AI search engine and MCP server for bots and agents. One Rust binary indexes code, docs, logs, JSONL/CSV and PDFs for BM25 full-text, vector and hybrid search, code search without grep, agent memory and RAG. Elasticsearch-compatible API; Corpus Hub serves hundreds of reference memory corpora.
Rust agent-memoryai-agentsbm25claude-codeclicode-searchcursordatabaseelasticsearchfull-text-searchhybrid-searchjsonllocal-firstmcpmcp-servermodel-context-protocolragrustsearch-enginevector-search
release: cut v1.0.0-rc.7
xerj-orgd1e73bc1aa78
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.mdindex b34fe1bb3..3a6130e90 100644--- a/CHANGELOG.md+++ b/CHANGELOG.md@@ -7,6 +7,76 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0## [Unreleased]+## [1.0.0-rc.7] - 2026-07-30++Seventh release candidate: the **second brain and security-hardening+release**. Headline for users: point one binary at a folder with+`xerj brain <folder>` and get a bi-temporal, evidence-carrying link graph+over your own documents, with a console view — THE MAP — that stays+readable at any corpus size. Alongside it, six network-reachable security+findings from a whitebox self-audit are fixed.++### Added++- **`xerj brain <folder>`** — one command turns a folder into a queryable+ knowledge graph. Structural detectors (wiki-links, markdown links,+ hrefs, folder adjacency, reading order) record, for every link, the+ exact sentence that created it and the byte offset it came from.+ Measured: 10 notes → 25 links in 0.1s; a 943 MB repo copy → 7,571 files,+ 2,128,360 notes, 20,930 links in 322.7s.+- **Graph HTTP API** — `POST`/`DELETE /_graph/{brain}/link`,+ `GET /_graph/{brain}/ego`, `GET /_graph/{brain}/overview`. Bi-temporal:+ links are retired, never deleted, and any past moment is replayable via+ `as_of`. Traversal is capped at 2 hops per call by design — XERJ is a+ search engine with a graph-shaped index, not a graph database.+- **THE MAP** (console) — a Canvas knowledge-graph view whose default+ "helicopter" altitude is bounded by construction: any corpus collapses+ to at most a dozen named groups plus one catch-all. Measured 19,299+ links / 1,550 documents → 13 groups in 44 ms; a synthetic 50,000-link+ budget → 13 groups / 60 bundles in 122 ms, byte-identical across runs;+ 60 fps pan/zoom/expand. Small corpora skip clustering and draw real+ notes, so the view is adaptive rather than one-size.+- **Cross-file-type links** — new `pathcite@1` and `cratecite@1`+ detectors relate documents to the code and files they cite, so a PDF or+ a design note can be shown next to the crate it references, with the+ citing text as evidence.+- **Agent surface** — four MCP tools (`xerj_brain_ego`, `xerj_brain_link`,+ `xerj_brain_unlink`, `xerj_brain_overview`) under+ `contract: xerj-second-brain/1`.+- `limits.snapshot_repo_allowlist` — an Elasticsearch `path.repo`+ equivalent bounding where snapshot repositories may live.++### Fixed++- **Security (unauthenticated):** `POST /_sql` with a deeply nested+ `WHERE` clause overflowed the stack and aborted the whole process. The+ WHERE parser now bounds recursion depth (`MAX_SQL_DEPTH`), as the+ query_string parser already did.+- **Security:** search-template parameters were spliced into the query+ JSON unescaped and re-parsed, so a parameter could inject query+ structure and drop the template's own filter. Parameters are now+ JSON-escaped and can no longer emit structural tokens.+- **Security:** a snapshot repository's `settings.location` was an+ unvalidated absolute path, so snapshots could read and write index data+ outside `data_dir`. Locations are now bounded by `data_dir` or the new+ allowlist.+- **Security:** the console's session `last_seen` refresh blind-wrote a+ stale copy of the session, which could resurrect a session revoked+ moments earlier. The refresh now re-reads and skips revoked sessions.+- Console: the Second Brain dashboard is no longer always present — it+ appears once at least one brain exists, so a user who has never run+ `xerj brain` is not shown an empty dashboard.+- Console: several second-brain counts reported the engine's 10,000-hit+ floor as an exact total on multi-million-note brains; totals are now+ exact, and floors are shown as `≥`.++### Notes++- The second brain's link detection is **structural and lexical** — there+ is no LLM and no semantic model in the loop, and the node-store embedder+ remains a lexical feature hash. Scale beyond the measured corpus above+ is not claimed.+## [1.0.0-rc.6] - 2026-07-28Sixth release candidate: the **semantic-analytics and bounded-memorydiff --git a/engine/Cargo.lock b/engine/Cargo.lockindex 1ecdf9aee..0c59c2e74 100644--- a/engine/Cargo.lock+++ b/engine/Cargo.lock@@ -6203,7 +6203,7 @@ dependencies = [[[package]]name = "xerj-ai"-version = "1.0.0-rc.6"+version = "1.0.0-rc.7"dependencies = ["anyhow","candle-core",@@ -6224,7 +6224,7 @@ dependencies = [[[package]]name = "xerj-api"-version = "1.0.0-rc.6"+version = "1.0.0-rc.7"dependencies = ["anyhow","async-trait",@@ -6254,7 +6254,7 @@ dependencies = [[[package]]name = "xerj-autoindex"-version = "1.0.0-rc.6"+version = "1.0.0-rc.7"dependencies = ["anyhow","chrono",@@ -6281,7 +6281,7 @@ dependencies = [[[package]]name = "xerj-cluster"-version = "1.0.0-rc.6"+version = "1.0.0-rc.7"dependencies = ["anyhow","async-trait",@@ -6303,7 +6303,7 @@ dependencies = [[[package]]name = "xerj-common"-version = "1.0.0-rc.6"+version = "1.0.0-rc.7"dependencies = ["anyhow","byteorder",@@ -6321,7 +6321,7 @@ dependencies = [[[package]]name = "xerj-compress"-version = "1.0.0-rc.6"+version = "1.0.0-rc.7"dependencies = ["byteorder","bytes",@@ -6334,7 +6334,7 @@ dependencies = [[[package]]name = "xerj-console-api"-version = "1.0.0-rc.6"+version = "1.0.0-rc.7"dependencies = ["anyhow","arc-swap",@@ -6370,7 +6370,7 @@ dependencies = [[[package]]name = "xerj-engine"-version = "1.0.0-rc.6"+version = "1.0.0-rc.7"dependencies = ["anyhow","arc-swap",@@ -6409,7 +6409,7 @@ dependencies = [[[package]]name = "xerj-fts"-version = "1.0.0-rc.6"+version = "1.0.0-rc.7"dependencies = ["anyhow","bitpacking",@@ -6435,7 +6435,7 @@ dependencies = [[[package]]name = "xerj-logs"-version = "1.0.0-rc.6"+version = "1.0.0-rc.7"dependencies = ["anyhow","byteorder",@@ -6453,7 +6453,7 @@ dependencies = [[[package]]name = "xerj-mcp"-version = "1.0.0-rc.6"+version = "1.0.0-rc.7"dependencies = ["anyhow","reqwest",@@ -6463,7 +6463,7 @@ dependencies = [[[package]]name = "xerj-query"-version = "1.0.0-rc.6"+version = "1.0.0-rc.7"dependencies = ["anyhow","base64 0.22.1",@@ -6478,7 +6478,7 @@ dependencies = [[[package]]name = "xerj-server"-version = "1.0.0-rc.6"+version = "1.0.0-rc.7"dependencies = ["anyhow","axum",@@ -6524,7 +6524,7 @@ dependencies = [[[package]]name = "xerj-storage"-version = "1.0.0-rc.6"+version = "1.0.0-rc.7"dependencies = ["anyhow","arc-swap",@@ -6554,7 +6554,7 @@ dependencies = [[[package]]name = "xerj-vector"-version = "1.0.0-rc.6"+version = "1.0.0-rc.7"dependencies = ["anyhow","byteorder",@@ -6572,7 +6572,7 @@ dependencies = [[[package]]name = "xerj-wasm"-version = "1.0.0-rc.6"+version = "1.0.0-rc.7"dependencies = ["anyhow","bytes",diff --git a/engine/Cargo.toml b/engine/Cargo.tomlindex 78c1687e1..a9d54729a 100644--- a/engine/Cargo.toml+++ b/engine/Cargo.toml@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ members = [][workspace.package]-version = "1.0.0-rc.6"+version = "1.0.0-rc.7"edition = "2021"license = "Apache-2.0"authors = ["xerj Contributors"]diff --git a/engine/crates/xerj-engine/src/engine.rs b/engine/crates/xerj-engine/src/engine.rsindex 6dcaf9d97..76cd7084b 100644--- a/engine/crates/xerj-engine/src/engine.rs+++ b/engine/crates/xerj-engine/src/engine.rs@@ -1942,53 +1942,6 @@ fn validate_snapshot_path(}}-#[cfg(test)]-mod snapshot_path_security_tests {- use super::validate_snapshot_path;-- #[test]- fn f_path_02_repo_location_outside_data_dir_is_rejected_by_default() {- let data = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();- // A repo location pointing outside data_dir (the F-PATH-02 exploit shape)- // with an empty allowlist must be refused.- let outside = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();- let repo = outside.path().to_str().unwrap();- let snap = std::path::Path::new(repo).join("s1");- let err = validate_snapshot_path(repo, "s1", &snap, data.path(), &[])- .expect_err("external repo location must be rejected");- assert!(err.to_string().contains("outside data_dir"), "{err}");- }-- #[test]- fn location_inside_data_dir_is_allowed() {- let data = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();- let repo_dir = data.path().join("backups");- std::fs::create_dir_all(&repo_dir).unwrap();- let repo = repo_dir.to_str().unwrap();- let snap = repo_dir.join("s1");- validate_snapshot_path(repo, "s1", &snap, data.path(), &[])- .expect("a repo under data_dir must be allowed");- }-- #[test]- fn explicit_allowlist_permits_an_external_root() {- let data = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();- let ext = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();- let repo = ext.path().to_str().unwrap().to_string();- let snap = std::path::Path::new(&repo).join("s1");- validate_snapshot_path(&repo, "s1", &snap, data.path(), &[repo.clone()])- .expect("an allowlisted external root must be permitted");- }-- #[test]- fn traversal_name_still_rejected_even_inside_an_allowed_base() {- let data = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();- let snap = data.path().join("..");- let repo = data.path().to_str().unwrap();- assert!(validate_snapshot_path(repo, "..", &snap, data.path(), &[]).is_err());- }-}-/// Recursively copy all files from `src` to `dst`, recording relative paths in `files`.fn copy_dir_recursive(src: &std::path::Path,@@ -2054,3 +2007,50 @@ fn es_type_to_field_type(es_type: &str) -> xerj_common::types::FieldType {_ => FieldType::Object,}}++#[cfg(test)]+mod snapshot_path_security_tests {+ use super::validate_snapshot_path;++ #[test]+ fn f_path_02_repo_location_outside_data_dir_is_rejected_by_default() {+ let data = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();+ // A repo location pointing outside data_dir (the F-PATH-02 exploit shape)+ // with an empty allowlist must be refused.+ let outside = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();+ let repo = outside.path().to_str().unwrap();+ let snap = std::path::Path::new(repo).join("s1");+ let err = validate_snapshot_path(repo, "s1", &snap, data.path(), &[])+ .expect_err("external repo location must be rejected");+ assert!(err.to_string().contains("outside data_dir"), "{err}");+ }++ #[test]+ fn location_inside_data_dir_is_allowed() {+ let data = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();+ let repo_dir = data.path().join("backups");+ std::fs::create_dir_all(&repo_dir).unwrap();+ let repo = repo_dir.to_str().unwrap();+ let snap = repo_dir.join("s1");+ validate_snapshot_path(repo, "s1", &snap, data.path(), &[])+ .expect("a repo under data_dir must be allowed");+ }++ #[test]+ fn explicit_allowlist_permits_an_external_root() {+ let data = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();+ let ext = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();+ let repo = ext.path().to_str().unwrap().to_string();+ let snap = std::path::Path::new(&repo).join("s1");+ validate_snapshot_path(&repo, "s1", &snap, data.path(), std::slice::from_ref(&repo))+ .expect("an allowlisted external root must be permitted");+ }++ #[test]+ fn traversal_name_still_rejected_even_inside_an_allowed_base() {+ let data = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();+ let snap = data.path().join("..");+ let repo = data.path().to_str().unwrap();+ assert!(validate_snapshot_path(repo, "..", &snap, data.path(), &[]).is_err());+ }+}