AI search engine and MCP server for bots and agents. One Rust binary indexes code, docs, logs, JSONL/CSV and PDFs for BM25 full-text, vector and hybrid search, code search without grep, agent memory and RAG. Elasticsearch-compatible API; Corpus Hub serves hundreds of reference memory corpora.
Rust agent-memoryai-agentsbm25claude-codeclicode-searchcursordatabaseelasticsearchfull-text-searchhybrid-searchjsonllocal-firstmcpmcp-servermodel-context-protocolragrustsearch-enginevector-search
site(use-cases): lead with the real audit story, drop the synthetic demo
xerj-org51594491f163
diff --git a/landing/llms-full.txt b/landing/llms-full.txtindex 73d04f0e9..028864628 100644--- a/landing/llms-full.txt+++ b/landing/llms-full.txt@@ -327,7 +327,6 @@ AI security review of a codebase too big to read:Aggregate a semantic slice in one request (kNN + aggregations, rc.6):https://github.com/xerj-org/xerj/tree/main/docs/case-studies/calltree-analytics- https://xerj.org/use-cases/semantic-analytics.htmlhttps://xerj.org/case-studies/calltree-analytics.htmlThe deep-research shape, where one question is half retrieval and halfanalytics — "of calls about wifi issues, how many are 2.4GHz vs 5GHz, and whatdiff --git a/landing/llms.txt b/landing/llms.txtindex 30d44507d..ceae1fa70 100644--- a/landing/llms.txt+++ b/landing/llms.txt@@ -62,7 +62,6 @@ Copy-pasteable, live-validated guides — this is first-class documentation, not- **Zero-config folder → neural semantic search** — [autoindex-semantic recipe](https://xerj.org/docs/recipes/autoindex-semantic-search.html): `xerj autoindex` a mixed folder, then search the discovered prose *by meaning* with the built-in neural embedder (`--embed-mode neural`); structured files (CSV/NDJSON) stay exactly filterable. One binary, no vector DB, no embedding service.- **All-you-can-eat search (one corpus, five ways)** — [all-way-search recipe](https://xerj.org/docs/recipes/all-way-search.html): index once, retrieve as full-text (BM25), semantic, vector kNN (more-like-this), hybrid (RRF), and semantic-scoped-by-keyword-filter — all from one index, no second datastore.- **AI security review of a codebase too big to read** — [WordPress-core case study](https://github.com/xerj-org/xerj/tree/main/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit): an agent audits real WordPress core (1,492 PHP files, ~619k lines — ~26× a 200k context window) by indexing the tree as queryable facts (call graph + taint facts, cap/nonce shapes, hook registrations, sanitizer-order fingerprints — built in ≈3.6 s at a 100% tree-sitter-php parse rate — plus a dangerous-call-site census built as a separate pass), then asking questions grep cannot phrase — "request source + SQL sink + no sanitizer in the same function" narrowed 11,990 functions to 4 candidates in one query. The structured audit summed to ~26k tokens vs ~5.2M just to load core once. Honest findings, stated as the docs state them: core came back hardened on every flow tested (the negative result is the result); the headline finding of three Medium-severity results — `wp_http_validate_url` missing 169.254.0.0/16, the cloud-metadata range, reachable via `pingback_ping` — is a known-class limitation, explicitly not claimed as a novel 0-day (the other two: a deploy-dependent ImageTragick surface in the Imagick image editor, and a role-injection inconsistency in `user-new.php` caught by the per-file sweep); published counter-examples where grep is the cheaper tool; and the audit surfaced a real XERJ engine bug (`term` on a keyword array matched only element [0] — memtable half fixed, segment half an open follow-up; the [playbook](https://github.com/xerj-org/xerj/blob/main/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/PLAYBOOK.md) ships the workarounds). The reusable pattern: read once to learn an invariant, compile it into an indexed fingerprint, query for violators, read only the survivors.-- **Aggregate a semantic slice in one request** — [semantic-analytics walkthrough](https://github.com/xerj-org/xerj/tree/main/docs/case-studies/calltree-analytics) ([use-case page](https://xerj.org/use-cases/semantic-analytics.html)): the deep-research shape where one question is half retrieval and half analytics — *"of calls about wifi issues, how many are 2.4GHz vs 5GHz, and what are the key issues?"* — answered in a single `POST /_search`, because the keyword/integer columns, the `text` body and the `dense_vector` live in one index. The rc.6 engine change runs aggregations over the **retrieved top-`k` neighbour set**, computed before the `from`/`size` hit page is cut, in the shared kNN result assembler; it applies to the top-level `knn` section, `query.knn`, a `bool` whose single `must`/`should` clause is the kNN, and the multi-`knn` array form — **not** to a kNN placed inside `bool.filter`, which is not peeled and still returns no buckets. Validated by integration test `test_knn_plus_aggregations_single_request`. Deliberate trade, stated because it is a real cost: an `aggs`-bearing kNN is gated out of the ANN path and routed to the exact brute-force scan, since ANN recall is <100% and bucket counts must not be approximate — so `num_candidates` is ignored there, the HNSW executor never serves an aggs-bearing kNN at any corpus size, and cost scales with corpus size × dims on every request. The slice aggregation reads the retrieved documents' `_source`, not doc-values (the columnar path is the no-kNN recurring-report shape). Provenance for every number in the walkthrough: it ran on a **generated** 130-conversation corpus (a seeded script, ~21 hand-written sentence templates) — not real customer data, not a deployment, not production scale, and nothing in it was timed at any corpus size. The band split (29 / 25), the CSAT median (4.0 — the population median of the generator's hand-written list, so any reasonably sized slice reports it) and the handle-time averages (897 s / 924 s — an independent uniform draw unrelated to band or text) are generator artifacts, not findings about support calls. `hits.total.value` for such a query is the `k` parameter echoed back (the neighbour-pool size), not a match count. Open gaps: `significant_terms` over a kNN slice returns empty (no background corpus wired); RRF fusion *is* exposed (`query.hybrid` + `fusion:"rrf"`, default `k=60`) but a hybrid query carrying `aggs` is rejected with a 400, so "aggregate the slice" works for a pure kNN slice only; the SQL surface is a thin `SELECT`/`WHERE`/`GROUP BY` mapping; and retrieval quality belongs to whatever embedding model produced the vectors, not to XERJ. ES/OpenSearch and Postgres+pgvector can already express this in one request — what differs is the cost model and operational weight, not whether the shape is possible.Supporting evidence, not the headline: in a closed-loop, cache-off benchmark vs live Elasticsearch 8.13.4, XERJ scored 55 wins / 26 ties / 4 losses (3 N/A) across the full matrix, with a 1.72× bulk-ingest win (191k vs 111k docs/s), a 1.61× smaller on-disk footprint, and kNN recall@10 1.00 (unfiltered kNN is now HNSW-served with exact rescoring; k=10 latency ties ES at ~1.8 ms). All 4 losses are the same architectural gap — read p99 under a concurrent write flood (mixed read-under-write); they are published, not hidden. Acked deletes survive SIGTERM/SIGKILL restarts (11/11 adversarial crash cells). Measure on your own workload.diff --git a/landing/sitemap.xml b/landing/sitemap.xmlindex 39ea92167..29e55eede 100644--- a/landing/sitemap.xml+++ b/landing/sitemap.xml@@ -50,11 +50,6 @@<lastmod>2026-07-27</lastmod><priority>0.7</priority></url>- <url>- <loc>https://xerj.org/use-cases/semantic-analytics.html</loc>- <lastmod>2026-07-27</lastmod>- <priority>0.7</priority>- </url><url><loc>https://xerj.org/use-cases/code-security-audit.html</loc><lastmod>2026-07-27</lastmod>diff --git a/landing/solutions/index.html b/landing/solutions/index.htmlindex 3e7e5742c..2d2fcba2c 100644--- a/landing/solutions/index.html+++ b/landing/solutions/index.html@@ -44,7 +44,6 @@<a href="/use-cases/elasticsearch-replacement.html">ES REPLACEMENT</a><a href="/use-cases/operational-intelligence.html">OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE</a><a href="/use-cases/code-security-audit.html">AI SECURITY REVIEW</a>- <a href="/use-cases/semantic-analytics.html">SEMANTIC ANALYTICS</a></nav><section class="scene-section" style="border-top:0; padding-top:0;">@@ -162,23 +161,6 @@<span class="card-cta">EXPLORE AI SECURITY REVIEW →</span></a>- <a class="card" href="/use-cases/semantic-analytics.html">- <span class="card-k">07 · SEMANTIC ANALYTICS · DEMO, NOT A DEPLOYMENT</span>- <span class="card-t">ONE QUERY.<br><span class="accent">TWO WORKLOADS.</span></span>- <span class="card-b">- A deep-research question that is half vector retrieval and half- analytics, answered in one search request. Aggregations- run over the retrieved top-k neighbour set, routed to the exact- scan so bucket counts are never approximate.- </span>- <span class="card-facts">- FOR DATA / ML ENG · ANALYTICS ENG · AI PRODUCT<br>- kNN + AGGREGATIONS IN ONE REQUEST (rc.6) · EXACT BUCKETS<br>- SHOWN ON A GENERATED 130-DOC CORPUS · NOT A BENCHMARK · NOTHING TIMED- </span>- <span class="card-cta">EXPLORE SEMANTIC ANALYTICS →</span>- </a>-</div></section>diff --git a/landing/use-cases.html b/landing/use-cases.htmlindex d2bcb04d0..bbb85b122 100644--- a/landing/use-cases.html+++ b/landing/use-cases.html@@ -40,11 +40,10 @@<nav class="uc-subnav" aria-label="Use cases"><a href="/use-cases.html" class="active">ALL USE CASES</a>+ <a href="/use-cases/code-security-audit.html">AI SECURITY REVIEW</a><a href="/use-cases/security-analytics.html">SECURITY ANALYTICS</a><a href="/use-cases/operational-intelligence.html">OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE</a><a href="/use-cases/ai-search-retrieval.html">AI SEARCH</a>- <a href="/use-cases/semantic-analytics.html">SEMANTIC ANALYTICS</a>- <a href="/use-cases/code-security-audit.html">AI SECURITY REVIEW</a><a href="/use-cases/elasticsearch-replacement.html">ES REPLACEMENT</a><a href="/use-cases/unified-observability.html">OBSERVABILITY</a></nav>@@ -53,20 +52,66 @@<div class="kicker"><span>USE CASES</span><span class="dash">·</span><span>ENTERPRISE</span></div><h1 class="hero" style="font-size: var(--fs-96);">REPLACE THE<br>STACK.<br><span class="accent">KEEP THE DATA.</span></h1><p class="lead" style="max-width:720px;">- Seven enterprise workloads. One binary. No Logstash, no Beats, no- separate vector database, no dedicated Kibana cluster. Six of the- sections below are real deployment patterns with measured numbers —- benchmarks against Elasticsearch 8.13, or token costs measured on a- real audit — and the seventh is a query-shape demonstration on a- generated corpus, not a deployment and not a benchmark. Each has a- live chart that says which it is.+ One binary. No Logstash, no Beats, no separate vector database, no+ dedicated Kibana cluster. The lead section is a <strong>real security+ audit</strong> — XERJ pointed at its own Rust engine and at WordPress+ core, finding (and fixing) real bugs, with every token cost measured.+ The rest are capability benchmarks against Elasticsearch 8.13,+ reproducible from <code class="inline">demo/playbooks/SCORECARD.md</code>.+ Every section's live chart says exactly what it measured — and we removed+ the demos that had no real scenario behind them.</p></section>-<!-- 01 SIEM — the headline chart IS the comparison -->+<!-- 01 AI SECURITY REVIEW — the real, full-story flagship --><div class="uc-showcase"><div class="uc-copy"><span class="uc-num">01</span>+ <div class="uc-title">FIND REAL BUGS.<br>INDEX ONCE,<br><span class="accent">QUERY THE FLAW.</span></div>+ <p class="uc-pitch">The flagship isn't a benchmark — it's an audit that found and fixed real vulnerabilities. XERJ indexed its own Rust engine (197 files) as security <em>facts</em> and a call graph, then a query grep cannot express surfaced an unauthenticated <code class="inline">/_sql</code> stack-overflow that abends the process, plus a search-template injection that leaks private documents and a snapshot path-traversal — <strong>all fixed on the branch, proven by crashing then not-crashing a live server</strong>. The same method on real WordPress core audited 1,492 files for ~26K tokens. Two codebases, real findings, every number reproducible.</p>+ <div class="uc-metric">6/6 KNOWN BUGS RECALLED · 171× FEWER TOKENS · 4 NEW HIGHS, 3 FIXED</div>+ <div class="uc-persona">CISO · APPSEC ENGINEER · SECURITY RESEARCHER · AI-AGENT BUILDER</div>+ <a href="/use-cases/code-security-audit.html" class="uc-cta">FULL USE CASE →</a>+ </div>+ <div class="uc-viz">+ <div class="kicker"><span>MEASURED · tiktoken cl100k_base · TOKENS TO REACH THE /_sql FINDING</span></div>+ <div class="cmp-bars">+ <div class="cmp-bars-head">+ <span></span>+ <span class="cmp-a">XERJ-ASSISTED</span>+ <span class="cmp-b">READ EVERY FILE</span>+ </div>+ <div class="cmp-bars-row">+ <span class="cmp-label">Tokens to the finding</span>+ <span class="cmp-val cmp-a">+ <span class="cmp-bar" style="width:0.5%;"></span>+ <span class="cmp-num">10,533</span>+ </span>+ <span class="cmp-val cmp-b">+ <span class="cmp-bar" style="width:90.0%;"></span>+ <span class="cmp-num">1,805,277 <span class="cmp-ratio">171×</span></span>+ </span>+ </div>+ <div class="cmp-bars-row">+ <span class="cmp-label">Detection vs grep (known bugs)</span>+ <span class="cmp-val cmp-a">+ <span class="cmp-bar" style="width:90.0%;"></span>+ <span class="cmp-num">6 / 6</span>+ </span>+ <span class="cmp-val cmp-b">+ <span class="cmp-bar" style="width:60.0%;"></span>+ <span class="cmp-num">4 / 6</span>+ </span>+ </div>+ </div>+ <p style="margin-top:14px; font-size:12px; letter-spacing:.04em; color:var(--z-mute); font-family:var(--font-data);">TOKEN COST TO THE ANSWER · NOT LATENCY · RECALL MEASURED AGAINST 6 KNOWN-FIXED BUGS (grep CAN'T FIND MISSING CODE) · FULL METHODOLOGY, ALL 8 FINDINGS & THE IN-SAMPLE CAVEAT IN <a href="https://github.com/xerj-org/xerj/tree/main/docs/case-studies/xerj-self-audit" rel="external">docs/case-studies/xerj-self-audit →</a> · WORDPRESS PROOF IN <a href="https://github.com/xerj-org/xerj/tree/main/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit" rel="external">wordpress-security-audit →</a></p>+ </div>+</div>++<!-- 02 SIEM — the headline chart IS the comparison -->+<div class="uc-showcase">+ <div class="uc-copy">+ <span class="uc-num">02</span><div class="uc-title">SECURITY<br>ANALYTICS<br><span class="accent">AT SCALE.</span></div><p class="uc-pitch">Your SOC team spends more time waiting for dashboards than investigating threats. The battery on the right is the reproducible XERJ-vs-Elasticsearch query matrix — bool filters, range scans, term lookups and aggregations — measured on a 1M-doc corpus. XERJ is the yellow bar; Elasticsearch 8.13 is the gray one.</p><div class="uc-metric">11.5× FASTER BOOL QUERIES</div>@@ -167,10 +212,10 @@</div></div>-<!-- 02 LOGS — ingest throughput over 24h -->+<!-- 03 LOGS — ingest throughput over 24h --><div class="uc-showcase"><div class="uc-copy">- <span class="uc-num">02</span>+ <span class="uc-num">03</span><div class="uc-title">OPERATIONAL<br><span class="accent">INTELLIGENCE.</span></div><p class="uc-pitch">Ship logs at line rate. Query hot data in milliseconds. No ILM policy puzzles, no shard tuning, no Logstash pipeline. The chart shows a 24-hour diurnal ingest pattern — XERJ sustains it with zero write-stalls, and ingests 1.5–1.7× faster than Elasticsearch in the reproducible benchmark.</p><div class="uc-metric">1.7× FASTER INGEST</div>@@ -193,10 +238,10 @@</div></div>-<!-- 03 AI — intent clusters + memory comparison -->+<!-- 04 AI — intent clusters + memory comparison --><div class="uc-showcase"><div class="uc-copy">- <span class="uc-num">03</span>+ <span class="uc-num">04</span><div class="uc-title">AI-NATIVE<br>SEARCH &<br><span class="accent">RETRIEVAL.</span></div><p class="uc-pitch">Hybrid semantic + keyword search in one query. The cluster plot shows 830K real queries grouped into six intent clusters — RAG retrieval dominates. Every cluster is one index query away, not a separate Pinecone call. The benchmark below is the reproducible XERJ-vs-Elasticsearch latency for kNN and text retrieval.</p><div class="uc-metric">3.4× FASTER kNN · 100% RECALL</div>@@ -257,10 +302,10 @@</div></div>-<!-- 04 ES REPLACEMENT — resource comparison is THE chart -->+<!-- 05 ES REPLACEMENT — resource comparison is THE chart --><div class="uc-showcase"><div class="uc-copy">- <span class="uc-num">04</span>+ <span class="uc-num">05</span><div class="uc-title">ELASTICSEARCH<br><span class="accent">REPLACEMENT.</span></div><p class="uc-pitch">Same API on port 9200. Same query DSL. Same client libraries. The comparison on the right is the reproducible query-latency head-to-head. Yellow is XERJ; gray is Elasticsearch 8.13 on the identical workload.</p><div class="uc-metric">1.20× SMALLER ON DISK</div>@@ -341,10 +386,10 @@</div></div>-<!-- 05 OBSERVABILITY — stack comparison -->+<!-- 06 OBSERVABILITY — stack comparison --><div class="uc-showcase"><div class="uc-copy">- <span class="uc-num">05</span>+ <span class="uc-num">06</span><div class="uc-title">UNIFIED<br><span class="accent">OBSERVABILITY.</span></div><p class="uc-pitch">Logs, traces, and metrics in one store — one binary instead of a Grafana-Loki-Tempo-Mimir stack to babysit. OTLP in, Prometheus out. The chart on the right is the reproducible query-latency head-to-head vs Elasticsearch 8.13 on log-shaped data.</p><div class="uc-metric">6 SYSTEMS → 1 BINARY</div>@@ -425,117 +470,6 @@</div></div>-<!-- 06 AI SECURITY REVIEW — token cost to the answer -->-<div class="uc-showcase">- <div class="uc-copy">- <span class="uc-num">06</span>- <div class="uc-title">INDEX ONCE.<br>QUERY THE<br><span class="accent">INVARIANT.</span></div>- <p class="uc-pitch">A method, not a target. Index a codebase once as security <em>facts</em>, compile the invariant you care about into a queryable fingerprint, query for the violators, read only the survivors. XERJ is the agent's second brain in that loop. The proof run is real WordPress core — 1,492 PHP files, indexed in ≈3.6 seconds.</p>- <div class="uc-metric">~26K-TOKEN STRUCTURED AUDIT vs ~5.2M TO LOAD THE TREE</div>- <div class="uc-persona">CISO · APPSEC ENGINEER · SECURITY RESEARCHER</div>- <a href="/use-cases/code-security-audit.html" class="uc-cta">FULL USE CASE →</a>- </div>- <div class="uc-viz">- <div class="kicker"><span>MEASURED · WORDPRESS CORE · docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit</span></div>- <div class="cmp-bars">- <div class="cmp-bars-head">- <span></span>- <span class="cmp-a">XERJ</span>- <span class="cmp-b">GREP + READ</span>- </div>- <div class="cmp-bars-row">- <span class="cmp-label">Sanitizer composition</span>- <span class="cmp-val cmp-a">- <span class="cmp-bar" style="width:0.1%;"></span>- <span class="cmp-num">~490 tok</span>- </span>- <span class="cmp-val cmp-b">- <span class="cmp-bar" style="width:90.0%;"></span>- <span class="cmp-num">~1,329,000 tok <span class="cmp-ratio">2,700× more</span></span>- </span>- </div><div class="cmp-bars-row">- <span class="cmp-label">Auth posture sweep</span>- <span class="cmp-val cmp-a">- <span class="cmp-bar" style="width:1.8%;"></span>- <span class="cmp-num">~6,600 tok</span>- </span>- <span class="cmp-val cmp-b">- <span class="cmp-bar" style="width:90.0%;"></span>- <span class="cmp-num">~335,500 tok <span class="cmp-ratio">51× more</span></span>- </span>- </div><div class="cmp-bars-row">- <span class="cmp-label">Reachability query</span>- <span class="cmp-val cmp-a">- <span class="cmp-bar" style="width:90.0%;"></span>- <span class="cmp-num">~482,800 tok</span>- </span>- <span class="cmp-val cmp-b">- <span class="cmp-bar" style="width:0.8%;"></span>- <span class="cmp-num">~4,300 tok <span class="cmp-ratio">112× less</span></span>- </span>- </div><div class="cmp-bars-row">- <span class="cmp-label">__destruct inventory</span>- <span class="cmp-val cmp-a">- <span class="cmp-bar" style="width:90.0%;"></span>- <span class="cmp-num">~14,700 tok</span>- </span>- <span class="cmp-val cmp-b">- <span class="cmp-bar" style="width:4.0%;"></span>- <span class="cmp-num">~649 tok <span class="cmp-ratio">23× less</span></span>- </span>- </div>- </div>- <p style="margin-top:14px; font-size:12px; letter-spacing:.04em; color:var(--z-mute); font-family:var(--font-data);">TOKEN COST TO THE ANSWER · NOT LATENCY · LAST TWO ROWS: THE PUBLISHED COUNTER-EXAMPLES WHERE GREP WINS — REACHABILITY IS THE AUDIT-TIME MEASUREMENT UNDER THE KEYWORD-ARRAY TERM BUG THE AUDIT ITSELF SURFACED · SOURCES IN <a href="https://github.com/xerj-org/xerj/tree/main/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit" rel="external">docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit →</a></p>- </div>-</div>--<!-- 07 SEMANTIC ANALYTICS — buckets over the retrieved neighbour set -->-<div class="uc-showcase">- <div class="uc-copy">- <span class="uc-num">07</span>- <div class="uc-title">AGGREGATE THE<br>SEMANTIC<br><span class="accent">SLICE.</span></div>- <p class="uc-pitch">A deep-research question bundles two workloads in one breath: <em>of calls about wifi issues, how many are 2.4GHz vs 5GHz, and what are the key issues?</em> The first clause is vector retrieval; everything after it is aggregation over exactly the documents that clause selected. XERJ answers it in a single search request — the columns, the full text and the vector live in one index, and the aggregations run over the retrieved top-k neighbour set. An aggregation-bearing kNN is routed to the exact scan deliberately, because bucket counts must not be approximate. The chart is that query shape working on a <em>generated</em> corpus: a correctness demo, not a benchmark, and nothing in it was timed.</p>- <div class="uc-metric">1 REQUEST · RETRIEVAL + EXACT BUCKETS + EVIDENCE · DEMO, NOT A DEPLOYMENT</div>- <div class="uc-persona">DATA / ML ENGINEER · ANALYTICS ENGINEER · AI PRODUCT</div>- <a href="/use-cases/semantic-analytics.html" class="uc-cta">FULL USE CASE →</a>- </div>- <div class="uc-viz">- <div class="kicker"><span>GENERATED 130-CONVERSATION CORPUS · NOT REAL DATA · NOT A DEPLOYMENT · NOT A BENCHMARK</span></div>- <div class="topn-list">- <div class="row">- <div class="row__label">band 2.4GHz</div>- <div class="row__val">29</div>- <div class="row__bar">- <svg class="chart" height="6" viewBox="0 0 200 6" preserveAspectRatio="none">- <line x1="0" y1="5" x2="200.0" y2="5" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="1"/>- </svg>- </div>- <div class="row__pct">36%</div>- </div>- <div class="row">- <div class="row__label">band n/a · non-wifi (derived: 80 − 54)</div>- <div class="row__val">26</div>- <div class="row__bar">- <svg class="chart" height="6" viewBox="0 0 200 6" preserveAspectRatio="none">- <line x1="0" y1="5" x2="179.3" y2="5" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="1"/>- </svg>- </div>- <div class="row__pct">33%</div>- </div>- <div class="row">- <div class="row__label">band 5GHz</div>- <div class="row__val">25</div>- <div class="row__bar">- <svg class="chart" height="6" viewBox="0 0 200 6" preserveAspectRatio="none">- <line x1="0" y1="5" x2="172.4" y2="5" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="1"/>- </svg>- </div>- <div class="row__pct">31%</div>- </div>- </div>- <p style="margin-top:14px; font-size:12px; letter-spacing:.04em; color:var(--z-mute); font-family:var(--font-data);">TERMS BUCKETS RETURNED IN THE SAME RESPONSE AS THE HITS · NOT LATENCY, NOTHING HERE WAS TIMED · THE POOL WAS THE k=80 NEAREST NEIGHBOURS, WHICH IS THE REQUEST PARAMETER ECHOED BACK AND NOT A MATCH COUNT — 54 OF THE 80 CARRIED A BAND; THE <code class="inline">n/a</code> ROW IS NOT IN THE PUBLISHED OUTPUT, THE DEMO SCRIPT FILTERS IT BEFORE PRINTING AND 26 IS THE REMAINDER · THE SPLIT IS OUTPUT OF A SEEDED GENERATOR (<code class="inline">random.seed(7)</code>, ~21 HAND-WRITTEN TEMPLATES), NOT A FINDING ABOUT SUPPORT CALLS · SOURCES IN <a href="https://github.com/xerj-org/xerj/tree/main/docs/case-studies/calltree-analytics" rel="external">docs/case-studies/calltree-analytics →</a></p>- </div>-</div><section class="lead-capture" id="demo"><div class="kicker"><span>READY?</span><span class="dash">·</span><span>REQUEST ACCESS</span></div>diff --git a/landing/use-cases/ai-search-retrieval.html b/landing/use-cases/ai-search-retrieval.htmlindex 5e2ac7338..24f8a000c 100644--- a/landing/use-cases/ai-search-retrieval.html+++ b/landing/use-cases/ai-search-retrieval.html@@ -40,11 +40,10 @@<nav class="uc-subnav" aria-label="Use cases"><a href="/use-cases.html">ALL USE CASES</a>+ <a href="/use-cases/code-security-audit.html">AI SECURITY REVIEW</a><a href="/use-cases/security-analytics.html">SECURITY ANALYTICS</a><a href="/use-cases/operational-intelligence.html">OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE</a><a href="/use-cases/ai-search-retrieval.html" class="active">AI SEARCH</a>- <a href="/use-cases/semantic-analytics.html">SEMANTIC ANALYTICS</a>- <a href="/use-cases/code-security-audit.html">AI SECURITY REVIEW</a><a href="/use-cases/elasticsearch-replacement.html">ES REPLACEMENT</a><a href="/use-cases/unified-observability.html">OBSERVABILITY</a></nav>diff --git a/landing/use-cases/code-security-audit.html b/landing/use-cases/code-security-audit.htmlindex 57d92c485..a0c1ed46f 100644--- a/landing/use-cases/code-security-audit.html+++ b/landing/use-cases/code-security-audit.html@@ -40,11 +40,10 @@<nav class="uc-subnav" aria-label="Use cases"><a href="/use-cases.html">ALL USE CASES</a>+ <a href="/use-cases/code-security-audit.html" class="active">AI SECURITY REVIEW</a><a href="/use-cases/security-analytics.html">SECURITY ANALYTICS</a><a href="/use-cases/operational-intelligence.html">OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE</a><a href="/use-cases/ai-search-retrieval.html">AI SEARCH</a>- <a href="/use-cases/semantic-analytics.html">SEMANTIC ANALYTICS</a>- <a href="/use-cases/code-security-audit.html" class="active">AI SECURITY REVIEW</a><a href="/use-cases/elasticsearch-replacement.html">ES REPLACEMENT</a><a href="/use-cases/unified-observability.html">OBSERVABILITY</a></nav>@@ -56,6 +55,11 @@<div class="kicker"><span>FOR</span><span class="dash">·</span><span>CISO</span><span class="dash">·</span><span>APPSEC ENGINEER</span><span class="dash">·</span><span>SECURITY RESEARCHER</span></div></div>+<section class="scene-section">+ <h2 class="scene" style="font-size:var(--fs-40);">TWO REAL <span class="accent">PROOF RUNS.</span></h2>+ <p class="wide">The method has been run end to end on two real codebases, not a demo corpus. The WordPress proof (below) is the token-economics story. The second run turned the method on <strong>XERJ's own Rust engine</strong> — and it is the stronger proof, because it found and <em>fixed</em> real vulnerabilities: an unauthenticated <code class="inline">/_sql</code> stack-overflow that aborts the process, a search-template injection that drops a query's ACL filter and leaks private documents, and a snapshot path-traversal that writes outside the data directory. Each was proven by crashing (then, after the fix, not crashing) a live server. Against six known-fixed bugs the substrate recalled <strong>6/6 where grep managed 4/6</strong> — grep cannot find a missing check — and reached the <code class="inline">/_sql</code> finding for <strong>171× fewer tokens</strong> than reading the tree. Full methodology, all eight findings, and the honest in-sample caveat: <a href="https://github.com/xerj-org/xerj/tree/main/docs/case-studies/xerj-self-audit" rel="external">docs/case-studies/xerj-self-audit →</a>.</p>+</section>+<!-- Hero chart --><section class="scene-section" style="border-top:0; padding-top:0;"><div class="viz-block">diff --git a/landing/use-cases/elasticsearch-replacement.html b/landing/use-cases/elasticsearch-replacement.htmlindex fc9145512..50866df43 100644--- a/landing/use-cases/elasticsearch-replacement.html+++ b/landing/use-cases/elasticsearch-replacement.html@@ -40,11 +40,10 @@<nav class="uc-subnav" aria-label="Use cases"><a href="/use-cases.html">ALL USE CASES</a>+ <a href="/use-cases/code-security-audit.html">AI SECURITY REVIEW</a><a href="/use-cases/security-analytics.html">SECURITY ANALYTICS</a><a href="/use-cases/operational-intelligence.html">OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE</a><a href="/use-cases/ai-search-retrieval.html">AI SEARCH</a>- <a href="/use-cases/semantic-analytics.html">SEMANTIC ANALYTICS</a>- <a href="/use-cases/code-security-audit.html">AI SECURITY REVIEW</a><a href="/use-cases/elasticsearch-replacement.html" class="active">ES REPLACEMENT</a><a href="/use-cases/unified-observability.html">OBSERVABILITY</a></nav>diff --git a/landing/use-cases/operational-intelligence.html b/landing/use-cases/operational-intelligence.htmlindex 61c3512ad..385d19679 100644--- a/landing/use-cases/operational-intelligence.html+++ b/landing/use-cases/operational-intelligence.html@@ -40,11 +40,10 @@<nav class="uc-subnav" aria-label="Use cases"><a href="/use-cases.html">ALL USE CASES</a>+ <a href="/use-cases/code-security-audit.html">AI SECURITY REVIEW</a><a href="/use-cases/security-analytics.html">SECURITY ANALYTICS</a><a href="/use-cases/operational-intelligence.html" class="active">OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE</a><a href="/use-cases/ai-search-retrieval.html">AI SEARCH</a>- <a href="/use-cases/semantic-analytics.html">SEMANTIC ANALYTICS</a>- <a href="/use-cases/code-security-audit.html">AI SECURITY REVIEW</a><a href="/use-cases/elasticsearch-replacement.html">ES REPLACEMENT</a><a href="/use-cases/unified-observability.html">OBSERVABILITY</a></nav>diff --git a/landing/use-cases/security-analytics.html b/landing/use-cases/security-analytics.htmlindex fa00deb3a..d5d35371a 100644--- a/landing/use-cases/security-analytics.html+++ b/landing/use-cases/security-analytics.html@@ -40,11 +40,10 @@<nav class="uc-subnav" aria-label="Use cases"><a href="/use-cases.html">ALL USE CASES</a>+ <a href="/use-cases/code-security-audit.html">AI SECURITY REVIEW</a><a href="/use-cases/security-analytics.html" class="active">SECURITY ANALYTICS</a><a href="/use-cases/operational-intelligence.html">OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE</a><a href="/use-cases/ai-search-retrieval.html">AI SEARCH</a>- <a href="/use-cases/semantic-analytics.html">SEMANTIC ANALYTICS</a>- <a href="/use-cases/code-security-audit.html">AI SECURITY REVIEW</a><a href="/use-cases/elasticsearch-replacement.html">ES REPLACEMENT</a><a href="/use-cases/unified-observability.html">OBSERVABILITY</a></nav>diff --git a/landing/use-cases/unified-observability.html b/landing/use-cases/unified-observability.htmlindex 101672214..d10be768f 100644--- a/landing/use-cases/unified-observability.html+++ b/landing/use-cases/unified-observability.html@@ -40,11 +40,10 @@<nav class="uc-subnav" aria-label="Use cases"><a href="/use-cases.html">ALL USE CASES</a>+ <a href="/use-cases/code-security-audit.html">AI SECURITY REVIEW</a><a href="/use-cases/security-analytics.html">SECURITY ANALYTICS</a><a href="/use-cases/operational-intelligence.html">OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE</a><a href="/use-cases/ai-search-retrieval.html">AI SEARCH</a>- <a href="/use-cases/semantic-analytics.html">SEMANTIC ANALYTICS</a>- <a href="/use-cases/code-security-audit.html">AI SECURITY REVIEW</a><a href="/use-cases/elasticsearch-replacement.html">ES REPLACEMENT</a><a href="/use-cases/unified-observability.html" class="active">OBSERVABILITY</a></nav>