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docs(case-study): agentic per-call audit + escaper-injection & class-based sinks
Xerj Squad A13caa4719a40
diff --git a/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/FINDINGS.md b/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/FINDINGS.mdindex 6b09c4411..d5a55cec6 100644--- a/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/FINDINGS.md+++ b/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/FINDINGS.md@@ -5,13 +5,19 @@| # | finding | class | severity | status ||---|---|---|---|---|| 1 | `wp_http_validate_url` allows `169.254.0.0/16` (cloud metadata) | SSRF (incomplete deny-list) | Medium (known-class) | **Real, verified, reachable** |+| 2 | `class-snoopy.php` curl build: `escapeshellarg($URI)` after flags, no `--` | option injection (escaper ≠ injection defense) | Medium (legacy, if URI attacker-set) | **Real pattern instance** |+| 3 | `class-wp-image-editor-imagick.php` parses uploaded image content | ImageTragick (image-rce-ssrf) | Medium (deploy-dependent) | **Real surface** || — | AJAX / REST / admin authorization | IDOR / privesc | — | Verified **clean** (object-scoped) || — | SQL double-`prepare` de-escape | SQLi | — | Verified **safe** (placeholder_escape) || — | sanitizer composition (escape→de-escape) | XSS/SQLi | — | Verified **safe** (escaper-last) |-Only finding #1 is a real weakness. The rest are documented negatives — core is-hardened — and each was confirmed by reading the real implementation, not by a-pattern match.+Findings 1–3 are real (2 and 3 are known-class / deploy-dependent, stated+honestly); the rest are documented negatives — core is hardened — each confirmed+by reading the real implementation, not a pattern match. Findings 2 and 3 came+from the **agentic per-call audit**: the agent read each flagged call+(`escapeshellarg`, `Imagick::readImage`, `ZipArchive`) and wrote a verdict back to+`wpsinks` — proving the escaper-injection and class-based-sink classes are now+covered.---@@ -76,6 +82,33 @@ re-check the IP at request time (mitigates DNS-rebinding TOCTOU).---+## Finding 2 — `escapeshellarg` option injection (class: escaper-is-not-injection-protection)++`wp-includes/class-snoopy.php` (legacy vendored HTTP lib) builds a curl command:+```php+$cmdline_params = '-k -D '.escapeshellarg($headerfile).' -H '.escapeshellarg($header)...+exec($this->curl_path.' '.$cmdline_params.' '.escapeshellarg($URI), ...);+```+`$URI` is `escapeshellarg`-escaped but placed **after the flags with no `--`+separator**. `escapeshellarg` prevents shell *command* breakout — it does **not**+prevent curl from parsing the value as an **option**. If `$URI` is+attacker-controlled and starts with `-`, e.g. `-o/var/www/html/x.php` (file write →+RCE) or `-K /etc/passwd`, curl obeys it. **Honest scope:** Snoopy is legacy and+core rarely routes attacker URLs to it; the point is the *class* — an escaper that+is not injection protection. **Fix:** insert a literal `--` before `$URI`; reject+leading `-`; use argv-form. This is the pattern `option-injection` in the guide.++## Finding 3 — Imagick processes uploaded image content (class: image-rce-ssrf)++`wp-includes/class-wp-image-editor-imagick.php` calls `Imagick::readImage($this->file)`+/ `readImageBlob(file_get_contents($this->file))` on **attacker-uploaded** images.+This is the ImageTragick surface (CVE-2016-3714 and kin): a crafted MVG/MSL/SVG+image can make an unpatched/mis-configured ImageMagick perform SSRF or command+execution via delegates. **Honest scope:** mitigated by a modern ImageMagick ++a restrictive `policy.xml`, which WP relies on the host to provide; WP checks file+type first but the content is still parsed. **Fix (deploy):** patched ImageMagick;+`policy.xml` disabling `MVG/MSL/URL/EPHEMERAL/HTTPS` coders.+## Verified-clean negatives (the honest majority)### Authorization / IDOR — cleandiff --git a/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/sink-census/PHP-DANGEROUS-FUNCTIONS.md b/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/sink-census/PHP-DANGEROUS-FUNCTIONS.mdindex df4ca7a65..cffdca0a8 100644--- a/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/sink-census/PHP-DANGEROUS-FUNCTIONS.md+++ b/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/sink-census/PHP-DANGEROUS-FUNCTIONS.md@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@# The PHP dangerous-function map (full reference)-275 potentially-vulnerable PHP built-ins/constructs across 28 categories. Generated from `php_dangerous_functions.json`. `arg` = the taint-relevant argument (0-indexed; `cb:N`=callable at N; `recv`=receiver/URL-set-elsewhere; `self`=construct operand; `ret`=return is the sink).+287 functions across 30 categories.## command-exec — RCE-command| function | kind | arg | note |@@ -264,6 +264,9 @@| `open` | method | 0 | XMLReader::open || `libxml_set_external_entity_loader` | call | cb:0 | || `transformToXml` | method | 0 | XSLTProcessor + registerPHPFunctions => RCE |+| `loadHTML` | method | 0 | DOMDocument::loadHTML — HTML parse; entity/xxe surface |+| `setEntityLoader` | method | cb:0 | libxml external entity loader |+| `setParserProperty` | method | 0 | XMLReader — can enable DTD/entity loading |## xss-output — XSS*raw output of unescaped data; escape per context*@@ -425,3 +428,24 @@| `strncmp` | call | 0 | || `hash_equals` | call | 0 | SAFE — the correct constant-time compare |+## archive-extraction — zip-slip-path-traversal+*extracting an archive writes entry paths; a `../` entry escapes the target dir (Zip Slip). Also symlink entries.*++| function | kind | arg | note |+|---|---|---|---|+| `extractTo` | method | 0 | ZipArchive/PharData::extractTo — writes each entry; ../ escapes dir |+| `addFile` | method | 0 | path added to archive |+| `addFromString` | method | 0 | entry name is attacker-influenced |+| `buildFromDirectory` | method | 0 | PharData |+| `convertToExecutable` | method | * | PharData -> executable phar |++## image-processing — image-rce-ssrf+*Imagick reads by URL (SSRF) and historically had delegate RCE (ImageTragick, MVG/MSL); GD from-URL is SSRF.*++| function | kind | arg | note |+|---|---|---|---|+| `readImage` | method | 0 | Imagick::readImage — URL => SSRF; format abuse |+| `readImageBlob` | method | 0 | |+| `readImageFile` | method | 0 | |+| `setImageFormat` | method | 0 | |+diff --git a/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/sink-census/PHP-SECURITY-GUIDE.md b/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/sink-census/PHP-SECURITY-GUIDE.mdindex 99dded3a7..16dccbf94 100644--- a/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/sink-census/PHP-SECURITY-GUIDE.md+++ b/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/sink-census/PHP-SECURITY-GUIDE.md@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@A whitebox PHP audit has **two axes**, and both must be covered to claimcompleteness:-1. **Dangerous functions (sinks)** — 275 built-ins/constructs, one call = one+1. **Dangerous functions (sinks)** — 287 built-ins/constructs, one call = onecandidate. Enumerable and *provable* by AST census. See[`PHP-DANGEROUS-FUNCTIONS.md`](PHP-DANGEROUS-FUNCTIONS.md) /`php_dangerous_functions.json`.@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ completeness:> **Rule of thumb:** a sink tells you *where danger can happen*; a pattern tells> you *how safe-looking code is actually exploitable*. You need both.-Measured on WordPress core: **11,191 sink sites** (proven 0-gap) + **2,077+Measured on WordPress core: **11,223 sink sites** (proven 0-gap) + **2,077pattern hits** across 10 AST-detectable patterns, + the manual/semantic classesbelow that require reasoning.@@ -24,8 +24,8 @@ below that require reasoning.## Part 1 — Dangerous functions (the sink axis)-Full table in [`PHP-DANGEROUS-FUNCTIONS.md`](PHP-DANGEROUS-FUNCTIONS.md). 275-functions across 28 categories, each with vuln class, safe/unsafe recipe, and the+Full table in [`PHP-DANGEROUS-FUNCTIONS.md`](PHP-DANGEROUS-FUNCTIONS.md). 287+functions across 30 categories, each with vuln class, safe/unsafe recipe, and thetaint-relevant argument: command/code exec, dynamic callables (`array_map`,`preg_replace_callback`), `unserialize`, include loaders, file read/write/delete/perms, directory, SSRF, SQL drivers, LDAP, XXE, variable-injection, ReDoS/ereg,@@ -55,6 +55,30 @@ process-control, reflection-invoke, type-juggle functions, output/XSS. Coverage- **Non-constant-time secret compare** (`timing-compare`) — `$mac == $expected`leaks timing *and* juggles. **Safe:** `hash_equals`. *(WP core: 56.)*+### A2. Escaper / defense that is NOT a defense+- **`escapeshellarg` does not stop argument/option injection** (`option-injection`)+ — it quotes a value so it can't start a *new command*, but the value can still+ be read as an **option**. `exec('tar '.escapeshellarg($f))` with+ `$f='--checkpoint-action=exec=sh'` runs a command; `curl … escapeshellarg($url)`+ with `$url='-o/var/www/x.php'` writes a file (RCE). **Found in WP** `class-snoopy.php`+ — `$URI` escaped but placed after curl flags with no `--`. **Safe:** literal `--`+ before user args; reject leading `-`; argv-form `proc_open`.+- **`escapeshellcmd` is weaker than `escapeshellarg`** (`escapeshellcmd-weak`) —+ escapes command metachars but leaves argument splitting/quoting; misused as if+ it quoted an argument.++### A3. Class-based sinks (danger inside methods, not free functions)+- **Zip Slip** (`zip-slip`) — `ZipArchive/PharData::extractTo($dir)` writes each+ entry by its own path; a `../` entry escapes `$dir` → arbitrary write (RCE). WP+ core avoids this by hand-rolling extraction with path checks in `unzip_file`.+- **ImageMagick / Imagick** (`image-rce-ssrf`) — `Imagick::readImage`/`readImageBlob`+ on attacker-uploaded content → ImageTragick (MVG/MSL/SVG delegate) SSRF/RCE if+ ImageMagick is unpatched or `policy.xml` missing. **Found in WP** `class-wp-image-editor-imagick.php`.+- **phar:// via any file op** (`phar-wrapper-op`) — a benign `file_exists`/+ `getimagesize` on `phar://x.jpg` triggers `unserialize` of Phar metadata.+- The census catalogues these as method/ctor sinks (`extractTo`, `loadHTML`,+ `readImage`, `new ZipArchive`, `new Imagick`, …) so they're enumerated too.+### B. Input shape (the `?param[]=` family)- **Array injection** (`array-injection`) — sending `login[]=a` makes`$_POST['login']` an **array**. It breaks every string-typed sink:diff --git a/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/sink-census/enrich_pipeline.py b/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/sink-census/enrich_pipeline.pyindex a4c5b60da..fa7ec65bd 100644--- a/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/sink-census/enrich_pipeline.py+++ b/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/sink-census/enrich_pipeline.py@@ -16,7 +16,10 @@ X = "http://127.0.0.1:9200"# ── Agent verdicts, keyed by file:line (reachable / guarded / severity / note) ──V = {# RCE-command- "wp-includes/class-snoopy.php:1018": ("server-http-lib","escapeshellarg(URI)","low","URI escaped; Snoopy is legacy vendored HTTP lib"),+ "wp-includes/class-snoopy.php:1018": ("server-http-lib-if-URI-attacker","escapeshellarg-NOT-option-safe","medium","OPTION INJECTION: $URI placed after curl flags with NO `--` separator; escapeshellarg stops command breakout but not curl option parsing -> $URI=\"-o/path\" writes a file (RCE) / -K reads. Snoopy legacy. Fix: add `--` before $URI."),+ "wp-includes/block-template-utils.php:1494": ("theme-export","ziparchive-CREATE-not-extract","low","ZipArchive::open(CREATE|OVERWRITE) builds an export zip; addFile/addFromString add content -> NOT zip-slip (that is on extractTo). WP extraction (unzip_file) hand-rolls path checks, avoiding extractTo."),+ "wp-includes/class-wp-image-editor-imagick.php:158": ("image-editor-uploaded-content","imagemagick-policy-dependent","medium","Imagick::readImage($this->file) parses attacker-UPLOADED image content -> ImageTragick/MVG/MSL/SVG delegate abuse (SSRF/RCE) if ImageMagick unpatched or policy.xml missing. WP checks file type first; content is still parsed."),+ "wp-includes/class-wp-image-editor-imagick.php:156": ("image-editor-uploaded-content","imagemagick-policy-dependent","medium","Imagick::readImageBlob(file_get_contents($this->file)) — same ImageTragick surface on uploaded content."),"wp-includes/ID3/getid3.lib.php:1806": ("media-analysis","fixed-binary+internal","medium","$commandline built from configured binary paths; confirm filenames are escaped"),"wp-includes/ID3/getid3.php:484": ("media-analysis","fixed-binary+internal","medium","same getID3 external-tool path"),"wp-includes/ID3/getid3.php:1824": ("media-analysis","fixed-binary+internal","medium","same"),@@ -57,7 +60,7 @@ def post(path, body, ct="application/json"):# pull every must-review site (the high-risk classes) and enrich — size covers allq = {"query": {"terms": {"class": ["RCE-command","RCE-code","deserialization","SSRF","SQLi","file-write","file-read","XXE","variable-injection",- "dynamic-invoke","LDAP-injection"]}},+ "dynamic-invoke","LDAP-injection","zip-slip-path-traversal","image-rce-ssrf"]}},"size": 5000, "_source": ["file","line","fn","class"]}hits = post("wpsinks/_search", json.dumps(q))["hits"]["hits"]reviewed = updates = 0diff --git a/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/sink-census/php_dangerous_functions.json b/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/sink-census/php_dangerous_functions.jsonindex ab85ffa85..d5d2d82ca 100644--- a/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/sink-census/php_dangerous_functions.json+++ b/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/sink-census/php_dangerous_functions.json@@ -1,202 +1,1440 @@{"meta": {"title": "Comprehensive PHP dangerous-function map",- "purpose": "The full reference of potentially-vulnerable PHP built-ins/constructs, by category and vuln class, with the taint-relevant argument. Superset of php_sink_catalog.json. Drives the coverage census — coverage = 'every call to a catalogued function enumerated'.",+ "purpose": "The full reference of potentially-vulnerable PHP built-ins/constructs, by category and vuln class, with the taint-relevant argument. Superset of php_sink_catalog.json. Drives the coverage census \u2014 coverage = 'every call to a catalogued function enumerated'.","arg_field": "sink_arg: 0-indexed dangerous argument, '*'=any, 'ret'=return is the sink, 'recv'=method receiver/URL set elsewhere, 'self'=language construct operand, 'cb:N'=argument N is a callable (second-order RCE if attacker-controlled)",- "sources": ["RIPS sinks", "Psalm taint sinks", "exakat security", "PHPCS-Security-Audit", "Semgrep php", "OWASP PHP dangerous functions", "php.ini disable_functions guidance"]+ "sources": [+ "RIPS sinks",+ "Psalm taint sinks",+ "exakat security",+ "PHPCS-Security-Audit",+ "Semgrep php",+ "OWASP PHP dangerous functions",+ "php.ini disable_functions guidance"+ ]},"categories": {- "command-exec": {"class": "RCE-command", "kind": "call", "fns": [- {"fn":"exec","arg":0},{"fn":"shell_exec","arg":0},{"fn":"system","arg":0},- {"fn":"passthru","arg":0},{"fn":"proc_open","arg":0},{"fn":"popen","arg":0},- {"fn":"pcntl_exec","arg":0},{"fn":"expect_popen","arg":0},{"fn":"ssh2_exec","arg":1},- {"fn":"ssh2_shell","arg":0},{"fn":"dl","arg":0,"note":"loads a native extension"},- {"fn":"w32api_invoke_function","arg":0}- ]},- "backtick-operator": {"class": "RCE-command", "kind": "construct", "fns": [- {"fn":"shell_command_expression","arg":"self","note":"`...` backtick executes a shell command"}- ]},- "code-eval": {"class": "RCE-code", "kind": "call", "fns": [- {"fn":"eval","arg":0},{"fn":"assert","arg":0,"note":"string arg eval'd pre-8.0"},- {"fn":"create_function","arg":1,"note":"eval-backed; removed 8.0"},- {"fn":"preg_replace","arg":0,"note":"/e modifier eval's replacement (removed 7.0); user pattern=ReDoS"},- {"fn":"mb_ereg_replace","arg":3,"note":"'e' option evals"},- {"fn":"mb_eregi_replace","arg":3,"note":"'e' option evals"},- {"fn":"ReflectionFunction","arg":0,"note":"->invoke() runs an arbitrary function"}- ]},- "dynamic-callable": {"class": "RCE-code-callable", "kind": "call", "note": "arbitrary function/method call if the callable is attacker-controlled (second-order)", "fns": [- {"fn":"call_user_func","arg":"cb:0"},{"fn":"call_user_func_array","arg":"cb:0"},- {"fn":"call_user_method","arg":"cb:0"},{"fn":"call_user_method_array","arg":"cb:0"},- {"fn":"forward_static_call","arg":"cb:0"},{"fn":"forward_static_call_array","arg":"cb:0"},- {"fn":"array_map","arg":"cb:0"},{"fn":"array_filter","arg":"cb:1"},- {"fn":"array_walk","arg":"cb:1"},{"fn":"array_walk_recursive","arg":"cb:1"},- {"fn":"array_reduce","arg":"cb:1"},{"fn":"array_diff_uassoc","arg":"cb:2"},- {"fn":"usort","arg":"cb:1"},{"fn":"uasort","arg":"cb:1"},{"fn":"uksort","arg":"cb:1"},- {"fn":"preg_replace_callback","arg":"cb:1"},{"fn":"preg_replace_callback_array","arg":"cb:0"},- {"fn":"register_shutdown_function","arg":"cb:0"},{"fn":"register_tick_function","arg":"cb:0"},- {"fn":"set_error_handler","arg":"cb:0"},{"fn":"set_exception_handler","arg":"cb:0"},- {"fn":"spl_autoload_register","arg":"cb:0"},{"fn":"ob_start","arg":"cb:0"},- {"fn":"iterator_apply","arg":"cb:1"},{"fn":"filter_var","arg":2,"note":"FILTER_CALLBACK option runs a callable"},- {"fn":"header_register_callback","arg":"cb:0"},{"fn":"stream_filter_register","arg":1}- ]},- "deserialization": {"class": "deserialization", "kind": "call", "note": "PHP Object Injection via magic methods (POP chains)", "fns": [- {"fn":"unserialize","arg":0},{"fn":"yaml_parse","arg":0},{"fn":"yaml_parse_file","arg":0},- {"fn":"yaml_parse_url","arg":0},{"fn":"igbinary_unserialize","arg":0},- {"fn":"msgpack_unserialize","arg":0},{"fn":"wddx_deserialize","arg":0},- {"fn":"session_decode","arg":0,"note":"deserializes into $_SESSION"}- ]},- "file-include": {"class": "LFI-RFI", "kind": "construct", "note": "includes AND executes the path; RFI if allow_url_include", "fns": [- {"fn":"include","arg":"self"},{"fn":"include_once","arg":"self"},- {"fn":"require","arg":"self"},{"fn":"require_once","arg":"self"},- {"fn":"virtual","arg":0,"kind":"call","note":"Apache subrequest"}- ]},- "file-read": {"class": "file-read", "kind": "call", "note": "arbitrary file read / path traversal; several also accept URL wrappers (SSRF)", "fns": [- {"fn":"file_get_contents","arg":0,"note":"URL => SSRF; php://filter => source disclosure"},- {"fn":"file","arg":0},{"fn":"fopen","arg":0,"note":"URL wrappers => SSRF"},- {"fn":"readfile","arg":0},{"fn":"fpassthru","arg":0},{"fn":"fgets","arg":0},- {"fn":"fgetc","arg":0},{"fn":"fread","arg":0},{"fn":"fscanf","arg":0},- {"fn":"parse_ini_file","arg":0},{"fn":"parse_ini_string","arg":0},- {"fn":"highlight_file","arg":0},{"fn":"show_source","arg":0},- {"fn":"readlink","arg":0},{"fn":"realpath","arg":0},- {"fn":"gzfile","arg":0},{"fn":"gzopen","arg":0},{"fn":"readgzfile","arg":0},- {"fn":"bzopen","arg":0},{"fn":"bzread","arg":0},{"fn":"zip_open","arg":0},- {"fn":"exif_read_data","arg":0},{"fn":"exif_thumbnail","arg":0},- {"fn":"getimagesize","arg":0,"note":"URL => SSRF"},{"fn":"getimagesizefromstring","arg":0},- {"fn":"finfo_file","arg":1},{"fn":"mime_content_type","arg":0},- {"fn":"imagecreatefromjpeg","arg":0,"note":"URL => SSRF"},{"fn":"imagecreatefrompng","arg":0},- {"fn":"imagecreatefromgif","arg":0},{"fn":"imagecreatefromwebp","arg":0},- {"fn":"SplFileObject","arg":0,"kind":"method"},{"fn":"md5_file","arg":0},{"fn":"sha1_file","arg":0},- {"fn":"hash_file","arg":1},{"fn":"stat","arg":0},{"fn":"lstat","arg":0},{"fn":"fileperms","arg":0}- ]},- "file-write": {"class": "file-write", "kind": "call", "note": "write/overwrite; RCE if attacker controls path+content of a .php", "fns": [- {"fn":"file_put_contents","arg":0},{"fn":"fwrite","arg":0,"note":"handle arg"},- {"fn":"fputs","arg":0},{"fn":"fputcsv","arg":0},{"fn":"move_uploaded_file","arg":1},- {"fn":"copy","arg":1,"note":"URL src => SSRF; dest => write"},{"fn":"rename","arg":1},- {"fn":"link","arg":1},{"fn":"symlink","arg":1},{"fn":"touch","arg":0},- {"fn":"mkdir","arg":0},{"fn":"tempnam","arg":0},{"fn":"tmpfile","arg":"ret"},- {"fn":"ftruncate","arg":0},{"fn":"vfprintf","arg":0},{"fn":"fprintf","arg":0}- ]},- "file-delete": {"class": "file-delete", "kind": "call", "fns": [- {"fn":"unlink","arg":0},{"fn":"rmdir","arg":0}- ]},- "file-perms": {"class": "file-perms", "kind": "call", "note": "privilege/ownership changes on a path", "fns": [- {"fn":"chmod","arg":0},{"fn":"chown","arg":0},{"fn":"chgrp","arg":0},- {"fn":"lchown","arg":0},{"fn":"lchgrp","arg":0},{"fn":"umask","arg":0}- ]},- "directory": {"class": "dir-listing-traversal", "kind": "call", "fns": [- {"fn":"scandir","arg":0},{"fn":"opendir","arg":0},{"fn":"readdir","arg":0},- {"fn":"glob","arg":0,"note":"glob:// wrapper"},{"fn":"dir","arg":0},- {"fn":"chdir","arg":0},{"fn":"chroot","arg":0}- ]},- "ssrf-network": {"class": "SSRF", "kind": "call", "note": "outbound request to an attacker-chosen host; block link-local/metadata/private", "fns": [- {"fn":"fsockopen","arg":0},{"fn":"pfsockopen","arg":0},- {"fn":"stream_socket_client","arg":0},{"fn":"stream_socket_server","arg":0},- {"fn":"curl_exec","arg":"recv","note":"URL set via curl_setopt CURLOPT_URL"},- {"fn":"curl_multi_exec","arg":"recv"},{"fn":"curl_setopt","arg":2,"note":"CURLOPT_URL"},- {"fn":"get_headers","arg":0},{"fn":"http_get","arg":0},{"fn":"http_post_data","arg":0},- {"fn":"gethostbyname","arg":0},{"fn":"gethostbynamel","arg":0},- {"fn":"dns_get_record","arg":0},{"fn":"checkdnsrr","arg":0},{"fn":"getmxrr","arg":0},- {"fn":"SoapClient","arg":0,"kind":"method","note":"WSDL URL => SSRF/XXE"},- {"fn":"stream_context_create","arg":0,"note":"can set follow_location/proxy"}- ]},- "sql": {"class": "SQLi", "kind": "call", "note": "raw SQL — use parameterized queries", "fns": [- {"fn":"mysqli_query","arg":1},{"fn":"mysqli_multi_query","arg":1},- {"fn":"mysqli_real_query","arg":1},{"fn":"mysqli_prepare","arg":1,"note":"unsafe if concatenated"},- {"fn":"mysql_query","arg":0},{"fn":"mysql_unbuffered_query","arg":0},- {"fn":"mysql_db_query","arg":1},{"fn":"pg_query","arg":1},- {"fn":"pg_send_query","arg":1},{"fn":"sqlite_query","arg":1},- {"fn":"sqlite_unbuffered_query","arg":1},{"fn":"sqlsrv_query","arg":1},- {"fn":"oci_parse","arg":1},{"fn":"odbc_exec","arg":1},{"fn":"odbc_prepare","arg":1},- {"fn":"db2_exec","arg":1},{"fn":"ibase_query","arg":1},{"fn":"mssql_query","arg":0},- {"fn":"maxdb_query","arg":1},{"fn":"ingres_query","arg":1},- {"fn":"query","arg":0,"kind":"method","note":"PDO::query / mysqli::query"},- {"fn":"exec","arg":0,"kind":"method","note":"PDO::exec (method form)"}- ]},- "ldap": {"class": "LDAP-injection", "kind": "call", "fns": [- {"fn":"ldap_search","arg":2},{"fn":"ldap_list","arg":2},{"fn":"ldap_read","arg":2},- {"fn":"ldap_bind","arg":1,"note":"auth bypass via crafted DN/empty pw"},- {"fn":"ldap_add","arg":2},{"fn":"ldap_modify","arg":2},{"fn":"ldap_delete","arg":1}- ]},- "xxe-xml": {"class": "XXE", "kind": "call", "note": "external entity expansion => file read/SSRF; disable entities", "fns": [- {"fn":"simplexml_load_string","arg":0},{"fn":"simplexml_load_file","arg":0},- {"fn":"xml_parse","arg":1},{"fn":"xml_parse_into_struct","arg":1},- {"fn":"loadXML","arg":0,"kind":"method","note":"DOMDocument::loadXML"},- {"fn":"load","arg":0,"kind":"method","note":"DOMDocument::load path/URL"},- {"fn":"loadHTMLFile","arg":0,"kind":"method"},- {"fn":"open","arg":0,"kind":"method","note":"XMLReader::open"},- {"fn":"libxml_set_external_entity_loader","arg":"cb:0"},- {"fn":"transformToXml","arg":0,"kind":"method","note":"XSLTProcessor + registerPHPFunctions => RCE"}- ]},- "xss-output": {"class": "XSS", "kind": "construct", "note": "raw output of unescaped data; escape per context", "fns": [- {"fn":"echo","arg":"self"},{"fn":"print","arg":"self"}- ]},- "xss-output-call": {"class": "XSS-or-info", "kind": "call", "fns": [- {"fn":"printf","arg":0,"note":"user format-string bug"},{"fn":"vprintf","arg":0},- {"fn":"print_r","arg":0,"note":"outputs unless 2nd arg true"},- {"fn":"var_dump","arg":"*"},{"fn":"var_export","arg":0,"note":"outputs unless 2nd arg true"},- {"fn":"exit","arg":0},{"fn":"die","arg":0},- {"fn":"htmlspecialchars_decode","arg":0,"note":"UNDOES escaping"},- {"fn":"html_entity_decode","arg":0,"note":"UNDOES escaping"}- ]},- "header-redirect": {"class": "header-injection-open-redirect", "kind": "call", "fns": [- {"fn":"header","arg":0,"note":"Location: => open redirect; CRLF pre-5.1.2"},- {"fn":"setcookie","arg":1},{"fn":"setrawcookie","arg":1},- {"fn":"session_set_cookie_params","arg":0}- ]},- "variable-injection": {"class": "variable-injection", "kind": "call", "note": "imports attacker keys into scope (register_globals-style)", "fns": [- {"fn":"extract","arg":0},{"fn":"parse_str","arg":0,"note":"1-arg form pollutes caller scope"},- {"fn":"mb_parse_str","arg":0},{"fn":"import_request_variables","arg":0},- {"fn":"compact","arg":"*","note":"info leak if keys tainted"}- ]},- "regex-redos": {"class": "ReDoS-or-injection", "kind": "call", "note": "catastrophic backtracking with a user pattern; deprecated ereg", "fns": [- {"fn":"preg_match","arg":0,"note":"user PATTERN => ReDoS"},{"fn":"preg_match_all","arg":0},- {"fn":"preg_split","arg":0},{"fn":"preg_grep","arg":0},- {"fn":"ereg","arg":0},{"fn":"eregi","arg":0},{"fn":"ereg_replace","arg":0},- {"fn":"eregi_replace","arg":0},{"fn":"mb_ereg","arg":0}- ]},- "mail-injection": {"class": "mail-header-injection", "kind": "call", "fns": [- {"fn":"mail","arg":3,"note":"additional_headers => header injection"},- {"fn":"mb_send_mail","arg":3},{"fn":"imap_mail","arg":3},{"fn":"ezmlm_hash","arg":0}- ]},- "weak-crypto": {"class": "weak-crypto", "kind": "call", "note": "fast/broken for passwords/tokens/integrity", "fns": [- {"fn":"md5","arg":0},{"fn":"sha1","arg":0},{"fn":"crc32","arg":0},- {"fn":"crypt","arg":0,"note":"weak without proper salt/algo"},- {"fn":"hash","arg":1,"note":"md5/sha1 for secrets"},- {"fn":"mcrypt_encrypt","arg":0,"note":"deprecated, ECB default"},- {"fn":"mcrypt_decrypt","arg":0}- ]},- "weak-random": {"class": "weak-random", "kind": "call", "note": "predictable; unfit for tokens/nonces/passwords", "fns": [- {"fn":"rand","arg":"ret"},{"fn":"mt_rand","arg":"ret"},{"fn":"mt_srand","arg":0},- {"fn":"srand","arg":0},{"fn":"uniqid","arg":"ret"},{"fn":"lcg_value","arg":"ret"},- {"fn":"str_shuffle","arg":0},{"fn":"array_rand","arg":0},{"fn":"shuffle","arg":0}- ]},- "info-disclosure": {"class": "info-disclosure", "kind": "call", "fns": [- {"fn":"phpinfo","arg":"*"},{"fn":"debug_zval_refcount","arg":0},- {"fn":"debug_backtrace","arg":"ret"},{"fn":"debug_print_backtrace","arg":"*"},- {"fn":"getenv","arg":0},{"fn":"get_cfg_var","arg":0},{"fn":"ini_get_all","arg":"ret"},- {"fn":"get_defined_vars","arg":"ret"},{"fn":"getmypid","arg":"ret"},- {"fn":"posix_getpwuid","arg":0},{"fn":"posix_getgrgid","arg":0},{"fn":"posix_getpwnam","arg":0}- ]},- "runtime-config": {"class": "config-tamper", "kind": "call", "note": "changes PHP/security settings at runtime", "fns": [- {"fn":"ini_set","arg":0},{"fn":"ini_alter","arg":0},{"fn":"ini_restore","arg":0},- {"fn":"putenv","arg":0},{"fn":"set_include_path","arg":0},{"fn":"apache_setenv","arg":0},- {"fn":"error_reporting","arg":0},{"fn":"assert_options","arg":0},{"fn":"setlocale","arg":1}- ]},- "process-control": {"class": "process-control", "kind": "call", "note": "signal/priv/process manipulation", "fns": [- {"fn":"posix_kill","arg":0},{"fn":"posix_setuid","arg":0},{"fn":"posix_setgid","arg":0},- {"fn":"posix_seteuid","arg":0},{"fn":"pcntl_fork","arg":"*"},{"fn":"pcntl_signal","arg":"cb:1"},- {"fn":"proc_nice","arg":0},{"fn":"proc_terminate","arg":0},{"fn":"apache_child_terminate","arg":"*"}- ]},- "reflection-invoke": {"class": "dynamic-invoke", "kind": "method", "note": "instantiate/invoke arbitrary class/method (gadget reach)", "fns": [- {"fn":"newInstance","arg":"*","note":"ReflectionClass::newInstance"},- {"fn":"newInstanceArgs","arg":"*"},{"fn":"invoke","arg":"*","note":"Reflection*::invoke"},- {"fn":"invokeArgs","arg":"*"},{"fn":"setAccessible","arg":0,"note":"bypasses visibility"}- ]},- "type-juggling": {"class": "auth-bypass-type-juggle", "kind": "call", "note": "loose comparison / magic-hash / non-strict search => auth bypass", "fns": [- {"fn":"in_array","arg":2,"note":"non-strict (3rd arg false) => 0==string"},- {"fn":"array_search","arg":2,"note":"non-strict"},- {"fn":"strcmp","arg":0,"note":"array arg returns NULL, NULL==0 true"},- {"fn":"strcasecmp","arg":0},{"fn":"strncmp","arg":0},{"fn":"hash_equals","arg":0,"note":"SAFE — the correct constant-time compare"}- ]}+ "command-exec": {+ "class": "RCE-command",+ "kind": "call",+ "fns": [+ {+ "fn": "exec",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "shell_exec",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "system",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "passthru",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "proc_open",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "popen",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "pcntl_exec",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "expect_popen",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "ssh2_exec",+ "arg": 1+ },+ {+ "fn": "ssh2_shell",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "dl",+ "arg": 0,+ "note": "loads a native extension"+ },+ {+ "fn": "w32api_invoke_function",+ "arg": 0+ }+ ]+ },+ "backtick-operator": {+ "class": "RCE-command",+ "kind": "construct",+ "fns": [+ {+ "fn": "shell_command_expression",+ "arg": "self",+ "note": "`...` backtick executes a shell command"+ }+ ]+ },+ "code-eval": {+ "class": "RCE-code",+ "kind": "call",+ "fns": [+ {+ "fn": "eval",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "assert",+ "arg": 0,+ "note": "string arg eval'd pre-8.0"+ },+ {+ "fn": "create_function",+ "arg": 1,+ "note": "eval-backed; removed 8.0"+ },+ {+ "fn": "preg_replace",+ "arg": 0,+ "note": "/e modifier eval's replacement (removed 7.0); user pattern=ReDoS"+ },+ {+ "fn": "mb_ereg_replace",+ "arg": 3,+ "note": "'e' option evals"+ },+ {+ "fn": "mb_eregi_replace",+ "arg": 3,+ "note": "'e' option evals"+ },+ {+ "fn": "ReflectionFunction",+ "arg": 0,+ "note": "->invoke() runs an arbitrary function"+ }+ ]+ },+ "dynamic-callable": {+ "class": "RCE-code-callable",+ "kind": "call",+ "note": "arbitrary function/method call if the callable is attacker-controlled (second-order)",+ "fns": [+ {+ "fn": "call_user_func",+ "arg": "cb:0"+ },+ {+ "fn": "call_user_func_array",+ "arg": "cb:0"+ },+ {+ "fn": "call_user_method",+ "arg": "cb:0"+ },+ {+ "fn": "call_user_method_array",+ "arg": "cb:0"+ },+ {+ "fn": "forward_static_call",+ "arg": "cb:0"+ },+ {+ "fn": "forward_static_call_array",+ "arg": "cb:0"+ },+ {+ "fn": "array_map",+ "arg": "cb:0"+ },+ {+ "fn": "array_filter",+ "arg": "cb:1"+ },+ {+ "fn": "array_walk",+ "arg": "cb:1"+ },+ {+ "fn": "array_walk_recursive",+ "arg": "cb:1"+ },+ {+ "fn": "array_reduce",+ "arg": "cb:1"+ },+ {+ "fn": "array_diff_uassoc",+ "arg": "cb:2"+ },+ {+ "fn": "usort",+ "arg": "cb:1"+ },+ {+ "fn": "uasort",+ "arg": "cb:1"+ },+ {+ "fn": "uksort",+ "arg": "cb:1"+ },+ {+ "fn": "preg_replace_callback",+ "arg": "cb:1"+ },+ {+ "fn": "preg_replace_callback_array",+ "arg": "cb:0"+ },+ {+ "fn": "register_shutdown_function",+ "arg": "cb:0"+ },+ {+ "fn": "register_tick_function",+ "arg": "cb:0"+ },+ {+ "fn": "set_error_handler",+ "arg": "cb:0"+ },+ {+ "fn": "set_exception_handler",+ "arg": "cb:0"+ },+ {+ "fn": "spl_autoload_register",+ "arg": "cb:0"+ },+ {+ "fn": "ob_start",+ "arg": "cb:0"+ },+ {+ "fn": "iterator_apply",+ "arg": "cb:1"+ },+ {+ "fn": "filter_var",+ "arg": 2,+ "note": "FILTER_CALLBACK option runs a callable"+ },+ {+ "fn": "header_register_callback",+ "arg": "cb:0"+ },+ {+ "fn": "stream_filter_register",+ "arg": 1+ }+ ]+ },+ "deserialization": {+ "class": "deserialization",+ "kind": "call",+ "note": "PHP Object Injection via magic methods (POP chains)",+ "fns": [+ {+ "fn": "unserialize",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "yaml_parse",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "yaml_parse_file",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "yaml_parse_url",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "igbinary_unserialize",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "msgpack_unserialize",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "wddx_deserialize",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "session_decode",+ "arg": 0,+ "note": "deserializes into $_SESSION"+ }+ ]+ },+ "file-include": {+ "class": "LFI-RFI",+ "kind": "construct",+ "note": "includes AND executes the path; RFI if allow_url_include",+ "fns": [+ {+ "fn": "include",+ "arg": "self"+ },+ {+ "fn": "include_once",+ "arg": "self"+ },+ {+ "fn": "require",+ "arg": "self"+ },+ {+ "fn": "require_once",+ "arg": "self"+ },+ {+ "fn": "virtual",+ "arg": 0,+ "kind": "call",+ "note": "Apache subrequest"+ }+ ]+ },+ "file-read": {+ "class": "file-read",+ "kind": "call",+ "note": "arbitrary file read / path traversal; several also accept URL wrappers (SSRF)",+ "fns": [+ {+ "fn": "file_get_contents",+ "arg": 0,+ "note": "URL => SSRF; php://filter => source disclosure"+ },+ {+ "fn": "file",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "fopen",+ "arg": 0,+ "note": "URL wrappers => SSRF"+ },+ {+ "fn": "readfile",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "fpassthru",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "fgets",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "fgetc",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "fread",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "fscanf",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "parse_ini_file",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "parse_ini_string",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "highlight_file",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "show_source",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "readlink",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "realpath",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "gzfile",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "gzopen",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "readgzfile",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "bzopen",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "bzread",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "zip_open",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "exif_read_data",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "exif_thumbnail",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "getimagesize",+ "arg": 0,+ "note": "URL => SSRF"+ },+ {+ "fn": "getimagesizefromstring",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "finfo_file",+ "arg": 1+ },+ {+ "fn": "mime_content_type",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "imagecreatefromjpeg",+ "arg": 0,+ "note": "URL => SSRF"+ },+ {+ "fn": "imagecreatefrompng",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "imagecreatefromgif",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "imagecreatefromwebp",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "SplFileObject",+ "arg": 0,+ "kind": "method"+ },+ {+ "fn": "md5_file",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "sha1_file",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "hash_file",+ "arg": 1+ },+ {+ "fn": "stat",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "lstat",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "fileperms",+ "arg": 0+ }+ ]+ },+ "file-write": {+ "class": "file-write",+ "kind": "call",+ "note": "write/overwrite; RCE if attacker controls path+content of a .php",+ "fns": [+ {+ "fn": "file_put_contents",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "fwrite",+ "arg": 0,+ "note": "handle arg"+ },+ {+ "fn": "fputs",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "fputcsv",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "move_uploaded_file",+ "arg": 1+ },+ {+ "fn": "copy",+ "arg": 1,+ "note": "URL src => SSRF; dest => write"+ },+ {+ "fn": "rename",+ "arg": 1+ },+ {+ "fn": "link",+ "arg": 1+ },+ {+ "fn": "symlink",+ "arg": 1+ },+ {+ "fn": "touch",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "mkdir",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "tempnam",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "tmpfile",+ "arg": "ret"+ },+ {+ "fn": "ftruncate",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "vfprintf",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "fprintf",+ "arg": 0+ }+ ]+ },+ "file-delete": {+ "class": "file-delete",+ "kind": "call",+ "fns": [+ {+ "fn": "unlink",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "rmdir",+ "arg": 0+ }+ ]+ },+ "file-perms": {+ "class": "file-perms",+ "kind": "call",+ "note": "privilege/ownership changes on a path",+ "fns": [+ {+ "fn": "chmod",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "chown",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "chgrp",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "lchown",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "lchgrp",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "umask",+ "arg": 0+ }+ ]+ },+ "directory": {+ "class": "dir-listing-traversal",+ "kind": "call",+ "fns": [+ {+ "fn": "scandir",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "opendir",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "readdir",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "glob",+ "arg": 0,+ "note": "glob:// wrapper"+ },+ {+ "fn": "dir",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "chdir",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "chroot",+ "arg": 0+ }+ ]+ },+ "ssrf-network": {+ "class": "SSRF",+ "kind": "call",+ "note": "outbound request to an attacker-chosen host; block link-local/metadata/private",+ "fns": [+ {+ "fn": "fsockopen",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "pfsockopen",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "stream_socket_client",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "stream_socket_server",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "curl_exec",+ "arg": "recv",+ "note": "URL set via curl_setopt CURLOPT_URL"+ },+ {+ "fn": "curl_multi_exec",+ "arg": "recv"+ },+ {+ "fn": "curl_setopt",+ "arg": 2,+ "note": "CURLOPT_URL"+ },+ {+ "fn": "get_headers",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "http_get",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "http_post_data",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "gethostbyname",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "gethostbynamel",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "dns_get_record",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "checkdnsrr",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "getmxrr",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "SoapClient",+ "arg": 0,+ "kind": "method",+ "note": "WSDL URL => SSRF/XXE"+ },+ {+ "fn": "stream_context_create",+ "arg": 0,+ "note": "can set follow_location/proxy"+ }+ ]+ },+ "sql": {+ "class": "SQLi",+ "kind": "call",+ "note": "raw SQL \u2014 use parameterized queries",+ "fns": [+ {+ "fn": "mysqli_query",+ "arg": 1+ },+ {+ "fn": "mysqli_multi_query",+ "arg": 1+ },+ {+ "fn": "mysqli_real_query",+ "arg": 1+ },+ {+ "fn": "mysqli_prepare",+ "arg": 1,+ "note": "unsafe if concatenated"+ },+ {+ "fn": "mysql_query",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "mysql_unbuffered_query",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "mysql_db_query",+ "arg": 1+ },+ {+ "fn": "pg_query",+ "arg": 1+ },+ {+ "fn": "pg_send_query",+ "arg": 1+ },+ {+ "fn": "sqlite_query",+ "arg": 1+ },+ {+ "fn": "sqlite_unbuffered_query",+ "arg": 1+ },+ {+ "fn": "sqlsrv_query",+ "arg": 1+ },+ {+ "fn": "oci_parse",+ "arg": 1+ },+ {+ "fn": "odbc_exec",+ "arg": 1+ },+ {+ "fn": "odbc_prepare",+ "arg": 1+ },+ {+ "fn": "db2_exec",+ "arg": 1+ },+ {+ "fn": "ibase_query",+ "arg": 1+ },+ {+ "fn": "mssql_query",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "maxdb_query",+ "arg": 1+ },+ {+ "fn": "ingres_query",+ "arg": 1+ },+ {+ "fn": "query",+ "arg": 0,+ "kind": "method",+ "note": "PDO::query / mysqli::query"+ },+ {+ "fn": "exec",+ "arg": 0,+ "kind": "method",+ "note": "PDO::exec (method form)"+ }+ ]+ },+ "ldap": {+ "class": "LDAP-injection",+ "kind": "call",+ "fns": [+ {+ "fn": "ldap_search",+ "arg": 2+ },+ {+ "fn": "ldap_list",+ "arg": 2+ },+ {+ "fn": "ldap_read",+ "arg": 2+ },+ {+ "fn": "ldap_bind",+ "arg": 1,+ "note": "auth bypass via crafted DN/empty pw"+ },+ {+ "fn": "ldap_add",+ "arg": 2+ },+ {+ "fn": "ldap_modify",+ "arg": 2+ },+ {+ "fn": "ldap_delete",+ "arg": 1+ }+ ]+ },+ "xxe-xml": {+ "class": "XXE",+ "kind": "call",+ "note": "external entity expansion => file read/SSRF; disable entities",+ "fns": [+ {+ "fn": "simplexml_load_string",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "simplexml_load_file",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "xml_parse",+ "arg": 1+ },+ {+ "fn": "xml_parse_into_struct",+ "arg": 1+ },+ {+ "fn": "loadXML",+ "arg": 0,+ "kind": "method",+ "note": "DOMDocument::loadXML"+ },+ {+ "fn": "load",+ "arg": 0,+ "kind": "method",+ "note": "DOMDocument::load path/URL"+ },+ {+ "fn": "loadHTMLFile",+ "arg": 0,+ "kind": "method"+ },+ {+ "fn": "open",+ "arg": 0,+ "kind": "method",+ "note": "XMLReader::open"+ },+ {+ "fn": "libxml_set_external_entity_loader",+ "arg": "cb:0"+ },+ {+ "fn": "transformToXml",+ "arg": 0,+ "kind": "method",+ "note": "XSLTProcessor + registerPHPFunctions => RCE"+ },+ {+ "fn": "loadHTML",+ "arg": 0,+ "kind": "method",+ "note": "DOMDocument::loadHTML \u2014 HTML parse; entity/xxe surface"+ },+ {+ "fn": "setEntityLoader",+ "arg": "cb:0",+ "kind": "method",+ "note": "libxml external entity loader"+ },+ {+ "fn": "setParserProperty",+ "arg": 0,+ "kind": "method",+ "note": "XMLReader \u2014 can enable DTD/entity loading"+ }+ ]+ },+ "xss-output": {+ "class": "XSS",+ "kind": "construct",+ "note": "raw output of unescaped data; escape per context",+ "fns": [+ {+ "fn": "echo",+ "arg": "self"+ },+ {+ "fn": "print",+ "arg": "self"+ }+ ]+ },+ "xss-output-call": {+ "class": "XSS-or-info",+ "kind": "call",+ "fns": [+ {+ "fn": "printf",+ "arg": 0,+ "note": "user format-string bug"+ },+ {+ "fn": "vprintf",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "print_r",+ "arg": 0,+ "note": "outputs unless 2nd arg true"+ },+ {+ "fn": "var_dump",+ "arg": "*"+ },+ {+ "fn": "var_export",+ "arg": 0,+ "note": "outputs unless 2nd arg true"+ },+ {+ "fn": "exit",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "die",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "htmlspecialchars_decode",+ "arg": 0,+ "note": "UNDOES escaping"+ },+ {+ "fn": "html_entity_decode",+ "arg": 0,+ "note": "UNDOES escaping"+ }+ ]+ },+ "header-redirect": {+ "class": "header-injection-open-redirect",+ "kind": "call",+ "fns": [+ {+ "fn": "header",+ "arg": 0,+ "note": "Location: => open redirect; CRLF pre-5.1.2"+ },+ {+ "fn": "setcookie",+ "arg": 1+ },+ {+ "fn": "setrawcookie",+ "arg": 1+ },+ {+ "fn": "session_set_cookie_params",+ "arg": 0+ }+ ]+ },+ "variable-injection": {+ "class": "variable-injection",+ "kind": "call",+ "note": "imports attacker keys into scope (register_globals-style)",+ "fns": [+ {+ "fn": "extract",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "parse_str",+ "arg": 0,+ "note": "1-arg form pollutes caller scope"+ },+ {+ "fn": "mb_parse_str",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "import_request_variables",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "compact",+ "arg": "*",+ "note": "info leak if keys tainted"+ }+ ]+ },+ "regex-redos": {+ "class": "ReDoS-or-injection",+ "kind": "call",+ "note": "catastrophic backtracking with a user pattern; deprecated ereg",+ "fns": [+ {+ "fn": "preg_match",+ "arg": 0,+ "note": "user PATTERN => ReDoS"+ },+ {+ "fn": "preg_match_all",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "preg_split",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "preg_grep",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "ereg",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "eregi",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "ereg_replace",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "eregi_replace",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "mb_ereg",+ "arg": 0+ }+ ]+ },+ "mail-injection": {+ "class": "mail-header-injection",+ "kind": "call",+ "fns": [+ {+ "fn": "mail",+ "arg": 3,+ "note": "additional_headers => header injection"+ },+ {+ "fn": "mb_send_mail",+ "arg": 3+ },+ {+ "fn": "imap_mail",+ "arg": 3+ },+ {+ "fn": "ezmlm_hash",+ "arg": 0+ }+ ]+ },+ "weak-crypto": {+ "class": "weak-crypto",+ "kind": "call",+ "note": "fast/broken for passwords/tokens/integrity",+ "fns": [+ {+ "fn": "md5",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "sha1",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "crc32",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "crypt",+ "arg": 0,+ "note": "weak without proper salt/algo"+ },+ {+ "fn": "hash",+ "arg": 1,+ "note": "md5/sha1 for secrets"+ },+ {+ "fn": "mcrypt_encrypt",+ "arg": 0,+ "note": "deprecated, ECB default"+ },+ {+ "fn": "mcrypt_decrypt",+ "arg": 0+ }+ ]+ },+ "weak-random": {+ "class": "weak-random",+ "kind": "call",+ "note": "predictable; unfit for tokens/nonces/passwords",+ "fns": [+ {+ "fn": "rand",+ "arg": "ret"+ },+ {+ "fn": "mt_rand",+ "arg": "ret"+ },+ {+ "fn": "mt_srand",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "srand",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "uniqid",+ "arg": "ret"+ },+ {+ "fn": "lcg_value",+ "arg": "ret"+ },+ {+ "fn": "str_shuffle",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "array_rand",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "shuffle",+ "arg": 0+ }+ ]+ },+ "info-disclosure": {+ "class": "info-disclosure",+ "kind": "call",+ "fns": [+ {+ "fn": "phpinfo",+ "arg": "*"+ },+ {+ "fn": "debug_zval_refcount",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "debug_backtrace",+ "arg": "ret"+ },+ {+ "fn": "debug_print_backtrace",+ "arg": "*"+ },+ {+ "fn": "getenv",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "get_cfg_var",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "ini_get_all",+ "arg": "ret"+ },+ {+ "fn": "get_defined_vars",+ "arg": "ret"+ },+ {+ "fn": "getmypid",+ "arg": "ret"+ },+ {+ "fn": "posix_getpwuid",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "posix_getgrgid",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "posix_getpwnam",+ "arg": 0+ }+ ]+ },+ "runtime-config": {+ "class": "config-tamper",+ "kind": "call",+ "note": "changes PHP/security settings at runtime",+ "fns": [+ {+ "fn": "ini_set",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "ini_alter",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "ini_restore",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "putenv",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "set_include_path",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "apache_setenv",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "error_reporting",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "assert_options",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "setlocale",+ "arg": 1+ }+ ]+ },+ "process-control": {+ "class": "process-control",+ "kind": "call",+ "note": "signal/priv/process manipulation",+ "fns": [+ {+ "fn": "posix_kill",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "posix_setuid",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "posix_setgid",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "posix_seteuid",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "pcntl_fork",+ "arg": "*"+ },+ {+ "fn": "pcntl_signal",+ "arg": "cb:1"+ },+ {+ "fn": "proc_nice",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "proc_terminate",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "apache_child_terminate",+ "arg": "*"+ }+ ]+ },+ "reflection-invoke": {+ "class": "dynamic-invoke",+ "kind": "method",+ "note": "instantiate/invoke arbitrary class/method (gadget reach)",+ "fns": [+ {+ "fn": "newInstance",+ "arg": "*",+ "note": "ReflectionClass::newInstance"+ },+ {+ "fn": "newInstanceArgs",+ "arg": "*"+ },+ {+ "fn": "invoke",+ "arg": "*",+ "note": "Reflection*::invoke"+ },+ {+ "fn": "invokeArgs",+ "arg": "*"+ },+ {+ "fn": "setAccessible",+ "arg": 0,+ "note": "bypasses visibility"+ }+ ]+ },+ "type-juggling": {+ "class": "auth-bypass-type-juggle",+ "kind": "call",+ "note": "loose comparison / magic-hash / non-strict search => auth bypass",+ "fns": [+ {+ "fn": "in_array",+ "arg": 2,+ "note": "non-strict (3rd arg false) => 0==string"+ },+ {+ "fn": "array_search",+ "arg": 2,+ "note": "non-strict"+ },+ {+ "fn": "strcmp",+ "arg": 0,+ "note": "array arg returns NULL, NULL==0 true"+ },+ {+ "fn": "strcasecmp",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "strncmp",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "hash_equals",+ "arg": 0,+ "note": "SAFE \u2014 the correct constant-time compare"+ }+ ]+ },+ "archive-extraction": {+ "class": "zip-slip-path-traversal",+ "kind": "method",+ "note": "extracting an archive writes entry paths; a `../` entry escapes the target dir (Zip Slip). Also symlink entries.",+ "fns": [+ {+ "fn": "extractTo",+ "arg": 0,+ "note": "ZipArchive/PharData::extractTo \u2014 writes each entry; ../ escapes dir"+ },+ {+ "fn": "addFile",+ "arg": 0,+ "note": "path added to archive"+ },+ {+ "fn": "addFromString",+ "arg": 0,+ "note": "entry name is attacker-influenced"+ },+ {+ "fn": "buildFromDirectory",+ "arg": 0,+ "kind": "method",+ "note": "PharData"+ },+ {+ "fn": "convertToExecutable",+ "arg": "*",+ "kind": "method",+ "note": "PharData -> executable phar"+ }+ ]+ },+ "image-processing": {+ "class": "image-rce-ssrf",+ "kind": "method",+ "note": "Imagick reads by URL (SSRF) and historically had delegate RCE (ImageTragick, MVG/MSL); GD from-URL is SSRF.",+ "fns": [+ {+ "fn": "readImage",+ "arg": 0,+ "note": "Imagick::readImage \u2014 URL => SSRF; format abuse"+ },+ {+ "fn": "readImageBlob",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "readImageFile",+ "arg": 0+ },+ {+ "fn": "setImageFormat",+ "arg": 0+ }+ ]+ }}-}+}\ No newline at end of filediff --git a/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/sink-census/php_dangerous_patterns.json b/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/sink-census/php_dangerous_patterns.jsonindex 7608538ad..87da3d6d7 100644--- a/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/sink-census/php_dangerous_patterns.json+++ b/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/sink-census/php_dangerous_patterns.json@@ -1,129 +1,286 @@{"meta": {"title": "PHP dangerous PATTERNS (non-function vulnerability classes)",- "purpose": "Language-level, input-shape, and semantic vulnerabilities that are NOT a single dangerous function call — the half a sink catalog misses. Each pattern says HOW to detect it (ast=node pattern, regex, query=XERJ, manual=reasoning) so the audit can claim coverage of patterns too.",- "detect_kinds": {"ast":"tree-sitter node pattern", "regex":"exact source regex", "query":"XERJ index query over facts", "manual":"needs agent reasoning / schema / runtime"}+ "purpose": "Language-level, input-shape, and semantic vulnerabilities that are NOT a single dangerous function call \u2014 the half a sink catalog misses. Each pattern says HOW to detect it (ast=node pattern, regex, query=XERJ, manual=reasoning) so the audit can claim coverage of patterns too.",+ "detect_kinds": {+ "ast": "tree-sitter node pattern",+ "regex": "exact source regex",+ "query": "XERJ index query over facts",+ "manual": "needs agent reasoning / schema / runtime"+ }},"patterns": [- {"id":"loose-eq","class":"type-juggling","title":"Loose == / != comparison",- "attack":"'0e123'==<'0e456' (magic hash), '0'==false, null==0, '1abc'==1, 'abc'==0 (pre-PHP8). Auth bypass when comparing secrets/hashes/tokens with == instead of ===.",- "detect":"ast: binary_expression operator in {==,!=,<>}. Flag when either side is a hash()/md5()/sha1() call, a token/password/hmac variable, or a request value.",- "safe":"=== / !== ; hash_equals() for secrets; password_verify() for passwords."},- {"id":"switch-loose","class":"type-juggling","title":"switch() uses loose comparison",- "attack":"switch($_GET['role']){case 0: admin...} — '0abc' or true loosely matches case 0.",- "detect":"ast: switch_statement whose condition is a request value or unhashed string.",- "safe":"match(true){...} (strict) or cast+validate the switch value first."},- {"id":"magic-hash","class":"type-juggling","title":"Magic-hash comparison (0e...)",- "attack":"md5('240610708')=='0e462097431906509019562988736854'; two 0e-prefixed hashes are equal under ==. Password/token bypass.",- "detect":"ast+manual: == between two hash outputs, or hash compared to a user value with ==.",- "safe":"hash_equals(); never == on hashes."},- {"id":"strcmp-array","class":"type-juggling","title":"strcmp/strcasecmp/strncmp with array arg returns NULL",- "attack":"?pw[]=x makes $_GET['pw'] an array; strcmp(array,$secret) returns NULL (+warning); if(strcmp(...)==0) => NULL==0 => TRUE => bypass.",- "detect":"ast+query: strcmp-family call where an argument traces to a request value with no is_string()/is_scalar() guard.",- "safe":"validate is_string() first; use hash_equals; check ===0 not ==0."},- {"id":"in-array-loose","class":"type-juggling","title":"in_array/array_search without strict=true",- "attack":"in_array('1abc',[1,2,3]) is TRUE loosely; in_array(0,['a','b']) TRUE pre-PHP8. Allow-list bypass.",- "detect":"ast: in_array/array_search call with <3 args (strict omitted) or 3rd arg falsey.",- "safe":"in_array($x,$arr,true)."},- {"id":"array-injection","class":"input-shape","title":"Array injection via param[]=",- "attack":"?login[]=a or login[]=a in POST makes $_POST['login'] an ARRAY. Breaks string-typed sinks: preg_match(returns false), strcmp/hash(NULL), sql (Array->'Array'), and bypasses is_string()-less checks. Also DoS/logic.",- "detect":"query+manual: request params used by string functions/SQL/regex without a preceding is_string()/is_scalar()/(string) cast or (array) normalisation.",- "safe":"cast/validate every request param to the expected type; reject arrays where scalars expected."},- {"id":"sql-truncation","class":"sql-semantic","title":"SQL column truncation (silent, non-STRICT mode)",- "attack":"Register user 'admin<55 spaces>x'; MySQL (non-strict) truncates to column length -> stored as 'admin' -> duplicate/overwrite admin account.",- "detect":"manual+schema: INSERT/UPDATE of a user-controlled string into a VARCHAR(N) unique column without an explicit length check; requires column lengths.",- "safe":"validate max length before insert; STRICT_ALL_TABLES; unique+trim checks."},- {"id":"charset-sqli","class":"sql-semantic","title":"Multibyte charset SQLi (addslashes/GBK bypass)",- "attack":"In GBK/Big5, 0xbf27 + addslashes -> 0xbf5c27 which is a valid multibyte char + a free quote -> breaks out. Defeats addslashes/manual escaping.",- "detect":"manual: manual escaping (addslashes/mysql_real_escape_string) with a connection charset set to a multibyte set instead of set_charset('utf8mb4').",- "safe":"parameterized queries; mysqli::set_charset('utf8mb4')."},- {"id":"order-by-inj","class":"sql-semantic","title":"ORDER BY / LIMIT / identifier injection",- "attack":"ORDER BY $_GET['sort'] — identifiers can't be bound with placeholders; direct concat = injection.",- "detect":"regex+query: ORDER BY/GROUP BY/LIMIT/table/column built from a request value (prepare can't bind these).",- "safe":"allow-list of column names; map input->fixed identifier."},- {"id":"second-order","class":"injection-flow","title":"Second-order injection (stored then used raw)",- "attack":"Value stored safely, later read from DB and concatenated into SQL/HTML/cmd without re-escaping. Taint 'launders' through storage.",- "detect":"manual: a value read from DB/option/meta reaching a sink; the taint graph must treat storage reads as tainted for stored-then-used flows.",- "safe":"escape at every sink, not just at input; treat DB reads as untrusted."},- {"id":"mass-assignment","class":"input-shape","title":"Mass assignment / register_globals emulation",- "attack":"extract($_REQUEST) or foreach($_POST as $k=>$v){$$k=$v;} or $obj->fill($_POST) overwrites vars/columns (e.g. is_admin).",- "detect":"ast: extract() / parse_str(1-arg) / variable_variable assignment ($$k) fed by a request array; object hydration from a raw request array.",- "safe":"explicit allow-list of fields; never bulk-assign request data."},- {"id":"var-variable","class":"input-shape","title":"Variable variables $$x",- "attack":"$$key where key is request-controlled -> arbitrary variable overwrite / info leak.",- "detect":"ast: variable_name whose name is itself a variable (dynamic_variable_name) fed by request.",- "safe":"array lookups with an allow-list, not $$."},- {"id":"null-byte","class":"input-shape","title":"Null-byte / poison-byte truncation",- "attack":"?file=secret.php%00.jpg truncates at NUL in include/file ops (pre-5.3.4); also %00 in strings splitting validators.",- "detect":"manual+regex: file/path/validator using a request value without an explicit NUL/`\\0` rejection; older PHP targets.",- "safe":"reject \\0; PHP>=5.3.4; realpath+allow-list."},- {"id":"path-traversal","class":"input-shape","title":"Path traversal encodings",- "attack":"../, ..%2f, %2e%2e%2f, ....//, absolute-path override, unicode dot. Escapes an intended base dir.",- "detect":"query+manual: file op / include with a request-derived path lacking realpath()-under-base or basename()+allow-list.",- "safe":"realpath() then verify str_starts_with(base); basename+allow-list."},- {"id":"phar-deser","class":"deserialization","title":"phar:// deserialization",- "attack":"phar://attacker.jpg triggers unserialize of the Phar metadata via ANY file op (file_exists/getimagesize/fopen) on an attacker-controlled path -> POP chain.",- "detect":"query+manual: any file op whose path can start with a user-controlled wrapper/scheme; combined with a gadget class present.",- "safe":"validate/deny wrappers; Phar::interceptFileFuncs; check scheme."},- {"id":"toctou","class":"race","title":"TOCTOU file race (check-then-use)",- "attack":"is_writable($f)/file_exists($f) then fopen/unlink($f) — attacker swaps the path (symlink) between check and use.",- "detect":"ast+manual: a file predicate on a path followed by an operation on the same path in a privileged context.",- "safe":"operate on fds (O_NOFOLLOW), atomic ops, avoid predictable temp paths."},- {"id":"timing-compare","class":"crypto-logic","title":"Non-constant-time secret comparison",- "attack":"if($mac == $expected) leaks byte-by-byte timing -> MAC/token forgery; also juggling.",- "detect":"ast: == / != / strcmp on a variable named mac/sig/hmac/token/hash/nonce.",- "safe":"hash_equals($known,$user)."},- {"id":"is-numeric-bypass","class":"type-confusion","title":"is_numeric / intval / filter_var bypass",- "attack":"is_numeric('0x1A'|'1e3'|' 12'|'+9') can be TRUE; (int)'123abc'=123; filter_var URL/EMAIL accepts javascript:, unusual hosts; is_numeric hex opens ID confusion.",- "detect":"ast+manual: is_numeric/ctype_digit/intval/(int)/filter_var used as the ONLY validation on a security-relevant value.",- "safe":"ctype_digit for digit-strings; FILTER + explicit flags; compare after cast+re-render."},- {"id":"loose-empty-isset","class":"logic","title":"empty()/isset() logic pitfalls",- "attack":"empty('0') and empty(0) are TRUE -> a legit '0' input treated as missing; isset() true for null-coalesced; == in guards.",- "detect":"manual: empty()/! on a value where '0'/0/'' are valid, in an auth/authorization/branch decision.",- "safe":"=== '' / array_key_exists / isset with explicit checks."},- {"id":"regex-anchor-bypass","class":"regex","title":"Regex anchor / multiline / dot bypass",- "attack":"preg_match('/^allowed$/',$x) — $ matches before a trailing \\n; with /m, ^/$ per line; . doesn't match \\n so payload on a second line bypasses. Also \\A\\z vs ^$.",- "detect":"regex+manual: a validation preg_match using ^...$ (not \\A...\\z) on a request value; check for /m and missing /s or /D.",- "safe":"\\A...\\z anchors; /D; reject newlines."},- {"id":"pcre-backtrack","class":"regex","title":"PCRE returns false on backtrack-limit (not 0)",- "attack":"On catastrophic backtracking preg_match returns FALSE, not 0; if(preg_match($bad,$x)) treats false as no-match, but code checking ==1 or !==false differs -> validator bypass + ReDoS.",- "detect":"ast+manual: preg_match result used in a boolean/auth branch without ===1 / preg_last_error() check; user-influenced pattern or subject length.",- "safe":"check ===1; bound input length; pcre.backtrack_limit."},- {"id":"session-fixation","class":"auth-session","title":"Session fixation (no regenerate on auth)",- "attack":"Attacker sets victim's session id pre-login; app doesn't session_regenerate_id(true) after auth -> session hijack.",- "detect":"query+manual: a login/privilege-elevation path with no session_regenerate_id(true) after establishing identity.",- "safe":"session_regenerate_id(true) on every privilege change."},- {"id":"cookie-flags","class":"auth-session","title":"Missing cookie security flags",- "attack":"setcookie without HttpOnly/Secure/SameSite -> XSS theft / CSRF / MITM.",- "detect":"ast: setcookie/setrawcookie/session_set_cookie_params with options lacking httponly|secure|samesite.",- "safe":"set HttpOnly+Secure+SameSite=Lax/Strict."},- {"id":"csrf-absence","class":"auth-logic","title":"State change without CSRF/nonce",- "attack":"A state-changing handler reachable without a verified nonce/token -> CSRF.",- "detect":"query: entry point performing a state change with NO nonce/token verification on the path (absence property — see the authz graph).",- "safe":"verify a per-user, per-action nonce/CSRF token on every state change."},- {"id":"xss-context","class":"xss","title":"Wrong-context / incomplete output escaping",- "attack":"htmlspecialchars without ENT_QUOTES inside an attribute; esc_html on a value placed in JS/URL/CSS context; double-encoding; json in <script> without JSON_HEX_TAG.",- "detect":"manual: an escaper whose context (HTML text/attr/JS/URL/CSS) does not match the output position.",- "safe":"context-correct escaper (attr vs html vs js vs url); ENT_QUOTES; JSON_HEX_* in <script>."},- {"id":"open-redirect","class":"redirect","title":"Open redirect",- "attack":"header('Location: '.$_GET['next']) or redirect($url) to //evil.com, \\evil, javascript:.",- "detect":"ast+query: header('Location'..)/redirect with a request-derived target lacking an allow-list/same-host check.",- "safe":"allow-list hosts; wp_safe_redirect; strip scheme/host."},- {"id":"host-header","class":"trust-boundary","title":"Host / X-Forwarded trust",- "attack":"Using $_SERVER['HTTP_HOST'] / X-Forwarded-For / X-Forwarded-Host for links, password-reset URLs, or IP allow-lists -> poisoning/spoof.",- "detect":"regex: $_SERVER['HTTP_HOST'|'HTTP_X_FORWARDED_*'] used in a URL, email, or access decision.",- "safe":"fixed site URL config; trust only vetted proxies."},- {"id":"error-suppression","class":"footgun","title":"@ error suppression hiding failures",- "attack":"@unserialize / @file_get_contents / @$_GET hides errors that mask a security-relevant failure or type issue.",- "detect":"ast: error_suppression_expression (@) on a security-relevant call.",- "safe":"handle errors explicitly."},- {"id":"upload-exec","class":"file-upload","title":"Unrestricted file upload -> exec",- "attack":"Attacker uploads shell.php / .phtml / double-ext shell.php.jpg / MIME-spoofed / .htaccess; served from an executable dir.",- "detect":"manual+query: move_uploaded_file/write into a web-served dir with extension/MIME derived from the upload and no allow-list / non-exec storage.",- "safe":"random name; extension+content allow-list; store outside web root / non-exec."},- {"id":"user-enum","class":"info-leak","title":"User enumeration (distinct response/timing)",- "attack":"Login/reset returns different message or timing for valid vs invalid users -> account enumeration.",- "detect":"manual: auth/reset flows with user-existence-dependent branches in message or timing.",- "safe":"uniform responses and timing."}+ {+ "id": "loose-eq",+ "class": "type-juggling",+ "title": "Loose == / != comparison",+ "attack": "'0e123'==<'0e456' (magic hash), '0'==false, null==0, '1abc'==1, 'abc'==0 (pre-PHP8). Auth bypass when comparing secrets/hashes/tokens with == instead of ===.",+ "detect": "ast: binary_expression operator in {==,!=,<>}. Flag when either side is a hash()/md5()/sha1() call, a token/password/hmac variable, or a request value.",+ "safe": "=== / !== ; hash_equals() for secrets; password_verify() for passwords."+ },+ {+ "id": "switch-loose",+ "class": "type-juggling",+ "title": "switch() uses loose comparison",+ "attack": "switch($_GET['role']){case 0: admin...} \u2014 '0abc' or true loosely matches case 0.",+ "detect": "ast: switch_statement whose condition is a request value or unhashed string.",+ "safe": "match(true){...} (strict) or cast+validate the switch value first."+ },+ {+ "id": "magic-hash",+ "class": "type-juggling",+ "title": "Magic-hash comparison (0e...)",+ "attack": "md5('240610708')=='0e462097431906509019562988736854'; two 0e-prefixed hashes are equal under ==. Password/token bypass.",+ "detect": "ast+manual: == between two hash outputs, or hash compared to a user value with ==.",+ "safe": "hash_equals(); never == on hashes."+ },+ {+ "id": "strcmp-array",+ "class": "type-juggling",+ "title": "strcmp/strcasecmp/strncmp with array arg returns NULL",+ "attack": "?pw[]=x makes $_GET['pw'] an array; strcmp(array,$secret) returns NULL (+warning); if(strcmp(...)==0) => NULL==0 => TRUE => bypass.",+ "detect": "ast+query: strcmp-family call where an argument traces to a request value with no is_string()/is_scalar() guard.",+ "safe": "validate is_string() first; use hash_equals; check ===0 not ==0."+ },+ {+ "id": "in-array-loose",+ "class": "type-juggling",+ "title": "in_array/array_search without strict=true",+ "attack": "in_array('1abc',[1,2,3]) is TRUE loosely; in_array(0,['a','b']) TRUE pre-PHP8. Allow-list bypass.",+ "detect": "ast: in_array/array_search call with <3 args (strict omitted) or 3rd arg falsey.",+ "safe": "in_array($x,$arr,true)."+ },+ {+ "id": "array-injection",+ "class": "input-shape",+ "title": "Array injection via param[]=",+ "attack": "?login[]=a or login[]=a in POST makes $_POST['login'] an ARRAY. Breaks string-typed sinks: preg_match(returns false), strcmp/hash(NULL), sql (Array->'Array'), and bypasses is_string()-less checks. Also DoS/logic.",+ "detect": "query+manual: request params used by string functions/SQL/regex without a preceding is_string()/is_scalar()/(string) cast or (array) normalisation.",+ "safe": "cast/validate every request param to the expected type; reject arrays where scalars expected."+ },+ {+ "id": "sql-truncation",+ "class": "sql-semantic",+ "title": "SQL column truncation (silent, non-STRICT mode)",+ "attack": "Register user 'admin<55 spaces>x'; MySQL (non-strict) truncates to column length -> stored as 'admin' -> duplicate/overwrite admin account.",+ "detect": "manual+schema: INSERT/UPDATE of a user-controlled string into a VARCHAR(N) unique column without an explicit length check; requires column lengths.",+ "safe": "validate max length before insert; STRICT_ALL_TABLES; unique+trim checks."+ },+ {+ "id": "charset-sqli",+ "class": "sql-semantic",+ "title": "Multibyte charset SQLi (addslashes/GBK bypass)",+ "attack": "In GBK/Big5, 0xbf27 + addslashes -> 0xbf5c27 which is a valid multibyte char + a free quote -> breaks out. Defeats addslashes/manual escaping.",+ "detect": "manual: manual escaping (addslashes/mysql_real_escape_string) with a connection charset set to a multibyte set instead of set_charset('utf8mb4').",+ "safe": "parameterized queries; mysqli::set_charset('utf8mb4')."+ },+ {+ "id": "order-by-inj",+ "class": "sql-semantic",+ "title": "ORDER BY / LIMIT / identifier injection",+ "attack": "ORDER BY $_GET['sort'] \u2014 identifiers can't be bound with placeholders; direct concat = injection.",+ "detect": "regex+query: ORDER BY/GROUP BY/LIMIT/table/column built from a request value (prepare can't bind these).",+ "safe": "allow-list of column names; map input->fixed identifier."+ },+ {+ "id": "second-order",+ "class": "injection-flow",+ "title": "Second-order injection (stored then used raw)",+ "attack": "Value stored safely, later read from DB and concatenated into SQL/HTML/cmd without re-escaping. Taint 'launders' through storage.",+ "detect": "manual: a value read from DB/option/meta reaching a sink; the taint graph must treat storage reads as tainted for stored-then-used flows.",+ "safe": "escape at every sink, not just at input; treat DB reads as untrusted."+ },+ {+ "id": "mass-assignment",+ "class": "input-shape",+ "title": "Mass assignment / register_globals emulation",+ "attack": "extract($_REQUEST) or foreach($_POST as $k=>$v){$$k=$v;} or $obj->fill($_POST) overwrites vars/columns (e.g. is_admin).",+ "detect": "ast: extract() / parse_str(1-arg) / variable_variable assignment ($$k) fed by a request array; object hydration from a raw request array.",+ "safe": "explicit allow-list of fields; never bulk-assign request data."+ },+ {+ "id": "var-variable",+ "class": "input-shape",+ "title": "Variable variables $$x",+ "attack": "$$key where key is request-controlled -> arbitrary variable overwrite / info leak.",+ "detect": "ast: variable_name whose name is itself a variable (dynamic_variable_name) fed by request.",+ "safe": "array lookups with an allow-list, not $$."+ },+ {+ "id": "null-byte",+ "class": "input-shape",+ "title": "Null-byte / poison-byte truncation",+ "attack": "?file=secret.php%00.jpg truncates at NUL in include/file ops (pre-5.3.4); also %00 in strings splitting validators.",+ "detect": "manual+regex: file/path/validator using a request value without an explicit NUL/`\\0` rejection; older PHP targets.",+ "safe": "reject \\0; PHP>=5.3.4; realpath+allow-list."+ },+ {+ "id": "path-traversal",+ "class": "input-shape",+ "title": "Path traversal encodings",+ "attack": "../, ..%2f, %2e%2e%2f, ....//, absolute-path override, unicode dot. Escapes an intended base dir.",+ "detect": "query+manual: file op / include with a request-derived path lacking realpath()-under-base or basename()+allow-list.",+ "safe": "realpath() then verify str_starts_with(base); basename+allow-list."+ },+ {+ "id": "phar-deser",+ "class": "deserialization",+ "title": "phar:// deserialization",+ "attack": "phar://attacker.jpg triggers unserialize of the Phar metadata via ANY file op (file_exists/getimagesize/fopen) on an attacker-controlled path -> POP chain.",+ "detect": "query+manual: any file op whose path can start with a user-controlled wrapper/scheme; combined with a gadget class present.",+ "safe": "validate/deny wrappers; Phar::interceptFileFuncs; check scheme."+ },+ {+ "id": "toctou",+ "class": "race",+ "title": "TOCTOU file race (check-then-use)",+ "attack": "is_writable($f)/file_exists($f) then fopen/unlink($f) \u2014 attacker swaps the path (symlink) between check and use.",+ "detect": "ast+manual: a file predicate on a path followed by an operation on the same path in a privileged context.",+ "safe": "operate on fds (O_NOFOLLOW), atomic ops, avoid predictable temp paths."+ },+ {+ "id": "timing-compare",+ "class": "crypto-logic",+ "title": "Non-constant-time secret comparison",+ "attack": "if($mac == $expected) leaks byte-by-byte timing -> MAC/token forgery; also juggling.",+ "detect": "ast: == / != / strcmp on a variable named mac/sig/hmac/token/hash/nonce.",+ "safe": "hash_equals($known,$user)."+ },+ {+ "id": "is-numeric-bypass",+ "class": "type-confusion",+ "title": "is_numeric / intval / filter_var bypass",+ "attack": "is_numeric('0x1A'|'1e3'|' 12'|'+9') can be TRUE; (int)'123abc'=123; filter_var URL/EMAIL accepts javascript:, unusual hosts; is_numeric hex opens ID confusion.",+ "detect": "ast+manual: is_numeric/ctype_digit/intval/(int)/filter_var used as the ONLY validation on a security-relevant value.",+ "safe": "ctype_digit for digit-strings; FILTER + explicit flags; compare after cast+re-render."+ },+ {+ "id": "loose-empty-isset",+ "class": "logic",+ "title": "empty()/isset() logic pitfalls",+ "attack": "empty('0') and empty(0) are TRUE -> a legit '0' input treated as missing; isset() true for null-coalesced; == in guards.",+ "detect": "manual: empty()/! on a value where '0'/0/'' are valid, in an auth/authorization/branch decision.",+ "safe": "=== '' / array_key_exists / isset with explicit checks."+ },+ {+ "id": "regex-anchor-bypass",+ "class": "regex",+ "title": "Regex anchor / multiline / dot bypass",+ "attack": "preg_match('/^allowed$/',$x) \u2014 $ matches before a trailing \\n; with /m, ^/$ per line; . doesn't match \\n so payload on a second line bypasses. Also \\A\\z vs ^$.",+ "detect": "regex+manual: a validation preg_match using ^...$ (not \\A...\\z) on a request value; check for /m and missing /s or /D.",+ "safe": "\\A...\\z anchors; /D; reject newlines."+ },+ {+ "id": "pcre-backtrack",+ "class": "regex",+ "title": "PCRE returns false on backtrack-limit (not 0)",+ "attack": "On catastrophic backtracking preg_match returns FALSE, not 0; if(preg_match($bad,$x)) treats false as no-match, but code checking ==1 or !==false differs -> validator bypass + ReDoS.",+ "detect": "ast+manual: preg_match result used in a boolean/auth branch without ===1 / preg_last_error() check; user-influenced pattern or subject length.",+ "safe": "check ===1; bound input length; pcre.backtrack_limit."+ },+ {+ "id": "session-fixation",+ "class": "auth-session",+ "title": "Session fixation (no regenerate on auth)",+ "attack": "Attacker sets victim's session id pre-login; app doesn't session_regenerate_id(true) after auth -> session hijack.",+ "detect": "query+manual: a login/privilege-elevation path with no session_regenerate_id(true) after establishing identity.",+ "safe": "session_regenerate_id(true) on every privilege change."+ },+ {+ "id": "cookie-flags",+ "class": "auth-session",+ "title": "Missing cookie security flags",+ "attack": "setcookie without HttpOnly/Secure/SameSite -> XSS theft / CSRF / MITM.",+ "detect": "ast: setcookie/setrawcookie/session_set_cookie_params with options lacking httponly|secure|samesite.",+ "safe": "set HttpOnly+Secure+SameSite=Lax/Strict."+ },+ {+ "id": "csrf-absence",+ "class": "auth-logic",+ "title": "State change without CSRF/nonce",+ "attack": "A state-changing handler reachable without a verified nonce/token -> CSRF.",+ "detect": "query: entry point performing a state change with NO nonce/token verification on the path (absence property \u2014 see the authz graph).",+ "safe": "verify a per-user, per-action nonce/CSRF token on every state change."+ },+ {+ "id": "xss-context",+ "class": "xss",+ "title": "Wrong-context / incomplete output escaping",+ "attack": "htmlspecialchars without ENT_QUOTES inside an attribute; esc_html on a value placed in JS/URL/CSS context; double-encoding; json in <script> without JSON_HEX_TAG.",+ "detect": "manual: an escaper whose context (HTML text/attr/JS/URL/CSS) does not match the output position.",+ "safe": "context-correct escaper (attr vs html vs js vs url); ENT_QUOTES; JSON_HEX_* in <script>."+ },+ {+ "id": "open-redirect",+ "class": "redirect",+ "title": "Open redirect",+ "attack": "header('Location: '.$_GET['next']) or redirect($url) to //evil.com, \\evil, javascript:.",+ "detect": "ast+query: header('Location'..)/redirect with a request-derived target lacking an allow-list/same-host check.",+ "safe": "allow-list hosts; wp_safe_redirect; strip scheme/host."+ },+ {+ "id": "host-header",+ "class": "trust-boundary",+ "title": "Host / X-Forwarded trust",+ "attack": "Using $_SERVER['HTTP_HOST'] / X-Forwarded-For / X-Forwarded-Host for links, password-reset URLs, or IP allow-lists -> poisoning/spoof.",+ "detect": "regex: $_SERVER['HTTP_HOST'|'HTTP_X_FORWARDED_*'] used in a URL, email, or access decision.",+ "safe": "fixed site URL config; trust only vetted proxies."+ },+ {+ "id": "error-suppression",+ "class": "footgun",+ "title": "@ error suppression hiding failures",+ "attack": "@unserialize / @file_get_contents / @$_GET hides errors that mask a security-relevant failure or type issue.",+ "detect": "ast: error_suppression_expression (@) on a security-relevant call.",+ "safe": "handle errors explicitly."+ },+ {+ "id": "upload-exec",+ "class": "file-upload",+ "title": "Unrestricted file upload -> exec",+ "attack": "Attacker uploads shell.php / .phtml / double-ext shell.php.jpg / MIME-spoofed / .htaccess; served from an executable dir.",+ "detect": "manual+query: move_uploaded_file/write into a web-served dir with extension/MIME derived from the upload and no allow-list / non-exec storage.",+ "safe": "random name; extension+content allow-list; store outside web root / non-exec."+ },+ {+ "id": "user-enum",+ "class": "info-leak",+ "title": "User enumeration (distinct response/timing)",+ "attack": "Login/reset returns different message or timing for valid vs invalid users -> account enumeration.",+ "detect": "manual: auth/reset flows with user-existence-dependent branches in message or timing.",+ "safe": "uniform responses and timing."+ },+ {+ "id": "option-injection",+ "class": "argument-injection",+ "title": "escapeshellarg does NOT stop argument/option injection",+ "attack": "escapeshellarg only quotes a value so it can't start a NEW command \u2014 it does NOT stop the value being read as an OPTION. e.g. exec('tar '.escapeshellarg($f)) with $f='--checkpoint=1 --checkpoint-action=exec=sh evil' => tar runs a command. Same: rsync -e, mysql --, curl -o/-K, ffmpeg -f, git --upload-pack, find -exec, zip -T -TT, wget -O.",+ "detect": "ast+manual: an exec-family call whose arg is escapeshellarg($x) BUT $x is placed where the program accepts options (no `--` separator before it, or the value can begin with `-`) and $x is request-derived.",+ "safe": "place a literal `--` before user args; validate the value doesn't start with `-`; use array-form proc_open/exec with explicit argv; allow-list."+ },+ {+ "id": "escapeshellcmd-weak",+ "class": "argument-injection",+ "title": "escapeshellcmd is weaker than escapeshellarg",+ "attack": "escapeshellcmd escapes shell metacharacters of a whole COMMAND but leaves spaces/quotes so arguments still split; it also lets option injection and unbalanced-quote tricks. Often misused as if it quoted an argument.",+ "detect": "ast: escapeshellcmd wrapping a value that is then used as an argument (not the whole command).",+ "safe": "escapeshellarg per-argument; argv-form; never escapeshellcmd for an argument."+ },+ {+ "id": "zip-slip",+ "class": "path-traversal",+ "title": "Archive extraction path traversal (Zip Slip)",+ "attack": "ZipArchive::extractTo($dir) / PharData / tar writes each entry using the entry's own path; an entry named ../../wp-config.php or /etc/... escapes $dir -> arbitrary write/overwrite (RCE if a .php lands in webroot). Symlink entries read/write outside too.",+ "detect": "query+manual: extractTo / archive extraction of an attacker-supplied archive without validating each entry path stays under the target (realpath prefix check).",+ "safe": "iterate entries, reject absolute/`..`/symlink names, realpath-under-base each before write."+ },+ {+ "id": "phar-wrapper-op",+ "class": "deserialization",+ "title": "phar:// via a file op on a user path (already-catalogued file ops)",+ "attack": "Any file op (file_exists/getimagesize/fopen/is_file/md5_file) on phar://uploaded.jpg triggers unserialize of Phar metadata -> POP chain. The 'safe-looking' file op is the trigger.",+ "detect": "query: file-read/exists ops whose path can carry a user-controlled stream wrapper (no scheme allow-list).",+ "safe": "validate scheme; Phar::interceptFileFuncs(); deny phar://."+ }]-}+}\ No newline at end of filediff --git a/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/sink-census/sink_census.py b/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/sink-census/sink_census.pyindex 3ae212f20..d76a042cb 100644--- a/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/sink-census/sink_census.py+++ b/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/sink-census/sink_census.py@@ -59,7 +59,9 @@ NONCODE_NODES = {"string", "encapsed_string", "comment", "heredoc", "nowdoc", "t# classes whose `new C(...)` construction is a sinkCTOR_SINKS = {"ReflectionFunction": "dynamic-invoke", "ReflectionMethod": "dynamic-invoke","ReflectionClass": "dynamic-invoke", "ReflectionObject": "dynamic-invoke",- "SoapClient": "SSRF", "SplFileObject": "file-read", "SimpleXMLElement": "XXE"}+ "SoapClient": "SSRF", "SplFileObject": "file-read", "SimpleXMLElement": "XXE",+ "ZipArchive": "zip-slip-path-traversal", "PharData": "zip-slip-path-traversal",+ "Phar": "deserialization", "Imagick": "image-rce-ssrf", "DOMDocument": "XXE"}def scan_file(path, rel):src = open(path, "rb").read()root = parser.parse(src).root_node