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Zero Breach — local, read-only scanner that checks a computer for indicators of the AdFection / Candiru ad-delivered spyware campaign. No network, no admin, no dependencies.

Search retained DNS history when current logging is disabled

interplains1029a9aefaea
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 091ff86..46ebdc7 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
# Zero Breach
-> Release v0.1.4 prioritizes local COM-registered files in the optional Candiru pattern check and expands Windows DNS-history coverage. See
-> [the v0.1.4 scope](COVERAGE-UPGRADE.md) and [pattern validation](DETECTION-UPGRADE.md). It needs a pinned YARA-X
-> dependency; default checks remain standard-library-only.
+> Release v0.1.5 searches saved Windows DNS events even when logging is currently
+> off. It keeps a coverage warning for unrecorded periods and does not change
+> logging settings. Optional Candiru patterns still need the pinned YARA-X engine;
+> see [pattern validation](DETECTION-UPGRADE.md). Default checks remain standard-library-only.
[![tests](https://github.com/interplains/zero-breach/actions/workflows/tests.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/interplains/zero-breach/actions/workflows/tests.yml)
@@ -144,7 +145,7 @@ set up (e.g. a bad indicator file).
Use the official repository above and check the downloaded file before running it.
-**1. Verify the publisher's signature.** Release v0.1.4 includes detached GPG
+**1. Verify the publisher's signature.** Release v0.1.5 includes detached GPG
signatures for the scanner and its checksum manifest, using ArchiveGenocide's
established release key. Follow [SIGNING.md](SIGNING.md), and compare the full
key fingerprint with [ArchiveGenocide's verification page](https://archivegenocide.com/verify.html).
@@ -168,11 +169,11 @@ you do not have to trust the download at all; you can reproduce it:
```
git clone https://github.com/interplains/zero-breach.git
cd zero-breach
-git checkout v0.1.4
+git checkout v0.1.5
python build/build.py # writes dist/zero-breach.py and prints its SHA-256
```
-These commands reproduce v0.1.4; substitute the matching tag for another release.
+These commands reproduce v0.1.5; substitute the matching tag for another release.
On macOS or Linux use `python3` for the build command.
Compare the hash with that release's published hash. The development branch may
contain later changes and is not expected to reproduce an earlier release.
diff --git a/SIGNING.md b/SIGNING.md
index 5924710..f565d61 100644
--- a/SIGNING.md
+++ b/SIGNING.md
@@ -1,17 +1,17 @@
# Verifying ArchiveGenocide release signatures
-Zero Breach v0.1.4 supplies detached GPG signatures for the exact released
+Zero Breach v0.1.5 supplies detached GPG signatures for the exact released
scanner and its SHA256SUMS.txt manifest. They use ArchiveGenocide's existing
Ed25519 release-signing key, also published on the archive's verification page.
Official repository: https://github.com/interplains/zero-breach
-Official release: https://github.com/interplains/zero-breach/releases/tag/v0.1.4
+Official release: https://github.com/interplains/zero-breach/releases/tag/v0.1.5
Independent publisher page: https://archivegenocide.com/scan/#verify-download
Established key identity: https://archivegenocide.com/verify.html
## Check the publisher and file
-Download these three files from the v0.1.4 release into one directory:
+Download these three files from the v0.1.5 release into one directory:
- zero-breach.py
- zero-breach.py.asc
@@ -36,9 +36,9 @@ Verification must succeed using the expected ArchiveGenocide key. A warning
that the key is not certified by your own web of trust is different from a
bad signature; do not ignore a fingerprint mismatch or failed verification.
-The expected SHA-256 of zero-breach.py v0.1.4 is:
+The expected SHA-256 of zero-breach.py v0.1.5 is:
- 5ab89ef3dda3579dfc0b4930b0d66290fdc755611afd91e28c373e30fe9996cc
+ 59811565be507c7d956e77f5f396b81545259c551fa9208d85654a01dec1048e
A signature verifies which key signed these exact bytes. It does not establish
that the program has no bugs. A checksum alone is not publisher authentication.
@@ -58,14 +58,14 @@ The manifest lists the fifteen release-content files, including the optional
requirements file and Candiru rule attribution and licence records. The manifest itself and
the added public key/signatures are not self-listed.
-Public verification artifacts are also retained in release-signatures/v0.1.4/.
+Public verification artifacts are also retained in release-signatures/v0.1.5/.
No private key is stored in this repository or in its project backups.
## Indicator updates are a separate trust path
The manually run scan/update-iocs.py still checks HTTPS, a published SHA-256,
and indicator-file validity. It does not automatically verify GPG signatures.
-The signed release manifest covers the indicator file shipped with v0.1.4;
+The signed release manifest covers the indicator file shipped with v0.1.5;
it does not authenticate later files fetched from the development branch.
## Maintainer release procedure
diff --git a/TESTING.md b/TESTING.md
index a2fb7bb..5b60f6c 100644
--- a/TESTING.md
+++ b/TESTING.md
@@ -35,11 +35,12 @@ untested optional positives as a skip. Use `--require-patterns` before release.
- The existing unit/regression suite.
- Two byte-identical builds of the downloadable script, plus its help/version.
-- Eleven fixture scenarios, each in fresh source-CLI and single-file processes:
+- Fifteen fixture scenarios, each in fresh source-CLI and single-file processes:
clean data, contacted domain, harmless research reference, exact hash hit,
corrupt database, a hit alongside a corrupt database, `--quick` coverage gap,
a DNS hit past the old 20,000-event limit, unread older DNS events without a
- hit, invalid indicator input, and COM-referenced optional file patterns.
+ hit, four disabled-DNS-log cases (retained match, retained clean data,
+ unreadable retained events and no events), invalid indicator input, and COM-referenced optional file patterns.
- Real browser-shaped SQLite files and harmless rule-matching bytes pass through
the real scanner modules, evidence grading, exit codes and text/JSON reports.
Source and download must agree. Cookie values must stay out of reports;
diff --git a/build/bundle.py b/build/bundle.py
index 1798274..dbf3d8f 100644
--- a/build/bundle.py
+++ b/build/bundle.py
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ A('import datetime')
A('import sys')
A('import time')
A('')
-A('__version__ = "0.1.4 (single-file build)"')
+A('__version__ = "0.1.5 (single-file build)"')
A('')
A('# --- embedded indicator data ------------------------------------------------')
A('# The real file is iocs/adfection_iocs.txt in the project. Its provenance')
diff --git a/scan/README.md b/scan/README.md
index d90d121..bc67c92 100644
--- a/scan/README.md
+++ b/scan/README.md
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
# adint-scan
-> Release v0.1.4 improves coverage for the experimental, opt-in `--patterns` check. See
-> [COVERAGE-UPGRADE.md](../COVERAGE-UPGRADE.md) and [DETECTION-UPGRADE.md](../DETECTION-UPGRADE.md) for dependencies, limits and
-> validation evidence. Default checks need no added packages.
+> Release v0.1.5 reads retained Windows DNS events even if logging is currently
+> disabled, and keeps gaps for unrecorded activity. It never enables logging.
+> Optional Candiru pattern dependencies and limits are documented in
+> [DETECTION-UPGRADE.md](../DETECTION-UPGRADE.md).
A local, read-only check for the published AdFection / Candiru indicators,
with explicit reporting of missing evidence and checks that could not run.
diff --git a/scan/adint_scan/__init__.py b/scan/adint_scan/__init__.py
index f5d6c89..c62af21 100644
--- a/scan/adint_scan/__init__.py
+++ b/scan/adint_scan/__init__.py
@@ -4,4 +4,4 @@ A clean result from this tool means "no known indicators were found in the place
that can be checked." It does NOT mean the device is clean. See SPEC-scanner.md.
"""
-__version__ = "0.1.4"
+__version__ = "0.1.5"
diff --git a/scan/adint_scan/modules/host.py b/scan/adint_scan/modules/host.py
index 744b335..4e3616d 100644
--- a/scan/adint_scan/modules/host.py
+++ b/scan/adint_scan/modules/host.py
@@ -690,7 +690,7 @@ def _check_dns_log(r: ModuleResult, ctx) -> None:
r.submetrics["dns_log_enabled"] = 1 if enabled else 0
r.submetrics["dns_log_records"] = records
- if not enabled or records <= 0:
+ if records <= 0:
# The important branch, and the common one. This must never read clean.
r.could_not_run("dns-log", _DNS_LOG_GAP)
r.note("dns-log: {} enabled={} records={} — forward-looking checks are "
@@ -702,14 +702,23 @@ def _check_dns_log(r: ModuleResult, ctx) -> None:
"days": 0,
"basis": "DNS logging is {} and holds {} records".format(
"enabled" if enabled else "disabled", records),
- "note": "Nothing was ever recorded, so there is no window at all — "
- "not a short one. This is the Windows default, on every PC.",
+ "note": "No saved DNS events were available for this scan. "
+ "This does not establish whether older events existed or were cleared.",
"how_to_enable": _HOW_TO_ENABLE,
}
return
- ctx.emit("[host] DNS-Client/Operational is enabled ({} records); "
- "scanning messages".format(records))
+ # IsEnabled controls current collection, not whether retained events can
+ # be read. Disabling logging must not hide existing historical evidence.
+ if not enabled:
+ r.could_not_run("dns-log-recording",
+ "DNS logging is currently off; queries made while "
+ "logging was off may be missing")
+ r.note("dns-log: logging is off; the log reports {} saved event(s). "
+ "Checking them does not enable logging."
+ .format(records))
+ ctx.emit("[host] DNS-Client/Operational logging is {} ({} retained records); "
+ "scanning messages".format("on" if enabled else "off", records))
# -ErrorAction Stop, not SilentlyContinue: with SilentlyContinue a failure to
# read the channel (ACL, corrupt .evtx, Event Log service degraded) exits 0
# with no output, so `events` is [] and `ev_err` is "" - and the log, which is
@@ -725,18 +734,16 @@ def _check_dns_log(r: ModuleResult, ctx) -> None:
" | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 3 -Compress".format(
_DNS_LOG, _DNS_EVENT_CAP), timeout=300)
if (ev_err and not events) or (records > 0 and not events):
- reason = ("log is enabled with {} records but none could be read{} - this "
+ reason = ("log has {} retained records but none could be read{} - this "
"machine's DNS history was NOT searched, so nothing here is "
"cleared".format(records, ": " + ev_err if ev_err else ""))
r.could_not_run("dns-log", reason)
- r.note(_ARM_HINT)
return
hits = 0
times = [t for t in (_str(ev, "Time") for ev in events) if t]
if times:
- # The log IS on, so there is a real window. Report its true extent rather
- # than implying the whole history of the machine.
+ # Retained records have dates even when logging is currently disabled.
r.reach["dns-log"] = {
"earliest": min(times),
"days": None,
@@ -745,6 +752,9 @@ def _check_dns_log(r: ModuleResult, ctx) -> None:
"note": "Queries before this are either rotated out of the log or "
"beyond the bounded event read.",
}
+ if not enabled:
+ r.reach["dns-log"]["note"] += " Logging is currently off; queries during unrecorded periods may be missing."
+ r.reach["dns-log"]["how_to_enable"] = _HOW_TO_ENABLE
for ev in events:
when = _str(ev, "Time")
hits += _match(
diff --git a/scan/tests/test_evidence.py b/scan/tests/test_evidence.py
index 17a04a5..a452b3f 100644
--- a/scan/tests/test_evidence.py
+++ b/scan/tests/test_evidence.py
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ from adint_scan import iocs as iocmod # noqa: E402
from adint_scan import report # noqa: E402
from adint_scan.context import ScanContext # noqa: E402
from adint_scan.modules import browser # noqa: E402
-from adint_scan.result import Hit, ModuleResult, PARTIAL # noqa: E402
+from adint_scan.result import Hit, ModuleResult, PARTIAL, UNKNOWN # noqa: E402
TEST_DOMAIN = "synthetic-test-indicator.invalid"
@@ -305,6 +305,56 @@ class TestBlockedDnsLookupIsNotContact(unittest.TestCase):
class TestDnsLogIsNotProofOfContact(unittest.TestCase):
+ def disabled_log(self, records, events, error=""):
+ from adint_scan.modules import host
+ with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="dnslog_off_") as tmp:
+ result = ModuleResult("host")
+ replies = [([{"IsEnabled": False, "RecordCount": records}], "")]
+ if records:
+ replies.append((events, error))
+ with patch.object(host, "_ps_json", side_effect=replies) as query:
+ host._check_dns_log(result, make_ctx(tmp))
+ self.assertEqual(query.call_count, 2 if records else 1)
+ for call in query.call_args_list:
+ self.assertIn("Get-WinEvent", call.args[0])
+ self.assertNotIn("wevtutil", call.args[0])
+ return result
+
+ def test_disabled_log_still_searches_retained_matching_event(self):
+ result = self.disabled_log(1, [{"Time": "2025-03-04T12:00:00Z", "Message": TEST_DOMAIN}])
+ self.assertEqual(result.status, "HITS")
+ self.assertEqual([(h.indicator, h.evidence) for h in result.hits], [(TEST_DOMAIN, "dns-record")])
+ self.assertEqual(result.hits[0].observed, "2025-03-04T12:00:00Z")
+ self.assertEqual(result.submetrics["dns_log_events_scanned"], 1)
+ self.assertEqual(result.submetrics["dns_log_enabled"], 0)
+ self.assertIn("how_to_enable", result.reach["dns-log"])
+
+ def test_disabled_log_clean_retained_event_keeps_recording_gap(self):
+ result = self.disabled_log(1, [{"Time": "2025-03-04T12:00:00Z", "Message": "ordinary.invalid"}])
+ self.assertEqual(result.status, PARTIAL)
+ self.assertEqual(result.hits, [])
+ self.assertTrue(any(c.name == "dns-log" and c.ran for c in result.checks))
+ self.assertTrue(any(c.name == "dns-log-recording" and not c.ran for c in result.checks))
+
+ def test_disabled_empty_log_is_not_clean(self):
+ result = self.disabled_log(0, [])
+ self.assertEqual(result.status, UNKNOWN)
+ self.assertNotIn("dns_log_events_scanned", result.submetrics)
+
+ def test_disabled_log_read_failure_is_not_clean(self):
+ result = self.disabled_log(1, [], "fixture permission denied")
+ self.assertEqual(result.status, UNKNOWN)
+ self.assertEqual(result.hits, [])
+ self.assertTrue(any(c.name == "dns-log" and not c.ran for c in result.checks))
+ self.assertNotIn("dns_log_events_scanned", result.submetrics)
+
+ def test_disabled_log_preserves_hit_and_older_retained_gap_together(self):
+ result = self.disabled_log(50001, [{"Time": "2025-03-04T12:00:00Z", "Message": TEST_DOMAIN}])
+ self.assertEqual(result.status, "HITS")
+ self.assertEqual(len(result.hits), 1)
+ self.assertTrue(any(c.name == "dns-log-older-events" and not c.ran for c in result.checks))
+ self.assertTrue(any(c.name == "dns-log-recording" and not c.ran for c in result.checks))
+
def test_dns_match_after_old_20000_event_limit_is_read(self):
from adint_scan.modules import host
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="dnslog_extended_") as tmp:
diff --git a/tools/release_check.py b/tools/release_check.py
index 25343a2..d82996a 100644
--- a/tools/release_check.py
+++ b/tools/release_check.py
@@ -15,7 +15,8 @@ import time
ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
CASES = ("clean", "contact", "reference", "hash", "corrupt", "hit-and-gap", "quick",
- "dns-cap-hit", "dns-cap-gap", "bad-feed", "patterns")
+ "dns-cap-hit", "dns-cap-gap", "dns-off-retained-hit", "dns-off-retained-clean",
+ "dns-off-unreadable", "dns-off-empty", "bad-feed", "patterns")
class DownloadPanel(HTMLParser):
diff --git a/tools/release_fixture.py b/tools/release_fixture.py
index 95c6821..f64c235 100644
--- a/tools/release_fixture.py
+++ b/tools/release_fixture.py
@@ -126,6 +126,8 @@ def main():
raise RuntimeError("fixture attempted file access outside test/code/runtime roots")
events = [{"Time": "2025-06-01T00:00:00", "Message": "ordinary.invalid"}]
+ if case == "dns-off-retained-hit":
+ events[0]["Message"] = DOMAIN
if case.startswith("dns-cap-"):
events = events * 50000
if case == "dns-cap-hit":
@@ -133,9 +135,12 @@ def main():
def ps_json(command, timeout=60):
if "-ListLog " in command:
- return [{"IsEnabled": True, "RecordCount": len(events) + int(case.startswith("dns-cap-"))}], ""
+ return [{"IsEnabled": not case.startswith("dns-off-"),
+ "RecordCount": 0 if case == "dns-off-empty" else len(events) + int(case.startswith("dns-cap-"))}], ""
if "Get-WinEvent -LogName " in command:
require("-MaxEvents 50000" in command, "unexpected DNS read cap")
+ if case == "dns-off-unreadable":
+ return [], "fixture read denied"
return events, ""
if "Get-DnsClientCache" in command:
return [{"Entry": DOMAIN, "Data": "0.0.0.0", "Type": 1}], ""
@@ -196,6 +201,7 @@ def main():
"reference": ("browser", DOMAIN, "referenced"),
"hash": ("hash", DIGEST, "on-disk"),
"dns-cap-hit": ("host", DOMAIN, "dns-record")}
+ expected["dns-off-retained-hit"] = ("host", DOMAIN, "dns-record")
if case == "patterns" and engine:
expected[case] = ("patterns", "yara:MAL_DevilsTongue_HijackDll", "file-pattern")
require(hits == ([expected[case]] if case in expected else []),
@@ -204,11 +210,20 @@ def main():
require(verdict["hits_total"] == len(hits), "incorrect total finding count")
expected_verdict = ("INDICATORS_FOUND" if hits else
"NO_KNOWN_INDICATORS_WITH_GAPS" if case in
- ("corrupt", "quick", "dns-cap-gap", "patterns") else "NO_KNOWN_INDICATORS")
+ ("corrupt", "quick", "dns-cap-gap", "patterns", "dns-off-retained-clean",
+ "dns-off-unreadable", "dns-off-empty") else "NO_KNOWN_INDICATORS")
require(verdict["status"] == expected_verdict, "incorrect overall verdict: " + str(verdict))
if case.startswith("dns-cap-"):
require(any("dns-log-older-events" in g for g in verdict["gaps"]), "missing DNS cap gap")
require(modules["host"]["submetrics"]["dns_log_events_scanned"] == 50000, "wrong DNS count")
+ if case.startswith("dns-off-"):
+ require(modules["host"]["submetrics"]["dns_log_enabled"] == 0, "logging state misreported")
+ require(bool(verdict["gaps"]), "disabled logging coverage gap missing")
+ if case.startswith("dns-off-retained-"):
+ require(modules["host"]["submetrics"]["dns_log_events_scanned"] == 1, "retained event not searched")
+ require("HOW TO TURN ON DNS HISTORY" in text, "future-logging instructions missing")
+ if case in ("dns-off-empty", "dns-off-unreadable"):
+ require(not modules["host"]["submetrics"].get("dns_log_events_scanned"), "unread log falsely searched")
if case == "quick":
require(modules["hash"]["status"] == "UNKNOWN", "quick scan falsely cleared file hashes")
if case in ("corrupt", "hit-and-gap"):