AI search engine and MCP server for bots and agents. One Rust binary indexes code, docs, logs, JSONL/CSV and PDFs for BM25 full-text, vector and hybrid search, code search without grep, agent memory and RAG. Elasticsearch-compatible API; Corpus Hub serves hundreds of reference memory corpora.
Rust agent-memoryai-agentsbm25claude-codeclicode-searchcursordatabaseelasticsearchfull-text-searchhybrid-searchjsonllocal-firstmcpmcp-servermodel-context-protocolragrustsearch-enginevector-search
docs(roadmap): add Xerj Packs section (#2770)
xerj-org2535836276df
diff --git a/ROADMAP.md b/ROADMAP.mdindex 3ceb11ddc..9825fe298 100644--- a/ROADMAP.md+++ b/ROADMAP.md@@ -622,6 +622,25 @@ These are ten feature requests the team ranked for 1.0, each filed as an issue o- **User-code ingest plugins.** *Today:* the ingest pipeline's transforms are built-in native Rust plugins — rename, drop, add, JSON parse, timestamp parse, PII redaction, grok, route — and they do run on `_bulk`. The crate is named `xerj-wasm`, but **the wasmtime backend is not in the tree**: there is no `wasmtime` dependency and no `wasm` feature, only a note that one could be added behind the same trait. Planned: a sandboxed runtime for user-supplied transforms with fuel and memory limits and no ambient filesystem or network access. Until then the refusal rule holds: a pipeline naming a processor this build does not implement is stored as unrunnable and every ingest through it is refused, never quietly run as a shorter pipeline.- **A corpus hub of signed, pre-indexed packs.** Download a reference corpus — a standard library, a specification set — already indexed, and mount it, instead of every user spending the same CPU-hours indexing the same public text. *Today:* the **records half is built and signed** — `xerj corpus build` (PR [#1046](https://github.com/xerj-org/xerj/pull/1046)) turns a declarative recipe (sources with licences, identity edges, merge precedence, derived fields) into a checksummed portable pack of *records* with a `format_version` readers refuse when unknown, per-file checksums verified on `corpus add --from <pack>`, and licence + provenance on every record; the first real pack is `rust-vulns` (`tools/packs/rust-vulns/`, identity-resolved across osv.dev and RustSec, with a test pinning its README numbers to a measured build), published by a scheduled workflow as a daily dated GitHub Release (immutable releases make tags single-use) with a **detached ed25519 signature** over SHA256SUMS (`xerj corpus keygen`/`sign`; `corpus add --verify-sig <pubkey>` checks origin before anything is indexed — the public key travels beside the recipe, never inside the pack; nobody in the prior-art survey signs their database). Still unbuilt: the **hub itself** (a directory of packs beyond this first one) and the **pre-indexed** half — the indexed-segment bundle that is the format this item would distribute, since indexing a records pack still costs each consumer the same CPU-hours. Its tracker, issue [#1030](https://github.com/xerj-org/xerj/issues/1030), was closed 2026-09-29: the records half shipped in rc.78, the pre-indexed half is descoped until the risks below are answered, and the work re-files when it starts. Three risks decide whether the rest ships: **redistribution licence** (an index is a derived copy of its source text — a pack may carry only what its licence lets us redistribute, which excludes much of what people most want indexed; the builder carries licence as record data and the pack author owns the choice); **pack safety** (a pack is untrusted input to the segment readers, so it needs the fuzzing the on-disk formats get, and a signature proves who built a pack, not that it is safe to open); and **format stability** (a published pack outlives the release that built it, so the pack format needs a compatibility promise the internal segment format has never had to make).+## Xerj Packs — built-in writing, bio and cyber tools++**Planned; no code exists yet.** Milestone: [Xerj Packs](https://github.com/xerj-org/xerj/milestone/10). Tracking issue: [#2769](https://github.com/xerj-org/xerj/issues/2769).++Built-in non-coding tool sets (Writing, Bio, Cyber), all native Rust in the xerj binary, with no Python glue and no separate pack install. A user asks their agent (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex) "write an article on X". The agent calls xerj tools that use Corpus Hub to build the chapters first, then the content, then a quality check. The user never calls the tools by hand.++- **Stdio MCP tool mode with no server needed** ([#2760](https://github.com/xerj-org/xerj/issues/2760)). `xerj mcp` runs per session, queries hub.xerj.org directly, caches corpora on disk, and also uses a local node if one is running. *Today:* `xerj mcp` proxies to a node that is already running. Only the feedback and field-report tools work without one.+- **`xerj init` auto-integration** ([#2761](https://github.com/xerj-org/xerj/issues/2761)). Registers the MCP server and writes SKILL.md files for Claude Code, Cursor and Codex.+- **Declarative recipe runner** ([#2762](https://github.com/xerj-org/xerj/issues/2762)). TOML recipes (corpora, filters, ranking, output schema, checks), so a new pack needs corpora and recipes but no new code.+- **Writing pack:** `write.outline` ([#2763](https://github.com/xerj-org/xerj/issues/2763)), `write.section` ([#2764](https://github.com/xerj-org/xerj/issues/2764)), and `write.review`, a deterministic anti-slop and citation checker that uses no model ([#2765](https://github.com/xerj-org/xerj/issues/2765)).+- **Bio pack** ([#2766](https://github.com/xerj-org/xerj/issues/2766)) grades evidence by study type. **Cyber pack** ([#2767](https://github.com/xerj-org/xerj/issues/2767)) covers separate scenarios that share one finding schema, cite corpus evidence, and guard scope (authorized targets only):+ - source code review, `cyber.code_review` ([#2771](https://github.com/xerj-org/xerj/issues/2771));+ - black-box test planning, `cyber.blackbox` ([#2772](https://github.com/xerj-org/xerj/issues/2772));+ - fuzzing plans and crash triage, `cyber.fuzz_plan` ([#2773](https://github.com/xerj-org/xerj/issues/2773));+ - exploitability and impact validation, `cyber.exploitability` ([#2774](https://github.com/xerj-org/xerj/issues/2774));+ - risk scoring with deterministic CVSS v3.1/v4 plus EPSS/KEV context, `cyber.score` ([#2775](https://github.com/xerj-org/xerj/issues/2775));+ - advisory writing, `cyber.advisory` / `cyber.cve_context` ([#2776](https://github.com/xerj-org/xerj/issues/2776)).+- **Docs, `xerj tools list`, site pages** ([#2768](https://github.com/xerj-org/xerj/issues/2768)).+## Beyond 1.0 — themes- **AST language expansion** — 25 further tree-sitter grammars, tiered by demand, one PR per