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docs(case-study): recover interrupted sweep + verify 8 dropped candidates + trigger traces
Xerj Squad A5364715eb35d
diff --git a/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/FINDINGS.md b/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/FINDINGS.mdindex fd117de69..d596f9e25 100644--- a/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/FINDINGS.md+++ b/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/FINDINGS.md@@ -140,6 +140,27 @@ but **not** `manage_network_users` POSTs `action=adduser` (valid `add-user` noncan existing user's email, `role=administrator`, no `noconfirmation` -> stored ->invitee visits the link -> becomes administrator.+**Exact trigger (traced to the HTTP request):**+```+POST /wp-admin/network/user-new.php (multisite; also wp-admin/user-new.php)+Cookie: <logged-in site admin: has create_users + promote_users, NOT manage_network_users>+Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded++action=adduser+&_wpnonce_add-user=<valid nonce from the Add-User form>+&[email protected] # must resolve via get_user_by('email')+&role=administrator # <-- injected; NOT in the inviter's editable_roles+ # (omit 'noconfirmation' so the email-invitation else-branch runs)+```+Server stores `new_user_{key} = { user_id, email, role:'administrator' }` (line 100,+**no `wp_ensure_editable_role`**). Second-order trigger — the invitee clicks:+```+GET /newbloguser/<key>/ # init hook maybe_add_existing_user_to_blog -> add_user_to_blog -> set_role('administrator')+```+No re-check on confirmation. Conditions to actually cross a boundary: (a) multisite,+(b) an `editable_roles` filter that restricts this inviter below `administrator`+(else `wp_ensure_editable_role` is a no-op and the role was assignable anyway).+**Honest severity — conditional, defense-in-depth in stock.** In a *stock* install`get_editable_roles()` returns all roles, so `wp_ensure_editable_role` is a no-opand the inviter could assign that role anyway — **no boundary is crossed**. The gapdiff --git a/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/ZERODAY-SWEEP.md b/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/ZERODAY-SWEEP.mdindex 0d325a737..d51077681 100644--- a/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/ZERODAY-SWEEP.md+++ b/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/ZERODAY-SWEEP.md@@ -53,3 +53,67 @@ the whole earlier audit) are the daily driver; this deep sweep is the periodic## ReproduceThe workflow script is under the session's `workflows/scripts/`; re-run points thesame reviewer/verifier prompts at any file list (`review_files.json`).++---++## Recovery after the usage-limit interruption++The run hit the weekly usage limit near the end. Reading the workflow+`journal.jsonl` (one `result` line per agent) recovers exactly what completed:++- **Review phase: 177/177 batches finished → all 883 files WERE analyzed.** No+ file was left unreviewed. (This is the important recovery result: the coverage+ of the *review* is complete.)+- **Verify phase: 36/44 candidates verified; 8 dropped** at the limit. So the gap+ is 8 *unverified candidates*, not unanalyzed files — recoverable by reading the+ code directly (no agents needed).++### The 8 dropped candidates — hand-verified by the lead (reading real code)++| candidate | lead verdict |+|---|---|+| `blocks/cover.php:102` (oEmbed KSES bypass) | **REFUTED** — the block builds a *fixed* `<iframe>` template with `esc_url($iframe_src)`; it does not emit the provider's raw HTML. Not injectable. |+| `feed-rss2-comments.php:107` (`]]>` CDATA breakout) | **Plausible, low–medium, unconfirmed.** `comment_text()` output sits inside `<![CDATA[…]]>`; `wp_kses_post` does not escape a literal `]]>`, so a comment containing `]]>` can close the CDATA and inject markup into the **comments RSS feed**. Trigger: unauthenticated comment on a post with comments-feed enabled; impact is on **feed consumers/aggregators** that render it unsanitized — not a WP-site compromise. Needs a feed-reader test to confirm; reported as a candidate. |+| `block-supports/custom-css.php:258` (edit_css scope) | **Plausible, medium, unconfirmed.** The custom-CSS strip is wired to `content_save_pre`/`content_filtered_save_pre` (post-content saves). If block-widget saves via the REST widgets path don't pass those filters, a user with `edit_theme_options` but not `edit_css`/`unfiltered_html` could store custom CSS. Trigger: authenticated `edit_theme_options` user, block-widget REST save. Needs the widget-save-path trace to confirm. |+| `rest .../widgets-controller.php:178` (context=edit scoping) | Candidate — read-scoping on `show_in_rest` sidebars; low, needs confirmation. |+| `rest .../global-styles-controller.php:256` (per-block css not validated) | Candidate — `validate_custom_css` only on top-level `styles.css`, low. |+| `rest .../abilities-v1-run-controller.php:163` (404-vs-403 info leak) | Candidate — ability-name enumeration; info-disclosure, low. |+| `wp-mail.php:170` (From-header → post author) | **Design-level**, by-documentation (Post-by-Email trusts the mailbox); not a code bug. |+| `wp-trackback.php:75` (UTF-7 charset filter) | WordPress **deliberately blocks** UTF-7 trackbacks here — the code is the mitigation, not a bug. Likely FP. |++**Net after recovery:** the one lead-confirmed *new* finding remains+`user-new.php` role injection (FINDINGS.md #4); `cover.php`, `wp-mail.php`,+`wp-trackback.php` are refuted/by-design; `feed-rss2-comments.php` and+`custom-css.php` are plausible-but-unconfirmed candidates worth a follow-up+(feed-reader test / widget-save-path trace) when the usage budget resets.++## How XERJ makes this discoverable vs. a full-context-window search++The naive alternative — feed the whole codebase to a model and ask "find bugs" —+fails on **three** axes this sweep exposes:++1. **It doesn't fit.** WP core is ~5.2M tokens; a 200k window holds ~4% of it.+ You *must* chunk, and chunking is where interprocedural bugs (the+ `user-new.php` role flows into `add_user_to_blog` two files away) get split+ apart and lost. XERJ holds the whole call graph as **facts** (~26k tokens for+ the structured audit) so the agent reasons over all 883 files without loading+ their text.+2. **It can't compare siblings without the map.** The `user-new.php` bug is a+ *missing sibling guard* — visible only when you see all three role-sinks+ together. XERJ's `wpsinks`/`wpauthz` indices return "every call to+ `add_option`/`add_existing_user_to_blog` with a role arg" in one query, so the+ reviewer is *handed the three siblings to compare*; a windowed scan reads them+ in different chunks and never lines them up.+3. **It re-reads everything every time.** A full-context pass pays the whole token+ cost per question. XERJ builds the index once and every subsequent query+ (sinks, patterns, authz posture, gadget reachability, taint) is ~hundreds to a+ few thousand tokens. The per-file *deep* sweep (~10.8M tokens, 222 agents) is+ the thorough backstop; the XERJ structured passes (~26k) are the daily driver —+ and XERJ is what let the sweep **target** the 883 security-relevant files+ instead of blindly chunking 1,492.++The division of labour: **XERJ narrows and proves coverage and hands the reviewer+the right neighbours to compare; the per-file read catches the logic/inconsistency+gaps the facts don't encode.** Neither alone found `user-new.php` — the structural+graph passed it (a cap check *was* present), and a blind full-context scan would+have split its cross-file flow. Together they caught it.