Worktrunk is a CLI for Git worktree management, designed for parallel AI agent workflows
ci: read TEND_BOT_TOKEN from an environment in every job (#3748)
Maximilian Roos59c7320a78a9
diff --git a/.github/CLAUDE.md b/.github/CLAUDE.mdindex bcf1e29c9..a5ce004bf 100644--- a/.github/CLAUDE.md+++ b/.github/CLAUDE.md@@ -11,10 +11,11 @@ Workflows check `user.login == 'worktrunk-bot'` directly.## Tokens-| Token | Purpose |-|-------|---------|-| `TEND_BOT_TOKEN` | Every workflow acting as `worktrunk-bot`, including the winget and Homebrew publish jobs |-| `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` | Authenticates Claude Code to the Anthropic API |+| Token | Purpose | Stored in |+|-------|---------|-----------|+| `TEND_BOT_TOKEN` | Every workflow acting as `worktrunk-bot`, including the winget and Homebrew publish jobs | `tend` and `release` environments |+| `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` | Authenticates Claude Code to the Anthropic API | repo level |+| `CODECOV_TOKEN` | Uploads coverage from `ci.yaml` and `coverage.yaml` | repo level, allowlisted in `.config/tend.yaml` |## Merge restriction@@ -25,22 +26,55 @@ Only the repo owner (`@max-sixty`, admin) can merge to `main`.## Environment protection-Release credentials live in GitHub Environments so no other workflow the repo-runs can read them. Each environment holds what one phase needs, since a job-that joins an environment can read every secret in it:+Credentials that grant write access live in a GitHub Environment so no other+workflow the repo runs can read them. Each environment holds what one phase+needs, since a job that joins an environment can read every secret in it:-| Environment | Secret | Read by |-|-------------|--------|---------|-| `release` | `AUR_SSH_PRIVATE_KEY` | `publish-aur` |-| `signing` | `SIGNPATH_API_TOKEN` | `build-local-artifacts` |+| Environment | Admits | Secret | Read by |+|-------------|--------|--------|---------|+| `tend` | `main` | `TEND_BOT_TOKEN` | every `tend-*.yaml` job but `relay`, `append-gist`, both `create-issue-on-*-failure` jobs |+| `release` | `v*` tags | `AUR_SSH_PRIVATE_KEY`, `TEND_BOT_TOKEN` | `publish-aur`, `publish-winget`, `publish-homebrew` |+| `signing` | `v*` tags | `SIGNPATH_API_TOKEN` | `build-local-artifacts` |+| `github-pages` | `main` | none — OIDC only | `deploy-docs` |-Both restrict deployments to `v*` tags and neither has a reviewer rule, so-joining a job to one costs no approval step.+The deployment branch policy is the gate: a job naming an environment runs+only from a ref the policy admits, so a workflow pushed to a feature branch is+refused before its first step. `worktrunk-bot` can push branches but cannot+update `main` (the "Merge access" ruleset) or move tags (the "Tag operations"+ruleset, admin-only), which is what makes both admitted sets unreachable to+it. No environment has a reviewer rule, so joining a job to one costs no+approval step.++`TEND_BOT_TOKEN` is stored in two environments rather than shared, because a+policy admits branches or tags but the token is needed under both: the bot's+own workflows run on `main`, the publish jobs on a `v*` tag. Adding the tag to+`tend` is not an option — `tend check` pins that policy to exactly the+protected branches and its `--fix` deletes anything else.++Jobs name `tend` as `{name: tend, deployment: false}`. GitHub files a+deployment record for every job that names an environment, against whatever+ref the run belongs to — under `pull_request_target` that is the pull request+itself, so an omission posts a "worktrunk-bot deployed to tend" line on every+push to every PR. `deployment: false` drops the record and keeps the gate. The+release jobs keep their records: a tag-push deployment lands in no PR+timeline, and it reads as what it is.++The generated `tend-*.yaml` files still carry the bare `environment: tend`,+because they are regenerated by the published `tend` rather than edited here —+`tend check`'s `environment-deployments` fails until a `uvx tend@latest init`+regen lands them on tend ≥ 0.1.14.crates.io publishing holds no stored token — it uses Trusted Publishing.crates.io mints a short-lived one only for an OIDC claim from `release.yaml`running in that same `release` environment.+`CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` is still at repo level, so `tend check`'s+`repo-secret-allowlist` fails until it moves. It cannot be read back from+GitHub, so moving it means pasting the value or re-minting with+`claude setup-token`; only the generated workflows read it, and all of them+name the `tend` environment, so nothing else breaks when the repo-level copy+goes.+## Build environment`Swatinem/rust-cache` hashes `CARGO*` and `RUST*` env vars into the cache key.diff --git a/.github/workflows/benchmarks.yaml b/.github/workflows/benchmarks.yamlindex 5b1692add..33701fd8e 100644--- a/.github/workflows/benchmarks.yaml+++ b/.github/workflows/benchmarks.yaml@@ -73,13 +73,37 @@ jobs:name: benchmark-results-${{ github.run_id }}path: target/criterion- # Time-series benchmark store, owned by worktrunk-bot:- # https://gist.github.com/worktrunk-bot/19bb23cb9658722abfe69479d0a4f9bf- #- # Cron-only: workflow_dispatch runs aren't appended (would pollute the- # time series). Skipped on forks: `TEND_BOT_TOKEN` is not exposed there.+ # Time-series benchmark store, owned by worktrunk-bot:+ # https://gist.github.com/worktrunk-bot/19bb23cb9658722abfe69479d0a4f9bf+ #+ # Cron-only: workflow_dispatch runs aren't appended (would pollute the+ # time series). Skipped on forks: the environment's secrets aren't exposed+ # there.+ #+ # Its own job so the token stays off `benchmarks`. The copy this job reads+ # is in the `tend` environment, whose policy admits `main` alone, so a job+ # naming it is refused on every other ref — which would take+ # workflow_dispatch against a chosen branch with it. A job GitHub skips+ # never requests its environment, so the cron gate above keeps the gate off+ # the dispatch path.+ append-gist:+ needs: benchmarks+ if: github.repository_owner == 'max-sixty' && github.event_name == 'schedule'+ runs-on: ubuntu-24.04+ environment:+ name: tend+ # A secret scope, not a deploy target — see .github/CLAUDE.md.+ deployment: false+ permissions:+ contents: read+ steps:+ - name: 📦 Download benchmark results+ uses: actions/download-artifact@v8+ with:+ name: benchmark-results-${{ github.run_id }}+ path: target/criterion+- name: 💾 Append results to gist- if: github.repository_owner == 'max-sixty' && github.event_name == 'schedule'env:GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.TEND_BOT_TOKEN }}GIST_ID: 19bb23cb9658722abfe69479d0a4f9bf@@ -111,9 +135,15 @@ jobs:git -C /tmp/gist pushcreate-issue-on-benchmark-failure:- needs: benchmarks+ needs:+ - benchmarks+ - append-gistif: always() && contains(needs.*.result, 'failure') && github.repository_owner == 'max-sixty' && github.event_name == 'schedule'runs-on: ubuntu-24.04+ environment:+ name: tend+ # A secret scope, not a deploy target — see .github/CLAUDE.md.+ deployment: falsepermissions:contents: readissues: writediff --git a/.github/workflows/nightly.yaml b/.github/workflows/nightly.yamlindex 2b1838e26..d81a6e452 100644--- a/.github/workflows/nightly.yaml+++ b/.github/workflows/nightly.yaml@@ -426,6 +426,13 @@ jobs:- link-checkif: always() && contains(needs.*.result, 'failure') && github.repository_owner == 'max-sixty' && github.event_name == 'schedule'runs-on: ubuntu-24.04+ environment:+ name: tend+ # A secret scope, not a deploy target — see .github/CLAUDE.md. The cron+ # gate above keeps this off the workflow's pull_request and+ # workflow_dispatch triggers, whose refs the `tend` policy can refuse;+ # its push trigger is `main`-only, which the policy already admits.+ deployment: falsepermissions:contents: readissues: writediff --git a/.github/workflows/release.yaml b/.github/workflows/release.yamlindex d235ba761..8ce7750c6 100644--- a/.github/workflows/release.yaml+++ b/.github/workflows/release.yaml@@ -406,6 +406,7 @@ jobs:- plan- hostruns-on: ubuntu-24.04+ environment: releaseif: ${{ needs.plan.outputs.publishing == 'true' }}env:GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.TEND_BOT_TOKEN }}@@ -428,6 +429,7 @@ jobs:- plan- hostruns-on: "ubuntu-24.04"+ environment: releaseenv:GITHUB_USER: "worktrunk-bot"GITHUB_EMAIL: "[email protected]"