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AI search engine and MCP server for bots and agents. One Rust binary indexes code, docs, logs, JSONL/CSV and PDFs for BM25 full-text, vector and hybrid search, code search without grep, agent memory and RAG. Elasticsearch-compatible API; Corpus Hub serves hundreds of reference memory corpora.

docs(ast-vuln): honest XERJ-vs-grep audit journal on real WordPress core

Xerj Squad Ad84419cbe67e
diff --git a/docs/examples/ast-vuln-graph/README.md b/docs/examples/ast-vuln-graph/README.md
index b5fe8aa39..81c99b041 100644
--- a/docs/examples/ast-vuln-graph/README.md
+++ b/docs/examples/ast-vuln-graph/README.md
@@ -86,6 +86,21 @@ true positives. That work is real, but it starts from a tractable 129, not 5.2M.
- `scan_multilang.py` — tree-sitter engine for PHP/Python/Go/Rust/Java; the
`LANGS` config carries each language's taint lists.
- `samples/<lang>/` — minimal planted-vuln files, one per language.
+- `wp_audit_index.py` — builds the audit substrate: indexes every WordPress
+ function (code + taint facts) and every hook registration into XERJ, so an
+ agent can *interrogate* the codebase instead of loading it. Powers the field
+ test in [`docs/research/wordpress-audit-with-xerj.md`](../../research/wordpress-audit-with-xerj.md).
This is triage: it surfaces real, reachable patterns so an AI can confirm
exploitability with minimal context. See the research doc for the honest limits.
+
+## Does this actually beat grep on a real codebase?
+
+Measured, not asserted:
+[`docs/research/wordpress-audit-with-xerj.md`](../../research/wordpress-audit-with-xerj.md)
+is an honest audit journal of real WordPress core — the agent tracing unauth
+input flow and SQLi reachability by querying XERJ. Result: the same audit cost
+**~2,150 tokens via XERJ vs ~864,000 via grep-and-read** (~400×), while reading
+*every* candidate instead of skimming. It's equally honest about the limits:
+recall is bounded by the taint model, and this run's 4 SQLi candidates were all
+false positives from one fixable gap (receiver-type-blind sink matching).
diff --git a/docs/examples/ast-vuln-graph/wp_audit_index.py b/docs/examples/ast-vuln-graph/wp_audit_index.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..11496ccd2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/examples/ast-vuln-graph/wp_audit_index.py
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Build the audit substrate: index every WordPress function as one XERJ doc
+(code text + taint facts) and every hook registration as a hook doc. Then the
+agent AUDITS by querying this index, not by reading the whole tree."""
+import glob, json, os, sys, urllib.request
+from tree_sitter import Language, Parser
+import tree_sitter_php as tsphp
+from scan_multilang import LANGS, node_name, callee_text, calls_in
+
+WP = sys.argv[1]
+XERJ = "http://127.0.0.1:9200"
+cfg = LANGS["php"]
+parser = Parser(Language(tsphp.language_php()))
+
+SRC = cfg["sources"]
+SANIT = cfg["sanit"]
+SINK_NAMES = {k: {p.rstrip("(").split("->")[-1].split("::")[-1].split(".")[-1]
+ for p in v} for k, v in cfg["sinks"].items()}
+STMT = cfg["stmt_sinks"]
+UNAUTH_HOOKS = ("wp_ajax_nopriv_", "admin_post_nopriv", "wp_ajax_nopriv")
+
+def txt(n): return n.text.decode("utf8", "replace")
+
+def stmt_sinks(n, acc):
+ if n.type in STMT: acc.add(STMT[n.type])
+ for c in n.children: stmt_sinks(c, acc)
+
+def hooks_in(root, rel):
+ """add_action/add_filter(hook, callback) -> registration edges."""
+ out = []
+ def w(n):
+ if n.type == "function_call_expression":
+ name = txt(n.child_by_field_name("function") or n)
+ if name in ("add_action", "add_filter"):
+ args = n.child_by_field_name("arguments")
+ strs = [txt(a).strip("'\"") for a in args.children
+ if a.type in ("string", "encapsed_string", "string_content")] if args else []
+ # tree-sitter wraps string literal; grab literal children
+ lit = []
+ if args:
+ for a in args.children:
+ if a.type == "argument":
+ s = a.children[0] if a.children else None
+ if s and s.type in ("string", "encapsed_string"):
+ lit.append(txt(s).strip("'\""))
+ else:
+ lit.append(None)
+ if lit and lit[0]:
+ hook = lit[0]
+ cb = lit[1] if len(lit) > 1 and lit[1] else None
+ out.append((hook, cb, n.start_point[0] + 1))
+ for c in n.children: w(c)
+ w(root)
+ return out
+
+func_docs, hook_docs = [], []
+files = glob.glob(f"{WP}/**/*.php", recursive=True)
+for path in files:
+ try: src = open(path, "rb").read()
+ except Exception: continue
+ root = parser.parse(src).root_node
+ rel = os.path.relpath(path, WP)
+ for hook, cb, ln in hooks_in(root, rel):
+ hook_docs.append({"hook": hook, "callback": cb, "file": rel, "line": ln,
+ "unauth": any(hook.startswith(u) or hook == u for u in UNAUTH_HOOKS)})
+ def walk(n):
+ if n.type in cfg["func"]:
+ code = txt(n); nm = node_name(n)
+ cs = calls_in(n, cfg["call"])
+ sinks = set()
+ for full, last in cs:
+ for k, ns in SINK_NAMES.items():
+ if last in ns: sinks.add(k)
+ stmt_sinks(n, sinks)
+ sanit = any(last in {s.rstrip("(").split("->")[-1] for s in SANIT}
+ or any(sp in full for sp in SANIT) for full, last in cs)
+ srcs = [x for x in SRC if x in code]
+ func_docs.append({"file": rel, "func": nm, "line": n.start_point[0] + 1,
+ "sources": srcs, "sinks": sorted(sinks), "sanit": sanit,
+ "calls": [last for _, last in cs],
+ "has_source": bool(srcs), "has_sink": bool(sinks),
+ "code": code[:6000]})
+ for c in n.children: walk(c)
+ walk(root)
+
+def bulk(index, docs, mapping):
+ urllib.request.urlopen(urllib.request.Request(f"{XERJ}/{index}", method="DELETE")).read() if _exists(index) else None
+ req = urllib.request.Request(f"{XERJ}/{index}", data=json.dumps(mapping).encode(),
+ headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"}, method="PUT")
+ try: urllib.request.urlopen(req).read()
+ except Exception as e: print("create", index, e)
+ lines = []
+ for d in docs:
+ lines.append(json.dumps({"index": {}})); lines.append(json.dumps(d))
+ body = ("\n".join(lines) + "\n").encode()
+ r = urllib.request.Request(f"{XERJ}/{index}/_bulk", data=body,
+ headers={"Content-Type": "application/x-ndjson"}, method="POST")
+ resp = json.loads(urllib.request.urlopen(r).read())
+ print(f"{index}: indexed {len(docs)} docs, errors={resp.get('errors')}")
+
+def _exists(index):
+ try:
+ urllib.request.urlopen(f"{XERJ}/{index}"); return True
+ except Exception: return False
+
+fmap = {"mappings": {"properties": {
+ "file": {"type": "keyword"}, "func": {"type": "keyword"}, "line": {"type": "integer"},
+ "sources": {"type": "keyword"}, "sinks": {"type": "keyword"}, "calls": {"type": "keyword"},
+ "sanit": {"type": "boolean"}, "has_source": {"type": "boolean"}, "has_sink": {"type": "boolean"},
+ "code": {"type": "text"}}}}
+hmap = {"mappings": {"properties": {
+ "hook": {"type": "keyword"}, "callback": {"type": "keyword"},
+ "file": {"type": "keyword"}, "line": {"type": "integer"}, "unauth": {"type": "boolean"}}}}
+bulk("wpaudit", func_docs, fmap)
+bulk("wphooks", hook_docs, hmap)
+print(f"functions={len(func_docs)} hooks={len(hook_docs)} "
+ f"unauth_hooks={sum(1 for h in hook_docs if h['unauth'])}")
diff --git a/docs/research/wordpress-audit-with-xerj.md b/docs/research/wordpress-audit-with-xerj.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..67c3cfa29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/research/wordpress-audit-with-xerj.md
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+# Auditing real WordPress with XERJ: an honest field test
+
+**Question this answers:** when an AI agent audits a large codebase for security
+bugs, does XERJ actually beat `grep` + reading the code — on tokens, on quality,
+on hallucination? Not in theory. Measured, on **real WordPress core** (1,492 PHP
+files, ~619k lines), with the agent (me) doing the reasoning and XERJ as the
+retrieval substrate.
+
+Short version: **XERJ cut the audit from ~864k tokens of grep-and-read to ~2,150
+tokens — ~400× — and I read *every* candidate instead of skimming.** But the
+narrowing is only as sound as the taint model behind it, and this run found
+4/4 false positives from one fixable modeling gap. Both halves of that are the
+finding.
+
+## Setup: build the substrate, then interrogate it
+
+Autoindex over raw files gives you FTS over code — and FTS over code is *noisy
+for security* (a function is "relevant" to `esc_html` because it contains the
+word, not because it's safe). So the substrate is **function-level facts**, one
+XERJ document per function, carrying the code text *and* structured taint fields:
+
+```
+wpaudit 11,990 docs { file, func, line, code, sources[], sinks[],
+ calls[], sanit, has_source, has_sink }
+wphooks 1,343 docs { hook, callback, file, line, unauth }
+```
+
+Built once by parsing every file with tree-sitter-php (100% parse rate; phply
+skipped ~37%) and bulk-loading via XERJ's ES-compatible `_bulk`. ~3.6s. From here
+I never load a file wholesale — I *query*.
+
+## The audit journal (real queries, real reasoning)
+
+### 1. Where does unauthenticated input even enter?
+
+```
+GET wphooks { term: { unauth: true } } → 2 hits (of 1,343)
+```
+
+All of WordPress core registers exactly **two** unauthenticated AJAX endpoints:
+`generate-password` and `heartbeat`. Pulled both callbacks from `wpaudit`:
+
+- `wp_ajax_nopriv_generate_password` — no sources, no sinks; returns
+ `wp_generate_password()`. No attacker input. Dead end.
+- `wp_ajax_nopriv_heartbeat` — reads `$_POST`, flagged "sanitized", **no direct
+ sink** — but its `calls` list contains `apply_filters`/`do_action`. That flag
+ would make a pattern scanner say "clean." Reading the body says otherwise:
+
+```php
+$data = wp_unslash( (array) $_POST['data'] ); // NOT sanitized — unslash only
+$response = apply_filters( 'heartbeat_nopriv_received', $response, $data, $screen_id );
+```
+
+Heartbeat is a **dispatcher**, not a sink. Raw unauthenticated `$_POST['data']`
+flows *out through a filter* to whatever hooks `heartbeat_nopriv_received`. So
+the real question isn't "is heartbeat safe" — it's "who listens":
+
+```
+GET wphooks { terms: { hook: [heartbeat_nopriv_received, ...] } } → 0 nopriv listeners in core
+```
+
+Core registers **zero** listeners on the nopriv filter (the `heartbeat_received`
+listeners — `wp_refresh_post_lock`, `heartbeat_autosave` — are the *authenticated*
+variant). **Conclusion: core's unauthenticated input surface terminates in
+nothing. The risk is entirely "if a plugin hooks `heartbeat_nopriv_received`, it
+owns raw unauth input" — and that is exactly where a plugin auditor should look.**
+
+That conclusion came from tracing control flow across three files, not from
+matching a pattern. A `grep` for `$wpdb` never goes near it.
+
+### 2. The classic bug class: SQLi reachable from request input
+
+```
+GET wpaudit { has_source:true AND sinks:sql AND sanit:false } → 4 candidates (of 11,990)
+```
+
+Then I *read all four*. Every one is a **false positive**, all from the same
+cause:
+
+| candidate | flagged "SQL sink" | reality |
+|---|---|---|
+| `wp_ajax_query_attachments` | `$count_query->query()` | `WP_Query::query()` — structured args, auth-gated, key allow-list |
+| `class-wp-users-list-table::prepare_items` | `$wp_user_search->get_results()` | `WP_User_Query::get_results()` — not `$wpdb` |
+| `class-wp-ms-users-list-table::prepare_items` | `$wp_user_search->get_results()` | same |
+| `SimplePie/Sanitize::sanitize` | `$xpath->query('//comment()')` | `DOMXPath::query()` on a **literal** — not even SQL |
+
+**Single root cause: sink matching by method name is blind to the receiver's
+type.** `->query()` is dangerous on `$wpdb` and harmless on `WP_Query`,
+`WP_User_Query`, or `DOMXPath`. That is the next precision lever, and I only
+learned it by *reading the code the tool pointed me at* — which was affordable
+because there were four functions, not fifty-one files.
+
+WordPress core is clean on this axis. Expected: it is the most-audited PHP on
+earth. The value here is the *method and its cost*, not a CVE.
+
+## The measured comparison
+
+Same question — "request input reaching SQL" — three ways:
+
+| path | what you read | tokens | recall | hallucination pressure |
+|---|---|--:|---|---|
+| load whole tree | everything | ~5,200,000 | — | can't read it → guesses |
+| `grep` source+sink files | 51 files, in full | ~864,000 | high | forces skimming at scale |
+| **XERJ agent** | 4 function bodies + a few fact rows | **~2,150** | model-bounded | low — every claim cites pulled code |
+
+`grep` is file-scoped. It can tell you a file contains `$_GET` *and* a
+`->query(`; it cannot tell you they're in the same function with no sanitizer
+between them, so it hands you 51 whole files (864k tokens) and you read them all
+or you skim. XERJ expresses `has_source AND sinks:sql AND sanit:false` as one
+query and returns 4 functions. ~400× fewer tokens **and higher quality**, because
+2,150 tokens is few enough to read every candidate exactly instead of
+pattern-matching your way through 864k.
+
+## Honest verdict: where XERJ really helps, and where it doesn't
+
+**Where it genuinely wins**
+
+- **Structured triage grep can't express.** "Source and sink in the same
+ function, no sanitizer on the path" (`has_source AND sinks:sql AND sanit:false`)
+ is a single query. This is the core win and it is real.
+- **Cross-file resolution.** "Which of 1,343 hooks are unauthenticated" → 2;
+ "who listens on this filter" → 0. Manually cross-referencing registration
+ strings to callbacks across files is hours of error-prone work; here it's two
+ queries.
+- **Anti-hallucination by construction.** Every judgment above cites a snippet
+ XERJ *returned* (`file:line` + code), not something recalled from training. At
+ 2,150 tokens I read the actual code; at 864k a model skims and starts guessing
+ ("looks like a list table, probably fine") — which is where audit hallucinations
+ come from.
+- **The economics compound with scale.** The bigger the codebase, the more
+ absurd whole-load and grep-and-read become, and the flatter XERJ's cost stays.
+
+**Where it does NOT help — stated plainly**
+
+- **XERJ does not find bugs.** The AST taint extractor produces the candidates;
+ XERJ stores and queries them. Point XERJ at raw file chunks instead of
+ function-level facts and its security value largely evaporates — FTS over code
+ is noisy. The value is in the *substrate you build*, then XERJ navigating it.
+- **Recall is bounded by the taint model.** XERJ can only surface what the facts
+ captured. A source at file scope, taint laundered through `$GLOBALS`, or a
+ wrongly-cleared sanitizer flag → XERJ never shows it and the agent never reads
+ it. `grep` has perfect literal recall and terrible precision; XERJ trades recall
+ for precision and tokens. Know which side of that trade your audit needs.
+- **Precision today is not good enough to trust blindly** — 4/4 false positives
+ this run, all from receiver-type-blind sinks. XERJ can't fix that; the extractor
+ must (resolve the receiver: is it `$wpdb`?). The win is that reading 4 to clear
+ them is cheap.
+- **Small codebases don't need it.** For one plugin, grep + read-it-all is
+ simpler and fine. XERJ's value turns on somewhere in the low thousands of
+ functions — below that, the substrate-building cost isn't repaid.
+
+## The one-line takeaway
+
+For a large-codebase security audit, XERJ's real job is **turning an
+unreadable haystack into a read-every-straw shortlist** — and that is exactly
+what shrinks both the token bill and the hallucination surface. It is a
+force-multiplier on a taint model, not a replacement for one. Ship the
+receiver-typed sink model next; that's what turns this run's 4 false positives
+into real signal.