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fix(guard): require messaging authorization for recipient consent and preserve role negation

Emre Sokullu5f32449f02bb
diff --git a/src/chrome/src/agent/agent.js b/src/chrome/src/agent/agent.js
index 9002944d5..bf5cd18f8 100644
--- a/src/chrome/src/agent/agent.js
+++ b/src/chrome/src/agent/agent.js
@@ -17848,14 +17848,18 @@ Rules: no prose intro, no conclusion, no "this screenshot shows...", no layout d
}
// Retain what the page actually showed only when the plan already permits
- // messaging. The block below tells the model to ask the user who the
- // message is for, and that answer has to be matched against real observed
- // identities. A read-only plan (requiresSubmission=false or
- // requiresStateChange=false) must never stage recipient consent: an answer
- // to a recipient clarify must not elevate a read-only plan into a sendable one.
+ // messaging and has pre-existing messaging authorization. The block below
+ // tells the model to ask the user who the message is for, and that answer
+ // has to be matched against real observed identities. A read-only plan
+ // (requiresSubmission=false or requiresStateChange=false) or an unrelated
+ // consequential submission plan (guard.messaging=null) must never stage
+ // recipient consent: an answer to a recipient clarify must not elevate an
+ // unauthorized plan into a sendable one.
if (guard) {
+ const messagingAuthorized = !!normalizeMessageTarget(guard.messaging);
const messagingPermitted = guard.requiresSubmission === true
- && guard.requiresStateChange === true;
+ && guard.requiresStateChange === true
+ && messagingAuthorized;
const observedRecipientCandidates = messagingPermitted
? this._messageRecipientCandidates(probe)
: [];
@@ -17864,11 +17868,12 @@ Rules: no prose intro, no conclusion, no "this screenshot shows...", no layout d
: null;
// Offered to the next clarify only. The model chooses what it asks, so a
// pending authorization must not survive into an unrelated question.
- // Staged only when the plan already permits messaging.
- // Associate with an explicit recipient-change clarification when a target
- // was already authorized, or a recipient clarification when missing.
+ // Staged only when the plan already permits messaging and has pre-existing
+ // messaging authorization.
+ // Associate with an explicit recipient-change clarification when a named target
+ // was already authorized, or a recipient clarification for active conversations.
guard.pendingRecipientAuthorization = messagingPermitted && observedRecipientCandidates.length > 0
- ? (target ? 'recipient_change' : true)
+ ? (target?.target_kind === 'named' ? 'recipient_change' : true)
: false;
}
@@ -17885,7 +17890,7 @@ Rules: no prose intro, no conclusion, no "this screenshot shows...", no layout d
? 'Message action blocked: WebBrain could not conclusively resolve the target control and active composer. Re-read the page and retry with an exact visible control or fresh ref_id.'
: target
? 'Message send blocked: the active conversation does not exactly match the recipient authorized by the user. Select the intended conversation, re-read its visible header, then retry the send action.'
- : (guard?.requiresSubmission === false || guard?.requiresStateChange === false
+ : (guard?.requiresSubmission === false || guard?.requiresStateChange === false || !target
? 'Message send blocked: the current plan does not authorize sending or submitting messages. Return the draft in chat or ask the user to authorize sending before attempting delivery.'
: 'Message send blocked: the current task has no structured recipient authorization. Ask the user to name the recipient or explicitly authorize the currently open conversation before retrying.'),
};
@@ -17966,8 +17971,10 @@ Rules: no prose intro, no conclusion, no "this screenshot shows...", no layout d
// question is a different question and must not inherit it. Clearing on
// all paths (including timeout, auto, mismatch, cancellation) keeps staged
// consent from remaining parked for an unrelated later clarify to pick up.
+ const messagingAuthorized = !!normalizeMessageTarget(guard.messaging);
const messagingPermitted = guard.requiresSubmission === true
- && guard.requiresStateChange === true;
+ && guard.requiresStateChange === true
+ && messagingAuthorized;
const pending = !!guard.pendingRecipientAuthorization && messagingPermitted;
const pendingType = typeof guard.pendingRecipientAuthorization === 'string'
? guard.pendingRecipientAuthorization
diff --git a/src/chrome/src/agent/message-recipient-guard.js b/src/chrome/src/agent/message-recipient-guard.js
index d9b68958a..975c495f5 100644
--- a/src/chrome/src/agent/message-recipient-guard.js
+++ b/src/chrome/src/agent/message-recipient-guard.js
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ export function clarificationAuthorizesRecipientRole(clarifyContext, answer, can
return negationRe.test(str);
}
- function prefixHasNegation(fullPrefix, prefix) {
+ function prefixHasNegation(fullPrefix, prefix, roleToCheck = null) {
if (hasNegation(prefix)) return true;
if (!fullPrefix) return false;
const boundaryRe = /[;\n\r|]|(?:\b(?:but|however|yet|instead\s+of|rather\s+than|whereas|while|whilst)\b)|(?:而不是|而非)/gi;
@@ -311,9 +311,30 @@ export function clarificationAuthorizesRecipientRole(clarifyContext, answer, can
const segment = fullPrefix.slice(lastBoundary);
const parts = segment.split(/[,,]/);
let relevantStart = 0;
+ const generalRecipientRe = /\b(?:anyone|anybody|any\s+one|no\s*one|nobody|someone|somebody|people|persons?|users?|recipients?|contacts?|others?|everyone|everybody|either|neither|all|any|team|group|members?)\b|谁|任何人|大家|所有人|团队|群组|成员/i;
+ const continuationRe = /^\s*(?:\b(?:especially|particularly|including|specifically|mainly|even|let\s+alone|much\s+less|not\s+to\s+mention)\b|尤其是|特别[是地]?|包括|更不用说|更别提)/i;
+
for (let i = 0; i < parts.length - 1; i++) {
- if (roleWordsRe.test(parts[i])) {
- relevantStart = parts.slice(0, i + 1).join(',').length + 1;
+ const part = parts[i];
+ const partHasNeg = hasNegation(part);
+ const partHasRole = roleWordsRe.test(part);
+
+ if (partHasRole) {
+ if (!partHasNeg) {
+ relevantStart = parts.slice(0, i + 1).join(',').length + 1;
+ } else {
+ if (roleToCheck && !snippetHasExplicitRole(part, roleToCheck)) {
+ relevantStart = parts.slice(0, i + 1).join(',').length + 1;
+ } else {
+ const remainingPrefix = parts.slice(i + 1).join(',');
+ const namesOtherRecipient = candidateAliases.length > 0
+ && !candidateAliases.some(alias => answerNamesIdentity(part, alias))
+ && !generalRecipientRe.test(part);
+ if (namesOtherRecipient && !continuationRe.test(remainingPrefix)) {
+ relevantStart = parts.slice(0, i + 1).join(',').length + 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
}
}
const relevantPrefix = segment.slice(relevantStart);
@@ -379,14 +400,14 @@ export function clarificationAuthorizesRecipientRole(clarifyContext, answer, can
const fullPrefix = answerText.slice(0, span.start);
if (prefixPatterns[roleToCheck].test(prefix)) {
- if (!prefixHasNegation(fullPrefix, prefix)) {
+ if (!prefixHasNegation(fullPrefix, prefix, roleToCheck)) {
return true;
}
}
const suffixMatch = suffix.match(suffixPatterns[roleToCheck]);
if (suffixMatch) {
- if (!prefixHasNegation(fullPrefix, prefix) && !hasNegation(suffixMatch[0]) && !isPrecededByNegatedCoordGroup(fullPrefix)) {
+ if (!prefixHasNegation(fullPrefix, prefix, roleToCheck) && !hasNegation(suffixMatch[0]) && !isPrecededByNegatedCoordGroup(fullPrefix)) {
return true;
}
}
@@ -398,7 +419,7 @@ export function clarificationAuthorizesRecipientRole(clarifyContext, answer, can
const intervening = fullSuffix.slice(0, coordMatch.index + coordMatch[0].length - coordMatch[1].length);
const rolePart = coordMatch[1];
if (!roleWordsRe.test(intervening) && suffixPatterns[roleToCheck].test(rolePart)) {
- if (!prefixHasNegation(fullPrefix, prefix) && !hasNegation(intervening) && !hasNegation(rolePart) && !isPrecededByNegatedCoordGroup(fullPrefix)) {
+ if (!prefixHasNegation(fullPrefix, prefix, roleToCheck) && !hasNegation(intervening) && !hasNegation(rolePart) && !isPrecededByNegatedCoordGroup(fullPrefix)) {
return true;
}
}
@@ -411,7 +432,7 @@ export function clarificationAuthorizesRecipientRole(clarifyContext, answer, can
const intervening = prefixCoordMatch[0].slice(roleLeader.length);
if (!roleWordsRe.test(intervening) && prefixPatterns[roleToCheck].test(roleLeader)) {
const beforeLeader = fullPrefix.slice(0, fullPrefix.length - prefixCoordMatch[0].length);
- if (!prefixHasNegation(beforeLeader, beforeLeader) && !hasNegation(roleLeader) && !hasNegation(intervening)) {
+ if (!prefixHasNegation(beforeLeader, beforeLeader, roleToCheck) && !hasNegation(roleLeader) && !hasNegation(intervening)) {
return true;
}
}
diff --git a/src/firefox/src/agent/agent.js b/src/firefox/src/agent/agent.js
index 01e4344ea..5a480f418 100644
--- a/src/firefox/src/agent/agent.js
+++ b/src/firefox/src/agent/agent.js
@@ -15601,14 +15601,18 @@ Rules: no prose intro, no conclusion, no "this screenshot shows...", no layout d
}
// Retain what the page actually showed only when the plan already permits
- // messaging. The block below tells the model to ask the user who the
- // message is for, and that answer has to be matched against real observed
- // identities. A read-only plan (requiresSubmission=false or
- // requiresStateChange=false) must never stage recipient consent: an answer
- // to a recipient clarify must not elevate a read-only plan into a sendable one.
+ // messaging and has pre-existing messaging authorization. The block below
+ // tells the model to ask the user who the message is for, and that answer
+ // has to be matched against real observed identities. A read-only plan
+ // (requiresSubmission=false or requiresStateChange=false) or an unrelated
+ // consequential submission plan (guard.messaging=null) must never stage
+ // recipient consent: an answer to a recipient clarify must not elevate an
+ // unauthorized plan into a sendable one.
if (guard) {
+ const messagingAuthorized = !!normalizeMessageTarget(guard.messaging);
const messagingPermitted = guard.requiresSubmission === true
- && guard.requiresStateChange === true;
+ && guard.requiresStateChange === true
+ && messagingAuthorized;
const observedRecipientCandidates = messagingPermitted
? this._messageRecipientCandidates(probe)
: [];
@@ -15617,11 +15621,12 @@ Rules: no prose intro, no conclusion, no "this screenshot shows...", no layout d
: null;
// Offered to the next clarify only. The model chooses what it asks, so a
// pending authorization must not survive into an unrelated question.
- // Staged only when the plan already permits messaging.
- // Associate with an explicit recipient-change clarification when a target
- // was already authorized, or a recipient clarification when missing.
+ // Staged only when the plan already permits messaging and has pre-existing
+ // messaging authorization.
+ // Associate with an explicit recipient-change clarification when a named target
+ // was already authorized, or a recipient clarification for active conversations.
guard.pendingRecipientAuthorization = messagingPermitted && observedRecipientCandidates.length > 0
- ? (target ? 'recipient_change' : true)
+ ? (target?.target_kind === 'named' ? 'recipient_change' : true)
: false;
}
@@ -15638,7 +15643,7 @@ Rules: no prose intro, no conclusion, no "this screenshot shows...", no layout d
? 'Message action blocked: WebBrain could not conclusively resolve the target control and active composer. Re-read the page and retry with an exact visible control or fresh ref_id.'
: target
? 'Message send blocked: the active conversation does not exactly match the recipient authorized by the user. Select the intended conversation, re-read its visible header, then retry the send action.'
- : (guard?.requiresSubmission === false || guard?.requiresStateChange === false
+ : (guard?.requiresSubmission === false || guard?.requiresStateChange === false || !target
? 'Message send blocked: the current plan does not authorize sending or submitting messages. Return the draft in chat or ask the user to authorize sending before attempting delivery.'
: 'Message send blocked: the current task has no structured recipient authorization. Ask the user to name the recipient or explicitly authorize the currently open conversation before retrying.'),
};
@@ -15719,8 +15724,10 @@ Rules: no prose intro, no conclusion, no "this screenshot shows...", no layout d
// question is a different question and must not inherit it. Clearing on
// all paths (including timeout, auto, mismatch, cancellation) keeps staged
// consent from remaining parked for an unrelated later clarify to pick up.
+ const messagingAuthorized = !!normalizeMessageTarget(guard.messaging);
const messagingPermitted = guard.requiresSubmission === true
- && guard.requiresStateChange === true;
+ && guard.requiresStateChange === true
+ && messagingAuthorized;
const pending = !!guard.pendingRecipientAuthorization && messagingPermitted;
const pendingType = typeof guard.pendingRecipientAuthorization === 'string'
? guard.pendingRecipientAuthorization
diff --git a/src/firefox/src/agent/message-recipient-guard.js b/src/firefox/src/agent/message-recipient-guard.js
index d9b68958a..975c495f5 100644
--- a/src/firefox/src/agent/message-recipient-guard.js
+++ b/src/firefox/src/agent/message-recipient-guard.js
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ export function clarificationAuthorizesRecipientRole(clarifyContext, answer, can
return negationRe.test(str);
}
- function prefixHasNegation(fullPrefix, prefix) {
+ function prefixHasNegation(fullPrefix, prefix, roleToCheck = null) {
if (hasNegation(prefix)) return true;
if (!fullPrefix) return false;
const boundaryRe = /[;\n\r|]|(?:\b(?:but|however|yet|instead\s+of|rather\s+than|whereas|while|whilst)\b)|(?:而不是|而非)/gi;
@@ -311,9 +311,30 @@ export function clarificationAuthorizesRecipientRole(clarifyContext, answer, can
const segment = fullPrefix.slice(lastBoundary);
const parts = segment.split(/[,,]/);
let relevantStart = 0;
+ const generalRecipientRe = /\b(?:anyone|anybody|any\s+one|no\s*one|nobody|someone|somebody|people|persons?|users?|recipients?|contacts?|others?|everyone|everybody|either|neither|all|any|team|group|members?)\b|谁|任何人|大家|所有人|团队|群组|成员/i;
+ const continuationRe = /^\s*(?:\b(?:especially|particularly|including|specifically|mainly|even|let\s+alone|much\s+less|not\s+to\s+mention)\b|尤其是|特别[是地]?|包括|更不用说|更别提)/i;
+
for (let i = 0; i < parts.length - 1; i++) {
- if (roleWordsRe.test(parts[i])) {
- relevantStart = parts.slice(0, i + 1).join(',').length + 1;
+ const part = parts[i];
+ const partHasNeg = hasNegation(part);
+ const partHasRole = roleWordsRe.test(part);
+
+ if (partHasRole) {
+ if (!partHasNeg) {
+ relevantStart = parts.slice(0, i + 1).join(',').length + 1;
+ } else {
+ if (roleToCheck && !snippetHasExplicitRole(part, roleToCheck)) {
+ relevantStart = parts.slice(0, i + 1).join(',').length + 1;
+ } else {
+ const remainingPrefix = parts.slice(i + 1).join(',');
+ const namesOtherRecipient = candidateAliases.length > 0
+ && !candidateAliases.some(alias => answerNamesIdentity(part, alias))
+ && !generalRecipientRe.test(part);
+ if (namesOtherRecipient && !continuationRe.test(remainingPrefix)) {
+ relevantStart = parts.slice(0, i + 1).join(',').length + 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
}
}
const relevantPrefix = segment.slice(relevantStart);
@@ -379,14 +400,14 @@ export function clarificationAuthorizesRecipientRole(clarifyContext, answer, can
const fullPrefix = answerText.slice(0, span.start);
if (prefixPatterns[roleToCheck].test(prefix)) {
- if (!prefixHasNegation(fullPrefix, prefix)) {
+ if (!prefixHasNegation(fullPrefix, prefix, roleToCheck)) {
return true;
}
}
const suffixMatch = suffix.match(suffixPatterns[roleToCheck]);
if (suffixMatch) {
- if (!prefixHasNegation(fullPrefix, prefix) && !hasNegation(suffixMatch[0]) && !isPrecededByNegatedCoordGroup(fullPrefix)) {
+ if (!prefixHasNegation(fullPrefix, prefix, roleToCheck) && !hasNegation(suffixMatch[0]) && !isPrecededByNegatedCoordGroup(fullPrefix)) {
return true;
}
}
@@ -398,7 +419,7 @@ export function clarificationAuthorizesRecipientRole(clarifyContext, answer, can
const intervening = fullSuffix.slice(0, coordMatch.index + coordMatch[0].length - coordMatch[1].length);
const rolePart = coordMatch[1];
if (!roleWordsRe.test(intervening) && suffixPatterns[roleToCheck].test(rolePart)) {
- if (!prefixHasNegation(fullPrefix, prefix) && !hasNegation(intervening) && !hasNegation(rolePart) && !isPrecededByNegatedCoordGroup(fullPrefix)) {
+ if (!prefixHasNegation(fullPrefix, prefix, roleToCheck) && !hasNegation(intervening) && !hasNegation(rolePart) && !isPrecededByNegatedCoordGroup(fullPrefix)) {
return true;
}
}
@@ -411,7 +432,7 @@ export function clarificationAuthorizesRecipientRole(clarifyContext, answer, can
const intervening = prefixCoordMatch[0].slice(roleLeader.length);
if (!roleWordsRe.test(intervening) && prefixPatterns[roleToCheck].test(roleLeader)) {
const beforeLeader = fullPrefix.slice(0, fullPrefix.length - prefixCoordMatch[0].length);
- if (!prefixHasNegation(beforeLeader, beforeLeader) && !hasNegation(roleLeader) && !hasNegation(intervening)) {
+ if (!prefixHasNegation(beforeLeader, beforeLeader, roleToCheck) && !hasNegation(roleLeader) && !hasNegation(intervening)) {
return true;
}
}
diff --git a/test/run.js b/test/run.js
index ed0602d25..c0a70e75f 100644
--- a/test/run.js
+++ b/test/run.js
@@ -4996,6 +4996,31 @@ test('direct-message recipient guard uses structured intent and exact active ide
false,
'emphasized denial across commas "Do not, under any circumstances, put Alice in To" must not authorize To for Alice',
);
+ assert.equal(
+ helper.clarificationAuthorizesRecipientRole(null, 'Do not put anyone in To, especially Alice in To', 'Alice', 'to'),
+ false,
+ 'comma following negated role phrase "Do not put anyone in To, especially Alice in To" must retain negation',
+ );
+ assert.equal(
+ helper.clarificationAuthorizesRecipientRole(null, 'Do not put anyone in To, including Alice in To', 'Alice', 'to'),
+ false,
+ 'comma following negated role phrase "Do not put anyone in To, including Alice in To" must retain negation',
+ );
+ assert.equal(
+ helper.clarificationAuthorizesRecipientRole(null, 'Do not put anyone in CC, especially Alice in To', 'Alice', 'to'),
+ true,
+ 'denial of CC must not negate affirmative role in To',
+ );
+ assert.equal(
+ helper.clarificationAuthorizesRecipientRole(null, 'Do not put Bob in To, Alice in To', 'Alice', 'to'),
+ true,
+ 'denial naming a different recipient must not negate Alice in To',
+ );
+ assert.equal(
+ helper.clarificationAuthorizesRecipientRole(null, 'Do not put Bob in To, put Alice in To', 'Alice', 'to'),
+ true,
+ 'denial naming Bob followed by affirmative verb must authorize Alice in To',
+ );
assert.deepEqual(
helper.resolveClarifiedRecipients(
[
@@ -5426,10 +5451,45 @@ test('direct-message recipient guard uses structured intent and exact active ide
);
assert.equal(agent._planExecutionGuards.get(tabId)?.messaging, null);
+ // A plan without messaging authorization (e.g. submitting a LinkedIn application)
+ // must never stage recipient consent even when requiresSubmission and requiresStateChange
+ // are true: a recipient clarify must not authorize sending when the plan never requested it.
+ agent._planExecutionGuards.set(tabId, {
+ messaging: null,
+ requiresSubmission: true,
+ requiresStateChange: true,
+ });
+ const unrelatedSubmissionSendBlock = await agent._messageRecipientGuardBlock(
+ tabId,
+ 'click_ax',
+ { ref_id: 'ref_send' },
+ 'https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/thread-1',
+ {},
+ );
+ assert.equal(unrelatedSubmissionSendBlock?.blocked, true);
+ assert.equal(unrelatedSubmissionSendBlock?.reasonCode, 'authorized_recipient_missing');
+ assert.equal(
+ agent._planExecutionGuards.get(tabId)?.observedRecipientCandidates,
+ null,
+ `${label}: plan without messaging authorization staged recipient candidates`,
+ );
+ assert.equal(
+ agent._planExecutionGuards.get(tabId)?.pendingRecipientAuthorization,
+ false,
+ `${label}: plan without messaging authorization staged pendingRecipientAuthorization`,
+ );
+ assert.equal(
+ agent._bindClarifiedMessageRecipient(tabId, 'Reply to Alice ([email protected])'),
+ false,
+ `${label}: clarify answer elevated an unrelated plan into an authorized sender`,
+ );
+ assert.equal(agent._planExecutionGuards.get(tabId)?.messaging, null);
+
// A messaging-authorized plan does stage consent for the clarify it asks for,
// and binds to the page-observed candidate rather than model-authored option text.
agent._planExecutionGuards.set(tabId, {
- messaging: null,
+ messaging: { target_kind: 'active_conversation', recipients: [] },
+ messagingConversationScope: 'thread-authorized',
requiresSubmission: true,
requiresStateChange: true,
});
@@ -5458,7 +5518,7 @@ test('direct-message recipient guard uses structured intent and exact active ide
}, `${label}: clarify authorization did not reach the recipient guard`);
const clarifyGuardState = candidates => ({
- messaging: null,
+ messaging: { target_kind: 'active_conversation', recipients: [] },
requiresSubmission: true,
requiresStateChange: true,
pendingRecipientAuthorization: true,
@@ -5472,7 +5532,9 @@ test('direct-message recipient guard uses structured intent and exact active ide
false,
`${label}: a recipient absent from the page was authorized by answer text alone`,
);
- assert.equal(agent._planExecutionGuards.get(tabId)?.messaging, null);
+ assert.deepEqual(agent._planExecutionGuards.get(tabId)?.messaging, {
+ target_kind: 'active_conversation', recipients: [],
+ });
// A failed match must consume the staged consent, not park it for whatever
// unrelated answer arrives next.
assert.equal(agent._planExecutionGuards.get(tabId)?.observedRecipientCandidates, null,
@@ -5545,13 +5607,15 @@ test('direct-message recipient guard uses structured intent and exact active ide
false,
`${label}: an incomplete recipient subset authorized a send target`,
);
- assert.equal(agent._planExecutionGuards.get(tabId)?.messaging, null);
+ assert.deepEqual(agent._planExecutionGuards.get(tabId)?.messaging, {
+ target_kind: 'active_conversation', recipients: [],
+ });
// Consent is staged for exactly one clarify. Without that scope, an answer
// to an unrelated question that merely mentions someone on the page would
// authorize sending to them.
agent._planExecutionGuards.set(tabId, {
- messaging: null,
+ messaging: { target_kind: 'active_conversation', recipients: [] },
requiresSubmission: true,
requiresStateChange: true,
observedRecipientCandidates: [{ identity: '[email protected]', role: 'to' }],