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docs(case-study): ship the audit skill as a tracked, copyable file
Xerj Squad Afd6a846b758e
diff --git a/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/COVERAGE-AUDIT.md b/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/COVERAGE-AUDIT.mdindex 5099a14e7..d2180c4e6 100644--- a/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/COVERAGE-AUDIT.md+++ b/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/COVERAGE-AUDIT.md@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Everything here is reproducible; scripts are in> **The full map is the reference.** [`PHP-DANGEROUS-FUNCTIONS.md`](sink-census/PHP-DANGEROUS-FUNCTIONS.md)> is the readable table of all 275 functions; `sink-census/php_dangerous_functions.json`> is the machine-readable source. This whole recipe is packaged as a copyable-> Claude Code skill — see [`.claude/skills/xerj-security-audit/`](../../../.claude/skills/xerj-security-audit/SKILL.md).+> Claude Code skill — see [`skill/SKILL.md`](skill/SKILL.md).## Step 1 — Map the dangerous built-ins (the full reference)diff --git a/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/README.md b/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/README.mdindex cda40250b..5c6c14356 100644--- a/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/README.md+++ b/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/README.md@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ read; scale and durability come from XERJ.zero gaps against grep, then AI-enrich into a queryable ledger (`sink-census/`).- [`sink-census/PHP-DANGEROUS-FUNCTIONS.md`](sink-census/PHP-DANGEROUS-FUNCTIONS.md) —the **full map of 275 dangerous PHP functions** (28 categories, taint-arg noted).-- **Copyable Claude Code skill**: [`.claude/skills/xerj-security-audit/`](../../../.claude/skills/xerj-security-audit/SKILL.md)+- **Copyable Claude Code skill**: [`skill/SKILL.md`](skill/SKILL.md)— install it and run this whole workflow on your own codebase.- [`FINDINGS.md`](FINDINGS.md) — the SSRF vulnerability, with verification andreachability.diff --git a/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/skill/README.md b/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/skill/README.mdnew file mode 100644index 000000000..6a53da159--- /dev/null+++ b/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/skill/README.md@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@+# xerj-security-audit — copyable Claude Code skill++`SKILL.md` is a self-contained Claude Code skill that encodes the whole+coverage-guaranteed whitebox audit workflow (setup → map → AST census → prove+0 gaps → index → AI-enrich → reason).++## Install+```bash+mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills/xerj-security-audit # or <repo>/.claude/skills/...+cp SKILL.md ~/.claude/skills/xerj-security-audit/SKILL.md+cp -r ../sink-census ~/.claude/skills/xerj-security-audit/ # the scripts + catalog+```+Then invoke it in Claude Code (`/xerj-security-audit`) or just ask to+"run the XERJ security audit" on a target codebase. Retarget another stack by+extending `php_dangerous_functions.json` (the taint model is data, not code).diff --git a/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/skill/SKILL.md b/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/skill/SKILL.mdnew file mode 100644index 000000000..9b5631f45--- /dev/null+++ b/docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/skill/SKILL.md@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@+---+name: xerj-security-audit+description: Coverage-guaranteed whitebox security audit of a codebase using XERJ + tree-sitter AST. Use when the user wants to security-review PHP (or other-language) code with a provable "we enumerated every dangerous call" guarantee, or asks to run the WordPress-style sink census / audit. Drives an index-once, query-read-reason loop; proves zero gaps against grep; enriches findings into a queryable ledger.+---++# XERJ whitebox security audit++Run a security review where **XERJ is the agent's second brain**: index the code+once, then interrogate it — never load whole files. The deliverable is a+*defensible coverage claim*, not a vibe. Scripts referenced below live in+`docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/sink-census/` (copy them alongside+this skill to reuse in another repo).++## When to use+- "Security-review this codebase / WordPress plugin / PHP app with coverage."+- "Find the dangerous calls / sinks and prove we didn't miss any."+- "Run the sink census / audit ledger."++## Prerequisites (state them, then set up)+- XERJ running, ES-compatible, on `http://127.0.0.1:9200` (`xerj --insecure --data-dir ./data`).+- `pip install tree-sitter tree-sitter-php` (+ the grammar for the target language).+- The target source tree on disk.++## The loop (do these in order; report honestly at each step)++### 1. Map the dangerous functions (knowledge)+Use `php_dangerous_functions.json` — 275 PHP built-ins/constructs across 28+categories (command/code exec, `unserialize`, include loaders, file r/w/delete,+SSRF, SQL drivers, XXE, callables, variable-injection, reflection, weak crypto/+random, type-juggling, …), each with vuln class + the **taint-relevant argument**.+For another framework/language, extend this map — it is data, not code.++### 2. Census every call site (AST)+`python3 sink_census.py <src>` parses every file with tree-sitter and records+**every** call site of a catalogued function (calls, methods, constructs like+`echo`/`include`/backtick, `new ReflectionFunction`). tree-sitter captures real+calls regardless of formatting/namespacing — grep cannot.++### 3. PROVE coverage (the guarantee — do not skip)+The census reconciles **every grep occurrence against the AST**, using AST+string/comment/inline-HTML node ranges as the oracle. A clean run prints:+```+UNEXPLAINED: 0 => coverage PROVEN (0 gaps)+```+If UNEXPLAINED > 0, EVERY residual must be resolved (it is either a real call the+extractor missed — fix the catalog/node-handling — or a proven non-call). Never+report coverage while residuals are unexplained.++### 4. Index + triage (XERJ `wpsinks`)+The census bulk-indexes one doc per call site (`file,line,fn,class,arg`). Query+the risk profile; the rare high-value classes are the must-review set (in WP core:+RCE-command 11, deserialization 13, SQL 200, SSRF 107). You can now *guarantee*+you've seen every one.++### 5. AI-enrich into a ledger (`enrich_pipeline.py`)+For each high-risk site: read the arg + enclosing code, decide `reachable`+(request/cache/trusted/literal), `guarded` (which defense), `severity`, and a+`verdict`; write it back to `wpsinks`. This is the embedding-pipeline analogue,+but the enrichment is reasoned security judgement, and it accretes across runs.+Enrich 100% of the rare classes; queue the long tail.++### 6. Reason about the real bugs (the parts a census can't see)+Sink coverage ≠ total coverage. Also sweep, using the other detectors in the case+study: object-scoped authorization / IDOR (`wp_authz_graph.py`,+`wp_checkuse_idor.py`), validator *completeness* (`wp_ssrf_ranges.py` — an+incomplete allow/deny list, e.g. SSRF missing `169.254`), and sanitizer+*composition* order (`wp_compose_index.py`). Verify each candidate by reading,+then by executing the flow. Trace reachability to real input.++## Honesty rules (these make the result trustworthy)+1. Precision from the graph/facts; full-text only to navigate. FTS over raw code+ is noisy for security.+2. Verify by reading, then by executing (port the flow to a runnable language if+ no runtime). No claim from memory of the framework — cite pulled `file:line`.+3. Trace reachability to attacker-controlled input before calling something a bug.+4. No manufactured findings — a clean negative is a valid result.+5. Report substrate/engine bugs: an impossible query result means the tool is+ wrong, not reality. (Known XERJ caveats today: `term` on a keyword *array*+ matches only the first element — traverse `_source` in code for reverse+ call-graphs; boolean `term` matches as a string — use `"true"`.)+6. State the coverage claim precisely: *"every call to a catalogued dangerous+ function is enumerated with a proven-zero-gap census"* — not "we read the code."++## The coverage statement this earns+> Every call to a known-dangerous built-in in the target (N sites, M functions,+> K files) is enumerated with a proven-zero-gap AST census, indexed, and triaged+> by vuln class; 100% of the command-exec / deserialization / SQL sinks carry an+> AI verdict.++## Reuse in another repo+Copy `docs/case-studies/wordpress-security-audit/sink-census/*` and this skill.+Point `sink_census.py` at your tree; extend `php_dangerous_functions.json` (or add+a language grammar + a parallel catalog) for your stack. The proof step and the+enrichment loop are language-agnostic.