanStart, to: scanEnd, by: 4) {+ let insn = buffer.readU32(at: off)+ guard insn >> 26 == 0b100101 else { continue } // BL+ let imm26 = insn & 0x03FF_FFFF+ let signedImm = Int32(bitPattern: imm26 << 6) >> 6+ let target = off + Int(signedImm) * 4+ guard target > 0, target + 40 <= buffer.count else { continue }+ // Check if target starts with PACIBSP+ guard buffer.readU32(at: target) == ARM64.pacibspU32 else { continue }+ // Check if target contains TBZ/TBNZ within first 20 instructions+ // followed by a BL (pattern of set_exception_behavior_violation)+ var hasTbCheck = false+ var innerBLTarget: Int? = nil+ for delta in stride(from: 4, through: 20 * 4, by: 4) {+ let ioff = target + delta+ guard ioff + 4 <= buffer.count else { break }+ let iraw = buffer.readU32(at: ioff)+ // TBZ/TBNZ: [30:25] = 01101x+ if (iraw & 0x7E000000) == 0x36000000 {+ hasTbCheck = true+ }+ // After TBZ, look for BL+ if hasTbCheck, iraw >> 26 == 0b100101 {+ let iimm26 = iraw & 0x03FF_FFFF+ let isigned = Int32(bitPattern: iimm26 << 6) >> 6+ let bt = ioff + Int(isigned) * 4+ if bt > 0, bt + 4 <= buffer.count,+ buffer.readU32(at: bt) == ARM64.pacibspU32+ {+ innerBLTarget = bt+ }+ break+ }+ }+ if let inner = innerBLTarget {+ log(" [*] set_exception_behavior_violation at foff 0x\(String(format: "%X", target))")+ log(" [*] thread_guard_violation at foff 0x\(String(format: "%X", inner))")+ // Step 4: patch thread_guard_violation → RET+ let va = fileOffsetToVA(inner)+ emit(+ inner,+ ARM64.ret,+ patchID: "kernel.thread_guard_violation",+ virtualAddress: va,+ description: "PACIBSP→RET (disable guard violation delivery)"+ )+ return true+ }+ }++ log(" [-] thread_guard_violation not found via anchor chain")+ return false+ }+}diff --git a/sources/FirmwarePatcher/Pipeline/FirmwarePipeline.swift b/sources/FirmwarePatcher/Pipeline/FirmwarePipeline.swiftindex 533d4a7b..9dda3a70 100644--- a/sources/FirmwarePatcher/Pipeline/FirmwarePipeline.swift+++ b/sources/FirmwarePatcher/Pipeline/FirmwarePipeline.swift@@ -261,14 +261,18 @@ public final class FirmwarePipeline {return switch variant {case .less:[]- case .regular, .dev:+ case .regular:+ [{ data, verbose in+ KernelPatcher(data: data, verbose: verbose, isDev: false)+ }]+ case .dev:[{ data, verbose in- KernelPatcher(data: data, verbose: verbose)+ KernelPatcher(data: data, verbose: verbose, isDev: true)}]case .jb:[{ data, verbose in- KernelPatcher(data: data, verbose: verbose)+ KernelPatcher(data: data, verbose: verbose, isDev: false)},{ data, verbose inKernelJBPatcher(data: data, verbose: verbose)