Open-source AI browser agent for Chrome and Firefox (monorepo) π§
Security tests β adversarial prompt-injection corpus
npm run test:security # human-readable
node test/security/injection-corpus.mjs --json # machine-readable results
What this covers
The highest-severity risk for an act-mode web agent is prompt injection
through page content β and specifically through text the user never sees:
ARIA labels, alt text, off-screen / display:none nodes, and crafted markup
that "reads as a command." A confused model that obeys it can click, type,
navigate, and submit as the logged-in user.
injection-corpus.mjs is a self-contained red-team harness (no LLM, no
browser, no network) that drives the deterministic trust boundary directly:
| Primitive | File | What it must guarantee |
|---|---|---|
Agent._wrapUntrusted |
src/*/src/agent/agent.js |
Page-derived bytes are sealed in a per-call nonce-tagged box; attacker boundary tags are neutralized (no breakout). |
Agent._digestToolResult |
src/*/src/agent/agent.js |
The turn-summarizer never launders injected text back into trusted context. |
UNTRUSTED_CONTENT_TOOLS |
src/*/src/agent/permission-gate.js |
Every page/ARIA-reading tool is classified untrusted. |
The corpus
27 payloads across six categories: classic instruction-override, role
spoofing (<system> / fake user turns), boundary breakout (literal close
tags, open-tag spoofing, case + attribute evasion, stacked tags),
hidden-text / ARIA (aria-label, alt-text, off-screen div, SVG
<title>/<desc>, aria-describedby indirection, aria-roledescription,
title/placeholder attributes, HTML comments, <noscript>, JSON-LD,
table headers), unicode evasion (RTL/bidi override, homoglyph boundary
spoof, invisible Unicode-tag smuggling, zero-width), and data exfiltration
(navigate-and-paste, markdown-link).
For every payload, against both the Chrome and Firefox builds, the harness asserts:
- the result is sealed by a genuine, matching, unguessable nonce boundary;
- no attacker-supplied boundary tag survives inside the box;
- the per-call nonce never appears in attacker-controlled bytes (no spoofing);
- benign page data is preserved (the agent can still read the page); and
- the digest does not leak the injected instruction text.
Plus a chrome/firefox parity check that both builds neutralize identically.
Scope / what is NOT here
This file covers risk (2), model confusion from page content. The other
risk β abuse of extension capabilities β is the capability gate, covered by
the capabilityFor / permission-gate tests in test/run.js.
These checks defend the boundary (data can never become an instruction).
They are deliberately model-independent. End-to-end behavioural evals against
real local/cloud models live under test/llm/.
Adding a payload
Append to the CORPUS array. Include a KEEP_* marker (benign data that must
survive) and a HIT_* marker (the injected command that must never leak). The
five invariants are applied automatically.