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docs(case-study): per-file zero-day sweep finds authz gap the structural pass missed
Xerj Squad A844ec089b679
diff --git a/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/FINDINGS.md b/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/FINDINGS.mdindex 3b60970ec..fd117de69 100644--- a/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/FINDINGS.md+++ b/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/FINDINGS.md@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@| 1 | `wp_http_validate_url` allows `169.254.0.0/16` (cloud metadata) | SSRF (incomplete deny-list) | Medium (known-class) | **Real, verified, reachable** || 2 | `class-snoopy.php` curl build: `escapeshellarg($URI)` after flags, no `--` | option injection (escaper ≠ injection defense) | Informational (core) | **NOT reachable in core — bundled dead code**; valid pattern for plugins || 3 | `class-wp-image-editor-imagick.php` parses uploaded image content | ImageTragick (image-rce-ssrf) | Medium (deploy-dependent) | **Real surface** |+| 4 | `user-new.php:100` stores `$_REQUEST['role']` with NO `wp_ensure_editable_role()` (2 of 3 sibling role-sinks guard it) | role injection / privilege-escalation (inconsistent authz) | Medium (multisite + filtered `editable_roles`) | **Real gap — found by the per-file sweep I missed** || — | AJAX / REST / admin authorization | IDOR / privesc | — | Verified **clean** (object-scoped) || — | SQL double-`prepare` de-escape | SQLi | — | Verified **safe** (placeholder_escape) || — | sanitizer composition (escape→de-escape) | XSS/SQLi | — | Verified **safe** (escaper-last) |@@ -111,6 +112,43 @@ a restrictive `policy.xml`, which WP relies on the host to provide; WP checks fitype first but the content is still parsed. **Fix (deploy):** patched ImageMagick;`policy.xml` disabling `MVG/MSL/URL/EPHEMERAL/HTTPS` coders.+## Finding 4 — inconsistent `wp_ensure_editable_role()` -> role injection (`user-new.php`)++**Found by the multi-agent per-file zero-day sweep — the structural authz graph+missed it** (it saw a `promote_user` cap check and passed; it did not check that+the *role-editability* guard was applied consistently).++`wp-admin/user-new.php` has **three** sinks that assign a request-supplied role.+Two are guarded, one is not:+```php+// line 73 (adduser, noconfirmation branch) -> GUARDED+wp_ensure_editable_role( $_REQUEST['role'] ); add_existing_user_to_blog([... 'role'=>$_REQUEST['role']]);+// line 231 (createuser branch) -> GUARDED+wp_ensure_editable_role( $_REQUEST['role'] );+// line 95-102 (adduser, email-invitation else branch) -> NOT GUARDED+add_option( 'new_user_'.$key, [ 'user_id'=>$user_id, 'email'=>..., 'role'=>$_REQUEST['role'] ] );+$roles = get_editable_roles(); $role = $roles[ $_REQUEST['role'] ]; // AFTER the store; email only; warning not wp_die+```+The stored role is later applied on confirmation: `/newbloguser/{key}/` ->+`maybe_add_existing_user_to_blog()` -> `add_existing_user_to_blog()` ->+`add_user_to_blog()` -> `$user->set_role($role)` — **with no re-check** (only the+default-true `can_add_user_to_blog` filter). So a role the inviter is not+authorized to assign is persisted and applied.++**Reachability:** authenticated multisite user with `promote_user` on the target+but **not** `manage_network_users` POSTs `action=adduser` (valid `add-user` nonce),+an existing user's email, `role=administrator`, no `noconfirmation` -> stored ->+invitee visits the link -> becomes administrator.++**Honest severity — conditional, defense-in-depth in stock.** In a *stock* install+`get_editable_roles()` returns all roles, so `wp_ensure_editable_role` is a no-op+and the inviter could assign that role anyway — **no boundary is crossed**. The gap+bites where **`editable_roles` is filtered** to restrict an admin below the injected+role (common in membership / role-manager plugins and multisite delegation), and+only on **multisite**. It is a genuine, unconditional *inconsistency* (2 of 3 sinks+guarded) matching upstream 7.0.2 — worth reporting to WordPress as a hardening fix,+not a stock-install RCE. Verified by reading the real code + adversarial agent.+## Verified-clean negatives (the honest majority)### Authorization / IDOR — cleandiff --git a/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/README.md b/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/README.mdindex d9598eee0..3b6447e20 100644--- a/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/README.md+++ b/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/README.md@@ -116,6 +116,9 @@ read; scale and durability come from XERJ.second-order, TOCTOU, timing, …) with attack + detection + safe recipe.- **Copyable Claude Code skill**: [`skill/SKILL.md`](skill/SKILL.md)— install it and run this whole workflow on your own codebase.+- [`ZERODAY-SWEEP.md`](ZERODAY-SWEEP.md) — **the multi-agent per-file zero-day+ sweep** (222 agents, adversarial verify): found a role-injection authz gap the+ structural graph missed. See FINDINGS.md #4.- [`AUTHENTICATION.md`](AUTHENTICATION.md) — **the WordPress auth story across all4 entry surfaces** (AJAX/REST/XML-RPC/admin-post): missing / insufficient /broken-`==` / race checked; ~51× fewer tokens than reading the handlers.diff --git a/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/ZERODAY-SWEEP.md b/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/ZERODAY-SWEEP.mdnew file mode 100644index 000000000..0d325a737--- /dev/null+++ b/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/ZERODAY-SWEEP.md@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@+# Per-file zero-day sweep (multi-agent workflow)++After the structural passes reported core "clean," a **per-file** review was run —+a multi-agent workflow over the 883 security-relevant files, each reviewer primed+to *assume bugs were missed and look harder*, with **adversarial verification** of+every candidate. This is the honest test of whether the structural approach had+blind spots. **It did — it found a real authz gap the graph missed.**++## The workflow+- **Scout** → the 883-file work-list (from the XERJ indices).+- **Review** → 177 agents (5 files each), reading real code + XERJ facts, hunting+ logic bugs / missing-insufficient-broken(`==`)-authz / second-order / TOCTOU /+ deser / type-confusion — reporting only concrete source→sink or broken-check+ candidates.+- **Verify** → an independent agent per candidate, tasked to **refute** it+ (reachable? guarded? dead code? receiver-type FP? deploy-only?).+- **Synthesize** → only survivors.++Scale: **222 agents, ~10.8M tokens, ~31 min**, 44 candidates → **5 confirmed**+after adversarial verification. (8 verify agents hit a usage limit near the end;+those candidates are unverified, not counted.)++## Confirmed findings++| # | file:line | class | severity | note |+|---|---|---|---|---|+| 1 | `wp-admin/user-new.php:100` | role injection (inconsistent `wp_ensure_editable_role`) | Medium (multisite + filtered roles) | **NEW — the structural graph missed it.** See FINDINGS.md #4 |+| 2 | `wp-includes/http.php:598` | SSRF `169.254` gap | Medium | independent re-discovery of FINDINGS.md #1 (validates the sweep) |+| 3 | `akismet/class.akismet-admin.php:1212` | CSRF (missing nonce on a GET view action) | Low | plugin, needs a logged-in admin + forged GET |+| 4 | `ID3/module.audio-video.flv.php:716` | resource-exhaustion DoS | Low | author+ uploads a crafted `.flv`; loop over attacker-set count |+| 5 | `build/pages/font-library/page.php:308` | missing capability check | Low | low-priv access to the font-library admin page |++Findings 3–5 are **at the workflow's adversarial-verifier confidence**; only #1+(and #2, already known) were re-read by the lead. #3–#5 are low-severity and+plugin/edge — reported honestly as candidates pending a lead read, not asserted.++## The honest takeaway — why the structural pass missed #1+My authz graph asked *"is there a capability check?"* — `user-new.php` has one+(`promote_user`), so it passed. The real bug is **inconsistency**: a second,+role-specific guard (`wp_ensure_editable_role`, added 6.8.0) is applied to 2 of 3+sibling role-sinks and **omitted on the third**. A "presence of a check" model+cannot see a *missing sibling guard*; a per-file read that compares the three+branches can. **Lesson: structural coverage and per-file reading are complementary+— the graph narrows and proves coverage; the read catches inconsistency and logic+gaps the facts don't encode.** This sweep is now part of the method.++## Cost+~10.8M tokens for the exhaustive per-file pass is the *thorough* end of the dial —+appropriate when you suspect misses. The cheap structural passes (~26k tokens for+the whole earlier audit) are the daily driver; this deep sweep is the periodic+"did we miss anything" backstop. Both belong in the workflow.++## Reproduce+The workflow script is under the session's `workflows/scripts/`; re-run points the+same reviewer/verifier prompts at any file list (`review_files.json`).