Open-source AI browser agent for Chrome and Firefox (monorepo) 🧠
JavaScript ai-agentai-agentsai-toolsbrowser-aibrowser-automationbrowser-extensionchrome-aichrome-devtoolschrome-extensionchrome-extensionsfirefox-addonfirefox-addonsfirefox-extensionfirefox-extensionsgemmagemma4minimaxoffline-aioffline-llmqwen
fix(recipient-guard): preserve authorized recipient roles when rebinding message recipients
Emre Sokullu2320b82c01f2
diff --git a/src/chrome/src/agent/agent.js b/src/chrome/src/agent/agent.jsindex c52c74645..06e5f0fa5 100644--- a/src/chrome/src/agent/agent.js+++ b/src/chrome/src/agent/agent.js@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ import {workflowControlLabelIsRequested,workflowRequiredRowsAreProcessed,} from './adapter-workflow-evidence.js';-import { answerNamesAllObservedRecipients, answerNamesIdentity, messageTargetMatchesObservedIdentities, normalizeMessageTarget, normalizeRecipientAnswer, normalizeRecipientIdentity } from './message-recipient-guard.js';+import { answerNamesAllObservedRecipients, answerNamesIdentity, messageTargetMatchesObservedIdentities, normalizeMessageTarget, normalizeRecipientAnswer, normalizeRecipientIdentity, resolveClarifiedRecipients } from './message-recipient-guard.js';import {fetchUrl,executeHttpSkillTool,@@ -17880,7 +17880,7 @@ Rules: no prose intro, no conclusion, no "this screenshot shows...", no layout d...(Array.isArray(context.options) ? context.options : []),].filter(Boolean).join(' ').toLowerCase();const changeWord = /(change|switch|different|instead|update|replace|another|new|更改|更换|切换|替换|换成)/i.test(text);- const targetWord = /(recipient|conversation|contact|send to|person|address|target|someone else|收件人|联系人|发送)/i.test(text);+ const targetWord = /(recipient|conversation|contact|send to|person|address|target|someone else|\b(?:to|cc|bcc|role|field)\b|收件人|联系人|发送)/i.test(text);return changeWord && targetWord;}if (purpose === 'message_recipient' || purpose === 'recipient_change') return true;@@ -17962,7 +17962,8 @@ Rules: no prose intro, no conclusion, no "this screenshot shows...", no layout dconst normalizedAnswer = normalizeRecipientAnswer(answer);if (!normalizedAnswer) return false;if (!answerNamesAllObservedRecipients(normalizedAnswer, observed)) return false;- const target = normalizeMessageTarget({ target_kind: 'named', recipients: observed });+ const resolvedRecipients = resolveClarifiedRecipients(observed, guard.messaging, clarifyContext, answer);+ const target = normalizeMessageTarget({ target_kind: 'named', recipients: resolvedRecipients });if (!target) return false;guard.messaging = target;return true;diff --git a/src/chrome/src/agent/message-recipient-guard.js b/src/chrome/src/agent/message-recipient-guard.jsindex 45209c7eb..007fb1db9 100644--- a/src/chrome/src/agent/message-recipient-guard.js+++ b/src/chrome/src/agent/message-recipient-guard.js@@ -213,3 +213,133 @@ export function messageTargetMatchesObservedIdentities(target, candidates) {return expected.size === recipients.size&& [...expected].every(key => recipients.has(key));}++/**+ * Does the clarification context or user answer explicitly authorize targetRole+ * (to, cc, or bcc) for candidateIdentity?+ *+ * For 'bcc' and 'cc', explicit mentions of BCC or CC in the text surrounding+ * the recipient identity or in the answer authorize the role.+ * For 'to', because "to" is also a ubiquitous preposition ("send to Alice"),+ * an explicit role label ("To: Alice", "Alice (To)", "as To", "in To", "To field")+ * or localized role indicator ("收件人", "主送") is required.+ */+export function clarificationAuthorizesRecipientRole(clarifyContext, answer, candidateIdentity, targetRole) {+ const role = String(targetRole || '').trim().toLowerCase();+ if (!MESSAGE_RECIPIENT_ROLES.has(role)) return false;++ const answerText = String(answer ?? '').trim();+ const contextTexts = clarifyContext && typeof clarifyContext === 'object'+ ? [+ clarifyContext.question,+ clarifyContext.reason,+ ...(Array.isArray(clarifyContext.options) ? clarifyContext.options : []),+ ].filter(Boolean).map(s => String(s).trim())+ : [];++ const normId = normalizeRecipientIdentity(candidateIdentity);++ function snippetHasExplicitRole(snippet, roleToCheck) {+ if (!snippet) return false;+ if (roleToCheck === 'bcc') {+ return /\b(?:bcc|blind\s+carbon\s+copy)\b|密送|暗送/i.test(snippet);+ }+ if (roleToCheck === 'cc') {+ return /\b(?:cc|carbon\s+copy)\b|抄送/i.test(snippet);+ }+ if (roleToCheck === 'to') {+ if (/\bto\s*[::]/i.test(snippet)) return true;+ if (/[(\[【]\s*to\s*[)\]】]/i.test(snippet)) return true;+ if (/\b(?:as|in|into|role|field)\s+to\b/i.test(snippet)) return true;+ if (/\bto\s+(?:field|role|recipient)\b/i.test(snippet)) return true;+ if (/\bfrom\s+(?:bcc|cc)\s+to\s+to\b/i.test(snippet)) return true;+ if (/\b(?:bcc|cc)\s*(?:->|=>|→)\s*to\b/i.test(snippet)) return true;+ if (/(?:作为|设为)?(?:收件人|主送)/i.test(snippet)) return true;+ const trimmed = snippet.trim();+ if (/^(?:to|as\s+to)$/i.test(trimmed)) return true;+ return false;+ }+ return false;+ }++ const clauseDelimiters = /[,;\n\r|/]|(?:\s+(?:and|or|以及|与|及)\s+)/i;++ function textAuthorizesRoleForIdentity(text) {+ if (!text) return false;+ const clauses = text.split(clauseDelimiters).map(s => s.trim()).filter(Boolean);+ let matchedClause = false;+ for (const clause of clauses) {+ if (normId && answerNamesIdentity(clause, normId)) {+ matchedClause = true;+ if (snippetHasExplicitRole(clause, role)) return true;+ }+ }+ if (!matchedClause) {+ if (normId && answerNamesIdentity(text, normId)) {+ const spans = findCandidateAnswerSpans(text, normId);+ for (const span of spans) {+ const window = text.slice(Math.max(0, span.start - 40), Math.min(text.length, span.end + 40));+ if (snippetHasExplicitRole(window, role)) return true;+ }+ } else if (!normId || clauses.length <= 1) {+ if (snippetHasExplicitRole(text, role)) return true;+ }+ }+ return false;+ }++ if (answerText && textAuthorizesRoleForIdentity(answerText)) {+ return true;+ }++ for (const contextText of contextTexts) {+ if (contextText && textAuthorizesRoleForIdentity(contextText)) {+ return true;+ }+ }++ return false;+}++/**+ * Resolve observed recipient candidates against previously authorized recipients+ * and clarification context/answer.+ *+ * When an observed candidate was already authorized with a different role (for+ * example, authorized as 'bcc' while the composer exposes 'to'), require the+ * clarification to explicitly authorize each changed To/CC/BCC role, or retain+ * the previously authorized role when only the identity was confirmed.+ */+export function resolveClarifiedRecipients(observedCandidates, previousTarget, clarifyContext, answer) {+ const previous = normalizeMessageTarget(previousTarget);+ const previousRolesByIdentity = new Map();+ if (previous?.recipients) {+ for (const r of previous.recipients) {+ const norm = normalizeRecipientIdentity(r.identity);+ if (norm && r.role) {+ previousRolesByIdentity.set(norm, r.role);+ }+ }+ }++ const rawList = Array.isArray(observedCandidates) ? observedCandidates : [];+ return rawList.map(candidate => {+ const legacy = typeof candidate === 'string' || typeof candidate === 'number';+ const identity = compact(legacy ? candidate : (candidate?.identity ?? candidate?.recipient), 240);+ const observedRole = compact(legacy ? 'to' : candidate?.role, 12).toLowerCase() || 'to';+ const norm = normalizeRecipientIdentity(identity);+ const previousRole = previousRolesByIdentity.get(norm);+ if (previousRole && previousRole !== observedRole) {+ const authorized = clarificationAuthorizesRecipientRole(clarifyContext, answer, identity, observedRole);+ return {+ identity,+ role: authorized ? observedRole : previousRole,+ };+ }+ return {+ identity,+ role: observedRole,+ };+ });+}+diff --git a/src/firefox/src/agent/agent.js b/src/firefox/src/agent/agent.jsindex 718b45050..fb5766c9d 100644--- a/src/firefox/src/agent/agent.js+++ b/src/firefox/src/agent/agent.js@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ import {workflowControlLabelIsRequested,workflowRequiredRowsAreProcessed,} from './adapter-workflow-evidence.js';-import { answerNamesAllObservedRecipients, answerNamesIdentity, messageTargetMatchesObservedIdentities, normalizeMessageTarget, normalizeRecipientAnswer, normalizeRecipientIdentity } from './message-recipient-guard.js';+import { answerNamesAllObservedRecipients, answerNamesIdentity, messageTargetMatchesObservedIdentities, normalizeMessageTarget, normalizeRecipientAnswer, normalizeRecipientIdentity, resolveClarifiedRecipients } from './message-recipient-guard.js';import {fetchUrl,executeHttpSkillTool,@@ -15633,7 +15633,7 @@ Rules: no prose intro, no conclusion, no "this screenshot shows...", no layout d...(Array.isArray(context.options) ? context.options : []),].filter(Boolean).join(' ').toLowerCase();const changeWord = /(change|switch|different|instead|update|replace|another|new|更改|更换|切换|替换|换成)/i.test(text);- const targetWord = /(recipient|conversation|contact|send to|person|address|target|someone else|收件人|联系人|发送)/i.test(text);+ const targetWord = /(recipient|conversation|contact|send to|person|address|target|someone else|\b(?:to|cc|bcc|role|field)\b|收件人|联系人|发送)/i.test(text);return changeWord && targetWord;}if (purpose === 'message_recipient' || purpose === 'recipient_change') return true;@@ -15715,7 +15715,8 @@ Rules: no prose intro, no conclusion, no "this screenshot shows...", no layout dconst normalizedAnswer = normalizeRecipientAnswer(answer);if (!normalizedAnswer) return false;if (!answerNamesAllObservedRecipients(normalizedAnswer, observed)) return false;- const target = normalizeMessageTarget({ target_kind: 'named', recipients: observed });+ const resolvedRecipients = resolveClarifiedRecipients(observed, guard.messaging, clarifyContext, answer);+ const target = normalizeMessageTarget({ target_kind: 'named', recipients: resolvedRecipients });if (!target) return false;guard.messaging = target;return true;diff --git a/src/firefox/src/agent/message-recipient-guard.js b/src/firefox/src/agent/message-recipient-guard.jsindex 45209c7eb..007fb1db9 100644--- a/src/firefox/src/agent/message-recipient-guard.js+++ b/src/firefox/src/agent/message-recipient-guard.js@@ -213,3 +213,133 @@ export function messageTargetMatchesObservedIdentities(target, candidates) {return expected.size === recipients.size&& [...expected].every(key => recipients.has(key));}++/**+ * Does the clarification context or user answer explicitly authorize targetRole+ * (to, cc, or bcc) for candidateIdentity?+ *+ * For 'bcc' and 'cc', explicit mentions of BCC or CC in the text surrounding+ * the recipient identity or in the answer authorize the role.+ * For 'to', because "to" is also a ubiquitous preposition ("send to Alice"),+ * an explicit role label ("To: Alice", "Alice (To)", "as To", "in To", "To field")+ * or localized role indicator ("收件人", "主送") is required.+ */+export function clarificationAuthorizesRecipientRole(clarifyContext, answer, candidateIdentity, targetRole) {+ const role = String(targetRole || '').trim().toLowerCase();+ if (!MESSAGE_RECIPIENT_ROLES.has(role)) return false;++ const answerText = String(answer ?? '').trim();+ const contextTexts = clarifyContext && typeof clarifyContext === 'object'+ ? [+ clarifyContext.question,+ clarifyContext.reason,+ ...(Array.isArray(clarifyContext.options) ? clarifyContext.options : []),+ ].filter(Boolean).map(s => String(s).trim())+ : [];++ const normId = normalizeRecipientIdentity(candidateIdentity);++ function snippetHasExplicitRole(snippet, roleToCheck) {+ if (!snippet) return false;+ if (roleToCheck === 'bcc') {+ return /\b(?:bcc|blind\s+carbon\s+copy)\b|密送|暗送/i.test(snippet);+ }+ if (roleToCheck === 'cc') {+ return /\b(?:cc|carbon\s+copy)\b|抄送/i.test(snippet);+ }+ if (roleToCheck === 'to') {+ if (/\bto\s*[::]/i.test(snippet)) return true;+ if (/[(\[【]\s*to\s*[)\]】]/i.test(snippet)) return true;+ if (/\b(?:as|in|into|role|field)\s+to\b/i.test(snippet)) return true;+ if (/\bto\s+(?:field|role|recipient)\b/i.test(snippet)) return true;+ if (/\bfrom\s+(?:bcc|cc)\s+to\s+to\b/i.test(snippet)) return true;+ if (/\b(?:bcc|cc)\s*(?:->|=>|→)\s*to\b/i.test(snippet)) return true;+ if (/(?:作为|设为)?(?:收件人|主送)/i.test(snippet)) return true;+ const trimmed = snippet.trim();+ if (/^(?:to|as\s+to)$/i.test(trimmed)) return true;+ return false;+ }+ return false;+ }++ const clauseDelimiters = /[,;\n\r|/]|(?:\s+(?:and|or|以及|与|及)\s+)/i;++ function textAuthorizesRoleForIdentity(text) {+ if (!text) return false;+ const clauses = text.split(clauseDelimiters).map(s => s.trim()).filter(Boolean);+ let matchedClause = false;+ for (const clause of clauses) {+ if (normId && answerNamesIdentity(clause, normId)) {+ matchedClause = true;+ if (snippetHasExplicitRole(clause, role)) return true;+ }+ }+ if (!matchedClause) {+ if (normId && answerNamesIdentity(text, normId)) {+ const spans = findCandidateAnswerSpans(text, normId);+ for (const span of spans) {+ const window = text.slice(Math.max(0, span.start - 40), Math.min(text.length, span.end + 40));+ if (snippetHasExplicitRole(window, role)) return true;+ }+ } else if (!normId || clauses.length <= 1) {+ if (snippetHasExplicitRole(text, role)) return true;+ }+ }+ return false;+ }++ if (answerText && textAuthorizesRoleForIdentity(answerText)) {+ return true;+ }++ for (const contextText of contextTexts) {+ if (contextText && textAuthorizesRoleForIdentity(contextText)) {+ return true;+ }+ }++ return false;+}++/**+ * Resolve observed recipient candidates against previously authorized recipients+ * and clarification context/answer.+ *+ * When an observed candidate was already authorized with a different role (for+ * example, authorized as 'bcc' while the composer exposes 'to'), require the+ * clarification to explicitly authorize each changed To/CC/BCC role, or retain+ * the previously authorized role when only the identity was confirmed.+ */+export function resolveClarifiedRecipients(observedCandidates, previousTarget, clarifyContext, answer) {+ const previous = normalizeMessageTarget(previousTarget);+ const previousRolesByIdentity = new Map();+ if (previous?.recipients) {+ for (const r of previous.recipients) {+ const norm = normalizeRecipientIdentity(r.identity);+ if (norm && r.role) {+ previousRolesByIdentity.set(norm, r.role);+ }+ }+ }++ const rawList = Array.isArray(observedCandidates) ? observedCandidates : [];+ return rawList.map(candidate => {+ const legacy = typeof candidate === 'string' || typeof candidate === 'number';+ const identity = compact(legacy ? candidate : (candidate?.identity ?? candidate?.recipient), 240);+ const observedRole = compact(legacy ? 'to' : candidate?.role, 12).toLowerCase() || 'to';+ const norm = normalizeRecipientIdentity(identity);+ const previousRole = previousRolesByIdentity.get(norm);+ if (previousRole && previousRole !== observedRole) {+ const authorized = clarificationAuthorizesRecipientRole(clarifyContext, answer, identity, observedRole);+ return {+ identity,+ role: authorized ? observedRole : previousRole,+ };+ }+ return {+ identity,+ role: observedRole,+ };+ });+}+diff --git a/test/run.js b/test/run.jsindex b675dd9a7..6b8f81368 100644--- a/test/run.js+++ b/test/run.js@@ -4708,6 +4708,72 @@ test('direct-message recipient guard uses structured intent and exact active ide{ identity: '[email protected]', role: 'to' },],), false, 'moving a BCC recipient into To must fail closed');++ // Role authorization and resolution tests:+ assert.equal(+ helper.clarificationAuthorizesRecipientRole(null, 'Send to Alice', 'Alice', 'to'),+ false,+ 'prepositional "to" must not explicitly authorize the To delivery role',+ );+ assert.equal(+ helper.clarificationAuthorizesRecipientRole(null, 'To: Alice', 'Alice', 'to'),+ true,+ 'explicit "To:" label must authorize the To delivery role',+ );+ assert.equal(+ helper.clarificationAuthorizesRecipientRole(null, 'Alice (To)', 'Alice', 'to'),+ true,+ 'parenthesized "(To)" label must authorize the To delivery role',+ );+ assert.equal(+ helper.clarificationAuthorizesRecipientRole(null, 'Send to Alice as To', 'Alice', 'to'),+ true,+ '"as To" must authorize the To delivery role',+ );+ assert.equal(+ helper.clarificationAuthorizesRecipientRole(null, 'Put Alice in the To field', 'Alice', 'to'),+ true,+ '"To field" must authorize the To delivery role',+ );+ assert.equal(+ helper.clarificationAuthorizesRecipientRole(null, 'CC: Alice', 'Alice', 'cc'),+ true,+ 'explicit "CC:" must authorize the CC delivery role',+ );+ assert.equal(+ helper.clarificationAuthorizesRecipientRole(null, 'BCC: Alice', 'Alice', 'bcc'),+ true,+ 'explicit "BCC:" must authorize the BCC delivery role',+ );+ assert.equal(+ helper.clarificationAuthorizesRecipientRole(null, 'To: Bob, BCC: Alice', 'Alice', 'to'),+ false,+ 'multi-recipient clause must not attribute another recipient\'s To role to Alice',+ );+ assert.equal(+ helper.clarificationAuthorizesRecipientRole(null, 'To: Bob, BCC: Alice', 'Alice', 'bcc'),+ true,+ 'multi-recipient clause must attribute BCC role to Alice',+ );++ const prevBccTarget = { target_kind: 'named', recipients: [{ identity: '[email protected]', role: 'bcc' }] };+ const observedToCandidates = [{ identity: '[email protected]', role: 'to' }];+ assert.deepEqual(+ helper.resolveClarifiedRecipients(observedToCandidates, prevBccTarget, null, '[email protected]'),+ [{ identity: '[email protected]', role: 'bcc' }],+ 'identity-only answer must retain previously authorized bcc role',+ );+ assert.deepEqual(+ helper.resolveClarifiedRecipients(observedToCandidates, prevBccTarget, null, 'Send to [email protected]'),+ [{ identity: '[email protected]', role: 'bcc' }],+ 'prepositional "to" answer must retain previously authorized bcc role',+ );+ assert.deepEqual(+ helper.resolveClarifiedRecipients(observedToCandidates, prevBccTarget, null, 'To: [email protected]'),+ [{ identity: '[email protected]', role: 'to' }],+ 'explicit "To:" answer must update to the authorized To role',+ );+assert.equal(helper.messageTargetMatchesObservedIdentities({ target_kind: 'named', recipients: ['Alice', '[email protected]'] },['Alice'],@@ -5336,6 +5402,46 @@ test('direct-message recipient guard uses structured intent and exact active idetarget_kind: 'named',recipients: [{ identity: '[email protected]', role: 'to' }],}, `${label}: recipient change did not update target`);++ // Role preservation during recipient-change clarification:+ // A plan authorizing Alice as BCC when composer exposes Alice as To must retain BCC+ // on an identity-only answer, preventing unauthorized exposure on next send.+ const bccPlanState = {+ messaging: { target_kind: 'named', recipients: [{ identity: '[email protected]', role: 'bcc' }] },+ requiresSubmission: true,+ requiresStateChange: true,+ pendingRecipientAuthorization: 'recipient_change',+ observedRecipientCandidates: [{ identity: '[email protected]', role: 'to' }],+ };++ agent._planExecutionGuards.set(tabId, { ...bccPlanState });+ assert.equal(+ agent._bindClarifiedMessageRecipient(tabId, '[email protected]', 'user', {+ question: 'Do you want to send to Alice instead?',+ purpose: 'recipient_change',+ }),+ true,+ `${label}: identity-confirmed clarify answer bound`,+ );+ assert.deepEqual(agent._planExecutionGuards.get(tabId)?.messaging, {+ target_kind: 'named',+ recipients: [{ identity: '[email protected]', role: 'bcc' }],+ }, `${label}: identity-only answer must retain previously authorized BCC role`);++ // Explicit role authorization in answer ("To: [email protected]") updates the role to To.+ agent._planExecutionGuards.set(tabId, { ...bccPlanState });+ assert.equal(+ agent._bindClarifiedMessageRecipient(tabId, 'To: [email protected]', 'user', {+ question: 'Do you want to switch Alice to To?',+ purpose: 'recipient_change',+ }),+ true,+ `${label}: explicit role change clarification bound`,+ );+ assert.deepEqual(agent._planExecutionGuards.get(tabId)?.messaging, {+ target_kind: 'named',+ recipients: [{ identity: '[email protected]', role: 'to' }],+ }, `${label}: explicit role answer must adopt the authorized To role`);}});