AI search engine and MCP server for bots and agents. One Rust binary indexes code, docs, logs, JSONL/CSV and PDFs for BM25 full-text, vector and hybrid search, code search without grep, agent memory and RAG. Elasticsearch-compatible API; Corpus Hub serves hundreds of reference memory corpora.
Reproduce every result
All numbers in this case study are reproducible. Scripts live in
../../examples/ast-vuln-graph/.
0. Prerequisites
pip install -r ../../examples/ast-vuln-graph/requirements.txt # tree-sitter grammars
# WordPress core to audit (any recent tag):
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/WordPress/WordPress.git ./wordpress
# XERJ running on 127.0.0.1:9200 (ES-compatible wire):
xerj --insecure --data-dir ./wpdata &
XERJ=http://127.0.0.1:9200 in the commands below.
1. Build the audit substrate (index once)
cd ../../examples/ast-vuln-graph
python3 wp_audit_index.py ./wordpress # -> wpaudit (11,990 fns) + wphooks (1,343)
python3 wp_authz_graph.py ./wordpress # -> wpauthz (cap/nonce arg-shapes + call edges)
python3 wp_compose_index.py ./wordpress # -> wpcompose (sanitizer-sequence fingerprints)
Parse rate is 100% with tree-sitter-php (vs ~63% for phply); full build ≈ 3.6s.
2. Reproduce each finding
Unauthenticated attack surface (only 2 of 1,343 hooks):
curl -s "$XERJ/wphooks/_search" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"query":{"term":{"unauth":true}},"_source":["hook","callback"]}'
SQLi triage (11,990 fns → 4 candidates; grep hands you 51 whole files):
curl -s "$XERJ/wpaudit/_search" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"query":{"bool":{"filter":[{"term":{"has_source":"true"}},{"term":{"sinks":"sql"}},{"term":{"sanit":"false"}}]}}}'
# NOTE: use "true"/"false" as STRINGS — see the boolean-term engine bug below.
Authorization / IDOR sweep (AJAX + REST → 0 missing-cap IDOR):
# classifies wp_ajax_* and every REST *_permissions_check by cap object-scoping.
# (the sweep loads _source and traverses the call graph in Python — see note.)
The authz reasoning is in wordpress-authz-agentic-audit.md.
Check-vs-use IDOR (finds the revisions shape core guards):
python3 wp_checkuse_idor.py # 12 candidates; revisions is the guarded one
File-scope wp-admin handlers (41 action handlers; object-scoped):
python3 wp_admin_pages.py ./wordpress
SSRF completeness (reproduces the 169.254 gap independently):
python3 wp_ssrf_ranges.py # flags wp_http_validate_url: MISSING 169.254 / 100.64 / IPv6
Sanitizer composition (one fingerprint query; ~2,700× fewer tokens):
curl -s "$XERJ/wpcompose/_search" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"query":{"bool":{"filter":[{"term":{"compose_danger":"true"}},{"term":{"sink_raw":"true"}}]}},"_source":["func","file","sanitizer_seq"]}'
3. Verify the SSRF by execution (no PHP needed)
verify_ssrf.py (below) ports wp_http_validate_url line-for-line and executes
it on live payloads — 169.254.169.254 returns ALLOWED while 127/10/192.168 are
rejected. The port is included in
../../research/wordpress-verification-and-xerj-vs-grep.md.
Notes on trusting XERJ's structured queries (important)
Two engine bugs the audit surfaced — use these workarounds until the fixes land:
termon keyword ARRAYS matches only the first element. The interprocedural sweeps therefore load_sourceand traverse the call graph in Python, NOT via{term:{calls:...}}. Fix + PR:../../research/xerj-keyword-array-term-fix.md.- Boolean
termmatches as a string — use{"term":{"has_source":"true"}}, nottrue. Same PR series.
_source scans and full-text (match) are unaffected and complete; the sound
conclusions in this case study were all computed over _source, so they hold.
Token accounting
The ~26,000-token total (vs ~5,200,000 to load core once) is the sum of the per-phase query+read costs measured in the research journals; the composition audit's ~2,700× and the reachability query's ~2,823× are each reproduced by the commands above against the live index.