Worktrunk is a CLI for Git worktree management, designed for parallel AI agent workflows
fix(url): scope the ssh:// userinfo search to the authority (#3813)
Worktrunk Bot049f4c9d6a82
diff --git a/src/git/url.rs b/src/git/url.rsindex 009d3fa2a..d9edfcfa7 100644--- a/src/git/url.rs+++ b/src/git/url.rs@@ -131,8 +131,8 @@ pub(crate) fn url_path_segments_eq(left: &str, right: &str) -> bool {canonical_url_path_segment(left).eq_ignore_ascii_case(&canonical_url_path_segment(right))}-/// Extract the network host (plus an HTTP(S)/git port, when present) from a URL-/// authority, discarding userinfo at the final `@`.+/// Extract the network host (plus a port, when present) from a URL authority,+/// discarding userinfo at the final `@`.////// The final separator matters for hostile or credential-bearing authorities:/// `[email protected]` connects to `attacker.example`, while@@ -169,8 +169,19 @@ impl GitRemoteUrl {} else if let Some(rest) = url.strip_prefix("ssh://") {// ssh://[email protected]/owner/repo.git or ssh://github.com/owner/repo.git// ssh://git@host:port/owner/repo.git (port is stripped — irrelevant to project identity)- let without_user = rest.split('@').next_back()?;- let (host_with_port, path) = without_user.split_once('/')?;+ //+ // Split the authority off at the first `/` before looking for `@`,+ // exactly as the scheme and SCP-style branches do: `@` is legal in a+ // path, and searching the whole remainder for it lets a later+ // segment pose as the authority. In+ //+ // ssh://[email protected]/owner/[email protected]/org/repo.git+ //+ // the last `@` would otherwise make the host `github.com` — the+ // identity `project_identifier` keys approvals on — for a remote+ // git connects to `attacker.example`.+ let (authority, path) = rest.split_once('/')?;+ let host_with_port = authority_host(authority)?;// Strip port from host (e.g., "gitlab.internal:2222" → "gitlab.internal")let host = host_with_port.split(':').next().unwrap_or(host_with_port);let (namespace, repo) = split_namespace_repo(path)?;@@ -1208,16 +1219,16 @@ mod tests {//// ssh://[email protected]@attacker.com/owner/repo.git//- // The parser uses: rest.split('@').next_back()- // This takes EVERYTHING after the LAST @+ // The authority is everything before the first `/`, and its userinfo+ // ends at the LAST `@` in it — the boundary git itself uses.//- // Input: "[email protected]@attacker.com/owner/repo.git"- // Split by @: ["user", "legitimate.com", "attacker.com/owner/repo.git"]- // next_back(): "attacker.com/owner/repo.git"+ // Authority: "[email protected]@attacker.com"+ // rsplit_once('@'): ("[email protected]", "attacker.com")// Host becomes: "attacker.com"//// This means ssh://[email protected]@attacker.com/owner/repo.git- // produces host = "attacker.com", not "victim.com"!+ // produces host = "attacker.com", not "victim.com" — which is the host+ // the connection actually goes to.// The URL parses successfully - last @ wins for user/host separationlet parsed =@@ -1238,42 +1249,55 @@ mod tests {#[test]fn test_adversarial_ssh_at_in_path() {- // What if @ appears in the path (namespace)?- // ssh://[email protected]/org@company/repo.git- //- // The parser uses split('@').next_back() which takes everything after- // the LAST @. So "[email protected]/org@company/repo.git" splits as:- // ["git", "host.com/org", "company/repo.git"]- // next_back() returns "company/repo.git"- // split_once('/') gives host="company", path="repo.git"- // split_namespace_repo("repo.git") has only 1 segment, returns None- //- // This URL is rejected - @ in namespace breaks ssh:// parsing-- assert!(- GitRemoteUrl::parse("ssh://[email protected]/org@company/repo.git").is_none(),- "SSH URLs with @ in path after host are rejected (ambiguous parsing)"- );-- // However, https:// handles @ in namespace correctly (no user@ prefix)+ // `@` is legal in a path, so the userinfo boundary is looked for inside+ // the authority — everything before the first `/` — and never in the+ // path. A namespace containing `@` therefore parses as itself.+ let ssh_with_at = GitRemoteUrl::parse("ssh://[email protected]/org@company/repo.git").unwrap();+ assert_eq!(ssh_with_at.host(), "host.com");+ assert_eq!(ssh_with_at.owner(), "org@company");+ assert_eq!(ssh_with_at.repo(), "repo");++ // https:// and SCP-style URLs agree — all three scope the `@` search to+ // the authority.let https_with_at = GitRemoteUrl::parse("https://host.com/org@company/repo.git").unwrap();assert_eq!(https_with_at.owner(), "org@company");assert_eq!(https_with_at.repo(), "repo");}+ /// A path segment must not be able to pose as the SSH authority. Searching+ /// the whole remainder for the last `@` let a crafted remote report a host+ /// git never connects to — and `project_identifier` is what+ /// `Approvals` keys a project's approved commands on, so a spoofed host+ /// silently borrows another project's approvals.+ #[test]+ fn test_adversarial_ssh_host_spoofed_from_path() {+ let parsed =+ GitRemoteUrl::parse("ssh://[email protected]/owner/[email protected]/org/repo.git")+ .expect("structurally valid SSH URL");+ assert_eq!(+ parsed.host(),+ "attacker.example",+ "the host is the authority git connects to, not a later path segment"+ );+ assert_eq!(parsed.forge_kind(), None);+ assert_eq!(+ parsed.project_identifier(),+ "attacker.example/owner/[email protected]/org/repo"+ );+ }+#[test]fn test_adversarial_empty_user_ssh() {// ssh://user@/owner/repo.git - empty host after user@- // After split('@').next_back(): "/owner/repo.git"- // split_once('/'): host="", path="owner/repo.git"- // Empty host is rejected+ // Authority: "user@" — rsplit_once('@') leaves nothing after the+ // separator, so the host is empty and the URL is rejectedassert!(GitRemoteUrl::parse("ssh://user@/owner/repo.git").is_none(),"Empty host should be rejected");// ssh://@host.com/owner/repo.git - empty user (@ with nothing before it)- // After split('@').next_back(): "host.com/owner/repo.git"+ // Authority: "@host.com" — rsplit_once('@') gives host "host.com"// This parses correctly - the empty user is effectively ignoredlet parsed = GitRemoteUrl::parse("ssh://@host.com/owner/repo.git").unwrap();assert_eq!(parsed.host(), "host.com");