Worktrunk is a CLI for Git worktree management, designed for parallel AI agent workflows
test(security): give the directive-injection tests branch names git accepts (#4194)
Worktrunk Botd3bbda2485bd
diff --git a/tests/integration_tests/security.rs b/tests/integration_tests/security.rsindex 6508d1217..78f51dbdb 100644--- a/tests/integration_tests/security.rs+++ b/tests/integration_tests/security.rs@@ -33,14 +33,28 @@//! the direct execution input is safe, but they don't test the wrapper. Full//! end-to-end tests with the shell wrapper//! are in `tests/integration_tests/shell_wrapper.rs`.+//!+//! ## Writing a payload git will accept+//!+//! A branch-name payload has to survive git's ref-name rules (git-check-ref-format(1)+//! rule 4), which reject a space and every ASCII control character — so+//! `echo PWNED > /tmp/…` and anything carrying a newline can never become a+//! branch, and a test built on one exercises nothing. Word-split the payload+//! with `$IFS` instead: `touch$IFS/tmp/hacked2` is a legal ref name and still+//! creates the canary if a shell ever evaluates it. A payload that reaches a+//! worktree path must also be a legal filename on Windows, which rules out+//! `< > : " | ? *` — `sanitize_branch_name` only rewrites `/` and `\`.+//!+//! Where git's own rules are the defense, assert the refusal rather than+//! returning early from it: a skip reads as a pass on every platform.use crate::common::{TestRepo, configure_directive_file, directive_file, repo, setup_snapshot_settings, wt_command,};-use insta::Settings;use insta_cmd::assert_cmd_snapshot;use rstest::rstest;use std::process::Command;+use worktrunk::config::sanitize_branch_name;////// Git provides the first line of defense by refusing to create commits@@ -118,26 +132,26 @@ fn test_rust_prevents_nul_bytes_in_args(repo: TestRepo) {}}+/// A branch name that is entirely an EXEC directive must not be executed.///-/// This tests the case where the entire branch name is a directive+/// The payload carries no space: git's ref-name rule 4 rejects a space outright+/// (as it does control characters), so a name built around `echo PWNED >+/// /tmp/…` can never be created and everything below it would be skipped.+/// `touch$IFS/tmp/hacked2` is the space-free equivalent — a valid ref name, a+/// legal path component on every platform `wt` builds a worktree on, and a+/// shell command that still creates the canary through `$IFS` word splitting+/// if anything ever evaluates it.+///+/// `wt switch --create` creates the branch itself, so this covers the success+/// path: the snapshot shows the directive-shaped name reaching the worktree+/// path and the success message verbatim, and the canary assertion shows+/// nothing evaluated it on the way.#[rstest]fn test_branch_name_is_directive_not_executed(repo: TestRepo) {- let malicious_branch = "__WORKTRUNK_EXEC__echo PWNED > /tmp/hacked2";-- // Try to create this branch- let result = repo- .git_command()- .args(["branch", malicious_branch])- .run()- .unwrap();+ let malicious_branch = "__WORKTRUNK_EXEC__touch$IFS/tmp/hacked2";+ let expected_worktree = expected_worktree_path(&repo, malicious_branch);- if !result.status.success() {- // Git rejected the malicious branch name- return;- }-- let mut settings = Settings::clone_current();- settings.set_snapshot_path("../snapshots");+ let settings = setup_snapshot_settings(&repo);settings.bind(|| {let (cd_path, _guard) = directive_file();@@ -150,6 +164,8 @@ fn test_branch_name_is_directive_not_executed(repo: TestRepo) {.current_dir(repo.root_path());assert_cmd_snapshot!(cmd);++ assert_cd_file_holds_worktree_path(&cd_path, &expected_worktree);});// Verify the malicious file was NOT created@@ -159,9 +175,79 @@ fn test_branch_name_is_directive_not_executed(repo: TestRepo) {);}+/// The worktree path `wt switch --create <branch>` produces under the default+/// layout: a sibling of the repo named `<repo>.<branch>`, with `/` and `\`+/// dashed out by `sanitize_branch_name` and nothing else rewritten.+fn expected_worktree_path(repo: &TestRepo, branch: &str) -> std::path::PathBuf {+ let root = repo.root_path();+ let repo_name = root.file_name().expect("repo root has a name");+ root.parent().expect("repo root has a parent").join(format!(+ "{}.{}",+ repo_name.to_string_lossy(),+ sanitize_branch_name(branch)+ ))+}++/// Assert the CD directive file holds what `wt` promises a wrapper it holds:+/// one line, and that line is the worktree `wt` just created.+///+/// This is the assertion that carries the directive tests. `wt` writes the CD+/// file itself (`src/output/global.rs`), so a branch name that smuggled a+/// second line or a different destination past the display layer would show up+/// here — whereas the `/tmp/hackedN` canaries in the callers can only ever+/// pass: these tests run the binary directly, and no shell evaluates the+/// file's contents.+///+/// It compares against `expected` rather than asking whether the line names+/// *a* directory, because the directive these tests model+/// (`__WORKTRUNK_CD__/tmp`) smuggles a path that exists — a verifier that only+/// checked `is_dir()` would pass on the leak it is named for. Both sides are+/// canonicalized: `wt` writes the logical, symlink-preserved path, which is+/// not textually the tempdir path on macOS.+fn assert_cd_file_holds_worktree_path(cd_path: &std::path::Path, expected: &std::path::Path) {+ let cd_content = std::fs::read_to_string(cd_path).unwrap_or_default();+ assert_eq!(+ cd_content.lines().count(),+ 1,+ "the CD file must hold a single line, got {cd_content:?}"+ );+ let written = std::fs::canonicalize(cd_content.trim()).unwrap_or_else(|e| {+ panic!("the CD file must hold an existing path, got {cd_content:?}: {e}")+ });+ let expected = std::fs::canonicalize(expected)+ .unwrap_or_else(|e| panic!("the new worktree {} should exist: {e}", expected.display()));+ assert_eq!(+ written, expected,+ "the CD file must hold the new worktree's path, got {cd_content:?}"+ );+}++/// Assert `wt` left the CD directive file untouched.+///+/// The counterpart to [`assert_cd_file_holds_worktree_path`] for the tests+/// whose `wt switch` fails: no switch happened, so nothing may move the user's+/// shell. `directive_file()` hands over an empty file, and `wt` only writes one+/// after a successful switch (`handle_switch_output`), so any content here is a+/// destination that came from somewhere other than a completed switch.+fn assert_cd_file_unwritten(cd_path: &std::path::Path) {+ let cd_content = std::fs::read_to_string(cd_path).unwrap_or_default();+ assert!(+ cd_content.is_empty(),+ "a failed switch must not write a cd directive, got {cd_content:?}"+ );+}++/// A directive smuggled onto a second line never reaches `wt` at all.+///+/// Git's ref-name validation is the layer that stops this one (defense layer 3+/// above): a newline is a control character, so `git branch` refuses the name+/// on every platform and no such branch can exist for `wt` to read. Assert that+/// refusal rather than skipping past it — the earlier form of this test tried+/// to create the branch and returned early when git said no, so its body never+/// ran and it passed without exercising anything.#[rstest]-fn test_branch_name_with_newline_directive_not_executed(repo: TestRepo) {- let malicious_branch = "feature\n__WORKTRUNK_EXEC__echo PWNED > /tmp/hacked3";+fn test_git_rejects_newline_directive_in_branch_name(repo: TestRepo) {+ let malicious_branch = "feature\n__WORKTRUNK_EXEC__touch$IFS/tmp/hacked3";let result = repo.git_command()@@ -169,29 +255,9 @@ fn test_branch_name_with_newline_directive_not_executed(repo: TestRepo) {.run().unwrap();- if !result.status.success() {- return;- }-- let mut settings = Settings::clone_current();- settings.set_snapshot_path("../snapshots");-- settings.bind(|| {- let (cd_path, _guard) = directive_file();- let mut cmd = wt_command();- repo.configure_wt_cmd(&mut cmd);- configure_directive_file(&mut cmd, &cd_path);- cmd.arg("switch")- .arg("--create")- .arg(malicious_branch)- .current_dir(repo.root_path());-- assert_cmd_snapshot!(cmd);- });-assert!(- !std::path::Path::new("/tmp/hacked3").exists(),- "Malicious code was executed!"+ !result.status.success(),+ "git should reject a branch name containing a newline");}@@ -240,10 +306,11 @@ fn test_branch_name_with_cd_directive_not_executed(repo: TestRepo) {.run().unwrap();- if !result.status.success() {- // Git rejected it - that's fine, nothing to test- return;- }+ assert!(+ result.status.success(),+ "git should accept {malicious_branch} as a branch name; \+ without the branch there is nothing for this test to exercise"+ );let settings = setup_snapshot_settings(&repo);@@ -257,8 +324,13 @@ fn test_branch_name_with_cd_directive_not_executed(repo: TestRepo) {.arg(malicious_branch).current_dir(repo.root_path());- // Branch name should appear in success message, but not as a separate directive+ // The branch is pre-created above, so `--create` fails: this snapshots+ // how a directive-shaped name renders in an error message.assert_cmd_snapshot!(cmd);++ // The payload names `/tmp`, which exists: the proof that nothing+ // honored it is that the failed switch wrote no destination at all.+ assert_cd_file_unwritten(&cd_path);});}@@ -282,6 +354,8 @@ fn test_error_message_with_directive_not_executed(repo: TestRepo) {// Should fail with error, but not execute directiveassert_cmd_snapshot!(cmd);++ assert_cd_file_unwritten(&cd_path);});assert!(@@ -295,22 +369,14 @@ fn test_error_message_with_directive_not_executed(repo: TestRepo) {/// part of the explicitly requested command.#[rstest]fn test_execute_flag_with_directive_like_branch_name(repo: TestRepo) {- // Branch name that looks like a directive- let malicious_branch = "__WORKTRUNK_EXEC__echo PWNED > /tmp/hacked7";+ // Branch name that looks like a directive. Space-free for the same reason+ // as `test_branch_name_is_directive_not_executed`: git rejects a ref-name+ // containing a space, so the old payload could never be created and the+ // branch it needs never existed.+ let malicious_branch = "__WORKTRUNK_EXEC__touch$IFS/tmp/hacked7";+ let expected_worktree = expected_worktree_path(&repo, malicious_branch);- let result = repo- .git_command()- .args(["branch", malicious_branch])- .run()- .unwrap();-- if !result.status.success() {- // Git rejected the branch name- return;- }-- let mut settings = Settings::clone_current();- settings.set_snapshot_path("../snapshots");+ let settings = setup_snapshot_settings(&repo);settings.bind(|| {let (cd_path, _guard) = directive_file();@@ -326,6 +392,8 @@ fn test_execute_flag_with_directive_like_branch_name(repo: TestRepo) {.current_dir(repo.root_path());assert_cmd_snapshot!(cmd);++ assert_cd_file_holds_worktree_path(&cd_path, &expected_worktree);});assert!(@@ -389,20 +457,24 @@ fn test_git_rejects_ansi_escape_in_branch_names(repo: TestRepo) {fn test_literal_escape_like_branch_names_displayed_safely(repo: TestRepo) {let branch_name = "fix-backslash-x1b-test";- let result = repo.git_command().args(["branch", branch_name]).run();-- if let Ok(output) = result- && output.status.success()- {- let mut settings = setup_snapshot_settings(&repo);- settings.add_filter(r"\b[0-9a-f]{7,40}\b", "[SHA]");-- settings.bind(|| {- let mut cmd = wt_command();- repo.configure_wt_cmd(&mut cmd);- cmd.args(["list", "--branches"])- .current_dir(repo.root_path());- assert_cmd_snapshot!(cmd);- });- }+ let output = repo+ .git_command()+ .args(["branch", branch_name])+ .run()+ .expect("git branch should run");+ assert!(+ output.status.success(),+ "git should accept {branch_name} as a branch name"+ );++ let mut settings = setup_snapshot_settings(&repo);+ settings.add_filter(r"\b[0-9a-f]{7,40}\b", "[SHA]");++ settings.bind(|| {+ let mut cmd = wt_command();+ repo.configure_wt_cmd(&mut cmd);+ cmd.args(["list", "--branches"])+ .current_dir(repo.root_path());+ assert_cmd_snapshot!(cmd);+ });}diff --git a/tests/snapshots/integration__integration_tests__security__branch_name_is_directive_not_executed.snap b/tests/snapshots/integration__integration_tests__security__branch_name_is_directive_not_executed.snapnew file mode 100644index 000000000..08071187f--- /dev/null+++ b/tests/snapshots/integration__integration_tests__security__branch_name_is_directive_not_executed.snap@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@+---+source: tests/integration_tests/security.rs+info:+ program: wt+ args:+ - switch+ - "--create"+ - __WORKTRUNK_EXEC__touch$IFS/tmp/hacked2+ env:+ APPDATA: "[TEST_CONFIG_HOME]"+ CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR: "[TEST_CLAUDE_CONFIG]"+ CLICOLOR_FORCE: "1"+ COLUMNS: "500"+ GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL: file+ GIT_AUTHOR_DATE: "2025-01-01T00:00:00Z"+ GIT_AUTHOR_EMAIL: [email protected]+ GIT_AUTHOR_NAME: Test User+ GIT_COMMITTER_DATE: "2025-01-01T00:00:00Z"+ GIT_COMMITTER_EMAIL: [email protected]+ GIT_COMMITTER_NAME: Test User+ GIT_CONFIG_COUNT: "2"+ GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL: /nonexistent/wt/gitconfig+ GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0: user.useConfigOnly+ GIT_CONFIG_KEY_1: rerere.enabled+ GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM: /nonexistent/wt/gitconfig+ GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0: "true"+ GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_1: "false"+ GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT: "0"+ HOME: "[TEST_HOME]"+ LANG: C+ LC_ALL: C+ LLVM_PROFILE_FILE: "[LLVM_PROFILE_FILE]"+ OPENCODE_CONFIG_DIR: "[TEST_OPENCODE_CONFIG]"+ PATH: "[PATH]"+ TERM: alacritty+ USERPROFILE: "[TEST_HOME]"+ WORKTRUNK_APPROVALS_PATH: "[TEST_APPROVALS]"+ WORKTRUNK_CONFIG_PATH: "[TEST_CONFIG]"+ WORKTRUNK_DIRECTIVE_CD_FILE: "[DIRECTIVE_CD_FILE]"+ WORKTRUNK_SYSTEM_CONFIG_PATH: "[TEST_SYSTEM_CONFIG]"+ WORKTRUNK_TEST_BASH_INSTALLED: "0"+ WORKTRUNK_TEST_CLAUDE_INSTALLED: "0"+ WORKTRUNK_TEST_CODEX_INSTALLED: "0"+ WORKTRUNK_TEST_DELAYED_STREAM_MS: "-1"+ WORKTRUNK_TEST_EPOCH: "1735776000"+ WORKTRUNK_TEST_FISH_INSTALLED: "0"+ WORKTRUNK_TEST_GEMINI_INSTALLED: "0"+ WORKTRUNK_TEST_MOCK_CONFIG_DIR: "[TEST_MOCK_CONFIG]"+ WORKTRUNK_TEST_NUSHELL_ENV: "0"+ WORKTRUNK_TEST_OPENCODE_INSTALLED: "0"+ WORKTRUNK_TEST_PARENT_SHELL: ""+ WORKTRUNK_TEST_POWERSHELL_ENV: "0"+ WORKTRUNK_TEST_POWERSHELL_INSTALLED: "0"+ WORKTRUNK_TEST_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS: "60000"+ WORKTRUNK_TEST_SKIP_URL_HEALTH_CHECK: "1"+ WORKTRUNK_TEST_ZSH_INSTALLED: "0"+ XDG_CONFIG_HOME: "[TEST_CONFIG_HOME]"+---+success: true+exit_code: 0+----- stdout -----++----- stderr -----+[32m✓[39m [32mCreated branch [1m__WORKTRUNK_EXEC__touch$IFS/tmp/hacked2[22m from [1mmain[22m and worktree @ [1m'_REPO_.__WORKTRUNK_EXEC__touch$IFS-tmp-hacked2'[22m[39m+[2m↳[22m [2mTo customize worktree locations, run [4mwt config create[24m[22m+[0mdiff --git a/tests/snapshots/integration__integration_tests__security__execute_flag_with_directive_like_branch_name.snap b/tests/snapshots/integration__integration_tests__security__execute_flag_with_directive_like_branch_name.snapnew file mode 100644index 000000000..7dde0cd2c--- /dev/null+++ b/tests/snapshots/integration__integration_tests__security__execute_flag_with_directive_like_branch_name.snap@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@+---+source: tests/integration_tests/security.rs+info:+ program: wt+ args:+ - switch+ - "--create"+ - __WORKTRUNK_EXEC__touch$IFS/tmp/hacked7+ - "-x"+ - echo+ - "--"+ - legitimate command+ env:+ APPDATA: "[TEST_CONFIG_HOME]"+ CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR: "[TEST_CLAUDE_CONFIG]"+ CLICOLOR_FORCE: "1"+ COLUMNS: "500"+ GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL: file+ GIT_AUTHOR_DATE: "2025-01-01T00:00:00Z"+ GIT_AUTHOR_EMAIL: [email protected]+ GIT_AUTHOR_NAME: Test User+ GIT_COMMITTER_DATE: "2025-01-01T00:00:00Z"+ GIT_COMMITTER_EMAIL: [email protected]+ GIT_COMMITTER_NAME: Test User+ GIT_CONFIG_COUNT: "2"+ GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL: /nonexistent/wt/gitconfig+ GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0: user.useConfigOnly+ GIT_CONFIG_KEY_1: rerere.enabled+ GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM: /nonexistent/wt/gitconfig+ GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0: "true"+ GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_1: "false"+ GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT: "0"+ HOME: "[TEST_HOME]"+ LANG: C+ LC_ALL: C+ LLVM_PROFILE_FILE: "[LLVM_PROFILE_FILE]"+ OPENCODE_CONFIG_DIR: "[TEST_OPENCODE_CONFIG]"+ PATH: "[PATH]"+ TERM: alacritty+ USERPROFILE: "[TEST_HOME]"+ WORKTRUNK_APPROVALS_PATH: "[TEST_APPROVALS]"+ WORKTRUNK_CONFIG_PATH: "[TEST_CONFIG]"+ WORKTRUNK_DIRECTIVE_CD_FILE: "[DIRECTIVE_CD_FILE]"+ WORKTRUNK_SYSTEM_CONFIG_PATH: "[TEST_SYSTEM_CONFIG]"+ WORKTRUNK_TEST_BASH_INSTALLED: "0"+ WORKTRUNK_TEST_CLAUDE_INSTALLED: "0"+ WORKTRUNK_TEST_CODEX_INSTALLED: "0"+ WORKTRUNK_TEST_DELAYED_STREAM_MS: "-1"+ WORKTRUNK_TEST_EPOCH: "1735776000"+ WORKTRUNK_TEST_FISH_INSTALLED: "0"+ WORKTRUNK_TEST_GEMINI_INSTALLED: "0"+ WORKTRUNK_TEST_MOCK_CONFIG_DIR: "[TEST_MOCK_CONFIG]"+ WORKTRUNK_TEST_NUSHELL_ENV: "0"+ WORKTRUNK_TEST_OPENCODE_INSTALLED: "0"+ WORKTRUNK_TEST_PARENT_SHELL: ""+ WORKTRUNK_TEST_POWERSHELL_ENV: "0"+ WORKTRUNK_TEST_POWERSHELL_INSTALLED: "0"+ WORKTRUNK_TEST_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS: "60000"+ WORKTRUNK_TEST_SKIP_URL_HEALTH_CHECK: "1"+ WORKTRUNK_TEST_ZSH_INSTALLED: "0"+ XDG_CONFIG_HOME: "[TEST_CONFIG_HOME]"+---+success: true+exit_code: 0+----- stdout -----+legitimate command++----- stderr -----+[32m✓[39m [32mCreated branch [1m__WORKTRUNK_EXEC__touch$IFS/tmp/hacked7[22m from [1mmain[22m and worktree @ [1m'_REPO_.__WORKTRUNK_EXEC__touch$IFS-tmp-hacked7'[22m[39m+[2m↳[22m [2mTo customize worktree locations, run [4mwt config create[24m[22m+[36m◎[39m [36mExecuting (--execute):[39m+[107m [0m [2m[0m[2m[34mecho[0m[2m [0m[2m[32m'legitimate command'[0m+[0m