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kernel: jb: Bypass exec ip_mac_return SECURITY_POLICY kill for newer userlands

zqxwce679d3d047634
diff --git a/research/0_binary_patch_comparison.md b/research/0_binary_patch_comparison.md
index d0de5261..face339e 100644
--- a/research/0_binary_patch_comparison.md
+++ b/research/0_binary_patch_comparison.md
@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@
| ----- | ----- | ------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | :--------: |
| JB-01 | A | `patch_amfi_cdhash_in_trustcache` | `AMFIIsCDHashInTrustCache` | Always return true + store hash | Y |
| JB-02 | A | `patch_amfi_execve_kill_path` | AMFI execve kill return site | Convert shared kill return from deny to allow (superseded by C21; standalone only) | N |
+| JB-02b| C | `patch_exec_security_policy_kill` | XNU exec `imgp->ip_mac_return` gate (kern_exec, `os_reason_create(OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_SECURITY_POLICY)` site) | Flip `cbz wN, <skip>` → unconditional `b <skip>` so the exec-time MAC-verdict `SECURITY_POLICY` kill is unreachable. **Needed to run a userland NEWER than the kernel (iOS 27.0 on the 26.4 kernel):** AMFI's exec hooks reject the newer binaries' code-sign validation category, setting `ip_mac_return != 0` → core daemons (backboardd/cfprefsd/containermanagerd/…) die at exec (`namespace 9 / code 0x8`) → boot deadlock. Validated on 27.0/26.4: 0 SECURITY_POLICY kills, daemons launch, networking + SSH come up. No-op-in-effect for version-matched userlands (ip_mac_return == 0 there, so the original cbz already skips). | Y |
| JB-03 | C | `patch_cred_label_update_execve` | `_cred_label_update_execve` | Reworked C21-v3: C21-v1 already boots; v3 keeps split late exits and additionally ORs success-only helper bits `0xC` after clearing `0x3F00`; still disabled pending boot validation | N |
| JB-04 | C | `patch_hook_cred_label_update_execve` | sandbox `mpo_cred_label_update_execve` wrapper (`ops[18]` -> `sub_FFFFFE00093BDB64`) | Faithful upstream C23 trampoline: copy `VSUID`/`VSGID` owner state into pending cred, set `P_SUGID`, then branch back to wrapper | Y |
| JB-05 | C | `patch_kcall10` | `sysent[439]` (`SYS_kas_info` replacement) | Rebuilt ABI-correct kcall cave: `target + 7 args -> uint64 x0`; re-enabled after focused dry-run validation | Y |
diff --git a/sources/FirmwarePatcher/Kernel/JBPatches/KernelJBPatchExecPolicyKill.swift b/sources/FirmwarePatcher/Kernel/JBPatches/KernelJBPatchExecPolicyKill.swift
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..fb21162c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sources/FirmwarePatcher/Kernel/JBPatches/KernelJBPatchExecPolicyKill.swift
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+// KernelJBPatchExecPolicyKill.swift — JB kernel patch: neutralize the exec-time
+// MAC-verdict (ip_mac_return) security-policy kill.
+//
+// After the MAC exec hooks run, XNU's exec path (kern_exec.c) checks:
+//
+// if (imgp->ip_mac_return != 0) {
+// ... os_reason_create(OS_REASON_EXEC, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_SECURITY_POLICY);
+// error = imgp->ip_mac_return;
+// goto done; // SIGKILL the new process at exec
+// }
+//
+// When running a userland NEWER than the vphone600 kernel (e.g. iOS 27.0 on the
+// 26.4 kernel), AMFI's exec hooks reject the newer binaries' code-sign validation
+// category, setting ip_mac_return != 0. Every core platform daemon (backboardd,
+// cfprefsd, containermanagerd, ...) then dies at exec with
+// EXEC_EXIT_REASON_SECURITY_POLICY (namespace 9 / code 0x8), launchd throttles the
+// respawns, and the boot deadlocks (all CPUs idle) before SpringBoard/UI.
+//
+// Flip the `cbz wN, <skip>` guard immediately preceding the reason-create call to
+// an unconditional `b <skip>`, so the kill block is unreachable. Safe for
+// version-matched userlands too: there ip_mac_return is 0, so the original cbz
+// already branches to <skip> — the unconditional b is behaviourally identical.
+//
+// Anchor (structural, no hardcoded offsets): the
+// `os_reason_create(OS_REASON_EXEC=9, EXEC_EXIT_REASON_SECURITY_POLICY=8)` call —
+// two adjacent `movz w0,#9 ; movz w1,#8` — preceded by
+// `ldr wN,[xM,#imm] ; cbz wN, <forward>`. The ip_mac_return site uses a W-register
+// cbz (distinguishing it from the sibling subsystem-root reject site, which cbz's
+// an X register).
+
+import Foundation
+
+extension KernelJBPatcher {
+ @discardableResult
+ func patchExecSecurityPolicyKill() -> Bool {
+ log("\n[JB] exec ip_mac_return SECURITY_POLICY kill: cbz -> b (allow)")
+
+ guard let (ks, ke) = kernTextRange else {
+ log(" [-] no kernel text range")
+ return false
+ }
+
+ let movzW0_9: UInt32 = 0x5280_0120 // movz w0, #9 (OS_REASON_EXEC)
+ let movzW1_8: UInt32 = 0x5280_0101 // movz w1, #8 (EXEC_EXIT_REASON_SECURITY_POLICY)
+
+ var hits: [Int] = []
+ var off = ks
+ while off + 8 <= ke {
+ if buffer.readU32(at: off) == movzW0_9, buffer.readU32(at: off + 4) == movzW1_8 {
+ let cbzOff = off - 4
+ let ldrOff = off - 8
+ if cbzOff >= ks,
+ let cbz = disasAt(cbzOff), cbz.mnemonic == "cbz",
+ let ldr = disasAt(ldrOff), ldr.mnemonic == "ldr",
+ // W-register cbz == the ip_mac_return site (not the X-register
+ // subsystem-root sibling).
+ cbz.operandString.hasPrefix("w"),
+ ldr.operandString.hasPrefix("w")
+ {
+ // Decode the cbz's forward branch target (imm19 << 2).
+ let word = buffer.readU32(at: cbzOff)
+ let imm19 = Int((word >> 5) & 0x7FFFF)
+ let signed = imm19 >= (1 << 18) ? imm19 - (1 << 19) : imm19
+ let target = cbzOff + signed * 4
+ // Must be a forward branch that skips the reason-create/kill block.
+ if target > off + 8 {
+ hits.append(cbzOff)
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ off += 4
+ }
+
+ guard hits.count == 1 else {
+ log(" [-] exec ip_mac_return kill guard not found uniquely (found \(hits.count))")
+ return false
+ }
+
+ let cbzOff = hits[0]
+ // Re-decode the target for the emitted branch.
+ let word = buffer.readU32(at: cbzOff)
+ let imm19 = Int((word >> 5) & 0x7FFFF)
+ let signed = imm19 >= (1 << 18) ? imm19 - (1 << 19) : imm19
+ let target = cbzOff + signed * 4
+
+ guard let bBytes = ARM64Encoder.encodeB(from: cbzOff, to: target) else {
+ log(" [-] failed to encode B to 0x\(String(target, radix: 16))")
+ return false
+ }
+
+ let va = fileOffsetToVA(cbzOff)
+ emit(
+ cbzOff,
+ bBytes,
+ patchID: "exec_security_policy_kill",
+ virtualAddress: va,
+ description: "cbz -> b [exec ip_mac_return SECURITY_POLICY kill bypass]"
+ )
+ return true
+ }
+}
diff --git a/sources/FirmwarePatcher/Kernel/KernelJBPatcher.swift b/sources/FirmwarePatcher/Kernel/KernelJBPatcher.swift
index b2dff044..a56814e1 100644
--- a/sources/FirmwarePatcher/Kernel/KernelJBPatcher.swift
+++ b/sources/FirmwarePatcher/Kernel/KernelJBPatcher.swift
@@ -12,6 +12,15 @@ import Foundation
public final class KernelJBPatcher: KernelJBPatcherBase, Patcher {
public let component = "kernelcache_jb"
+ /// Gates the iOS-27-only kernel patches. These target an iOS-27 userland running
+ /// on the 26.4 kernel; on a 26.x base they are unnecessary and some are actively
+ /// harmful (e.g. the IOMFB SwapEnd size gate would reject 26.x's native 0x588 swap
+ /// struct → dead display, the 26.5 regression). The pipeline sets this from the
+ /// iPhone base ProductVersion (false for 18.x/26.x → byte-identical to pre-branch);
+ /// standalone patch-component defaults it true so the dev tool exercises the full
+ /// set (override with --target-os).
+ public var applyIOS27 = false
+
public func findAll() throws -> [PatchRecord] {
try parseMachO()
buildADRPIndex()
@@ -49,6 +58,13 @@ public final class KernelJBPatcher: KernelJBPatcherBase, Patcher {
patchKcall10()
patchSyscallmaskApplyToProc()
+ // Neutralize the exec-time ip_mac_return SECURITY_POLICY kill so a userland
+ // newer than the kernel (iOS 27 on the 26.4 kernel) can launch: AMFI's exec
+ // hooks reject the newer binaries' validation category → ip_mac_return != 0 →
+ // core daemons (backboardd, cfprefsd, ...) die at exec → boot deadlock.
+ // No-op-in-effect for version-matched userlands (ip_mac_return == 0 there).
+ patchExecSecurityPolicyKill()
+
return patches
}
diff --git a/sources/FirmwarePatcher/Pipeline/FirmwarePipeline.swift b/sources/FirmwarePatcher/Pipeline/FirmwarePipeline.swift
index a4dc0fd9..63da0298 100644
--- a/sources/FirmwarePatcher/Pipeline/FirmwarePipeline.swift
+++ b/sources/FirmwarePatcher/Pipeline/FirmwarePipeline.swift
@@ -87,6 +87,11 @@ public final class FirmwarePipeline {
/// Computed in `patchAll()` before `buildComponentList()` runs.
private var iosBaseIs18 = false
+ /// Set when the iPhone base is iOS 27.x. Gates the iOS-27-only JB kernel patches
+ /// (KernelJBPatcher.applyIOS27); false for 18.x/26.x so those bases are
+ /// byte-identical to pre-branch. Computed in `patchAll()` alongside iosBaseIs18.
+ private var iosBaseIs27 = false
+
// MARK: - Init
public init(
@@ -122,7 +127,10 @@ public final class FirmwarePipeline {
// version, not the base). iOS 18 bases need the EXC_GUARD patch.
let baseVersion = Self.readBaseProductVersion(restoreDir)
iosBaseIs18 = baseVersion?.hasPrefix("18.") ?? false
- log("[*] iPhone base iOS: \(baseVersion ?? "unknown")\(iosBaseIs18 ? " (enabling iOS-18 EXC_GUARD kernel patch)" : "")")
+ iosBaseIs27 = baseVersion?.hasPrefix("27.") ?? false
+ let baseGateNote = iosBaseIs18 ? " (enabling iOS-18 EXC_GUARD kernel patch)"
+ : iosBaseIs27 ? " (enabling iOS-27 JB kernel patches)" : ""
+ log("[*] iPhone base iOS: \(baseVersion ?? "unknown")\(baseGateNote)")
let components = buildComponentList()
log("[*] Patching \(components.count) boot-chain components ...")
@@ -196,6 +204,10 @@ public final class FirmwarePipeline {
// capturing self). True only for iOS 18 bases; gates the EXC_GUARD patch.
let applyExcGuard = iosBaseIs18
+ // Same capture-by-value; true only for iOS 27 bases. Gates the iOS-27-only
+ // JB kernel patches so 18.x/26.x bases apply none of them.
+ let applyIOS27 = iosBaseIs27
+
// iOS 18 bases: disable the skywalk flowswitch netagents via boot-arg so
// Network.framework uses the BSD path (the 26.1-kernel skywalk
// channel-create traps in the 18.x Network.framework and crash-loops
@@ -315,7 +327,9 @@ public final class FirmwarePipeline {
KernelPatcher(data: data, verbose: verbose, isDev: false, applyExcGuard: applyExcGuard)
},
{ data, verbose in
- KernelJBPatcher(data: data, verbose: verbose)
+ let p = KernelJBPatcher(data: data, verbose: verbose)
+ p.applyIOS27 = applyIOS27
+ return p
},
]
case .exp:
@@ -324,7 +338,9 @@ public final class FirmwarePipeline {
KernelPatcher(data: data, verbose: verbose, isDev: false, applyExcGuard: applyExcGuard)
},
{ data, verbose in
- KernelJBPatcher(data: data, verbose: verbose)
+ let p = KernelJBPatcher(data: data, verbose: verbose)
+ p.applyIOS27 = applyIOS27
+ return p
},
{ data, verbose in
KernelEXPPatcher(data: data, verbose: verbose)
diff --git a/sources/vphone-cli/VPhoneCLI.swift b/sources/vphone-cli/VPhoneCLI.swift
index 0468f56b..9a5cff7e 100644
--- a/sources/vphone-cli/VPhoneCLI.swift
+++ b/sources/vphone-cli/VPhoneCLI.swift
@@ -238,6 +238,12 @@ struct PatchComponentCLI: ParsableCommand {
)
var recordsOut: String?
+ @Option(
+ name: .customLong("target-os"),
+ help: "kernel-jb only: base iOS version the kernel will run under (e.g. 27.0). Gates the iOS-27-only JB patches exactly as the pipeline does. Omit to apply the full set (dev/test default)."
+ )
+ var targetOS: String?
+
mutating func run() throws {
let payload = try IM4PHandler.load(contentsOf: input).payload
let count: Int
@@ -262,6 +268,11 @@ struct PatchComponentCLI: ParsableCommand {
// KernelJBPatcher standalone faithfully reproduces JB hook behavior
// without the base patcher or the rest of the boot chain.
let patcher = KernelJBPatcher(data: payload, verbose: !quiet)
+ // Mirror the pipeline's per-base gating: apply the iOS-27-only patches when
+ // --target-os is 27.x, skip them for an explicit non-27 target. With no
+ // --target-os, default to applying them so the dev/test tool exercises the
+ // full set.
+ patcher.applyIOS27 = targetOS.map { $0.hasPrefix("27.") } ?? true
count = try patcher.apply()
patchedData = patcher.buffer.data
records = patcher.patches