Open-source AI browser agent for Chrome and Firefox (monorepo) ðŸ§
JavaScript ai-agentai-agentsai-toolsbrowser-aibrowser-automationbrowser-extensionchrome-aichrome-devtoolschrome-extensionchrome-extensionsfirefox-addonfirefox-addonsfirefox-extensionfirefox-extensionsgemmagemma4minimaxoffline-aioffline-llmqwen
fix(permission): tighten grouped search candidate scope and gate checks
Codex release-state test50a05a8bee42
diff --git a/src/chrome/src/agent/agent.js b/src/chrome/src/agent/agent.jsindex f82e8b38b..726fe5070 100644--- a/src/chrome/src/agent/agent.js+++ b/src/chrome/src/agent/agent.js@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ import {normalizeCloudflareManagedChallengeState,} from './cloudflare-managed-challenge.js';import { getRecordingStateFresh as recorderStateFresh } from '../recorder/host.js';-import { Capability, CAPABILITY_LABEL, SubmitRisk, capabilitiesFor, classifySearchNavigation, classifySubmitRisk, requiredHosts, frameHostMatches, isNetworkMutation, normalizeHost, PermissionManager, submitActionKey, UNTRUSTED_CONTENT_TOOLS } from './permission-gate.js';+import { Capability, CAPABILITY_LABEL, SubmitRisk, capabilitiesFor, classifySearchNavigation, classifySubmitRisk, requiredHosts, frameHostMatches, isNetworkMutation, normalizeHost, registrableHost, PermissionManager, submitActionKey, UNTRUSTED_CONTENT_TOOLS } from './permission-gate.js';import {buildPlannerMessages,buildPlannerIntentMessages,@@ -11914,29 +11914,23 @@ Rules: no prose intro, no conclusion, no "this screenshot shows...", no layout dlet choice = null;if (canGroupSearch) {const intentKey = submitActionKey(submitConfirmation, submitConfirmation.url);- const intentVerdict = this.permissions.checkIntent(intentKey, tabId);- if (intentVerdict.allowed) {- choice = 'once';- } else if (intentVerdict.needsPrompt) {- choice = await this._promptGroupedSearchPermission(tabId, submitRisk.host, onUpdate);- if (choice === null) {- const value = '[Stopped by user before executing requested tool calls.]';- this._appendSyntheticToolResults(tabId, toolCalls, toolIndex, messages, onUpdate, step, () => ({- success: false,- cancelled: true,- error: value,- }));- onUpdate('warning', { message: 'Stopped by user.' });- return { action: 'abort', value };- }- this.permissions.recordIntent(- intentKey,- [Capability.NAVIGATE, Capability.TYPE, Capability.CLICK],- choice === 'once' ? 'allow' : 'deny',- tabId,- );- } else {- choice = 'deny';+ choice = await this._authorizeGroupedSearch(+ tabId,+ submitRisk.host,+ intentKey,+ [Capability.NAVIGATE, Capability.TYPE, Capability.CLICK],+ onUpdate,+ { actionUrl: submitRisk.action },+ );+ if (choice === null) {+ const value = '[Stopped by user before executing requested tool calls.]';+ this._appendSyntheticToolResults(tabId, toolCalls, toolIndex, messages, onUpdate, step, () => ({+ success: false,+ cancelled: true,+ error: value,+ }));+ onUpdate('warning', { message: 'Stopped by user.' });+ return { action: 'abort', value };}if (choice === 'once') {capabilities = capabilities.filter(capability => capability !== Capability.CLICK);@@ -11992,41 +11986,48 @@ Rules: no prose intro, no conclusion, no "this screenshot shows...", no layout dgroupedSearchForm.url,);if (groupedRisk.risk === SubmitRisk.LOW_RISK_SEARCH) {- const intentKey = submitActionKey(groupedSearchForm, groupedSearchForm.url);- const choice = await this._authorizeGroupedSearch(- tabId,- groupedRisk.host,- intentKey,- [Capability.NAVIGATE, Capability.TYPE, Capability.CLICK],- onUpdate,- );- if (choice === null) {- const value = '[Stopped by user before executing requested tool calls.]';- this._appendSyntheticToolResults(tabId, toolCalls, toolIndex, messages, onUpdate, step, () => ({- success: false,- cancelled: true,- error: value,- }));- onUpdate('warning', { message: 'Stopped by user.' });- return { action: 'abort', value };- }- if (choice !== 'once') {- messages.push({- role: 'tool',- tool_call_id: tc.id,- content: JSON.stringify({+ const existingGate = this.permissions.check(groupedRisk.host, Capability.TYPE, tabId);+ if (existingGate.allowed) {+ // Standing "always" type grant covers this; don't intercept with grouped search.+ capabilities = capabilities.filter(capability => capability !== Capability.TYPE);+ } else {+ const intentKey = submitActionKey(groupedSearchForm, groupedSearchForm.url);+ const choice = await this._authorizeGroupedSearch(+ tabId,+ groupedRisk.host,+ intentKey,+ [Capability.NAVIGATE, Capability.TYPE, Capability.CLICK],+ onUpdate,+ { actionUrl: groupedRisk.action },+ );+ if (choice === null) {+ const value = '[Stopped by user before executing requested tool calls.]';+ this._appendSyntheticToolResults(tabId, toolCalls, toolIndex, messages, onUpdate, step, () => ({success: false,- denied: true,- permissionRequired: true,- groupedPermission: true,- error: `The user did not allow the grouped low-risk search actions on ${groupedRisk.host || 'this site'}. Do NOT retry this unchanged search unless the user explicitly allows it.`,- }),- });- onUpdate('warning', { message: 'Low-risk search blocked until the user allows the grouped actions.' });- if (interruptFailedBrowserAction(toolIndex, fnName)) { navNotices.length = 0; break; }- continue;+ cancelled: true,+ error: value,+ }));+ onUpdate('warning', { message: 'Stopped by user.' });+ return { action: 'abort', value };+ }+ if (choice !== 'once') {+ messages.push({+ role: 'tool',+ tool_call_id: tc.id,+ content: JSON.stringify({+ success: false,+ denied: true,+ permissionRequired: true,+ groupedPermission: true,+ error: `The user did not allow the grouped low-risk search actions on ${groupedRisk.host || 'this site'}. Do NOT retry this unchanged search unless the user explicitly allows it.`,+ }),+ });+ onUpdate('warning', { message: 'Low-risk search blocked until the user allows the grouped actions.' });+ if (interruptFailedBrowserAction(toolIndex, fnName)) { navNotices.length = 0; break; }+ continue;+ }+ capabilities = capabilities.filter(capability => capability !== Capability.TYPE);}- capabilities = capabilities.filter(capability => capability !== Capability.TYPE);}}if (@@ -12054,41 +12055,48 @@ Rules: no prose intro, no conclusion, no "this screenshot shows...", no layout dif (fnName === 'navigate' && capabilities.includes(Capability.NAVIGATE)) {const navigationRisk = classifySearchNavigation(fnArgs?.url, curUrl);if (navigationRisk.risk === SubmitRisk.LOW_RISK_SEARCH) {- const choice = await this._authorizeGroupedSearch(- tabId,- navigationRisk.host,- '',- [Capability.NAVIGATE, Capability.TYPE, Capability.CLICK],- onUpdate,- { candidateOnly: true },- );- if (choice === null) {- const value = '[Stopped by user before executing requested tool calls.]';- this._appendSyntheticToolResults(tabId, toolCalls, toolIndex, messages, onUpdate, step, () => ({- success: false,- cancelled: true,- error: value,- }));- onUpdate('warning', { message: 'Stopped by user.' });- return { action: 'abort', value };- }- if (choice !== 'once') {- messages.push({- role: 'tool',- tool_call_id: tc.id,- content: JSON.stringify({+ const existingGate = this.permissions.check(navigationRisk.host, Capability.NAVIGATE, tabId);+ if (existingGate.allowed) {+ // The user previously granted NAVIGATE (e.g. "always allow").+ // Honor that standing grant and bypass the grouped search card.+ capabilities = capabilities.filter(capability => capability !== Capability.NAVIGATE);+ } else {+ const choice = await this._authorizeGroupedSearch(+ tabId,+ navigationRisk.host,+ '',+ [Capability.NAVIGATE, Capability.TYPE, Capability.CLICK],+ onUpdate,+ { candidateOnly: true, actionUrl: navigationRisk.action },+ );+ if (choice === null) {+ const value = '[Stopped by user before executing requested tool calls.]';+ this._appendSyntheticToolResults(tabId, toolCalls, toolIndex, messages, onUpdate, step, () => ({success: false,- denied: true,- permissionRequired: true,- groupedPermission: true,- error: `The user did not allow the grouped low-risk search actions on ${navigationRisk.host || 'this site'}. Do NOT retry this unchanged search unless the user explicitly allows it.`,- }),- });- onUpdate('warning', { message: 'Low-risk search blocked until the user allows the grouped actions.' });- if (interruptFailedBrowserAction(toolIndex, fnName)) { navNotices.length = 0; break; }- continue;+ cancelled: true,+ error: value,+ }));+ onUpdate('warning', { message: 'Stopped by user.' });+ return { action: 'abort', value };+ }+ if (choice !== 'once') {+ messages.push({+ role: 'tool',+ tool_call_id: tc.id,+ content: JSON.stringify({+ success: false,+ denied: true,+ permissionRequired: true,+ groupedPermission: true,+ error: `The user did not allow the grouped low-risk search actions on ${navigationRisk.host || 'this site'}. Do NOT retry this unchanged search unless the user explicitly allows it.`,+ }),+ });+ onUpdate('warning', { message: 'Low-risk search blocked until the user allows the grouped actions.' });+ if (interruptFailedBrowserAction(toolIndex, fnName)) { navNotices.length = 0; break; }+ continue;+ }+ capabilities = capabilities.filter(capability => capability !== Capability.NAVIGATE);}- capabilities = capabilities.filter(capability => capability !== Capability.NAVIGATE);}}let blocked = null; // { capability, host }@@ -12625,6 +12633,17 @@ Rules: no prose intro, no conclusion, no "this screenshot shows...", no layout dconst beforeFull = this._normalizeUrl(beforeUrl);const afterFull = this._normalizeUrl(afterUrl);const fullUrlChanged = beforeFull && afterFull && beforeFull !== afterFull;+ if (fullUrlChanged) {+ // If navigation leaves the approved candidate's registrable site,+ // clear the candidate so it doesn't linger on an unrelated domain.+ // Don't clear if navigating from blank/about/initial page into the target site,+ // or between subdomains of the same registrable site.+ const afterHost = normalizeHost(afterUrl);+ const candidate = this.permissions.intentCandidates.find(c => c.tabId === tabId);+ if (candidate && afterHost && registrableHost(afterHost) !== registrableHost(candidate.host)) {+ this.permissions.clearIntentCandidates(tabId);+ }+ }if (fullUrlChanged && toolResult && typeof toolResult === 'object') {// Scroll refs/coordinates are scoped to the current route, including// SPA views distinguished only by query/hash.@@ -21620,14 +21639,17 @@ Rules: no prose intro, no conclusion, no "this screenshot shows...", no layout dreturn String(response?.answer || '').trim().toLowerCase() === 'once' ? 'once' : 'deny';}- async _authorizeGroupedSearch(tabId, host, intentKey, capabilities, onUpdate, { candidateOnly = false } = {}) {+ async _authorizeGroupedSearch(tabId, host, intentKey, capabilities, onUpdate, { candidateOnly = false, actionUrl = '' } = {}) {let verdict = candidateOnly- ? this.permissions.checkIntentCandidate(host, tabId)+ ? this.permissions.checkIntentCandidate(host, tabId, null, actionUrl): this.permissions.checkIntent(intentKey, tabId);if (!candidateOnly && !verdict.allowed && verdict.needsPrompt) {- const candidateVerdict = this.permissions.checkIntentCandidate(host, tabId);+ const candidateVerdict = this.permissions.checkIntentCandidate(host, tabId, null, actionUrl);if (candidateVerdict.allowed) {this.permissions.recordIntent(intentKey, capabilities, 'allow', tabId);+ // Consume the single-use allow candidate so it does not auto-promote+ // a subsequent search or different action later in the task.+ this.permissions.consumeIntentCandidate(tabId);return 'once';}if (!candidateVerdict.needsPrompt) return 'deny';@@ -21642,6 +21664,7 @@ Rules: no prose intro, no conclusion, no "this screenshot shows...", no layout dcapabilities,choice === 'once' ? 'allow' : 'deny',tabId,+ actionUrl,);} else {this.permissions.recordIntent(@@ -23064,6 +23087,7 @@ Rules: no prose intro, no conclusion, no "this screenshot shows...", no layout dvalidationSubmitEvidence: detected.validationSubmitEvidence === 'strong' ? 'strong' : 'heuristic',summary: String(detected.summary || '').slice(0, 1200),fields: Array.isArray(detected.fields) ? detected.fields.slice(0, 12) : [],+ hiddenFields: Array.isArray(detected.hiddenFields) ? detected.hiddenFields.slice(0, 20) : [],changedFields: Array.isArray(detected.changedFields) ? detected.changedFields.slice(0, 8) : [],method: String(detected.method || 'GET').slice(0, 20).toUpperCase(),action: String(detected.action || '').slice(0, 300),@@ -23095,6 +23119,7 @@ Rules: no prose intro, no conclusion, no "this screenshot shows...", no layout dtool: name,summary: String(resolvedForm.summary || '').slice(0, 1200),fields: Array.isArray(resolvedForm.fields) ? resolvedForm.fields.slice(0, 12) : [],+ hiddenFields: Array.isArray(resolvedForm.hiddenFields) ? resolvedForm.hiddenFields.slice(0, 20) : [],changedFields: Array.isArray(resolvedForm.changedFields) ? resolvedForm.changedFields.slice(0, 8) : [],method: String(resolvedForm.method || 'GET').slice(0, 20).toUpperCase(),action: String(resolvedForm.action || '').slice(0, 300),@@ -23377,6 +23402,17 @@ Rules: no prose intro, no conclusion, no "this screenshot shows...", no layout dreturn !['hidden', 'submit', 'button', 'reset', 'image'].includes(type);}).slice(0, 20);+ // Capture hidden inputs metadata (names, IDs, labels only; NO values).+ // This lets the risk classifier fail closed if a form contains a hidden+ // token or credential field (csrf_token, api_key, etc.), without leaking+ // hidden secrets into summaries or telemetry.+ const hiddenControls = Array.from(form.querySelectorAll('input[type="hidden"]')).slice(0, 20);+ const hiddenFields = hiddenControls.map(el => ({+ type: 'hidden',+ name: compact(el.getAttribute?.('name') || '', 80),+ id: compact(el.getAttribute?.('id') || '', 80),+ ariaLabel: compact(el.getAttribute?.('aria-label') || '', 120),+ }));const fields = controls.map((el) => {const value = fieldValue(el, pendingEl, pendingValue);const before = defaultValue(el);@@ -23405,6 +23441,7 @@ Rules: no prose intro, no conclusion, no "this screenshot shows...", no layout dreturn {summary: `${origin} ${changedText}`,fields: fields.slice(0, 12),+ hiddenFields,changedFields,method,action,diff --git a/src/chrome/src/agent/permission-gate.js b/src/chrome/src/agent/permission-gate.jsindex e74e05cab..452ded469 100644--- a/src/chrome/src/agent/permission-gate.js+++ b/src/chrome/src/agent/permission-gate.js@@ -148,6 +148,22 @@ const MULTI_LABEL_SITE_SUFFIXES = new Set(['github.io', 'gitlab.io', 'netlify.app', 'netlify.com', 'vercel.app','pages.dev', 'workers.dev', 'herokuapp.com', 'firebaseapp.com', 'web.app','glitch.me', 'cloudfront.net', 'azurewebsites.net', 'r2.dev', 'github.dev',+ // Multi-tenant hosting suffixes: without these, alice.blogspot.com and+ // victim.blogspot.com would compare equal and share a grouped approval.+ 'blogspot.com', 'wordpress.com', 'wixsite.com', 'squarespace.com',+ 'medium.com', 'notion.site', 'notion.so', 'webflow.io', 'shopify.com',+ 'myshopify.com', 'tumblr.com', 'weebly.com', 'ghost.io', 'gitbook.io',+ 'substack.com', 'storenvy.com', 'bigcartel.com', 'shopifycloud.com',+ 'azureedge.net', 'amazonaws.com', 'elasticbeanstalk.com', 'appspot.com',+]);++// Three-label shared suffixes (e.g. alice.blogspot.co.uk, bucket.s3.amazonaws.com).+// When the last three labels match, the registrable domain needs four labels+// to stay tenant-specific.+const THREE_LABEL_SITE_SUFFIXES = new Set([+ 'blogspot.co.uk', 'blogspot.de', 'blogspot.fr', 'blogspot.jp',+ 'wordpress.co.uk', 's3.amazonaws.com',+ 's3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com', 's3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com',]);export const SubmitRisk = {@@ -188,12 +204,38 @@ export function registrableHost(input) {if (host.includes(':') || /^\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+$/.test(host)) return host;const parts = host.split('.');if (parts.length < 2) return host;+ // Longest match first: a three-label shared suffix (e.g. blogspot.co.uk)+ // needs four labels to stay tenant-specific.+ if (parts.length >= 4) {+ const suffix3 = parts.slice(-3).join('.');+ if (THREE_LABEL_SITE_SUFFIXES.has(suffix3)) return parts.slice(-4).join('.');+ }const suffix = parts.slice(-2).join('.');return parts.length >= 3 && MULTI_LABEL_SITE_SUFFIXES.has(suffix)? parts.slice(-3).join('.'): suffix;}+/**+ * Normalized search-action identity (origin + pathname, no query/hash).+ * Binds a grouped candidate to the approved search endpoint so a different+ * form on the same registrable host does not auto-inherit the approval.+ * Query terms live in changedFields (the intent key), not here.+ */+export function normalizeSearchActionBase(input) {+ if (!input) return '';+ try {+ const parsed = new URL(String(input));+ if (!/^https?:$/i.test(parsed.protocol)) return '';+ const host = normalizeHost(parsed.hostname);+ if (!host) return '';+ const pathname = parsed.pathname || '/';+ return `${parsed.protocol.toLowerCase()}//${host}${pathname}`;+ } catch {+ return '';+ }+}+function submitActionUrl(submitInfo = {}, currentUrlOrHost = '') {const rawAction = submitInfo.actionUrl || submitInfo.action || submitInfo.url || currentUrlOrHost;const base = submitInfo.url || currentUrlOrHost;@@ -235,9 +277,17 @@ export function classifySubmitRisk(submitInfo = {}, currentUrlOrHost = '') {const fields = Array.isArray(submitInfo.fields) ? submitInfo.fields.slice(0, 20) : [];if (!fields.length) return freshSubmitRisk('form has no resolved search fields');+ // Hidden controls are excluded from visible fields by the probe, but their+ // names/ids can still carry secrets (csrf_token, access_token, api_key).+ // The probe reports them as metadata-only hiddenFields (no values), so a+ // hidden token field still disqualifies the form from grouping.+ const hiddenFields = Array.isArray(submitInfo.hiddenFields) ? submitInfo.hiddenFields.slice(0, 20) : [];if (fields.some(field => SENSITIVE_SUBMIT_FIELD_RE.test(submitFieldDescriptor(field)))) {return freshSubmitRisk('form contains a credential or payment field');}+ if (hiddenFields.some(field => SENSITIVE_SUBMIT_FIELD_RE.test(submitFieldDescriptor(field)))) {+ return freshSubmitRisk('form contains a hidden credential or token field');+ }const pathname = actionUrl.pathname || '/';const actionParameters = [...actionUrl.searchParams.keys()].join(' ');@@ -304,7 +354,8 @@ export function submitActionKey(submitInfo = {}, currentUrlOrHost = '') {const host = normalizeHost(actionUrl?.hostname || submitInfo.host || currentUrlOrHost);const method = String(submitInfo.method || 'GET').trim().toUpperCase();const fields = Array.isArray(submitInfo.fields) ? submitInfo.fields : [];- const sensitive = fields+ const hiddenFields = Array.isArray(submitInfo.hiddenFields) ? submitInfo.hiddenFields : [];+ const sensitive = [...fields, ...hiddenFields].filter(field => SENSITIVE_SUBMIT_FIELD_RE.test(submitFieldDescriptor(field))).map(field => submitFieldDescriptor(field));const changed = (Array.isArray(submitInfo.changedFields) ? submitInfo.changedFields : fields.filter(field => field?.changed))@@ -660,18 +711,30 @@ export class PermissionManager {return this.intentCandidates.some(candidate => candidate.tabId === tabId);}- checkIntentCandidate(host, tabId, capability = null) {+ /**+ * Check a provisional navigation candidate. The candidate is bound to the+ * approved search endpoint (origin + pathname via normalizeSearchActionBase)+ * in addition to the registrable host, so approving one search form does not+ * auto-approve a different form or a different search URL on the same site.+ * Pass expectedAction (the new navigation target or form action) to enforce+ * the binding; omitting it preserves the legacy host-only check.+ */+ checkIntentCandidate(host, tabId, capability = null, expectedAction = '') {const targetSite = registrableHost(host);+ const expectedBase = normalizeSearchActionBase(expectedAction);const candidate = this.intentCandidates.find(item =>item.tabId === tabId&& registrableHost(item.host) === targetSite&& (!capability || item.capabilities.includes(capability)));if (!candidate) return { allowed: false, needsPrompt: true };+ if (expectedBase && candidate.actionBase && candidate.actionBase !== expectedBase) {+ return { allowed: false, needsPrompt: true };+ }return { allowed: candidate.action === 'allow', needsPrompt: false, candidate };}- recordIntentCandidate(host, capabilities, action, tabId) {+ recordIntentCandidate(host, capabilities, action, tabId, actionUrl = '') {const normalizedHost = normalizeHost(host);if (!normalizedHost) return;this.intentCandidates = this.intentCandidates.filter(candidate => candidate.tabId !== tabId);@@ -679,11 +742,27 @@ export class PermissionManager {host: normalizedHost,capabilities: [...new Set(Array.isArray(capabilities) ? capabilities : [])],action: action === 'allow' ? 'allow' : 'deny',+ actionBase: normalizeSearchActionBase(actionUrl || host),+ actionUrl: String(actionUrl || '').slice(0, 300),tabId,ts: Date.now(),});}+ /**+ * Consume a single-use allow candidate after it promotes to a full intent+ * grant. Without this, one approval would auto-promote every subsequent+ * same-site search for the rest of the turn, contradicting the "only this+ * unchanged search" consent copy. Deny candidates persist so retries fail+ * closed without re-prompting.+ */+ consumeIntentCandidate(tabId) {+ const remaining = this.intentCandidates.filter(candidate =>+ !(candidate.tabId === tabId && candidate.action === 'allow')+ );+ this.intentCandidates = remaining;+ }+clearIntentCandidates(tabId) {this.intentCandidates = this.intentCandidates.filter(candidate => candidate.tabId !== tabId);}diff --git a/src/firefox/src/agent/agent.js b/src/firefox/src/agent/agent.jsindex d1958ddc0..3f7d7e097 100644--- a/src/firefox/src/agent/agent.js+++ b/src/firefox/src/agent/agent.js@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ import {cloudflareManagedChallengeStorageKey,normalizeCloudflareManagedChallengeState,} from './cloudflare-managed-challenge.js';-import { Capability, CAPABILITY_LABEL, SubmitRisk, capabilitiesFor, classifySearchNavigation, classifySubmitRisk, requiredHosts, frameHostMatches, isNetworkMutation, normalizeHost, PermissionManager, submitActionKey, UNTRUSTED_CONTENT_TOOLS } from './permission-gate.js';+import { Capability, CAPABILITY_LABEL, SubmitRisk, capabilitiesFor, classifySearchNavigation, classifySubmitRisk, requiredHosts, frameHostMatches, isNetworkMutation, normalizeHost, registrableHost, PermissionManager, submitActionKey, UNTRUSTED_CONTENT_TOOLS } from './permission-gate.js';import {buildPlannerMessages,buildPlannerIntentMessages,@@ -10465,29 +10465,23 @@ Rules: no prose intro, no conclusion, no "this screenshot shows...", no layout dlet choice = null;if (canGroupSearch) {const intentKey = submitActionKey(submitConfirmation, submitConfirmation.url);- const intentVerdict = this.permissions.checkIntent(intentKey, tabId);- if (intentVerdict.allowed) {- choice = 'once';- } else if (intentVerdict.needsPrompt) {- choice = await this._promptGroupedSearchPermission(tabId, submitRisk.host, onUpdate);- if (choice === null) {- const value = '[Stopped by user before executing requested tool calls.]';- this._appendSyntheticToolResults(tabId, toolCalls, toolIndex, messages, onUpdate, step, () => ({- success: false,- cancelled: true,- error: value,- }));- onUpdate('warning', { message: 'Stopped by user.' });- return { action: 'abort', value };- }- this.permissions.recordIntent(- intentKey,- [Capability.NAVIGATE, Capability.TYPE, Capability.CLICK],- choice === 'once' ? 'allow' : 'deny',- tabId,- );- } else {- choice = 'deny';+ choice = await this._authorizeGroupedSearch(+ tabId,+ submitRisk.host,+ intentKey,+ [Capability.NAVIGATE, Capability.TYPE, Capability.CLICK],+ onUpdate,+ { actionUrl: submitRisk.action },+ );+ if (choice === null) {+ const value = '[Stopped by user before executing requested tool calls.]';+ this._appendSyntheticToolResults(tabId, toolCalls, toolIndex, messages, onUpdate, step, () => ({+ success: false,+ cancelled: true,+ error: value,+ }));+ onUpdate('warning', { message: 'Stopped by user.' });+ return { action: 'abort', value };}if (choice === 'once') {capabilities = capabilities.filter(capability => capability !== Capability.CLICK);@@ -10544,41 +10538,48 @@ Rules: no prose intro, no conclusion, no "this screenshot shows...", no layout dgroupedSearchForm.url,);if (groupedRisk.risk === SubmitRisk.LOW_RISK_SEARCH) {- const intentKey = submitActionKey(groupedSearchForm, groupedSearchForm.url);- const choice = await this._authorizeGroupedSearch(- tabId,- groupedRisk.host,- intentKey,- [Capability.NAVIGATE, Capability.TYPE, Capability.CLICK],- onUpdate,- );- if (choice === null) {- const value = '[Stopped by user before executing requested tool calls.]';- this._appendSyntheticToolResults(tabId, toolCalls, toolIndex, messages, onUpdate, step, () => ({- success: false,- cancelled: true,- error: value,- }));- onUpdate('warning', { message: 'Stopped by user.' });- return { action: 'abort', value };- }- if (choice !== 'once') {- messages.push({- role: 'tool',- tool_call_id: tc.id,- content: JSON.stringify({+ const existingGate = this.permissions.check(groupedRisk.host, Capability.TYPE, tabId);+ if (existingGate.allowed) {+ // Standing "always" type grant covers this; don't intercept with grouped search.+ capabilities = capabilities.filter(capability => capability !== Capability.TYPE);+ } else {+ const intentKey = submitActionKey(groupedSearchForm, groupedSearchForm.url);+ const choice = await this._authorizeGroupedSearch(+ tabId,+ groupedRisk.host,+ intentKey,+ [Capability.NAVIGATE, Capability.TYPE, Capability.CLICK],+ onUpdate,+ { actionUrl: groupedRisk.action },+ );+ if (choice === null) {+ const value = '[Stopped by user before executing requested tool calls.]';+ this._appendSyntheticToolResults(tabId, toolCalls, toolIndex, messages, onUpdate, step, () => ({success: false,- denied: true,- permissionRequired: true,- groupedPermission: true,- error: `The user did not allow the grouped low-risk search actions on ${groupedRisk.host || 'this site'}. Do NOT retry this unchanged search unless the user explicitly allows it.`,- }),- });- onUpdate('warning', { message: 'Low-risk search blocked until the user allows the grouped actions.' });- if (interruptFailedBrowserAction(toolIndex, fnName)) { navNotices.length = 0; break; }- continue;+ cancelled: true,+ error: value,+ }));+ onUpdate('warning', { message: 'Stopped by user.' });+ return { action: 'abort', value };+ }+ if (choice !== 'once') {+ messages.push({+ role: 'tool',+ tool_call_id: tc.id,+ content: JSON.stringify({+ success: false,+ denied: true,+ permissionRequired: true,+ groupedPermission: true,+ error: `The user did not allow the grouped low-risk search actions on ${groupedRisk.host || 'this site'}. Do NOT retry this unchanged search unless the user explicitly allows it.`,+ }),+ });+ onUpdate('warning', { message: 'Low-risk search blocked until the user allows the grouped actions.' });+ if (interruptFailedBrowserAction(toolIndex, fnName)) { navNotices.length = 0; break; }+ continue;+ }+ capabilities = capabilities.filter(capability => capability !== Capability.TYPE);}- capabilities = capabilities.filter(capability => capability !== Capability.TYPE);}}if (@@ -10606,41 +10607,48 @@ Rules: no prose intro, no conclusion, no "this screenshot shows...", no layout dif (fnName === 'navigate' && capabilities.includes(Capability.NAVIGATE)) {const navigationRisk = classifySearchNavigation(fnArgs?.url, curUrl);if (navigationRisk.risk === SubmitRisk.LOW_RISK_SEARCH) {- const choice = await this._authorizeGroupedSearch(- tabId,- navigationRisk.host,- '',- [Capability.NAVIGATE, Capability.TYPE, Capability.CLICK],- onUpdate,- { candidateOnly: true },- );- if (choice === null) {- const value = '[Stopped by user before executing requested tool calls.]';- this._appendSyntheticToolResults(tabId, toolCalls, toolIndex, messages, onUpdate, step, () => ({- success: false,- cancelled: true,- error: value,- }));- onUpdate('warning', { message: 'Stopped by user.' });- return { action: 'abort', value };- }- if (choice !== 'once') {- messages.push({- role: 'tool',- tool_call_id: tc.id,- content: JSON.stringify({+ const existingGate = this.permissions.check(navigationRisk.host, Capability.NAVIGATE, tabId);+ if (existingGate.allowed) {+ // The user previously granted NAVIGATE (e.g. "always allow").+ // Honor that standing grant and bypass the grouped search card.+ capabilities = capabilities.filter(capability => capability !== Capability.NAVIGATE);+ } else {+ const choice = await this._authorizeGroupedSearch(+ tabId,+ navigationRisk.host,+ '',+ [Capability.NAVIGATE, Capability.TYPE, Capability.CLICK],+ onUpdate,+ { candidateOnly: true, actionUrl: navigationRisk.action },+ );+ if (choice === null) {+ const value = '[Stopped by user before executing requested tool calls.]';+ this._appendSyntheticToolResults(tabId, toolCalls, toolIndex, messages, onUpdate, step, () => ({success: false,- denied: true,- permissionRequired: true,- groupedPermission: true,- error: `The user did not allow the grouped low-risk search actions on ${navigationRisk.host || 'this site'}. Do NOT retry this unchanged search unless the user explicitly allows it.`,- }),- });- onUpdate('warning', { message: 'Low-risk search blocked until the user allows the grouped actions.' });- if (interruptFailedBrowserAction(toolIndex, fnName)) { navNotices.length = 0; break; }- continue;+ cancelled: true,+ error: value,+ }));+ onUpdate('warning', { message: 'Stopped by user.' });+ return { action: 'abort', value };+ }+ if (choice !== 'once') {+ messages.push({+ role: 'tool',+ tool_call_id: tc.id,+ content: JSON.stringify({+ success: false,+ denied: true,+ permissionRequired: true,+ groupedPermission: true,+ error: `The user did not allow the grouped low-risk search actions on ${navigationRisk.host || 'this site'}. Do NOT retry this unchanged search unless the user explicitly allows it.`,+ }),+ });+ onUpdate('warning', { message: 'Low-risk search blocked until the user allows the grouped actions.' });+ if (interruptFailedBrowserAction(toolIndex, fnName)) { navNotices.length = 0; break; }+ continue;+ }+ capabilities = capabilities.filter(capability => capability !== Capability.NAVIGATE);}- capabilities = capabilities.filter(capability => capability !== Capability.NAVIGATE);}}let blocked = null; // { capability, host }@@ -11154,6 +11162,17 @@ Rules: no prose intro, no conclusion, no "this screenshot shows...", no layout dconst beforeFull = this._normalizeUrl(beforeUrl);const afterFull = this._normalizeUrl(afterUrl);const fullUrlChanged = beforeFull && afterFull && beforeFull !== afterFull;+ if (fullUrlChanged) {+ // If navigation leaves the approved candidate's registrable site,+ // clear the candidate so it doesn't linger on an unrelated domain.+ // Don't clear if navigating from blank/about/initial page into the target site,+ // or between subdomains of the same registrable site.+ const afterHost = normalizeHost(afterUrl);+ const candidate = this.permissions.intentCandidates.find(c => c.tabId === tabId);+ if (candidate && afterHost && registrableHost(afterHost) !== registrableHost(candidate.host)) {+ this.permissions.clearIntentCandidates(tabId);+ }+ }if (fullUrlChanged && toolResult && typeof toolResult === 'object') {// Scroll refs/coordinates are scoped to the current route, including// SPA views distinguished only by query/hash.@@ -19377,14 +19396,17 @@ Rules: no prose intro, no conclusion, no "this screenshot shows...", no layout dreturn String(response?.answer || '').trim().toLowerCase() === 'once' ? 'once' : 'deny';}- async _authorizeGroupedSearch(tabId, host, intentKey, capabilities, onUpdate, { candidateOnly = false } = {}) {+ async _authorizeGroupedSearch(tabId, host, intentKey, capabilities, onUpdate, { candidateOnly = false, actionUrl = '' } = {}) {let verdict = candidateOnly- ? this.permissions.checkIntentCandidate(host, tabId)+ ? this.permissions.checkIntentCandidate(host, tabId, null, actionUrl): this.permissions.checkIntent(intentKey, tabId);if (!candidateOnly && !verdict.allowed && verdict.needsPrompt) {- const candidateVerdict = this.permissions.checkIntentCandidate(host, tabId);+ const candidateVerdict = this.permissions.checkIntentCandidate(host, tabId, null, actionUrl);if (candidateVerdict.allowed) {this.permissions.recordIntent(intentKey, capabilities, 'allow', tabId);+ // Consume the single-use allow candidate so it does not auto-promote+ // a subsequent search or different action later in the task.+ this.permissions.consumeIntentCandidate(tabId);return 'once';}if (!candidateVerdict.needsPrompt) return 'deny';@@ -19399,6 +19421,7 @@ Rules: no prose intro, no conclusion, no "this screenshot shows...", no layout dcapabilities,choice === 'once' ? 'allow' : 'deny',tabId,+ actionUrl,);} else {this.permissions.recordIntent(@@ -20824,6 +20847,7 @@ Rules: no prose intro, no conclusion, no "this screenshot shows...", no layout dvalidationSubmitEvidence: detected.validationSubmitEvidence === 'strong' ? 'strong' : 'heuristic',summary: String(detected.summary || '').slice(0, 1200),fields: Array.isArray(detected.fields) ? detected.fields.slice(0, 12) : [],+ hiddenFields: Array.isArray(detected.hiddenFields) ? detected.hiddenFields.slice(0, 20) : [],changedFields: Array.isArray(detected.changedFields) ? detected.changedFields.slice(0, 8) : [],method: String(detected.method || 'GET').slice(0, 20).toUpperCase(),action: String(detected.action || '').slice(0, 300),@@ -20855,6 +20879,7 @@ Rules: no prose intro, no conclusion, no "this screenshot shows...", no layout dtool: name,summary: String(resolvedForm.summary || '').slice(0, 1200),fields: Array.isArray(resolvedForm.fields) ? resolvedForm.fields.slice(0, 12) : [],+ hiddenFields: Array.isArray(resolvedForm.hiddenFields) ? resolvedForm.hiddenFields.slice(0, 20) : [],changedFields: Array.isArray(resolvedForm.changedFields) ? resolvedForm.changedFields.slice(0, 8) : [],method: String(resolvedForm.method || 'GET').slice(0, 20).toUpperCase(),action: String(resolvedForm.action || '').slice(0, 300),@@ -21049,6 +21074,17 @@ Rules: no prose intro, no conclusion, no "this screenshot shows...", no layout dreturn !['hidden', 'submit', 'button', 'reset', 'image'].includes(type);}).slice(0, 20);+ // Capture hidden inputs metadata (names, IDs, labels only; NO values).+ // This lets the risk classifier fail closed if a form contains a hidden+ // token or credential field (csrf_token, api_key, etc.), without leaking+ // hidden secrets into summaries or telemetry.+ const hiddenControls = Array.from(form.querySelectorAll('input[type="hidden"]')).slice(0, 20);+ const hiddenFields = hiddenControls.map(el => ({+ type: 'hidden',+ name: compact(el.getAttribute?.('name') || '', 80),+ id: compact(el.getAttribute?.('id') || '', 80),+ ariaLabel: compact(el.getAttribute?.('aria-label') || '', 120),+ }));const fields = controls.map((el) => {const value = fieldValue(el, pendingEl, pendingValue);const before = defaultValue(el);@@ -21077,6 +21113,7 @@ Rules: no prose intro, no conclusion, no "this screenshot shows...", no layout dreturn {summary: `${origin} ${changedText}`,fields: fields.slice(0, 12),+ hiddenFields,changedFields,method,action,diff --git a/src/firefox/src/agent/permission-gate.js b/src/firefox/src/agent/permission-gate.jsindex 071c350c4..ed8f50c16 100644--- a/src/firefox/src/agent/permission-gate.js+++ b/src/firefox/src/agent/permission-gate.js@@ -139,6 +139,22 @@ const MULTI_LABEL_SITE_SUFFIXES = new Set(['github.io', 'gitlab.io', 'netlify.app', 'netlify.com', 'vercel.app','pages.dev', 'workers.dev', 'herokuapp.com', 'firebaseapp.com', 'web.app','glitch.me', 'cloudfront.net', 'azurewebsites.net', 'r2.dev', 'github.dev',+ // Multi-tenant hosting suffixes: without these, alice.blogspot.com and+ // victim.blogspot.com would compare equal and share a grouped approval.+ 'blogspot.com', 'wordpress.com', 'wixsite.com', 'squarespace.com',+ 'medium.com', 'notion.site', 'notion.so', 'webflow.io', 'shopify.com',+ 'myshopify.com', 'tumblr.com', 'weebly.com', 'ghost.io', 'gitbook.io',+ 'substack.com', 'storenvy.com', 'bigcartel.com', 'shopifycloud.com',+ 'azureedge.net', 'amazonaws.com', 'elasticbeanstalk.com', 'appspot.com',+]);++// Three-label shared suffixes (e.g. alice.blogspot.co.uk, bucket.s3.amazonaws.com).+// When the last three labels match, the registrable domain needs four labels+// to stay tenant-specific.+const THREE_LABEL_SITE_SUFFIXES = new Set([+ 'blogspot.co.uk', 'blogspot.de', 'blogspot.fr', 'blogspot.jp',+ 'wordpress.co.uk', 's3.amazonaws.com',+ 's3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com', 's3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com',]);export const SubmitRisk = {@@ -179,12 +195,38 @@ export function registrableHost(input) {if (host.includes(':') || /^\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+$/.test(host)) return host;const parts = host.split('.');if (parts.length < 2) return host;+ // Longest match first: a three-label shared suffix (e.g. blogspot.co.uk)+ // needs four labels to stay tenant-specific.+ if (parts.length >= 4) {+ const suffix3 = parts.slice(-3).join('.');+ if (THREE_LABEL_SITE_SUFFIXES.has(suffix3)) return parts.slice(-4).join('.');+ }const suffix = parts.slice(-2).join('.');return parts.length >= 3 && MULTI_LABEL_SITE_SUFFIXES.has(suffix)? parts.slice(-3).join('.'): suffix;}+/**+ * Normalized search-action identity (origin + pathname, no query/hash).+ * Binds a grouped candidate to the approved search endpoint so a different+ * form on the same registrable host does not auto-inherit the approval.+ * Query terms live in changedFields (the intent key), not here.+ */+export function normalizeSearchActionBase(input) {+ if (!input) return '';+ try {+ const parsed = new URL(String(input));+ if (!/^https?:$/i.test(parsed.protocol)) return '';+ const host = normalizeHost(parsed.hostname);+ if (!host) return '';+ const pathname = parsed.pathname || '/';+ return `${parsed.protocol.toLowerCase()}//${host}${pathname}`;+ } catch {+ return '';+ }+}+function submitActionUrl(submitInfo = {}, currentUrlOrHost = '') {const rawAction = submitInfo.actionUrl || submitInfo.action || submitInfo.url || currentUrlOrHost;const base = submitInfo.url || currentUrlOrHost;@@ -226,9 +268,17 @@ export function classifySubmitRisk(submitInfo = {}, currentUrlOrHost = '') {const fields = Array.isArray(submitInfo.fields) ? submitInfo.fields.slice(0, 20) : [];if (!fields.length) return freshSubmitRisk('form has no resolved search fields');+ // Hidden controls are excluded from visible fields by the probe, but their+ // names/ids can still carry secrets (csrf_token, access_token, api_key).+ // The probe reports them as metadata-only hiddenFields (no values), so a+ // hidden token field still disqualifies the form from grouping.+ const hiddenFields = Array.isArray(submitInfo.hiddenFields) ? submitInfo.hiddenFields.slice(0, 20) : [];if (fields.some(field => SENSITIVE_SUBMIT_FIELD_RE.test(submitFieldDescriptor(field)))) {return freshSubmitRisk('form contains a credential or payment field');}+ if (hiddenFields.some(field => SENSITIVE_SUBMIT_FIELD_RE.test(submitFieldDescriptor(field)))) {+ return freshSubmitRisk('form contains a hidden credential or token field');+ }const pathname = actionUrl.pathname || '/';const actionParameters = [...actionUrl.searchParams.keys()].join(' ');@@ -295,7 +345,8 @@ export function submitActionKey(submitInfo = {}, currentUrlOrHost = '') {const host = normalizeHost(actionUrl?.hostname || submitInfo.host || currentUrlOrHost);const method = String(submitInfo.method || 'GET').trim().toUpperCase();const fields = Array.isArray(submitInfo.fields) ? submitInfo.fields : [];- const sensitive = fields+ const hiddenFields = Array.isArray(submitInfo.hiddenFields) ? submitInfo.hiddenFields : [];+ const sensitive = [...fields, ...hiddenFields].filter(field => SENSITIVE_SUBMIT_FIELD_RE.test(submitFieldDescriptor(field))).map(field => submitFieldDescriptor(field));const changed = (Array.isArray(submitInfo.changedFields) ? submitInfo.changedFields : fields.filter(field => field?.changed))@@ -645,18 +696,30 @@ export class PermissionManager {return this.intentCandidates.some(candidate => candidate.tabId === tabId);}- checkIntentCandidate(host, tabId, capability = null) {+ /**+ * Check a provisional navigation candidate. The candidate is bound to the+ * approved search endpoint (origin + pathname via normalizeSearchActionBase)+ * in addition to the registrable host, so approving one search form does not+ * auto-approve a different form or a different search URL on the same site.+ * Pass expectedAction (the new navigation target or form action) to enforce+ * the binding; omitting it preserves the legacy host-only check.+ */+ checkIntentCandidate(host, tabId, capability = null, expectedAction = '') {const targetSite = registrableHost(host);+ const expectedBase = normalizeSearchActionBase(expectedAction);const candidate = this.intentCandidates.find(item =>item.tabId === tabId&& registrableHost(item.host) === targetSite&& (!capability || item.capabilities.includes(capability)));if (!candidate) return { allowed: false, needsPrompt: true };+ if (expectedBase && candidate.actionBase && candidate.actionBase !== expectedBase) {+ return { allowed: false, needsPrompt: true };+ }return { allowed: candidate.action === 'allow', needsPrompt: false, candidate };}- recordIntentCandidate(host, capabilities, action, tabId) {+ recordIntentCandidate(host, capabilities, action, tabId, actionUrl = '') {const normalizedHost = normalizeHost(host);if (!normalizedHost) return;this.intentCandidates = this.intentCandidates.filter(candidate => candidate.tabId !== tabId);@@ -664,11 +727,27 @@ export class PermissionManager {host: normalizedHost,capabilities: [...new Set(Array.isArray(capabilities) ? capabilities : [])],action: action === 'allow' ? 'allow' : 'deny',+ actionBase: normalizeSearchActionBase(actionUrl || host),+ actionUrl: String(actionUrl || '').slice(0, 300),tabId,ts: Date.now(),});}+ /**+ * Consume a single-use allow candidate after it promotes to a full intent+ * grant. Without this, one approval would auto-promote every subsequent+ * same-site search for the rest of the turn, contradicting the "only this+ * unchanged search" consent copy. Deny candidates persist so retries fail+ * closed without re-prompting.+ */+ consumeIntentCandidate(tabId) {+ const remaining = this.intentCandidates.filter(candidate =>+ !(candidate.tabId === tabId && candidate.action === 'allow')+ );+ this.intentCandidates = remaining;+ }+clearIntentCandidates(tabId) {this.intentCandidates = this.intentCandidates.filter(candidate => candidate.tabId !== tabId);}diff --git a/test/run.js b/test/run.jsindex 8151e9d61..f72d0c637 100644--- a/test/run.js+++ b/test/run.js@@ -106687,6 +106687,13 @@ test('submit risk classifier groups only conservative same-site GET searches', ();assert.equal(registrableHost('api.example.co.uk'), 'example.co.uk');assert.equal(registrableHostCh('www.example.co.uk'), 'example.co.uk');+ // Multi-tenant suffixes keep distinct tenants isolated+ assert.equal(registrableHost('alice.blogspot.com'), 'alice.blogspot.com');+ assert.notEqual(registrableHost('alice.blogspot.com'), registrableHost('victim.blogspot.com'));+ assert.equal(registrableHost('user.notion.site'), 'user.notion.site');+ assert.equal(registrableHost('store.myshopify.com'), 'store.myshopify.com');+ assert.equal(registrableHost('alice.blogspot.co.uk'), 'alice.blogspot.co.uk');+ assert.notEqual(registrableHost('alice.blogspot.co.uk'), registrableHost('victim.blogspot.co.uk'));for (const [label, classify] of [['firefox', classifySubmitRisk], ['chrome', classifySubmitRiskCh]]) {const cases = [@@ -106696,6 +106703,8 @@ test('submit risk classifier groups only conservative same-site GET searches', ([{ ...search, fields: [{ type: 'text', name: 'cardnumber', label: 'Card number' }] }, 'payment'],[{ ...search, fields: [{ type: 'password', name: 'q', label: 'Search' }] }, 'credential'],[{ ...search, actionUrl: 'https://scholar.google.com/account', fields: [{ type: 'text', name: 'title', label: 'Title' }] }, 'resolved search'],+ [{ ...search, hiddenFields: [{ type: 'hidden', name: 'csrf_token' }] }, 'hidden csrf token'],+ [{ ...search, hiddenFields: [{ type: 'hidden', name: 'api_key' }] }, 'hidden api key'],];for (const [info, reason] of cases) {const result = classify(info, search.url);@@ -106733,6 +106742,15 @@ test('task-scoped grouped approvals stay per-tab, deny retries, and expire at tuassert.equal(pm.checkIntent(key, 1, Capability.CLICK).needsPrompt, false);pm.beginTurn(1);assert.equal(pm.checkIntent(key, 1, Capability.CLICK).needsPrompt, true);++ // Candidate grants are bound to action URL and single-use allow promotion+ pm.recordIntentCandidate('scholar.google.com', [Capability.NAVIGATE, Capability.TYPE, Capability.CLICK], 'allow', 1, 'https://scholar.google.com/scholar');+ assert.equal(pm.checkIntentCandidate('scholar.google.com', 1, null, 'https://scholar.google.com/scholar').allowed, true);+ // Different action path on same site must not be allowed+ assert.equal(pm.checkIntentCandidate('scholar.google.com', 1, null, 'https://scholar.google.com/different').needsPrompt, true);+ // Single-use allow candidate consumption+ pm.consumeIntentCandidate(1);+ assert.equal(pm.checkIntentCandidate('scholar.google.com', 1, null, 'https://scholar.google.com/scholar').needsPrompt, true);});test('parity: chrome & firefox permission-gate behave identically', async () => {