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Zero Breach — local, read-only scanner that checks a computer for indicators of the AdFection / Candiru ad-delivered spyware campaign. No network, no admin, no dependencies.

Initial release

interplains884579faeb47
diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
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+# Personal scan output — contains usernames, account names, timestamps, hits.
+# Never publish. Users' own reports stay on their own machines.
+findings/
+*.report.txt
+scan-*.txt
+scan-*.json
+
+# The website self-check is deployed separately and is a different work stream;
+# its NOTES.md also carries infrastructure detail that must not be published.
+web/
+
+# Python caches and build junk
+__pycache__/
+*.pyc
+*.pyo
+.pytest_cache/
+.DS_Store
+
+# The single-file build is a release artifact, regenerated by build/bundle.py.
+# Keep it out of source control so the source is the source of truth.
+adint-scan-standalone.py
+dist/adint-scan-standalone.py
+
+# Internal development/process docs — kept locally, not published.
+HANDOVER.md
+DESIGN.md
+SPEC-scanner.md
diff --git a/LICENSE b/LICENSE
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/LICENSE
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diff --git a/NOTICE b/NOTICE
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/NOTICE
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+adint-scan
+Copyright 2026 archivegenocide.com
+
+Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may not use
+this software except in compliance with the License. You may obtain a copy of
+the License in the file LICENSE in this directory, or at:
+
+ http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+
+Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software distributed
+under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR
+CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+NOT AFFILIATED, NOT ENDORSED
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+This project is independent. It is NOT affiliated with, endorsed by, reviewed by
+or connected to any of the organisations whose published research it draws on:
+
+ The Citizen Lab (University of Toronto)
+ Confiant
+ Recorded Future / Insikt Group
+ Amnesty International Security Lab
+ Access Now
+
+Their names appear here only to cite the source of an indicator or to point a
+user at help. Any error in this software, and any error in how a published
+indicator has been transcribed or classified here, is this project's alone.
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+INDICATOR DATA IS LICENSED SEPARATELY
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+The indicator set in iocs/ is NOT covered by the Apache License above. It is
+released into the public domain under CC0 1.0 so that it can be copied into
+blocklists, STIX bundles, MISP instances and other tools without friction.
+See iocs/LICENSE.md.
+
+Primary sources for the indicator set:
+
+ The Citizen Lab, "Exposing AdFection: How Discover-Tech Turned Targeted Ads
+ Into a Pipeline for Zero-Click Mercenary Spyware", 2026-10-15.
+
+ Recorded Future / Insikt Group, "Devil's Tongue" infrastructure reporting,
+ CTA-2025-0805, August 2025.
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+WHAT THIS SOFTWARE DOES NOT PROMISE
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+A result of "no known indicators found" is not a clean bill of health, and this
+software states so in its own output. It cannot detect an unknown indicator, it
+cannot see evidence that has already expired, and it is not a substitute for
+expert forensic help. Anyone with real reason for concern should contact the
+Access Now Digital Security Helpline (https://www.accessnow.org/help/) or the
+Amnesty International Security Lab (https://securitylab.amnesty.org/).
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
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+++ b/README.md
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+# adint-scan
+
+A local, read-only scanner that checks a computer for traces of the **AdFection /
+Candiru** spyware campaign — the operation in which an ad-tech company used
+real-time ad bidding to deliver zero-click spyware to targeted people.
+
+It searches the machine's own leftover records — browser history, cookies, caches
+and connection records, file fingerprints, auto-start registrations and the DNS
+resolver cache — for 263 published indicators, and reports what it found, how
+strong the evidence is, and just as importantly **what it could not check**.
+
+> **A clean result is not a clean bill of health.** Spyware of this grade is built
+> to defeat exactly this kind of check, most of the evidence it leaves expires
+> within weeks, and Windows does not record DNS history unless someone turned it
+> on. This tool narrows uncertainty; it does not remove it. If you have real
+> reason to believe you are a target, the right step is expert help — the
+> [Access Now Digital Security Helpline](https://www.accessnow.org/help/) or the
+> [Amnesty International Security Lab](https://securitylab.amnesty.org/) — not a
+> self-service script.
+
+## Background
+
+In October 2026 The Citizen Lab documented how the ad-tech firm Discover-Tech used
+its **Controlium** platform to fingerprint and infect devices the moment an
+advertisement was rendered, delivering Candiru spyware with no click required.
+At least 45 devices at Al Jazeera were compromised across 2024–2025. The indicator
+set here is drawn from that reporting and from Recorded Future's independent
+tracking of the same infrastructure.
+
+There is nothing to patch: the delivery vector is real-time ad bidding working as
+designed. The practical defences are to reduce exposure (block ads at the device
+or gateway) and to look for traces of contact — which is what this tool does.
+
+- The Citizen Lab, *Exposing AdFection* (2026-10-15)
+- Recorded Future / Insikt Group, *Tracking Candiru's DevilsTongue Spyware* (CTA-2025-0805)
+
+## What it checks
+
+| area | what it reads |
+|---|---|
+| **Browser** | history, cookies (host names and timestamps only), favicons, HTTP cache, Local/Session Storage, Service Worker caches, and HSTS/connection records — across Chrome, Edge, Brave, Chromium and Firefox, every profile |
+| **Files** | SHA-256 of candidate files under the user-writable locations spyware drops into, against known sample hashes |
+| **Host** (Windows) | per-user COM registrations (this campaign's documented persistence), the DNS resolver cache, whether DNS history logging is even enabled, and the hosts file |
+
+Every match is **evidence-graded**, because the artifact decides the meaning. A
+cookie the browser set, or an HSTS record it stored, proves the device *contacted*
+a host. A domain merely appearing in a cached web page usually means the person
+*read an article about* the campaign. The tool keeps those apart so that reading
+about this topic never produces a false alarm, and a real contact is never buried.
+
+## Install and run
+
+Requires Python 3.7 or newer. No administrator. No third-party packages.
+
+**Single file (simplest):** download `adint-scan-standalone.py` and run
+
+```
+python -X utf8 adint-scan-standalone.py # full scan
+python -X utf8 adint-scan-standalone.py --quick # faster; skips file fingerprinting
+python -X utf8 adint-scan-standalone.py --json report.json
+```
+
+**From source:**
+
+```
+python -X utf8 scan/adint-scan.py
+```
+
+The scan is read-only: it changes nothing, needs no administrator, and never
+touches the network — it will not even resolve an indicator, because resolving a
+command-and-control domain would announce the person running it to whoever
+operates the infrastructure.
+
+Exit codes: `0` nothing found, `2` an indicator matched, `1` the scan could not be
+set up (e.g. a bad indicator file).
+
+## Reading the result
+
+The report opens with a plain-language summary: what was found, how serious it is,
+what to do, and **what could not be checked**. Findings are ranked strongest-first:
+
+- **on-disk** — a file matches a known sample's fingerprint (conclusive)
+- **persistence** — a name is registered to run automatically (serious)
+- **contacted** — the device demonstrably communicated with the host (serious)
+- **configured** — a name is mapped to a real address in local configuration
+- **referenced** — the name only appeared in saved page text (usually benign)
+
+Domain and IP matches are printed defanged (`example[.]com`) so that forwarding a
+report to a help organisation cannot cause a mail gateway to contact the
+indicator on the reader's behalf.
+
+## Indicator data and interoperability
+
+The 263 indicators live in [`iocs/adfection_iocs.txt`](iocs/adfection_iocs.txt),
+one per line with its tier, confidence and source. They are also exported as a
+STIX 2.1 bundle and a MISP event in [`dist/`](dist/), so they can be loaded into
+MISP, a SIEM, or Amnesty International's Mobile Verification Toolkit for mobile
+forensics:
+
+```
+mvt-ios check-backup --iocs dist/adfection.stix.json <backup folder>
+```
+
+Regenerate the exports with `python build/emit_stix.py` and `python build/emit_misp.py`.
+
+## Design principles
+
+- **Never contact an indicator.** The entire scan runs inside a guard that makes
+ any network access raise an error; a bug that tried to resolve a domain crashes
+ loudly rather than leaking a signal.
+- **Measured, never inferred.** A check that could not run is reported as a gap,
+ never as clean. This is enforced structurally, not by convention.
+- **Precision over coverage.** An unsigned binary in a user-writable path is not a
+ finding; plenty of honest software looks like that. Alarms that mean nothing
+ teach people to ignore the tool.
+- **Reads nothing it does not need.** It reads cookie *host names*, never cookie
+ *values*, and never touches the credential-decryption paths that an infostealer
+ would — a distinction asserted by the test suite, not just promised here.
+- **Read-only, no administrator, no telemetry, no dependencies.**
+
+## Tests
+
+```
+cd scan && python -m unittest discover -s tests
+```
+
+The suite covers the network guard, the evidence grading, the boundary matching
+(so a longer name or number that merely contains an indicator does not match), the
+loader's failure modes, and behavioural proofs that the tool never reads cookie
+values or the browser's master key.
+
+## Licence
+
+The software is licensed under the **Apache License 2.0** (`LICENSE`). The
+indicator data in `iocs/` and `dist/` is released into the public domain under
+**CC0 1.0** (`iocs/LICENSE.md`), so it can be copied into blocklists, MISP, STIX
+and other tools without restriction.
+
+This project is **not affiliated with, and not endorsed by**, The Citizen Lab,
+Confiant, Recorded Future, Amnesty International or Access Now. Their work is cited
+as the source of the indicators and as the place to turn for expert help. See
+`NOTICE` for details.
diff --git a/build/bundle.py b/build/bundle.py
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/build/bundle.py
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+"""Build a single-file, self-contained copy of the scanner.
+
+One .py file someone can be emailed, read, and run. It embeds the indicator data
+so there is no second file to lose, and it deliberately OMITS arm.py, so the
+result cannot change anything on the machine it runs on - which is a much better
+thing to be able to promise someone receiving a script from a friend.
+
+The only transformation applied to the module sources is renaming the two names
+that collide across the three scan modules (NAME and run), plus dropping the
+package-internal imports, since everything lands in one namespace.
+"""
+import io
+import os
+import re
+import sys
+import time
+
+# Defaults assume this file sits in <root>/build/. Both can still be overridden
+# on the command line, which is how the one-off test builds were made.
+ROOT = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
+SRC = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else ROOT
+OUT = (sys.argv[2] if len(sys.argv) > 2
+ else os.path.join(SRC, "dist", "adint-scan-standalone.py"))
+
+PKG = os.path.join(SRC, "scan", "adint_scan")
+IOC = os.path.join(SRC, "iocs", "adfection_iocs.txt")
+
+
+def read(path):
+ return io.open(path, encoding="utf-8").read()
+
+
+def strip_imports(text):
+ """Remove package-internal imports and __future__ (re-emitted once at top).
+
+ Handles a parenthesised multi-line import,
+ from .result import (A, B,
+ C, D)
+ by consuming lines until the parentheses balance. Dropping only the first
+ line of such a statement would leave its continuation lines behind as stray
+ indented text - a syntax error in the bundled file.
+ """
+ out = []
+ lines = text.split("\n")
+ i = 0
+ while i < len(lines):
+ line = lines[i]
+ s = line.strip()
+ is_future = s.startswith("from __future__")
+ is_local = bool(re.match(r"^from \.+[A-Za-z_. ]* import ", s)
+ or re.match(r"^from \.+ import ", s))
+ if is_future or is_local:
+ # If the import opens a parenthesis that does not close on this line,
+ # skip the whole continuation.
+ depth = line.count("(") - line.count(")")
+ i += 1
+ while depth > 0 and i < len(lines):
+ depth += lines[i].count("(") - lines[i].count(")")
+ i += 1
+ continue
+ out.append(line)
+ i += 1
+ return "\n".join(out)
+
+
+def namespace(text, suffix):
+ """Rename the two identifiers that collide between scan modules."""
+ text = re.sub(r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])NAME(?![A-Za-z0-9_])",
+ "NAME_" + suffix.upper(), text)
+ text = text.replace("def run(ctx)", "def run_{}(ctx)".format(suffix))
+ return text
+
+
+parts = []
+A = parts.append
+
+ioc_text = read(IOC)
+ioc_mtime = os.path.getmtime(IOC)
+
+A('#!/usr/bin/env python3')
+A('# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-')
+A('"""adint-scan (single-file build) - local check for published AdFection /')
+A('Candiru spyware indicators.')
+A('')
+A('WHAT THIS IS')
+A(' A read-only checker. It searches this computer\'s own leftover records -')
+A(' browser cache and cookies, file fingerprints, auto-start registrations, the')
+A(' DNS resolver cache - for {} indicators published by The Citizen Lab'.format(
+ len([l for l in ioc_text.split("\n")
+ if l.strip() and not l.strip().startswith("#")])))
+A(' (Exposing AdFection, 2026-10-15) and Recorded Future (CTA-2025-0805).')
+A('')
+A('WHAT IT WILL NOT DO')
+A(' - It never changes anything. The only file it writes is its own report. No')
+A(' registry writes, no settings touched: it has no code path of any kind')
+A(' that can modify this machine.')
+A(' - It never uses the network. Not to check for updates, not for telemetry,')
+A(' and above all never to look up an indicator - resolving a spyware domain')
+A(' would announce the person running this to whoever operates it. The whole')
+A(' scan runs inside a guard that makes network access raise an error.')
+A(' - It never decrypts anything. It reads cookie HOST NAMES only, never cookie')
+A(' values. Decrypting those is what credential-stealing malware does; this')
+A(' has no need for it and no code to do it.')
+A('')
+A('IMPORTANT - WHAT A CLEAN RESULT MEANS')
+A(' "No known indicators found" means exactly that, and nothing more. It is not')
+A(' a clean bill of health. Spyware of this grade is built to defeat this class')
+A(' of check, most of the evidence it would leave expires within weeks, and')
+A(' Windows does not record DNS history unless someone turned it on. If you have')
+A(' real reason for concern, the answer is expert help, not this script:')
+A(' Access Now Digital Security Helpline https://www.accessnow.org/help/')
+A(' Amnesty International Security Lab https://securitylab.amnesty.org/')
+A(' The Citizen Lab https://citizenlab.ca/')
+A('')
+A('LICENCE')
+A(' Software: Apache License 2.0. Indicator data: CC0 1.0 (public domain).')
+A(' Copyright 2026 archivegenocide.com. Provided AS IS, without warranty.')
+A(' Full text, and the sources every indicator came from:')
+A(' https://github.com/interplains/adint-scan')
+A(' NOT affiliated with, and NOT endorsed by, The Citizen Lab, Confiant,')
+A(' Recorded Future, Amnesty International or Access Now.')
+A('')
+A('USAGE')
+A(' python -X utf8 adint-scan-standalone.py')
+A(' python -X utf8 adint-scan-standalone.py --json report.json')
+A('')
+A('Requires Python 3.7 or newer. Needs no administrator. Windows gets all four')
+A('checks; macOS and Linux get the browser and file checks.')
+A('"""')
+A('from __future__ import annotations')
+A('')
+A('import argparse')
+A('import datetime')
+A('import sys')
+A('import time')
+A('')
+A('__version__ = "0.1.0 (single-file build)"')
+A('')
+A('# --- embedded indicator data ------------------------------------------------')
+A('# The real file is iocs/adfection_iocs.txt in the project. Its provenance')
+A('# comments are kept verbatim so every indicator can be traced to its report.')
+A('IOC_BUILD_EPOCH = {!r} # mtime of the indicator file at build time'.format(
+ ioc_mtime))
+A("IOC_DATA = r'''")
+A(ioc_text.replace("'''", "' ' '"))
+A("'''")
+A('')
+
+for label, fname in (("result", "result.py"),
+ ("iocs", "iocs.py"),
+ ("netguard", "netguard.py"),
+ ("context", "context.py"),
+ ("report", "report.py")):
+ A('# --- {} {}'.format(label, '-' * max(0, 72 - len(label))))
+ A(strip_imports(read(os.path.join(PKG, fname))))
+ A('')
+
+for label, fname, suffix in (("modules/browser", "browser.py", "browser"),
+ ("modules/hashscan", "hashscan.py", "hash"),
+ ("modules/host", "host.py", "host")):
+ A('# --- {} {}'.format(label, '-' * max(0, 72 - len(label))))
+ A(namespace(strip_imports(read(os.path.join(PKG, "modules", fname))), suffix))
+ A('')
+
+A('# --- entry point ------------------------------------------------------------')
+A('''
+
+def _load_embedded_iocs(path=None):
+ """Parse the embedded indicator data, or an external file if one is given."""
+ if path:
+ return load(path)
+ import tempfile
+ tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="adint_ioc_")
+ try:
+ p = os.path.join(tmp, "adfection_iocs.txt")
+ with io.open(p, "w", encoding="utf-8", newline="\\n") as fh:
+ fh.write(IOC_DATA)
+ ioc_set = load(p)
+ finally:
+ shutil.rmtree(tmp, ignore_errors=True)
+ # Report the age of the DATA, not of the temp file we just wrote, so the
+ # staleness warning stays truthful in a single-file build.
+ ioc_set.source_mtime = IOC_BUILD_EPOCH
+ ioc_set.source_path = "(embedded in this script)"
+ return ioc_set
+
+
+def _hold(args):
+ """Keep the window open when this was double-clicked.
+
+ Double-clicking a .py in Explorer opens a console that closes the instant
+ the script ends - so the entire report would flash past unread, which is the
+ most likely way a non-technical person runs this. Pausing costs a keypress
+ for anyone running it from a terminal, and saves the report for everyone else.
+ """
+ if getattr(args, "no_pause", False) or not sys.stdout.isatty():
+ return
+ try:
+ input("\\nPress Enter to close this window...")
+ except (EOFError, KeyboardInterrupt):
+ pass
+
+
+def _force_utf8_io():
+ """Make stdout/stderr encode UTF-8 whatever the console code page is. On a
+ stock Windows Python these default to cp1252, and printing a non-Latin
+ profile name or username - Arabic, Hebrew, Persian, Cyrillic, CJK, i.e. this
+ tool's users - then crashes with UnicodeEncodeError instead of producing a
+ report, worst of all while writing the report file after the work is done.
+ This makes the fix independent of the caller remembering `python -X utf8`."""
+ for stream in (sys.stdout, sys.stderr):
+ try:
+ stream.reconfigure(encoding="utf-8", errors="backslashreplace")
+ except (AttributeError, ValueError):
+ pass
+
+
+def main(argv=None):
+ _force_utf8_io()
+ p = argparse.ArgumentParser(
+ prog="adint-scan-standalone",
+ description="Read-only check for published AdFection / Candiru "
+ "indicators. A clean result is NOT a clean bill of health.")
+ p.add_argument("--json", metavar="PATH",
+ help="also write a machine-readable report to PATH")
+ p.add_argument("--iocs", metavar="PATH",
+ help="use an external indicator file instead of the "
+ "embedded one")
+ p.add_argument("--version", action="version",
+ version="adint-scan " + __version__)
+ p.add_argument("--quick", action="store_true",
+ help="skip fingerprinting every file (roughly halves the "
+ "runtime). The skipped check is reported as a gap, not "
+ "as clean.")
+ p.add_argument("--no-pause", action="store_true",
+ help="do not wait for a keypress before exiting")
+ args = p.parse_args(sys.argv[1:] if argv is None else argv)
+
+ if sys.version_info < (3, 7):
+ print("This needs Python 3.7 or newer; this is {}.{}.".format(
+ *sys.version_info[:2]), file=sys.stderr)
+ _hold(args)
+ return 1
+
+ try:
+ ioc_set = _load_embedded_iocs(args.iocs)
+ except IocError as exc:
+ print("error: {}".format(exc), file=sys.stderr)
+ _hold(args)
+ return 1
+
+ ctx = ScanContext(iocs=ioc_set, quick=args.quick)
+ started = datetime.datetime.now()
+ results = []
+ # The whole scan runs inside the no-network guard (see the header).
+ with no_network():
+ for name, fn in (("browser", run_browser), ("hash", run_hash),
+ ("host", run_host)):
+ if name == "hash" and args.quick:
+ r = ModuleResult("hash")
+ r.could_not_run(
+ "file-fingerprints",
+ "skipped by --quick. No file on this machine was "
+ "fingerprinted, so a known sample sitting on disk would "
+ "not have been found. Re-run without --quick to include it")
+ results.append(r)
+ print("[*] skipping file fingerprints (--quick)", file=sys.stderr)
+ continue
+ print("[*] running check: {}".format(name), file=sys.stderr)
+ started_mod = time.time()
+ try:
+ result = fn(ctx)
+ except Exception as exc:
+ result = ModuleResult(name)
+ result.could_not_run(name, "module error: {}".format(exc))
+ result.duration_s = time.time() - started_mod
+ print("[*] {} finished in {:.0f}s".format(name, result.duration_s),
+ file=sys.stderr)
+ results.append(result)
+
+ document = build_document(ioc_set, results, started)
+ print(render_human(document))
+
+ if args.json:
+ try:
+ write_json(document, args.json)
+ print("\\n[wrote JSON report to {}]".format(args.json),
+ file=sys.stderr)
+ except OSError as exc:
+ print("\\n[could not write JSON report to {}: {}]".format(
+ args.json, exc), file=sys.stderr)
+
+ _hold(args)
+ return 2 if document["verdict"]["status"] == "INDICATORS_FOUND" else 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+ raise SystemExit(main())
+''')
+
+text = "\n".join(parts)
+io.open(OUT, "w", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n").write(text)
+print("wrote {} ({:,} bytes, {:,} lines)".format(
+ OUT, len(text.encode("utf-8")), text.count("\n") + 1))
diff --git a/build/emit_misp.py b/build/emit_misp.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6da4e70
--- /dev/null
+++ b/build/emit_misp.py
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Emit a MISP event (JSON) from the curated IOC file.
+
+Why MISP: the victims in this campaign were institutions — the ICC, the IAEA,
+Al Jazeera. Institutions deploy by policy, not by 400 people installing a browser
+extension (DESIGN.md). One newsroom admin importing one MISP event protects
+everyone behind that gateway.
+
+Usage:
+ python emit_misp.py [--iocs ../iocs/adfection_iocs.txt] [--out ../dist/adfection.misp.json]
+
+No network access. Reads one local file, writes one local file.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import datetime
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+import uuid
+
+sys.path.insert(0, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)),
+ "..", "scan"))
+
+from adint_scan import iocs as iocmod # noqa: E402
+
+NAMESPACE = uuid.UUID("6f0b4a2e-5d1c-4f3b-9a7e-adf3c70f1001")
+
+CITIZENLAB_URL = ("https://citizenlab.ca/research/"
+ "how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/")
+
+# MISP attribute type per inferred indicator type.
+MISP_TYPE = {
+ iocmod.TYPE_DOMAIN: "domain",
+ iocmod.TYPE_IP: "ip-dst",
+ iocmod.TYPE_SHA256: "sha256",
+}
+
+# Which MISP object-relation category each tier belongs in.
+MISP_CATEGORY = {
+ "cc": "Network activity",
+ "validator": "Network activity",
+ "delivery": "Network activity",
+ "historical": "Network activity",
+ "sample": "Payload delivery",
+ "candiru": "Network activity",
+ "candiru-ip": "Network activity",
+}
+
+# to_ids says "this is safe to turn into a detection rule". Delivery-tier ad
+# infrastructure is deliberately NOT to_ids: an ad impression is not proof of
+# infection, and shipping it as a detection signature would bury analysts in
+# false positives and teach them to ignore the feed (D4, precision over coverage).
+# `candiru` domains are included: they are attributed attack infrastructure with
+# distinctive names, so a detection rule on them is defensible.
+# `candiru-ip` is deliberately EXCLUDED. Cloud IPs from a 2025 report are very
+# likely reassigned, and shipping 109 of them as detection signatures would
+# generate alerts on innocent tenants and teach analysts to mute the feed.
+TO_IDS_TIERS = {"cc", "validator", "sample", "candiru"}
+
+
+def build_event(ioc_set: iocmod.IocSet, now: datetime.datetime) -> dict:
+ date = now.strftime("%Y-%m-%d")
+ stamp = str(int(now.timestamp()))
+
+ attributes = []
+ for ind in ioc_set.indicators:
+ misp_type = MISP_TYPE.get(ind.type)
+ if not misp_type:
+ continue
+ attributes.append({
+ "uuid": str(uuid.uuid5(NAMESPACE, "misp-attr:" + ind.value)),
+ "type": misp_type,
+ "category": MISP_CATEGORY.get(ind.tier, "Network activity"),
+ "value": ind.value,
+ "to_ids": ind.tier in TO_IDS_TIERS,
+ "timestamp": stamp,
+ "comment": "tier={} confidence={} (Citizen Lab, Exposing AdFection, "
+ "2026-10-15)".format(ind.tier, ind.confidence),
+ "Tag": [
+ {"name": 'adint:tier="{}"'.format(ind.tier)},
+ {"name": 'adint:confidence="{}"'.format(ind.confidence)},
+ ],
+ })
+
+ return {
+ "Event": {
+ "uuid": str(uuid.uuid5(NAMESPACE, "misp-event:adfection")),
+ "info": "AdFection / Discover-Tech / Candiru — zero-click spyware "
+ "delivered through real-time ad bidding",
+ "date": date,
+ "timestamp": stamp,
+ # 2 = "Possibly false" is wrong here; 1 = Confirmed for primary-sourced
+ # indicators read out of the report body.
+ "analysis": "2",
+ "threat_level_id": "1",
+ "published": False,
+ "Attribute": attributes,
+ "Tag": [
+ {"name": 'type:OSINT'},
+ {"name": 'misp-galaxy:mercenary-spyware="Candiru"'},
+ {"name": 'adint:campaign="AdFection"'},
+ ],
+ "Object": [],
+ "extra": {
+ "source": "The Citizen Lab, 'Exposing AdFection' (2026-10-15) and "
+ "Confiant, 'ADINT' (2026-10-15).",
+ "source_url": CITIZENLAB_URL,
+ "attribution_note": "Neither The Citizen Lab nor Confiant is "
+ "affiliated with this tool or endorses it. "
+ "Their report is the source; the tool is not "
+ "theirs.",
+ "caveat": "An ad impression from the delivery-tier infrastructure "
+ "is NOT proof of infection. The validator server decided "
+ "per device whether to proceed. A hit means investigate.",
+ },
+ }
+ }
+
+
+def main(argv=None) -> int:
+ here = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
+ p = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Emit a MISP event from the IOC file.")
+ p.add_argument("--iocs", default=os.path.join(here, "..", "iocs",
+ "adfection_iocs.txt"))
+ p.add_argument("--out", default=os.path.join(here, "..", "dist",
+ "adfection.misp.json"))
+ args = p.parse_args(argv)
+
+ ioc_set = iocmod.load(args.iocs)
+ event = build_event(ioc_set, datetime.datetime.utcnow())
+
+ out = os.path.abspath(args.out)
+ os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(out), exist_ok=True)
+ with open(out, "w", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n") as fh:
+ json.dump(event, fh, indent=2, ensure_ascii=False)
+ fh.write("\n")
+
+ attrs = event["Event"]["Attribute"]
+ to_ids = sum(1 for a in attrs if a["to_ids"])
+ print("wrote {}".format(out))
+ print(" {} attributes, {} marked to_ids (detection-safe tiers only)".format(
+ len(attrs), to_ids))
+ return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+ raise SystemExit(main())
diff --git a/build/emit_stix.py b/build/emit_stix.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dad2d74
--- /dev/null
+++ b/build/emit_stix.py
@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Emit a STIX 2.1 bundle from the curated IOC file.
+
+Why STIX specifically: Amnesty's MVT already does mobile forensics well and
+consumes STIX. We do not compete with it (SPEC-scanner.md non-goals) — we hand its
+users the indicators so they can run their own trusted tool against their own
+devices. A newsroom admin can load the same bundle into MISP or a SIEM.
+
+Deterministic IDs: object UUIDs are uuid5 over a fixed namespace plus the
+indicator value, so re-running this emitter produces the SAME ids. MISP and MVT
+can then de-duplicate across updates instead of accumulating copies.
+
+Usage:
+ python emit_stix.py [--iocs ../iocs/adfection_iocs.txt] [--out ../dist/adfection.stix.json]
+
+No network access. Reads one local file, writes one local file.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import datetime
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+import uuid
+
+sys.path.insert(0, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)),
+ "..", "scan"))
+
+from adint_scan import iocs as iocmod # noqa: E402
+
+# Stable namespace for this project's deterministic STIX ids.
+NAMESPACE = uuid.UUID("6f0b4a2e-5d1c-4f3b-9a7e-adf3c70f1001")
+
+CITIZENLAB_URL = ("https://citizenlab.ca/research/"
+ "how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/")
+
+# Per-tier wording. The tier is the whole point of the curation: a delivery domain
+# in your logs means something very different from a C&C callback.
+TIER_DESCRIPTION = {
+ "cc": "Candiru command-and-control server. A connection to this is the most "
+ "serious of the indicator classes.",
+ "validator": "Candiru validator server. Profiled a device and decided per "
+ "device whether to deliver an exploit.",
+ "delivery": "Discover-Tech / Controlium ad-delivery infrastructure. An "
+ "impression from this is NOT proof of infection — not every ad "
+ "carried a payload.",
+ "historical": "Infrastructure from the separate, older 2021 'Hooking Candiru' "
+ "campaign. Included because a hit would still be significant.",
+ "sample": "SHA-256 of a published Candiru sample. One build only; another "
+ "victim's binary will not match.",
+ "candiru": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight "
+ "clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator "
+ "infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so "
+ "the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "candiru-ip": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A "
+ "DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 "
+ "report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by "
+ "now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting "
+ "period.",
+}
+
+PATTERN_FOR_TYPE = {
+ iocmod.TYPE_DOMAIN: "[domain-name:value = '{}']",
+ iocmod.TYPE_IP: "[ipv4-addr:value = '{}']",
+ iocmod.TYPE_SHA256: "[file:hashes.'SHA-256' = '{}']",
+}
+
+
+def _det_id(prefix: str, key: str) -> str:
+ return "{}--{}".format(prefix, uuid.uuid5(NAMESPACE, prefix + ":" + key))
+
+
+def build_bundle(ioc_set: iocmod.IocSet, now: datetime.datetime) -> dict:
+ stamp = now.replace(microsecond=0).isoformat() + "Z"
+ objects = []
+
+ identity_id = _det_id("identity", "adint-shield")
+ objects.append({
+ "type": "identity",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": identity_id,
+ "created": stamp,
+ "modified": stamp,
+ "name": "adint-scan IOC set",
+ "identity_class": "system",
+ "description": "Curated from public reporting. NOT affiliated with, and "
+ "NOT endorsed by, The Citizen Lab or Confiant.",
+ })
+
+ malware_id = _det_id("malware", "candiru")
+ objects.append({
+ "type": "malware",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": malware_id,
+ "created": stamp,
+ "modified": stamp,
+ "name": "Candiru",
+ "is_family": True,
+ "description": "Mercenary spyware from the Israeli vendor Candiru "
+ "(US-blacklisted since 2021), delivered zero-click through "
+ "Discover-Tech's Controlium ad platform in the AdFection "
+ "campaign.",
+ "external_references": [{
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": CITIZENLAB_URL,
+ }],
+ })
+
+ relationships = []
+ for ind in ioc_set.indicators:
+ pattern_tpl = PATTERN_FOR_TYPE.get(ind.type)
+ if not pattern_tpl:
+ continue
+ ind_id = _det_id("indicator", ind.value)
+ objects.append({
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": ind_id,
+ "created": stamp,
+ "modified": stamp,
+ "created_by_ref": identity_id,
+ "name": ind.value,
+ "description": TIER_DESCRIPTION.get(ind.tier, ind.tier),
+ "indicator_types": ["malicious-activity"],
+ "pattern": pattern_tpl.format(ind.value),
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": stamp,
+ # Provenance travels with every indicator. A hit without a citation is
+ # unusable, so sourcing is a label, not a footnote.
+ "labels": ["tier:" + ind.tier, "confidence:" + ind.confidence],
+ # STIX confidence is 0-100. 'secondary' means we read it in a summary
+ # of the report rather than the report body: treat it as lower.
+ "confidence": 85 if ind.confidence == "primary" else 50,
+ "external_references": [{
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": CITIZENLAB_URL,
+ }],
+ })
+ relationships.append({
+ "type": "relationship",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": _det_id("relationship", "indicates:" + ind.value),
+ "created": stamp,
+ "modified": stamp,
+ "relationship_type": "indicates",
+ "source_ref": ind_id,
+ "target_ref": malware_id,
+ })
+
+ objects.extend(relationships)
+ return {
+ "type": "bundle",
+ "id": _det_id("bundle", "adfection"),
+ "objects": objects,
+ }
+
+
+def main(argv=None) -> int:
+ here = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
+ p = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Emit a STIX 2.1 bundle from the IOC file.")
+ p.add_argument("--iocs", default=os.path.join(here, "..", "iocs",
+ "adfection_iocs.txt"))
+ p.add_argument("--out", default=os.path.join(here, "..", "dist",
+ "adfection.stix.json"))
+ args = p.parse_args(argv)
+
+ ioc_set = iocmod.load(args.iocs)
+ bundle = build_bundle(ioc_set, datetime.datetime.utcnow())
+
+ out = os.path.abspath(args.out)
+ os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(out), exist_ok=True)
+ with open(out, "w", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n") as fh:
+ json.dump(bundle, fh, indent=2, ensure_ascii=False)
+ fh.write("\n")
+
+ n_ind = sum(1 for o in bundle["objects"] if o["type"] == "indicator")
+ print("wrote {}".format(out))
+ print(" {} indicator objects, {} objects total".format(
+ n_ind, len(bundle["objects"])))
+ return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+ raise SystemExit(main())
diff --git a/dist/adfection.misp.json b/dist/adfection.misp.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6fbbc32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dist/adfection.misp.json
@@ -0,0 +1,4502 @@
+{
+ "Event": {
+ "uuid": "488ca63a-d3c3-5f39-a764-2d806c4686a7",
+ "info": "AdFection / Discover-Tech / Candiru — zero-click spyware delivered through real-time ad bidding",
+ "date": "2026-10-17",
+ "timestamp": "1792266561",
+ "analysis": "2",
+ "threat_level_id": "1",
+ "published": false,
+ "Attribute": [
+ {
+ "uuid": "7f64da60-19f1-527b-8c33-b48dc47543c7",
+ "type": "ip-dst",
+ "category": "Network activity",
+ "value": "104.207.153.0",
+ "to_ids": false,
+ "timestamp": "1792266561",
+ "comment": "tier=candiru-ip confidence=primary (Citizen Lab, Exposing AdFection, 2026-10-15)",
+ "Tag": [
+ {
+ "name": "adint:tier=\"candiru-ip\""
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "adint:confidence=\"primary\""
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "53e01f39-23ee-567c-a89c-30193d6e017a",
+ "type": "ip-dst",
+ "category": "Network activity",
+ "value": "107.170.37.216",
+ "to_ids": false,
+ "timestamp": "1792266561",
+ "comment": "tier=candiru-ip confidence=primary (Citizen Lab, Exposing AdFection, 2026-10-15)",
+ "Tag": [
+ {
+ "name": "adint:tier=\"candiru-ip\""
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "adint:confidence=\"primary\""
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "a623eb9d-c567-5946-8bd1-826c1931089d",
+ "type": "ip-dst",
+ "category": "Network activity",
+ "value": "107.170.42.32",
+ "to_ids": false,
+ "timestamp": "1792266561",
+ "comment": "tier=candiru-ip confidence=primary (Citizen Lab, Exposing AdFection, 2026-10-15)",
+ "Tag": [
+ {
+ "name": "adint:tier=\"candiru-ip\""
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "adint:confidence=\"primary\""
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "149297b2-1607-58cc-a8d1-73cecf96afe5",
+ "type": "ip-dst",
+ "category": "Network activity",
+ "value": "107.170.42.56",
+ "to_ids": false,
+ "timestamp": "1792266561",
+ "comment": "tier=candiru-ip confidence=primary (Citizen Lab, Exposing AdFection, 2026-10-15)",
+ "Tag": [
+ {
+ "name": "adint:tier=\"candiru-ip\""
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "adint:confidence=\"primary\""
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "324fd9d3-2db1-5c58-8bf4-b3af7c8c1029",
+ "type": "ip-dst",
+ "category": "Network activity",
+ "value": "134.209.220.157",
+ "to_ids": false,
+ "timestamp": "1792266561",
+ "comment": "tier=candiru-ip confidence=primary (Citizen Lab, Exposing AdFection, 2026-10-15)",
+ "Tag": [
+ {
+ "name": "adint:tier=\"candiru-ip\""
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "adint:confidence=\"primary\""
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "2da5c03d-0e8d-57bd-89ae-7d92a41041da",
+ "type": "ip-dst",
+ "category": "Network activity",
+ "value": "134.209.3.89",
+ "to_ids": false,
+ "timestamp": "1792266561",
+ "comment": "tier=candiru-ip confidence=primary (Citizen Lab, Exposing AdFection, 2026-10-15)",
+ "Tag": [
+ {
+ "name": "adint:tier=\"candiru-ip\""
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "adint:confidence=\"primary\""
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "uuid": "521cf1ae-3342-5551-9ac6-242bd9ed4a8f",
+ "type": "ip-dst",
+ "category": "Network activity",
+ "value": "136.244.69.219",
+ "to_ids": false,
+ "timestamp": "1792266561",
+ "comment": "tier=candiru-ip confidence=primary (Citizen Lab, Exposing AdFection, 2026-10-15)",
+ "Tag": [
+ {
+ "name": "adint:tier=\"candiru-ip\""
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "adint:confidence=\"primary\""
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+ "comment": "tier=candiru-ip confidence=primary (Citizen Lab, Exposing AdFection, 2026-10-15)",
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+ "comment": "tier=candiru-ip confidence=primary (Citizen Lab, Exposing AdFection, 2026-10-15)",
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+ "timestamp": "1792266561",
+ "comment": "tier=candiru-ip confidence=primary (Citizen Lab, Exposing AdFection, 2026-10-15)",
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+ "timestamp": "1792266561",
+ "comment": "tier=candiru-ip confidence=primary (Citizen Lab, Exposing AdFection, 2026-10-15)",
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+ "timestamp": "1792266561",
+ "comment": "tier=candiru-ip confidence=primary (Citizen Lab, Exposing AdFection, 2026-10-15)",
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+ "timestamp": "1792266561",
+ "comment": "tier=candiru-ip confidence=primary (Citizen Lab, Exposing AdFection, 2026-10-15)",
+ "Tag": [
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+ "timestamp": "1792266561",
+ "comment": "tier=candiru-ip confidence=primary (Citizen Lab, Exposing AdFection, 2026-10-15)",
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+ "timestamp": "1792266561",
+ "comment": "tier=candiru-ip confidence=primary (Citizen Lab, Exposing AdFection, 2026-10-15)",
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+ "timestamp": "1792266561",
+ "comment": "tier=candiru-ip confidence=primary (Citizen Lab, Exposing AdFection, 2026-10-15)",
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+ "timestamp": "1792266561",
+ "comment": "tier=candiru-ip confidence=primary (Citizen Lab, Exposing AdFection, 2026-10-15)",
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+ "timestamp": "1792266561",
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+ "timestamp": "1792266561",
+ "comment": "tier=delivery confidence=primary (Citizen Lab, Exposing AdFection, 2026-10-15)",
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+ "timestamp": "1792266561",
+ "comment": "tier=delivery confidence=primary (Citizen Lab, Exposing AdFection, 2026-10-15)",
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+ "timestamp": "1792266561",
+ "comment": "tier=candiru confidence=primary (Citizen Lab, Exposing AdFection, 2026-10-15)",
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+ "timestamp": "1792266561",
+ "comment": "tier=candiru confidence=primary (Citizen Lab, Exposing AdFection, 2026-10-15)",
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+ "to_ids": true,
+ "timestamp": "1792266561",
+ "comment": "tier=candiru confidence=primary (Citizen Lab, Exposing AdFection, 2026-10-15)",
+ "Tag": [
+ {
+ "name": "adint:tier=\"candiru\""
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "adint:confidence=\"primary\""
+ }
+ ]
+ }
+ ],
+ "Tag": [
+ {
+ "name": "type:OSINT"
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "misp-galaxy:mercenary-spyware=\"Candiru\""
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "adint:campaign=\"AdFection\""
+ }
+ ],
+ "Object": [],
+ "extra": {
+ "source": "The Citizen Lab, 'Exposing AdFection' (2026-10-15) and Confiant, 'ADINT' (2026-10-15).",
+ "source_url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/",
+ "attribution_note": "Neither The Citizen Lab nor Confiant is affiliated with this tool or endorses it. Their report is the source; the tool is not theirs.",
+ "caveat": "An ad impression from the delivery-tier infrastructure is NOT proof of infection. The validator server decided per device whether to proceed. A hit means investigate."
+ }
+ }
+}
diff --git a/dist/adfection.stix.json b/dist/adfection.stix.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4d232f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dist/adfection.stix.json
@@ -0,0 +1,10027 @@
+{
+ "type": "bundle",
+ "id": "bundle--4fc8bd9d-df64-5596-aa7b-4a59c8d7eace",
+ "objects": [
+ {
+ "type": "identity",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "name": "adint-scan IOC set",
+ "identity_class": "system",
+ "description": "Curated from public reporting. NOT affiliated with, and NOT endorsed by, The Citizen Lab or Confiant."
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "malware",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "malware--75526ba0-abba-56bc-af06-770a39688ab3",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "name": "Candiru",
+ "is_family": true,
+ "description": "Mercenary spyware from the Israeli vendor Candiru (US-blacklisted since 2021), delivered zero-click through Discover-Tech's Controlium ad platform in the AdFection campaign.",
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--74b8e458-3dfb-5c8a-b187-8b25a1a6a071",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "104.207.153.0",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '104.207.153.0']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--a706cd83-7ef4-5734-be39-6621f183c5cf",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "107.170.37.216",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '107.170.37.216']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--dd16f702-8fdb-503f-acfd-2a6a68ee2da5",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "107.170.42.32",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '107.170.42.32']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--5b899b27-9513-5138-a76f-e179b1bfc84c",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "107.170.42.56",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '107.170.42.56']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--ca6c0518-f307-598f-9a8b-07ecf951b8dd",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "134.209.220.157",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '134.209.220.157']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--d3302b7a-4792-5188-9240-5bb890f0c74b",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "134.209.3.89",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '134.209.3.89']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--30164156-f885-5f34-a487-acc0176efc97",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "136.244.69.219",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '136.244.69.219']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--2ea7e1c4-5a0f-5754-ab41-2e4ee3089bf3",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "137.184.254.107",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '137.184.254.107']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--b7719b9b-d659-5882-9921-da07d189133d",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "138.197.43.97",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '138.197.43.97']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--c43c260a-4ce9-5a85-8ac4-974d0b307e99",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "139.59.14.26",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '139.59.14.26']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--3b23217a-27a5-5513-a568-6aa594c54f25",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "139.84.208.188",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '139.84.208.188']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--734bdb5c-d3da-5d9a-ada1-369bc67c098a",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "140.82.5.20",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '140.82.5.20']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--97eaba41-e7e4-5d9e-afe9-7e3ac4a0490f",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "143.198.64.22",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '143.198.64.22']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--20b7f35a-703b-5713-8a68-29a8374329db",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "146.70.102.108",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '146.70.102.108']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--364a1d3b-aed3-5f06-bdf2-c0c8d6b15b18",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "146.70.102.110",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '146.70.102.110']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--6fb0e044-4dc9-5f5b-a984-9e6f705fc8af",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "146.70.102.121",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '146.70.102.121']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--53f9fcbc-6c6d-5568-b678-83cefc77dd8c",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "146.70.102.134",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '146.70.102.134']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--7852f146-c6be-5413-9000-389aee47e361",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "146.70.116.7",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '146.70.116.7']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--6dfd456b-7c30-55c4-a932-ce32c7cf8f31",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "146.70.131.224",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '146.70.131.224']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--1d98520d-938c-5a0d-ad59-2df9a1ec88e9",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "146.70.147.9",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '146.70.147.9']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--d1d1bdd6-6924-5363-9eba-b2a7d4f69a05",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "146.70.160.49",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '146.70.160.49']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--122e9a9f-b108-5d02-9603-78952d79d37b",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "146.70.169.165",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '146.70.169.165']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--86d118d5-d8aa-5981-9a1c-a400159d5b87",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "146.70.20.203",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '146.70.20.203']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--283c360f-94d6-551c-8129-eb013acdea9d",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "146.70.29.228",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '146.70.29.228']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--2c4f0866-02ed-599e-bec2-76dd17f42edf",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "146.70.53.156",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '146.70.53.156']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--45ad95ba-c815-51e6-ad4c-83244e545325",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "146.70.81.218",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '146.70.81.218']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--7e7a7983-e430-53c0-83c7-90eea3dca0c6",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "146.70.86.251",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '146.70.86.251']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--f3285b0a-a5c9-55b4-be7b-ce4dd027f074",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "147.182.161.167",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '147.182.161.167']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--20c5adde-23eb-549d-b83f-758766367b22",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "149.248.1.147",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '149.248.1.147']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--38c57dff-53f1-595a-b8b5-5b8b2a6df1ec",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "149.28.142.211",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '149.28.142.211']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--921102f2-a3b8-550c-89a7-5cde42d07f43",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "149.28.242.133",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '149.28.242.133']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--473da9ec-128c-5c82-96ab-f9b8aac1db2c",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "149.28.250.35",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '149.28.250.35']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--a6908b38-c346-5f2c-b55f-ffd529bca9d7",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "149.28.253.112",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '149.28.253.112']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--3cd1461e-c129-5199-9330-100c8b54ea8a",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "149.28.57.173",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '149.28.57.173']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--c7b88823-7b76-59b3-918e-03794291ce49",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "149.28.71.25",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '149.28.71.25']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
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+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
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+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '149.28.77.207']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
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+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
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+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '152.42.226.197']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
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+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
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+ "malicious-activity"
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+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '155.138.163.117']",
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+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '155.138.202.66']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
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+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '155.138.240.74']",
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+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
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+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
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+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '157.230.128.10']",
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+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
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+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '157.245.176.133']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
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+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
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+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
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+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
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+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '158.247.194.199']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
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+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
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+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
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+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '159.223.151.126']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
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+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
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+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '159.223.208.191']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
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+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
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+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "159.89.14.225",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '159.89.14.225']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
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+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
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+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "161.35.150.79",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '161.35.150.79']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
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+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
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+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "164.92.225.66",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '164.92.225.66']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
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+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
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+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "164.92.235.125",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '164.92.235.125']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
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+ "confidence": 85,
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+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
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+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "165.22.5.231",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '165.22.5.231']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
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+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
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+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "165.22.51.81",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '165.22.51.81']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
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+ "labels": [
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+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
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+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "165.22.71.71",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '165.22.71.71']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
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+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
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+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "165.227.145.109",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '165.227.145.109']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
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+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--fe9895cf-a21c-5848-9ebe-c9cba4aa5b70",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "167.99.3.150",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '167.99.3.150']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--e81acee1-9a50-50a2-91cd-f30604cadb1c",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "167.99.85.48",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '167.99.85.48']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--07b68cfb-69d6-552a-8cc4-5ba6a631c355",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "174.138.34.46",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '174.138.34.46']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--dbb8446a-534b-5370-9283-81f4120ec437",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "178.128.49.106",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '178.128.49.106']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--3fed1d42-6019-5542-8d59-02d65a2bcd0f",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "185.181.8.155",
+ "description": "Infrastructure from the separate, older 2021 'Hooking Candiru' campaign. Included because a hit would still be significant.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '185.181.8.155']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:historical",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--65fb5a3a-0c07-5553-92b5-6f2fad82a632",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "185.234.52.230",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '185.234.52.230']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--f82a6982-3f3d-5454-8cd8-1a7632aeb3fa",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "188.208.141.190",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '188.208.141.190']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--1466e0d2-ebf1-5815-9340-843cc89b646e",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "194.180.158.45",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '194.180.158.45']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--cce1e199-4417-586f-bdee-6ec1671756b8",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "194.180.158.71",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '194.180.158.71']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--80cc0359-6559-513a-881d-fd03be26e8f6",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "194.180.191.84",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '194.180.191.84']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--81532265-3870-5a50-8a97-a8ba748c6b87",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "194.37.97.159",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '194.37.97.159']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--f6c2b960-2490-545c-aa52-2bffc21aa959",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "198.211.98.248",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '198.211.98.248']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--1f57ae10-c153-56c9-97a5-dd976173afb1",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "199.247.10.38",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '199.247.10.38']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--5aa9ef46-9a37-5de2-ac7a-223d73563c66",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "206.81.14.237",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '206.81.14.237']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--759709a2-a08c-5647-90ca-482b48f69cd4",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "207.246.105.206",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '207.246.105.206']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--0889601a-7d30-5767-996a-34c094d46af9",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "207.246.113.7",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '207.246.113.7']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--c1d9cd96-fd92-5254-b65a-4cfe3cf0b6d8",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "207.246.87.188",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '207.246.87.188']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--a3db8ab0-ecb3-579f-b7b6-0181e8021452",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "207.246.90.6",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '207.246.90.6']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--7d43cabe-b445-51c7-93dd-3c1d50e6129f",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "208.76.221.167",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '208.76.221.167']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--783ca176-1828-5f2f-817c-4737dd215278",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "208.76.223.59",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '208.76.223.59']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--96b1b765-a198-570f-b877-518f7377f6ca",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "208.85.18.104",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '208.85.18.104']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--dffc34f8-a52b-5797-81a2-914546b97922",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "213.252.232.129",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '213.252.232.129']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--ecf9c6d1-ac93-550b-85b6-7c2b51614c3c",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "213.252.232.141",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '213.252.232.141']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--ed5c4b82-e9fb-50c4-874f-67514ccc8325",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "216.128.178.12",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '216.128.178.12']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--6e095799-48c1-56c4-95f1-7d95ea83cc7a",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "216.238.77.17",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '216.238.77.17']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--db6d3de8-743e-53f2-b197-1df444fc4ae1",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "216.238.80.164",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '216.238.80.164']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--5b4442a4-d367-57f8-9e15-7fccda83b387",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "216.238.86.164",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '216.238.86.164']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--9707fff2-91c5-59f3-b8e0-e7e58ff22d02",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "216.238.91.249",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '216.238.91.249']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--c75c1014-a327-59cb-b568-dfbb03726b49",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "217.69.10.11",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '217.69.10.11']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--264d904c-1f74-53e4-ab9b-d3bdf123100c",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "217.69.6.58",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '217.69.6.58']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--697e041d-4145-587a-96ce-86e1a6f91513",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "23.227.198.196",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '23.227.198.196']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--602eb27f-640d-5013-b84c-0772eff99f2f",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "23.29.115.188",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '23.29.115.188']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--9a219b0f-fde9-5955-9e52-5104cb0197c8",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "255869de85e2a171993fc5eb8a556d873a1b8966e040f6f55926f2fa2d595cc8",
+ "description": "SHA-256 of a published Candiru sample. One build only; another victim's binary will not match.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[file:hashes.'SHA-256' = '255869de85e2a171993fc5eb8a556d873a1b8966e040f6f55926f2fa2d595cc8']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:sample",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--1f804b9f-ff42-55e2-a50b-b8d0e72eeb48",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "38.132.101.35",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '38.132.101.35']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--14c458ed-e035-516f-a05a-7b06e880e8c8",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "45.32.109.170",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '45.32.109.170']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--c56873ec-da79-5723-98ed-935cb7645f2c",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "45.32.150.100",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '45.32.150.100']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--c1ee157c-8879-51f1-93bb-a38d242b408f",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "45.76.252.109",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '45.76.252.109']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--d716862f-e0c8-5641-891a-81664a5444d2",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "45.76.31.6",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '45.76.31.6']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--a3cf78d1-aedb-5cde-b5de-85912418bd7a",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "45.77.105.76",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '45.77.105.76']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--e9e09667-bd4e-5935-a9ed-d695ef2e71bd",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "45.77.57.173",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '45.77.57.173']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--3eb861c4-18f6-5e10-9876-8819e6e912bc",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "5.181.159.109",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '5.181.159.109']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--953e8da2-f917-5e5c-a90b-424d46466b2b",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "5.252.178.158",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '5.252.178.158']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--06699a72-b150-5f62-bb06-50b955506307",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "52.174.65.77",
+ "description": "Candiru command-and-control server. A connection to this is the most serious of the indicator classes.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '52.174.65.77']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:cc",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--13077d18-3007-58e9-a16e-be3b10516172",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "64.225.3.138",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '64.225.3.138']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--125aa7f4-26ee-5378-9dbc-d791f2fa7654",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "64.226.103.163",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '64.226.103.163']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--8c3f1bc8-f3d6-5933-9436-d491a753661a",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "65.20.105.177",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '65.20.105.177']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--9d8af6b1-c088-54af-9119-c1e10647bc23",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "65.20.106.49",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '65.20.106.49']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--9c6d3357-0678-5402-b490-93770cb17f30",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "65.20.96.9",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '65.20.96.9']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--5197cb55-ed9d-5b83-a075-0f4f3ac745ae",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "66.42.126.125",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '66.42.126.125']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--b9e04445-ff86-5bfa-90c6-3e3216575c7e",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "66.42.73.169",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '66.42.73.169']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--50d049fc-28bc-5fa5-aac9-e1afc2dfa66e",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "68.183.169.21",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '68.183.169.21']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--fea94816-4fb1-58cb-a215-26685b235778",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "68.183.186.185",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '68.183.186.185']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--cd8853a9-bd58-57da-9daf-c0d045ad1d09",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "70.34.194.5",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '70.34.194.5']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--626ee39c-1876-527c-8033-f583cb96b4ac",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "70.34.251.208",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '70.34.251.208']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--2c4fd1ed-a040-5344-982b-b3a5b00886a3",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "84.247.51.183",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '84.247.51.183']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--145219c7-0b5d-53d6-9665-2cf1db49142b",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "88.119.175.56",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '88.119.175.56']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--b24726c5-9b1c-59bc-8757-b6ce99bd108d",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "88.119.175.75",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '88.119.175.75']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--639b840c-8918-56db-8d09-9f202e76b370",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "91.207.173.115",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '91.207.173.115']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--2397465c-debc-5c7b-9175-868c9dac4f3b",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "95.179.215.54",
+ "description": "IP address of Candiru-attributed infrastructure. WEAKER THAN A DOMAIN: these are mostly cloud-hosted addresses from a 2025 report and are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now. Only meaningful if the hit is dated within the reporting period.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '95.179.215.54']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru-ip",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--988c09e2-5a2d-5105-ab35-880089ba8f29",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "ads-impressions.com",
+ "description": "Discover-Tech / Controlium ad-delivery infrastructure. An impression from this is NOT proof of infection — not every ad carried a payload.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'ads-impressions.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:delivery",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--3baf930c-b6b9-5853-9f24-621cfde2876e",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "ads-monitor.xyz",
+ "description": "Discover-Tech / Controlium ad-delivery infrastructure. An impression from this is NOT proof of infection — not every ad carried a payload.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'ads-monitor.xyz']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:delivery",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--10656dc4-6490-5f0a-a046-8010cd9bed7f",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "adtimizer.co",
+ "description": "Discover-Tech / Controlium ad-delivery infrastructure. An impression from this is NOT proof of infection — not every ad carried a payload.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'adtimizer.co']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:delivery",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--8a8b8c23-dc1e-55bd-82f6-bb627413ecb5",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "adtracker.link",
+ "description": "Infrastructure from the separate, older 2021 'Hooking Candiru' campaign. Included because a hit would still be significant.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'adtracker.link']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:historical",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--9b40e4ce-b130-5635-b5f6-12bef024eb36",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "akedo.gg",
+ "description": "Discover-Tech / Controlium ad-delivery infrastructure. An impression from this is NOT proof of infection — not every ad carried a payload.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'akedo.gg']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:delivery",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--d8cff811-3de7-5597-a9e2-f49e95c9b85f",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "ambiguouscommerce.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'ambiguouscommerce.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--2e58598e-265b-502c-a90b-145786a295f0",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "antperspective.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'antperspective.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--fe87a3e0-b0ee-54ad-aeac-70b163937d85",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "aperturebelt.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'aperturebelt.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--5d2e3758-67f8-5a3e-92ff-c7b98f9ea915",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "archer.westeurope.cloudapp.azure.com",
+ "description": "Candiru command-and-control server. A connection to this is the most serious of the indicator classes.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'archer.westeurope.cloudapp.azure.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:cc",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--e29fcbe7-02f5-52e3-83a5-3d442321ca29",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "asknapkin.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'asknapkin.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--0a106c3d-8e79-5aca-9301-5a5f0b792d28",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "barnsecret.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'barnsecret.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--5a7c2727-f428-5e2f-9546-d9c536b6baa6",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "baseagriculture.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'baseagriculture.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--fce6dd87-a10a-5a75-83ac-e394d253da57",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "basicstraw.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'basicstraw.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--b485ff61-b6ab-5358-874e-5655b65ab8b3",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "basinapposite.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'basinapposite.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--cb97286e-b226-55f3-a09c-acb2a966894f",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "bd-mainserver.herokuapp.com",
+ "description": "Candiru command-and-control server. A connection to this is the most serious of the indicator classes.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'bd-mainserver.herokuapp.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:cc",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--8170af07-ac15-57df-b008-b00e771fb2a8",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "beneathbreadth.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'beneathbreadth.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--1e1a1439-9f49-5563-97b2-63b6a8b49471",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "bizarreclassify.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'bizarreclassify.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--70eac4aa-63ce-5fc6-aa67-4f0f652f2a78",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "blockroster.net",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'blockroster.net']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--381e46dd-ac74-58d3-b54c-8f29646b4bb1",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "bondmuscle.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'bondmuscle.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--e8ee60e2-5360-5b99-bcea-d19151cee3bf",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "breadgroomer.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'breadgroomer.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--5555e634-cee2-543d-a344-c47742599cae",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "bronzemonth.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'bronzemonth.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--633225aa-8583-5936-affa-a9f950093a36",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "browniebell.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'browniebell.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--f0335175-b0d7-5e3a-a2fb-f97198b2dc84",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "bypassbirch.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'bypassbirch.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--38d6936b-d6fb-5e8a-911c-3ac0f91e390f",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "bypasscalculate.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'bypasscalculate.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--5e4921ae-b2b7-53fd-996b-3c35fed63a56",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "bypasscommerce.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'bypasscommerce.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--9cb2fdec-c6fd-59c1-b64b-8f2270d64993",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "calmbase.org",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'calmbase.org']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--37e8331d-3c70-51ef-8592-035e64cb3a7f",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "cartoondrop.net",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'cartoondrop.net']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--7e54fd2d-f308-56b5-9669-8d9d32f92501",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "cdnmobile.io",
+ "description": "Infrastructure from the separate, older 2021 'Hooking Candiru' campaign. Included because a hit would still be significant.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'cdnmobile.io']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:historical",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--fbd612d4-973c-51a7-adaa-b8558f9657f1",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "checkmyimp.com",
+ "description": "Discover-Tech / Controlium ad-delivery infrastructure. An impression from this is NOT proof of infection — not every ad carried a payload.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'checkmyimp.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:delivery",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--28e7318f-6d70-582d-87b0-113d9d053f11",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "chickenstrawberry.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'chickenstrawberry.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--d13bb7df-fb3c-58b8-b4fd-543c34b592a0",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "citecivilization.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'citecivilization.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--d8528e57-9b6c-5ff1-b94e-d3e2eca689ac",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "closetmeat.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'closetmeat.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--08e4577c-5a2a-5281-a434-c154096999a3",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "commonclever.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'commonclever.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--847caad1-0809-5654-802e-41664a29c4a4",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "concretebottle.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'concretebottle.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--15739160-0a0d-5020-9bd8-8b49da084209",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "conquerconfess.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'conquerconfess.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--5c2b93e7-4baf-5004-8856-a792e323d77c",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "containsnow.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'containsnow.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--4030e321-22d7-53dd-8af8-7bd992841ec3",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "contradictionblindness.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'contradictionblindness.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--1827ff3e-4d6e-5ed0-a0fa-e6a22c5378ae",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "controlium.net",
+ "description": "Discover-Tech / Controlium ad-delivery infrastructure. An impression from this is NOT proof of infection — not every ad carried a payload.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'controlium.net']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:delivery",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--18fda003-8e46-5b6f-89d1-cedeef785557",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "convincechaotic.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'convincechaotic.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--3f34990e-d09e-58e0-b4dc-8435959bbe95",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "cookie-sync.xyz",
+ "description": "Discover-Tech / Controlium ad-delivery infrastructure. An impression from this is NOT proof of infection — not every ad carried a payload.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'cookie-sync.xyz']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:delivery",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--c106f88c-abb0-54c6-913b-cd4797389d6c",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "cookiesurfer.com",
+ "description": "Discover-Tech / Controlium ad-delivery infrastructure. An impression from this is NOT proof of infection — not every ad carried a payload.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'cookiesurfer.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:delivery",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--443ccd83-0af1-5cb0-ab85-cd0b3b88a98d",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "cooperatedisinfect.net",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'cooperatedisinfect.net']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--3e404a8d-e5ca-596d-a45d-b8c2a0ae2488",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "cottonbread.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'cottonbread.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--f076b92d-5c84-5784-9127-420cc363574a",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "cranberrybear.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'cranberrybear.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--e4186723-9847-523d-9017-be5ebf434254",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "cropcritique.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'cropcritique.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--5737d9d5-8674-506d-9498-cd6ac483c159",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "crossoverdue.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'crossoverdue.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--7618b9f7-b2a1-5a57-93cd-e3f675dc4a07",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "d1fcoizt7mje85.cloudfront.net",
+ "description": "Discover-Tech / Controlium ad-delivery infrastructure. An impression from this is NOT proof of infection — not every ad carried a payload.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'd1fcoizt7mje85.cloudfront.net']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:delivery",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--eb5e393c-9543-5a38-95d0-e9a560758718",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "damageconsider.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'damageconsider.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--96505ef7-15df-5d7a-b0a8-3a8f2592887e",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "deardrill.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'deardrill.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--840f58bb-5924-5061-80d5-ea81e1a4bb92",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "dediccatedconsideration.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'dediccatedconsideration.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--a8ea7be1-8d57-5cce-a401-83049a0ee507",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "deducedefend.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'deducedefend.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--46998941-e9ee-5102-94f2-dca93a4557a9",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "deliverconcern.net",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'deliverconcern.net']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--9179f07b-247c-58fd-84b5-586d8dc96ef2",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "densefoot.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'densefoot.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--0f81b6c1-12f5-554d-b4e9-415d724b38f4",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "desireeclipse.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'desireeclipse.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--9c921045-4123-532b-8b79-6dc129637d30",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "detaincharity.net",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'detaincharity.net']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--f094e140-6365-52fe-a428-e2d3fedc18a2",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "deterdiffusion.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'deterdiffusion.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--9f78fe24-e591-5d8c-8f78-2cd5414da78f",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "devotionbelief.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'devotionbelief.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--f0605778-593c-5c24-a0e4-4e54c0960bc1",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "discover-tech.io",
+ "description": "Discover-Tech / Controlium ad-delivery infrastructure. An impression from this is NOT proof of infection — not every ad carried a payload.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'discover-tech.io']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:delivery",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--490dce38-65ac-5f40-8929-7f3695646f50",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "discovertech-alb-100966113.us-east-1.elb.amazonaws.com",
+ "description": "Discover-Tech / Controlium ad-delivery infrastructure. An impression from this is NOT proof of infection — not every ad carried a payload.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'discovertech-alb-100966113.us-east-1.elb.amazonaws.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:delivery",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--a2e021de-573d-573c-af8d-2eea4fc3e75e",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "distractionfar.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'distractionfar.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--d4746b71-62f4-5283-a3e8-3e0a3025bdd5",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "drivesplash.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'drivesplash.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--21c6a678-5ea8-5139-85eb-7c80818e611c",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "drummerjourney.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'drummerjourney.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--16cf74e7-7256-5dfb-a5aa-d66ee1f8db2c",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "dtech.adtimizer.co",
+ "description": "Discover-Tech / Controlium ad-delivery infrastructure. An impression from this is NOT proof of infection — not every ad carried a payload.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'dtech.adtimizer.co']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:delivery",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--8c2fa2cb-2a91-5008-bf67-fee6882df253",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "dumplingbell.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'dumplingbell.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--7dcb6ff3-df78-5612-87b9-1a02a9583038",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "electric-prime.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'electric-prime.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--93f2ef5d-adc1-5652-8394-2231b7fce79f",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "elifluousscintillam.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'elifluousscintillam.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--3d0e8ea7-31e0-5cda-ab35-9fdc668a7e12",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "eminententwine.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'eminententwine.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--29f43c4d-5fc4-578c-a76f-0bd56c741d30",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "events.myweb3id.io",
+ "description": "Discover-Tech / Controlium ad-delivery infrastructure. An impression from this is NOT proof of infection — not every ad carried a payload.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'events.myweb3id.io']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:delivery",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--75138b27-51a0-5721-8d4d-7d8118ed2589",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "events.platc-tester.com",
+ "description": "Discover-Tech / Controlium ad-delivery infrastructure. An impression from this is NOT proof of infection — not every ad carried a payload.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'events.platc-tester.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:delivery",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--b352b5f2-a30f-5585-b0f8-fa337d693a7f",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "exhibitexpanse.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'exhibitexpanse.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--21875a74-3953-5933-a25d-a62c189a7b92",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "fallaciousessential.net",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'fallaciousessential.net']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--d5ca03fb-d0bc-5ff4-afd2-dcbfade16ff3",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "fearevolve.com",
+ "description": "Candiru command-and-control server. A connection to this is the most serious of the indicator classes.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'fearevolve.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:cc",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--3d9bf952-f41c-5d19-bb2d-9be6828d2f85",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "fileswaper.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'fileswaper.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--4e07f13e-8941-5a4b-99c3-5782f061e120",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "finalsalami.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'finalsalami.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--8430ca8a-f29b-535b-863e-bd0d15a9ad5e",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "flexibleelevator.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'flexibleelevator.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--949a46bd-6b4c-5741-ac48-99060d96bbf0",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "foamdirection.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'foamdirection.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--034be14c-c502-5cdb-be66-ec77a89a3ad3",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "forecastgarden.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'forecastgarden.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--24c0ec3b-4f69-5dca-a520-98247fcad567",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "goatsandals.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'goatsandals.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--5b0b2e83-d654-5e9c-a8c0-2ba47e442773",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "golfconcert.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'golfconcert.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--4c5cee1c-0add-5a43-869c-9c8722c1b74d",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "groundbreakinginitative.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'groundbreakinginitative.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--81844542-9035-5b52-9a5f-0c6be466b067",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "guitarcalculate.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'guitarcalculate.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--2829db85-28fa-5d13-b9f4-1afb85637a14",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "hostilefauna.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'hostilefauna.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--eea8fd38-d52e-59f3-8e54-bb82526eb275",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "infinoas.mtrtb.com",
+ "description": "Discover-Tech / Controlium ad-delivery infrastructure. An impression from this is NOT proof of infection — not every ad carried a payload.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'infinoas.mtrtb.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:delivery",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--4fb61cf8-23e9-530b-884a-9b5796b1045e",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "insightenterprisells.com",
+ "description": "Candiru command-and-control server. A connection to this is the most serious of the indicator classes.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'insightenterprisells.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:cc",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--f2307656-7da8-5aef-8075-4604b48f0b15",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "isolatelecture.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'isolatelecture.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--fd13bc71-265a-5788-9436-09d91167eae0",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "jellybat.net",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'jellybat.net']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--96741a74-b648-5709-8aeb-54b77bbd7a8f",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "jobmarcher.com",
+ "description": "Candiru command-and-control server. A connection to this is the most serious of the indicator classes.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'jobmarcher.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:cc",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--62b7dffd-489a-54bf-923b-d71af6653495",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "journeyjest.net",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'journeyjest.net']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--d17f1380-ca54-51be-932f-c270f899d95e",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "kartingrumble.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'kartingrumble.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--d5d059b9-b976-5e0e-ad69-8a9a11a50d4e",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "keyadapter.com",
+ "description": "Candiru validator server. Profiled a device and decided per device whether to deliver an exploit.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'keyadapter.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:validator",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--868679c3-b2f6-5e76-939c-6e4bdc4da9dc",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "labyrinthextravagance.org",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'labyrinthextravagance.org']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--3e245c84-37d8-5101-91e8-ace71339b683",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "leafconfuse.net",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'leafconfuse.net']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--ab2c9806-3f32-575e-a7f4-f9d4a76d3acb",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "lessonhandle.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'lessonhandle.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--6e74160d-09f1-5864-a014-b2bb82a0839c",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "macrodrop.net",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'macrodrop.net']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--62fc0d0e-f1a4-5e7e-bad4-46bfbb631d4f",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "macromint.net",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'macromint.net']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--cf1dc887-1669-55ab-82fd-80e461e126ec",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "maturitygenesis.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'maturitygenesis.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--93bd0593-733e-50d2-a3a9-d77a66be9818",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "measurecabin.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'measurecabin.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--f0ab3196-8fb7-5557-b195-1d2025aa3d24",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "msstore.io",
+ "description": "Infrastructure from the separate, older 2021 'Hooking Candiru' campaign. Included because a hit would still be significant.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'msstore.io']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:historical",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--aa96f2ab-6deb-5184-805b-31c9063630df",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "mtrtb.com",
+ "description": "Discover-Tech / Controlium ad-delivery infrastructure. An impression from this is NOT proof of infection — not every ad carried a payload.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'mtrtb.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:delivery",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--35f31504-8166-5407-b511-ad485891d5b6",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "mushroompalm.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'mushroompalm.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--04caf740-451d-5ea5-8c2d-fd65a5dc46b3",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "mydsp.io",
+ "description": "Discover-Tech / Controlium ad-delivery infrastructure. An impression from this is NOT proof of infection — not every ad carried a payload.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'mydsp.io']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:delivery",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--5a775530-da09-5d63-bfec-3f3a18be1310",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "myipinfo.io",
+ "description": "Discover-Tech / Controlium ad-delivery infrastructure. An impression from this is NOT proof of infection — not every ad carried a payload.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'myipinfo.io']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:delivery",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--5d8397d2-70e2-5eb6-9af2-c4e18cb4eb4e",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "myweb3id.io",
+ "description": "Discover-Tech / Controlium ad-delivery infrastructure. An impression from this is NOT proof of infection — not every ad carried a payload.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'myweb3id.io']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:delivery",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--741332cc-9dc3-5f36-8317-4df49b9eca56",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "noas.adtimizer.co",
+ "description": "Discover-Tech / Controlium ad-delivery infrastructure. An impression from this is NOT proof of infection — not every ad carried a payload.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'noas.adtimizer.co']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:delivery",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--b1f6c7a0-9b92-5355-a4c1-0ee16ec1a2af",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "noas.impchkdsp.com",
+ "description": "Discover-Tech / Controlium ad-delivery infrastructure. An impression from this is NOT proof of infection — not every ad carried a payload.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'noas.impchkdsp.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:delivery",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--c89241fc-c230-58b1-8349-e8f6668fe2c3",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "noas.mtrtb.com",
+ "description": "Discover-Tech / Controlium ad-delivery infrastructure. An impression from this is NOT proof of infection — not every ad carried a payload.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'noas.mtrtb.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:delivery",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--2f269832-8553-596d-bd6a-cf1a2d020813",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "noas.powerium.net",
+ "description": "Discover-Tech / Controlium ad-delivery infrastructure. An impression from this is NOT proof of infection — not every ad carried a payload.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'noas.powerium.net']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:delivery",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--4d0f7bca-fdc8-5b99-b488-4ddd570b9cee",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "noas.trakking.co",
+ "description": "Discover-Tech / Controlium ad-delivery infrastructure. An impression from this is NOT proof of infection — not every ad carried a payload.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'noas.trakking.co']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:delivery",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--1df0d257-446c-5d91-9143-3249173e2dcd",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "notableexam.org",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'notableexam.org']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--14c0ff99-0741-5df5-bd09-17d829245f6c",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "notionnowadays.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'notionnowadays.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--957ef285-db0c-551b-8332-0e7fc80dcec8",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "nutralove.co",
+ "description": "Discover-Tech / Controlium ad-delivery infrastructure. An impression from this is NOT proof of infection — not every ad carried a payload.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'nutralove.co']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:delivery",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--46098238-fb08-5a2f-b19d-1c04736bafd9",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "outdooutcome.com",
+ "description": "Candiru command-and-control server. A connection to this is the most serious of the indicator classes.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'outdooutcome.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:cc",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--410ff6fd-3c9d-5f5c-980b-dd8ced2949c3",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "parkourbus.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'parkourbus.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--5619a82b-9828-5a25-b349-1d8287302c43",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "patternperiod.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'patternperiod.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--6313e7e9-7e7a-53b0-971a-3f283094bd68",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "penslice.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'penslice.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--117236a2-bf04-5295-b910-4e8d1f085ff0",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "pepperdominate.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'pepperdominate.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--03726c36-6879-59d6-828a-2d0bf0716ee1",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "plasticbells.com",
+ "description": "Candiru command-and-control server. A connection to this is the most serious of the indicator classes.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'plasticbells.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:cc",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--4a3e77b6-55ac-5bd7-868a-cbb6e7336529",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "platc-tester.com",
+ "description": "Discover-Tech / Controlium ad-delivery infrastructure. An impression from this is NOT proof of infection — not every ad carried a payload.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'platc-tester.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:delivery",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--8fc7049d-16c6-5d85-89e0-8ef633728665",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "powerium.net",
+ "description": "Discover-Tech / Controlium ad-delivery infrastructure. An impression from this is NOT proof of infection — not every ad carried a payload.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'powerium.net']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:delivery",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--ac8653df-82a5-5df4-99e7-0c68e3cbb67e",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "ppv2.mtrtb.com",
+ "description": "Discover-Tech / Controlium ad-delivery infrastructure. An impression from this is NOT proof of infection — not every ad carried a payload.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'ppv2.mtrtb.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:delivery",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--1f35772c-19b6-563d-a714-4596e6505cf7",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "pqv2.mtrtb.com",
+ "description": "Discover-Tech / Controlium ad-delivery infrastructure. An impression from this is NOT proof of infection — not every ad carried a payload.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'pqv2.mtrtb.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:delivery",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--3c072885-5880-542d-a6e2-623d23c42d21",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "prawnbasket.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'prawnbasket.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--cb51fb7e-0054-5fb7-bce6-b34f3827522f",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "predictproper.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'predictproper.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--9a475a17-eb08-55cc-9cb9-01063d37cea1",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "pressaviation.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'pressaviation.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--56cc3ff7-f9ad-5ed2-b287-df82210fb24b",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "profligatecensure.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'profligatecensure.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--81695c83-2f8b-5ea5-9fd2-a30d1d86bf65",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "qa-noas.powerium.net",
+ "description": "Discover-Tech / Controlium ad-delivery infrastructure. An impression from this is NOT proof of infection — not every ad carried a payload.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'qa-noas.powerium.net']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:delivery",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--c48ff11a-8dcd-5ec3-b9b1-f5c893d2d41e",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "rollstrech.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'rollstrech.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--b600e8ee-7b04-589a-bdd9-39d6c7c6afbf",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "romancedrum.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'romancedrum.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--214a1816-1124-5a4d-8be1-4e0cd6cfdbb4",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "sacrificeprincipal.net",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'sacrificeprincipal.net']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--b5e26bc5-4342-51be-b270-1cbf4973c47a",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "salmonpride.net",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'salmonpride.net']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--3e9e4b57-5b90-5e3d-8eaa-2c974be7866f",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "scoreparade.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'scoreparade.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--15f69e82-2ca3-5dfb-91b5-5893c10fd85f",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "selectedpazzle.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'selectedpazzle.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--10956a59-9c33-5cee-81db-fc57566dc137",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "shareitwork.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'shareitwork.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--71a4731c-9480-5bb8-9985-fe5da3d498ff",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "sharethere.net",
+ "description": "Candiru validator server. Profiled a device and decided per device whether to deliver an exploit.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'sharethere.net']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:validator",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--2b589c17-ca1e-59f7-a9ab-b6c1c18a3b49",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "signifyslight.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'signifyslight.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--36b874d5-e7f2-531a-bec5-d1376313683c",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "sincereaccertain.com",
+ "description": "Discover-Tech / Controlium ad-delivery infrastructure. An impression from this is NOT proof of infection — not every ad carried a payload.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'sincereaccertain.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:delivery",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--9c0f4c1f-e58e-53e7-a8eb-24bdbe0949fa",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "spongefruit.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'spongefruit.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--10759b97-cf0a-5e29-a4cf-1d101ca15f5e",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "stablesurface.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'stablesurface.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--8392a57a-66f7-5d1a-a958-d4cdc177d47c",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "strangegarden.org",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'strangegarden.org']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--84a4ff9c-810b-533c-9afc-0d003d871ac8",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "stylebrakedown.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'stylebrakedown.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--3ab7871b-d27f-5acd-8e9b-a776a78112e7",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "suggestutterly.com",
+ "description": "Candiru command-and-control server. A connection to this is the most serious of the indicator classes.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'suggestutterly.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:cc",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--2d6c0562-dc17-507c-9708-d181ef76581d",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "sunsetpotential.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'sunsetpotential.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--64f0cd80-1ba5-5e89-a69a-4fd767d458d1",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "tacticscheap.net",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'tacticscheap.net']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--a3dc4457-dc84-57b2-8769-407b8e1921e3",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "tidalscreen.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'tidalscreen.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--11c0a215-aad6-5011-9412-69160b3bbd3d",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "tracker.mtrtb.com",
+ "description": "Discover-Tech / Controlium ad-delivery infrastructure. An impression from this is NOT proof of infection — not every ad carried a payload.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'tracker.mtrtb.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:delivery",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--a2a7ec44-8815-552a-9846-47d2208a05b4",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "tracookiepixel.xyz",
+ "description": "Discover-Tech / Controlium ad-delivery infrastructure. An impression from this is NOT proof of infection — not every ad carried a payload.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'tracookiepixel.xyz']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:delivery",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--accdbf02-24bb-5cf2-80f9-e139c6acf07e",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "tubeshape.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'tubeshape.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--c84b432e-ac23-5cbb-a134-ff1c6c300ca4",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "ultimatematter.info",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'ultimatematter.info']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--7b078a1c-aab7-5edb-960c-c3616b8e6e32",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "velvetpremier.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'velvetpremier.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--e584b29b-2671-5f79-a0cb-725a5fad3ffa",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "volasim.com",
+ "description": "Discover-Tech / Controlium ad-delivery infrastructure. An impression from this is NOT proof of infection — not every ad carried a payload.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'volasim.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:delivery",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "indicator",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "indicator--4c40c5b0-e44e-5868-9a6d-f4d24c21ed3b",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--294ec63a-c449-5439-83fb-942185697747",
+ "name": "windomination.com",
+ "description": "Candiru-attributed server infrastructure. The source lists eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2 with higher-tier operator infrastructure and does not state which role this domain had, so the role is unspecified. A hit is serious.",
+ "indicator_types": [
+ "malicious-activity"
+ ],
+ "pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'windomination.com']",
+ "pattern_type": "stix",
+ "valid_from": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "labels": [
+ "tier:candiru",
+ "confidence:primary"
+ ],
+ "confidence": 85,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Citizen Lab",
+ "description": "Exposing AdFection (2026-10-15)",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "relationship",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "relationship--a452af6e-84bc-5189-857c-31a67117b04a",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
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+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "relationship_type": "indicates",
+ "source_ref": "indicator--c84b432e-ac23-5cbb-a134-ff1c6c300ca4",
+ "target_ref": "malware--75526ba0-abba-56bc-af06-770a39688ab3"
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "relationship",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "relationship--b39013e9-03ac-5ecb-b89e-f21aa30c2bbb",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "relationship_type": "indicates",
+ "source_ref": "indicator--7b078a1c-aab7-5edb-960c-c3616b8e6e32",
+ "target_ref": "malware--75526ba0-abba-56bc-af06-770a39688ab3"
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "relationship",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "relationship--e215edee-fe0a-561a-99d3-d45c0a260fa3",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "relationship_type": "indicates",
+ "source_ref": "indicator--e584b29b-2671-5f79-a0cb-725a5fad3ffa",
+ "target_ref": "malware--75526ba0-abba-56bc-af06-770a39688ab3"
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "relationship",
+ "spec_version": "2.1",
+ "id": "relationship--39b4f279-c00e-50c5-ab9a-13abdfde5e38",
+ "created": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "modified": "2026-10-17T22:49:21Z",
+ "relationship_type": "indicates",
+ "source_ref": "indicator--4c40c5b0-e44e-5868-9a6d-f4d24c21ed3b",
+ "target_ref": "malware--75526ba0-abba-56bc-af06-770a39688ab3"
+ }
+ ]
+}
diff --git a/iocs/LICENSE.md b/iocs/LICENSE.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c7387df
--- /dev/null
+++ b/iocs/LICENSE.md
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+# Indicator data — CC0 1.0 Universal (public domain dedication)
+
+The files in this directory — `adfection_iocs.txt` and the generated exports in
+`../dist/` — are dedicated to the public domain under
+**[CC0 1.0 Universal](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/legalcode)**.
+
+To the extent possible under law, archivegenocide.com has waived all copyright
+and related or neighbouring rights to this indicator set. You may copy, modify,
+distribute and use it, including commercially, without asking and without
+attribution.
+
+**The software in the rest of this repository is licensed separately**, under the
+Apache License 2.0. See `../LICENSE`.
+
+## Why CC0 and not Apache for the data
+
+An indicator is a fact. Facts are not copyrightable, so a restrictive licence
+here would be both unenforceable and obstructive. What *is* arguably protectable
+is the curation — the tiering, the confidence grading, the per-indicator source
+attribution — and CC0 waives that too, deliberately. The entire point of this
+file is that other people put it in their own tools: DNS blocklists, MISP
+instances, STIX bundles, SIEM rules, Amnesty's MVT. Any friction in that is
+friction against the people the data exists to protect.
+
+## Attribution is not required, but is appreciated and is good practice
+
+Not for us — for the researchers. The indicators were published by:
+
+- **The Citizen Lab** (University of Toronto), *"Exposing AdFection: How
+ Discover-Tech Turned Targeted Ads Into a Pipeline for Zero-Click Mercenary
+ Spyware"*, 2026-10-15.
+- **Recorded Future / Insikt Group**, *Devil's Tongue* infrastructure reporting,
+ CTA-2025-0805, August 2025.
+
+Every line in `adfection_iocs.txt` carries its source in the fourth column, and
+every object in the STIX and MISP exports carries it too, so this attribution
+survives being copied into another tool. Please keep that column intact when you
+redistribute.
+
+## Please read the header of the indicator file before using it
+
+`adfection_iocs.txt` documents what was **deliberately not imported** and why —
+including the 305 validator domains Citizen Lab counted but did not publish, and
+corporate domains that are attribution rather than indicators. It also explains
+why the `candiru-ip` tier is weaker than the others: those are cloud-hosted
+addresses from 2025 that are very likely reassigned to unrelated tenants by now,
+and are only meaningful when a hit is dated within the reporting period.
+
+Blocking them wholesale, or feeding them to a tool that alerts on any match, will
+generate false positives against innocent people. The tiers exist precisely so
+you do not have to do that. See also `VALIDATOR-GAP.md`.
diff --git a/iocs/VALIDATOR-GAP.md b/iocs/VALIDATOR-GAP.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7b89577
--- /dev/null
+++ b/iocs/VALIDATOR-GAP.md
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+# The validator gap — and the published method for closing it
+
+`adfection_iocs.txt` carries **2 of 305** Candiru validator server domains, and **0
+of 319** validator IPs. This file records why, and the exact method The Citizen Lab
+used to find them, so that whoever can run it is not starting from scratch.
+
+## Why the list is missing
+
+The report states the count but never publishes the set:
+
+> "In all, we found 305 distinct domain names on 319 IP addresses."
+
+Only `keyadapter.com` and `sharethere.net` are named in the body text. Appendix C
+covers the **Discover-Tech / Controlium ad infrastructure** (all of which is now
+imported), not the Candiru validator layer. There is no appendix listing validators.
+
+This matters more than any other gap in the data set. The validator is the server
+that decided, per device, whether to proceed to an exploit. **A validator hit is
+evidence of targeting; a delivery-tier hit is only evidence of having seen an ad.**
+We can detect the latter and are nearly blind to the former.
+
+## The method, from the report (Section 2, "Fingerprinting Candiru Servers")
+
+Citizen Lab did not get the list from an inside source. They found it by matching
+an HTTP response pattern across historical internet-wide scan data on **Censys**.
+Anyone with the same access can reproduce it.
+
+**Fingerprint V1 — validator servers.** The report gives this regular expression
+over the HTTP response banner (reproduced in two fragments as published):
+
+```
+HTTP/1\.1 [^\r\n]+\r\ndate: [^\r\n]+\r?\n(connection: [^\r\n]+\r\n)?content-type: [^\r\n]+\r\n
+server: Apache[^\r\n]*\r\ncontent-length: [0-9]+\r\n.*
+```
+
+**Fingerprint C1 — command-and-control servers.** Four C&C servers matched:
+
+```
+HTTP/1\.1 [0-9]+ \r\nDate: [^\r\n]+\r?\nContent-Type: text/html
+```
+...continuing with `Connection: keep-alive` and `server: nginx` headers. The report
+notes the other three C&C servers had no matching response in scan data.
+
+**Search parameters used:** Censys, **one historical snapshot per month, August 2022
+to July 2026**.
+
+A footnote in the report warns that the `\r?` after the date header is an artifact of
+a **2022 Censys bug**, not server behaviour — so a naive re-run against other scan
+data, or against a different period, needs that allowance or it will miss hosts.
+
+## What reproducing it actually requires
+
+1. **Censys access with historical search.** The free tier queries only the current
+ snapshot. This needs the paid/research tier, which Censys grants to academics and
+ journalists on application.
+2. **Accepting that the answer is mostly historical.** The report says the behaviour
+ "gradually began being retired" in **May and June 2026**. A scan of today's
+ internet will find few or no live validators. The value is in the monthly
+ snapshots back to 2022, which is exactly the part that needs paid access.
+3. **Care about false positives.** `server: Apache` plus a content-length is an
+ extremely common shape. The fingerprint presumably worked because of the exact
+ header order and casing; a loose re-implementation would match a large share of
+ the ordinary web. **Do not put the raw output of a re-run into this IOC file
+ without validating it.** An over-broad validator list is worse than none: it
+ would point at innocent servers in the one tier where a hit implies targeting.
+
+## The quicker path
+
+**Ask.** Citizen Lab publishes to enable exactly this kind of defensive work, and the
+report names **Sekoia** and **Recorded Future** as having previously attributed some
+of these domains to Candiru. Any of the three may share the set, or confirm a
+re-derived one, which solves the false-positive problem above. Amnesty's Security Lab
+maintains indicator files for MVT and would be a natural home for the result.
+
+That is a short email, versus a paid Censys tier plus a validation problem.
+
+## Status
+
+| | |
+|---|---|
+| Validator domains held | 2 of 305 |
+| Validator IPs held | 0 of 319 |
+| Method published? | Yes — Fingerprint V1, above |
+| Reproducible without paid access? | No |
+| Asked Citizen Lab / Sekoia / Recorded Future? | **Not yet — open action** |
diff --git a/iocs/adfection_iocs.txt b/iocs/adfection_iocs.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ec8f82a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/iocs/adfection_iocs.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,382 @@
+# AdFection / Discover-Tech / Candiru - indicators of compromise
+#
+# Source: The Citizen Lab, "Exposing AdFection: How Discover-Tech Turned Targeted Ads
+# Into a Pipeline for Zero-Click Mercenary Spyware", published 2026-10-15.
+# https://citizenlab.ca/research/how-discover-tech-turned-targeted-ads-into-a-pipeline-for-spyware/
+# Companion: Confiant, "ADINT: Weaponized Ad Tech for Zero-Click Spyware and Mass
+# Identity Vacuuming" (same date).
+#
+# Extended 2026-10-18 from the report's own Appendix C ("Domains linked to Discover-Tech
+# and Controlium") and its body text. Every line below was read out of the report itself
+# and cross-checked by two independent reads of the page before being added.
+#
+# Format: indicator <TAB> tier <TAB> confidence
+# tier = cc | validator | delivery | historical | sample
+# confidence = primary (read out of the Citizen Lab report body or its appendix)
+# secondary (reported by a third-party summary of the report - VERIFY
+# against the report's own appendix before acting on it)
+#
+# The indicator TYPE is inferred from its shape, so this file stays three columns:
+# 64 hex chars -> sha256 sample hash dotted quad -> IP otherwise -> domain
+# The schema is deliberately wider than this one campaign: ADINT is a technique, not
+# an incident, so the same file is meant to carry other vendors (NSO, Intellexa /
+# Predator, Paragon, Cytrox) as their indicators are published. Keep the confidence
+# column on every line - a hit without a citation is unusable.
+#
+# Appendix C lists its entries as wildcards (`*.controlium[.]net`). Matching here is
+# case-insensitive SUBSTRING matching, so the registrable domain covers every subdomain
+# automatically. Named subdomains are kept anyway, because knowing WHICH endpoint was
+# contacted is worth more than a bare domain hit when someone has to triage it.
+#
+# IMPORTANT, from the report itself: an ad impression from this infrastructure in your
+# logs is NOT proof of infection. Not every ad carried a payload, and the validator
+# server decided per-device whether to continue. A hit here means "investigate", never
+# "you are compromised".
+#
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# DELIBERATELY NOT IMPORTED
+#
+# 1. The validator server set. The report states verbatim: "In all, we found 305
+# distinct domain names on 319 IP addresses" - but it does NOT publish that list.
+# Only the two below are named. So this file carries 2 of 305 validator domains and
+# none of the 319 IPs, and that gap CANNOT be closed from the public report. It is
+# the single largest known hole in this data set. Anyone with access to the full set
+# (Citizen Lab, Sekoia and Recorded Future are named as having attributed some of
+# them) could close it.
+# 2. Discover-Tech's own corporate websites (intelos.io, tekma.io, tekma-dmp.ai, and
+# the shared Wix account linking them). These appear in the report as ATTRIBUTION
+# evidence - they are how the companies were tied together - not as attack
+# infrastructure. Matching them would flag anyone who merely read about the company,
+# which is a false positive, not a finding.
+# 3. 10.0.0.52 (an internal address seen in login records, explicitly not infrastructure)
+# and 62.90.129.xxx (redacted in the source, so unusable).
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+#
+# Candiru command-and-control. These four matched the report's C&C "Fingerprint C1".
+fearevolve.com cc primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+jobmarcher.com cc primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+insightenterprisells.com cc primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+plasticbells.com cc primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+#
+# Two further Fingerprint C1 domains, registered within two hours of each other on
+# 2025-03-18.
+outdooutcome.com cc primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+suggestutterly.com cc primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+#
+# An IP that matched the same fingerprint, plus the two shared-hosting hostnames the
+# report says pointed at it. The hostnames are specific enough to match safely; the
+# IP is an Azure address, so note that cloud IPs get reassigned to innocent tenants
+# over time - treat an IP-only hit as weaker than a domain hit.
+52.174.65.77 cc primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+archer.westeurope.cloudapp.azure.com cc primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+bd-mainserver.herokuapp.com cc primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+#
+# Candiru validator servers (device profiling / target selection).
+# Only these two are named in the report. See "DELIBERATELY NOT IMPORTED" above: the
+# other 303 domains and all 319 IPs are counted in the report but never listed.
+keyadapter.com validator primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+sharethere.net validator primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+#
+# Discover-Tech / Controlium infrastructure - Appendix C, "General".
+discover-tech.io delivery primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+mtrtb.com delivery primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+mydsp.io delivery primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+controlium.net delivery primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+powerium.net delivery primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+platc-tester.com delivery primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+myweb3id.io delivery primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+myipinfo.io delivery primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+akedo.gg delivery primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+volasim.com delivery primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+#
+# Appendix C, "NOAS Servers" - the ad-serving endpoints (the report lists these with a
+# /getAd or /cplatform/getAd path; the host is what is matchable in local artifacts).
+noas.mtrtb.com delivery primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+infinoas.mtrtb.com delivery primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+ppv2.mtrtb.com delivery primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+pqv2.mtrtb.com delivery primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+events.platc-tester.com delivery primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+events.myweb3id.io delivery primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+noas.powerium.net delivery primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+qa-noas.powerium.net delivery primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+noas.adtimizer.co delivery primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+noas.impchkdsp.com delivery primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+noas.trakking.co delivery primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+#
+# Appendix C, "Ad Tracking Domains".
+tracookiepixel.xyz delivery primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+cookiesurfer.com delivery primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+cookie-sync.xyz delivery primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+ads-monitor.xyz delivery primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+checkmyimp.com delivery primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+ads-impressions.com delivery primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+nutralove.co delivery primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+#
+# Further delivery infrastructure named in the report body.
+adtimizer.co delivery primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+dtech.adtimizer.co delivery primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+tracker.mtrtb.com delivery primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+sincereaccertain.com delivery primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+d1fcoizt7mje85.cloudfront.net delivery primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+discovertech-alb-100966113.us-east-1.elb.amazonaws.com delivery primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+#
+# Candiru infrastructure from the 2021 "Hooking Candiru" report - a SEPARATE, older
+# campaign. Included because a hit would still be significant, not because it is part
+# of AdFection.
+msstore.io historical primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+adtracker.link historical primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+cdnmobile.io historical primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+185.181.8.155 historical primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+#
+# Known sample - the one Candiru Windows DLL published for this campaign.
+# SHA-256 of the DLL delivered through Discover-Tech ads (Citizen Lab, 2026-10-15).
+# This is ONE build. Another victim's DLL is compiled differently and will not match,
+# so a clean hash result is close to meaningless on its own - it is here because a
+# match would be conclusive, not because a miss is reassuring.
+255869de85e2a171993fc5eb8a556d873a1b8966e040f6f55926f2fa2d595cc8 sample primary citizenlab-adfection-2026
+#
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# SECOND SOURCE: Recorded Future, Insikt Group, "Tracking Candiru's DevilsTongue
+# Spyware in Multiple Countries" (CTA-2025-0805), published 2025-08-05.
+# https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/tracking-candirus-devilstongue-spyware
+# Imported 2026-10-18 from that report's Appendix A, transcribed by script rather
+# than by hand so a typo cannot invent a domain.
+#
+# WHY THIS IS HERE: the Citizen Lab report says its 305-domain validator set
+# "includes ones publicly attributed to Candiru by Sekoia, as well as Recorded
+# Future". This is that Recorded Future set. It does NOT recover the 305 (see
+# VALIDATOR-GAP.md), but it is the largest body of independently-attributed
+# Candiru infrastructure that is actually published.
+#
+# CROSS-VALIDATION, and the reason to trust this import: four domains in this
+# appendix - fearevolve.com, jobmarcher.com, outdooutcome.com, suggestutterly.com -
+# were ALREADY in this file from the Citizen Lab report, where they are named as
+# command-and-control servers. And the DevilsTongue SHA-256 in this appendix is
+# byte-identical to the AdFection sample hash below. Two vendors, 14 months apart,
+# describing the same infrastructure and the same binary.
+#
+# TIER CHOICE: Recorded Future describes eight clusters mixing victim-facing C2
+# with higher-tier operator infrastructure, and does not say which domain is
+# which. Filing them as `cc` would claim precision the source does not give, so
+# they are `candiru` = "Candiru-attributed, role unspecified". A hit is serious.
+#
+# THE IPs ARE WEAKER THAN THE DOMAINS, deliberately tiered apart as `candiru-ip`.
+# Nearly all are Vultr / DigitalOcean addresses from a report dated 2025-08. Cloud
+# IPs get reassigned to unrelated, innocent tenants within months. An undated hit
+# on one of these is far more likely to be a coincidence than a finding; it is
+# only meaningful if the hit carries a DATE inside the period (a DNS log entry,
+# say). Do not treat an IP hit as evidence on its own.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ambiguouscommerce.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+antperspective.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+aperturebelt.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+asknapkin.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+barnsecret.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+baseagriculture.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+basicstraw.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+basinapposite.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+beneathbreadth.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+bizarreclassify.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+blockroster.net candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+bondmuscle.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+breadgroomer.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+bronzemonth.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+browniebell.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+bypassbirch.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+bypasscalculate.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+bypasscommerce.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+calmbase.org candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+cartoondrop.net candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+chickenstrawberry.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+citecivilization.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+closetmeat.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+commonclever.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+concretebottle.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+conquerconfess.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+containsnow.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+contradictionblindness.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+convincechaotic.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+cooperatedisinfect.net candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+cottonbread.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+cranberrybear.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+cropcritique.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+crossoverdue.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+damageconsider.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+deardrill.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+dediccatedconsideration.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+deducedefend.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+deliverconcern.net candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+densefoot.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+desireeclipse.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+detaincharity.net candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+deterdiffusion.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+devotionbelief.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+distractionfar.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+drivesplash.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+drummerjourney.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+dumplingbell.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+electric-prime.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+elifluousscintillam.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+eminententwine.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+exhibitexpanse.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+fallaciousessential.net candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+fileswaper.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+finalsalami.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+flexibleelevator.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+foamdirection.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+forecastgarden.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+goatsandals.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+golfconcert.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+groundbreakinginitative.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+guitarcalculate.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+hostilefauna.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+isolatelecture.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+jellybat.net candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+journeyjest.net candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+kartingrumble.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+labyrinthextravagance.org candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+leafconfuse.net candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+lessonhandle.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+macrodrop.net candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+macromint.net candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+maturitygenesis.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+measurecabin.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+mushroompalm.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+notableexam.org candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+notionnowadays.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+parkourbus.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+patternperiod.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+penslice.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+pepperdominate.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+prawnbasket.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+predictproper.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+pressaviation.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+profligatecensure.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+rollstrech.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+romancedrum.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+sacrificeprincipal.net candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+salmonpride.net candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+scoreparade.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+selectedpazzle.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+shareitwork.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+signifyslight.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+spongefruit.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+stablesurface.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+strangegarden.org candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+stylebrakedown.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+sunsetpotential.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+tacticscheap.net candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+tidalscreen.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+tubeshape.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+ultimatematter.info candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+velvetpremier.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+windomination.com candiru primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+5.181.159.109 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+5.252.178.158 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+23.29.115.188 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
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+38.132.101.35 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+45.32.109.170 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+45.32.150.100 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+45.76.31.6 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+45.76.252.109 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+45.77.57.173 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+45.77.105.76 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+64.225.3.138 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+64.226.103.163 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+65.20.96.9 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+65.20.105.177 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+65.20.106.49 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+66.42.73.169 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
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+68.183.169.21 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+68.183.186.185 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+70.34.194.5 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
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+84.247.51.183 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+88.119.175.56 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+88.119.175.75 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+91.207.173.115 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+95.179.215.54 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+104.207.153.0 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+107.170.37.216 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+107.170.42.32 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+107.170.42.56 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+134.209.3.89 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+134.209.220.157 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+136.244.69.219 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+137.184.254.107 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+138.197.43.97 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+139.59.14.26 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+139.84.208.188 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+140.82.5.20 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+143.198.64.22 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+146.70.20.203 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+146.70.29.228 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
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+146.70.86.251 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+146.70.102.108 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+146.70.102.110 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+146.70.102.121 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+146.70.102.134 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+146.70.116.7 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+146.70.131.224 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+146.70.147.9 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+146.70.160.49 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+146.70.169.165 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+147.182.161.167 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+149.28.57.173 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+149.28.71.25 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+149.28.77.207 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+149.28.142.211 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+149.28.242.133 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+149.28.250.35 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+149.28.253.112 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+149.248.1.147 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+152.42.226.197 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+155.138.163.117 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+155.138.202.66 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+155.138.240.74 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+157.230.128.10 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+157.245.176.133 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+158.247.194.199 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+159.89.14.225 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+159.223.151.126 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+159.223.208.191 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+161.35.150.79 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+164.92.225.66 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+164.92.235.125 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+165.22.5.231 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+165.22.51.81 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+165.22.71.71 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+165.227.145.109 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+167.99.3.150 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+167.99.85.48 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+174.138.34.46 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+178.128.49.106 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+185.234.52.230 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+188.208.141.190 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+194.37.97.159 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+194.180.158.45 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+194.180.158.71 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+194.180.191.84 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+198.211.98.248 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+199.247.10.38 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+206.81.14.237 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+207.246.87.188 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+207.246.90.6 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+207.246.105.206 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+207.246.113.7 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+208.76.221.167 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
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+208.85.18.104 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+213.252.232.129 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+213.252.232.141 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+216.128.178.12 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+216.238.77.17 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+216.238.80.164 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+216.238.86.164 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+216.238.91.249 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+217.69.6.58 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
+217.69.10.11 candiru-ip primary recordedfuture-2025-08
diff --git a/scan/CONTRACT.md b/scan/CONTRACT.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..15d9eee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scan/CONTRACT.md
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+# Module contract — build against this
+
+Each scan module is a file in `adint_scan/modules/` that defines exactly:
+
+```python
+NAME = "browser" # or "hash", "host", "deep"
+
+def run(ctx) -> ModuleResult:
+ ...
+```
+
+- `ctx` is `adint_scan.context.ScanContext`: `ctx.iocs` (an `IocSet`),
+ `ctx.deep` (bool), `ctx.emit(str)` for progress (goes to stderr — never print
+ to stdout from a module; stdout is the final human report).
+- Return `adint_scan.result.ModuleResult`.
+
+## IocSet (adint_scan/iocs.py) — what modules read
+
+- `ctx.iocs.network_strings` → sorted lower-case list of domain + IP strings for
+ substring matching in artifacts. **Never resolve or connect to these.**
+- `ctx.iocs.hashes` → list of `Indicator` with `.value` (lower-case sha256).
+- `ctx.iocs.lookup(value)` → the `Indicator` for a matched string, or None;
+ use it to attach `.tier` / `.confidence` provenance to each Hit.
+
+## ModuleResult (adint_scan/result.py) — how to report
+
+- `r = ModuleResult(NAME)`
+- On every hit: `r.add_hit(Hit(indicator=ioc, location=path, detail=ctx, tier=..., confidence=...))`
+ — get tier/confidence from `ctx.iocs.lookup(ioc)`.
+- `r.checked`, `r.skipped` are running integer counts (files/DBs examined; items skipped).
+- `r.submetrics` is a dict of named counts for the report, e.g.
+ `{"sqlite": 28, "blob": 44634}`.
+- **Record each sub-check's fate (this is the D3 contract):**
+ - `r.ran("dns-cache")` when a sub-check executed (even if it found nothing).
+ - `r.could_not_run("dns-log", "operational log disabled")` when it could not.
+ A module with any `could_not_run` becomes PARTIAL/UNKNOWN automatically — do
+ NOT report a clean sub-check that never actually ran.
+- `r.note("free text")` for extra context.
+
+## Hard rules (doctrine)
+
+- **D2 — never contact an indicator.** No `socket`, `urllib`, `requests`, DNS
+ resolution, ping, HTTP, WHOIS — nothing. The scan already runs inside a guard
+ that raises `NetworkContactAttempt` if you try; do not work around it. Reading
+ the LOCAL OS DNS cache (already-resolved entries) via a `subprocess` call to a
+ system tool is allowed and resolves nothing.
+- **Read-only.** A module must not create, modify or delete anything on the host
+ (temp copies of locked DBs in the system temp dir, cleaned up, are the only
+ writes permitted).
+- **Never crash the run.** Catch per-item errors (locked file, permission
+ denied, unreadable DB), count them as `skipped`, and continue. A skipped item
+ is not a clean item.
+- Match is case-insensitive substring for domains/IPs; exact hex compare for hashes.
+
+## Platform
+
+Windows first. On a platform where a module cannot run (e.g. the Windows-only
+host module on Linux), return a ModuleResult whose checks are all `could_not_run`
+with reason "not supported on <platform>" — never a fake CLEAN.
diff --git a/scan/README.md b/scan/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b326551
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scan/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+# adint-scan
+
+A local, read-only check for the published AdFection / Candiru indicators, and —
+more usefully — a way to make this machine *answerable next time*.
+
+It replaces the three proof-of-concept scripts in `../scripts/` with one tool, one
+set of counts and one report. Those scripts are kept for reference; this is what
+you run.
+
+## What it tells you, and what it cannot
+
+It answers two questions honestly:
+
+1. Are the published indicators present in the places this machine can actually
+ be checked?
+2. Will this machine be checkable next time? — and if not, `--arm` offers to fix
+ that.
+
+**A clean result means "no known indicators were found in the places that can be
+checked." It does not mean the device is clean.** Spyware of this grade is
+purpose-built to defeat exactly this class of check. The tool says so on every
+run, and it reports a check that *could not run* as `UNKNOWN`, never as clean —
+a gap and a clean result are different answers and are never merged.
+
+If you have a concrete reason to suspect this machine, the answer is expert
+forensics, not this tool:
+
+- [Access Now Digital Security Helpline](https://www.accessnow.org/help/)
+- [Amnesty International Security Lab](https://securitylab.amnesty.org/)
+- [The Citizen Lab](https://citizenlab.ca/)
+
+## Running it
+
+No dependencies beyond Python 3.8+. No installation.
+
+```
+cd scan
+python -X utf8 adint-scan.py
+```
+
+```
+adint-scan [--deep] [--quick] [--json PATH] [--iocs PATH]
+```
+
+| flag | effect |
+|---|---|
+| *(none)* | tier 1: browser, hash and host IOC match. Read-only, no admin. |
+| `--quick` | skip file fingerprinting (~halves the runtime). The skip is reported as a gap, not as clean. |
+| `--json PATH` | also write the machine-readable report |
+| `--iocs PATH` | use a different indicator file (default `../iocs/adfection_iocs.txt`) |
+| `--deep` | tier 2: full persistence sweep. Not implemented — the flag reports an honest `UNKNOWN` gap rather than faking a sweep |
+
+Exit codes: `0` nothing found, `2` an indicator matched, `1` the scan could not
+be set up. This release writes nothing to the system and needs no administrator
+under any flag.
+
+### Modules
+
+| module | what it reads |
+|---|---|
+| `browser` | history, cookies, favicons, HTTP cache, LevelDB and Service Worker caches across Chrome / Edge / Brave / Chromium (every profile) and Firefox. Locked databases are copied before being opened. |
+| `hash` | SHA-256 of candidate files under AppData, ProgramData, both Temps, Downloads, Desktop, Documents and Public, against the sample hashes in the IOC set. |
+| `host` | per-user COM registrations (this chain's documented persistence), the DNS resolver cache, whether DNS history exists at all, and the hosts file. |
+
+Why the browser module looks at the cache and not just history: history records
+only top-level navigations, and an ad is a subresource inside an iframe. A real
+impression would never appear in history. The cache, cookie stores and LevelDB
+files do record subresource origins — and they are short-lived, which is part of
+the honest answer about how far back any of this can see.
+
+## Turning on DNS history (the one thing worth doing for next time)
+
+The single biggest finding from the reference machine was that
+`Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client/Operational` **is disabled by default on Windows**.
+On a normal machine there is therefore no DNS history at all, which is why the
+2024–2025 window in which the Al Jazeera devices were hit cannot be checked
+retrospectively. That cannot be fixed backwards. It can be fixed forwards, in one
+command, and the report prints it for you when it finds the log disabled:
+
+```
+# in an Administrator PowerShell
+wevtutil sl Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client/Operational /e:true /ms:67108864
+```
+
+`/e:true` turns the log on; `/ms` sizes it to 64 MB so it holds months rather
+than hours. Turn it back off with the same line and `/e:false`. This protects
+nothing and tells you nothing about the past — it just means a future scan has a
+record to search instead of an empty attic.
+
+> **A system-writing "arm" helper** (automated DNS-log enabling, a persistence
+> baseline/diff) exists in `arm.py` but is **deliberately not wired to the CLI in
+> this release**. A pre-release review found its undo path could, from its own
+> journal file, delete scheduled tasks and could discard collected DNS history,
+> and in a tool at-risk people run that is not acceptable. It returns once the
+> undo path has been rebuilt with a write-ahead journal and per-step safety. The
+> one manual command above does the one thing that mattered.
+
+## Rules the code is held to
+
+- **Never contact an indicator.** No DNS resolution, ping, HTTP or WHOIS of any
+ indicator, ever — resolving a C&C domain announces a possible victim to the
+ people running it. This is enforced at runtime (the whole scan runs inside a
+ guard that raises if anything touches the network) and asserted in
+ `tests/test_netguard.py`, which also fails if a module so much as *imports* a
+ network library or shells out to a resolver.
+- **No telemetry.** None, of any kind.
+- **Measured, never inferred.** If a check could not run, it is `UNKNOWN`.
+- **Precision over coverage.** An unsigned binary in a user-writable path is not
+ a finding; plenty of honest software looks like that. Fourteen scary findings
+ that mean nothing teach people to ignore the tool.
+- **Read-only by default**, and nothing writes without an explicit flag.
+- **No administrator** required for the default scan.
+
+## Tests
+
+```
+cd scan
+python -X utf8 -m unittest discover -s tests -v
+```
+
+## Emitters
+
+`../build/emit_stix.py` and `../build/emit_misp.py` turn the same curated IOC
+file into a STIX 2.1 bundle and a MISP event, written to `../dist/`. STIX because
+Amnesty's **MVT** already does mobile forensics well and consumes it — the right
+move is to hand MVT users the indicators, not to rebuild MVT. MISP because
+institutions deploy by policy: one newsroom admin importing one event protects
+everyone behind the gateway.
+
+Delivery-tier ad infrastructure is deliberately *not* marked `to_ids` in the MISP
+event. An ad impression is not proof of infection, and shipping it as a detection
+signature would bury an analyst in false positives.
+
+## Attribution
+
+The indicators come from The Citizen Lab's *Exposing AdFection* (2026-10-15) and
+Confiant's companion *ADINT* report. **Neither is affiliated with this tool and
+neither endorses it.** Their report is the source; the tool is not theirs.
diff --git a/scan/adint-scan.py b/scan/adint-scan.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3a4807e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scan/adint-scan.py
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Launcher so the tool can be run as `python -X utf8 adint-scan.py [...]`
+without installing the package. Equivalent to `python -m adint_scan`."""
+
+import os
+import sys
+
+sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
+
+from adint_scan.cli import main # noqa: E402
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+ raise SystemExit(main())
diff --git a/scan/adint_scan/__init__.py b/scan/adint_scan/__init__.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..50de63b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scan/adint_scan/__init__.py
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+"""adint-scan — local, read-only detector for AdFection / Candiru indicators.
+
+A clean result from this tool means "no known indicators were found in the places
+that can be checked." It does NOT mean the device is clean. See SPEC-scanner.md.
+"""
+
+__version__ = "0.1.0"
diff --git a/scan/adint_scan/__main__.py b/scan/adint_scan/__main__.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bfdcd0c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scan/adint_scan/__main__.py
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+from .cli import main
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+ raise SystemExit(main())
diff --git a/scan/adint_scan/arm.py b/scan/adint_scan/arm.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dc78aef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scan/adint_scan/arm.py
@@ -0,0 +1,554 @@
+"""Tier 5 — `--arm`: make this machine answerable next time.
+
+Why this is the most valuable thing in the tool
+-----------------------------------------------
+The reference run found that `Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client/Operational` is
+DISABLED by default on Windows. On a normal machine there is therefore no DNS
+history at all, which is why the 2024-2025 window in which the Al Jazeera devices
+were hit cannot be checked retrospectively from the host. We cannot fix that
+backwards. We can make the *next* campaign answerable — and a machine that is a
+tripwire is worth more to an at-risk person than one that searches an empty attic.
+
+Doctrine
+--------
+D5 Nothing here runs without an explicit flag. `--arm` on its own is a DRY RUN:
+ it prints precisely what each step would change, whether it needs
+ administrator, and how to undo it — and changes nothing. You opt into each
+ step by name (or `--all`).
+D2 Still no network. Note what is deliberately NOT here: we do not download
+ Sysmon. An auto-updating security tool with this adversary is itself a
+ target, and fetching a binary at arm time would be exactly the supply-chain
+ exposure DESIGN.md warns about. We detect Sysmon and print the manual step.
+D3 Every change is journalled with its PRIOR value, so `--undo` restores the
+ previous state rather than guessing a default.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import ctypes
+import datetime
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import platform
+import subprocess
+import sys
+from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional, Tuple
+
+STATE_DIRNAME = "adint-scan"
+STATE_FILE = "arm-state.json"
+BASELINE_FILE = "persistence-baseline.json"
+
+DNS_LOG = "Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client/Operational"
+DNS_LOG_SIZE_BYTES = 64 * 1024 * 1024 # 64 MB of retention, ~months of queries
+RESCAN_TASK_NAME = "adint-scan-periodic"
+
+# --- small helpers ----------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def state_dir() -> str:
+ base = os.environ.get("LOCALAPPDATA") or os.path.expanduser("~")
+ return os.path.join(base, STATE_DIRNAME)
+
+
+def _state_path() -> str:
+ return os.path.join(state_dir(), STATE_FILE)
+
+
+def _baseline_path() -> str:
+ return os.path.join(state_dir(), BASELINE_FILE)
+
+
+def is_admin() -> bool:
+ if platform.system() != "Windows":
+ return os.geteuid() == 0 if hasattr(os, "geteuid") else False
+ try:
+ return bool(ctypes.windll.shell32.IsUserAnAdmin())
+ except Exception:
+ return False
+
+
+def _ps(cmd: str, timeout: int = 120) -> Tuple[int, str, str]:
+ """Run a PowerShell command. Used for local system state only — never for
+ anything that would resolve or contact an indicator.
+
+ encoding/errors are explicit because PowerShell and the Windows console
+ tools write in the console code page, not UTF-8; strict decoding raises
+ inside subprocess's reader thread on any non-ASCII byte.
+ """
+ cmd = "[Console]::OutputEncoding=[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8; " + cmd
+ proc = subprocess.run(
+ ["powershell", "-NoProfile", "-NonInteractive",
+ "-ExecutionPolicy", "Bypass", "-Command", cmd],
+ capture_output=True, text=True,
+ encoding="utf-8", errors="replace", timeout=timeout)
+ return proc.returncode, (proc.stdout or ""), (proc.stderr or "")
+
+
+def _run(argv: List[str], timeout: int = 120) -> Tuple[int, str, str]:
+ # wevtutil and schtasks emit the console code page; decode leniently so a
+ # localised Windows cannot crash an undo.
+ proc = subprocess.run(argv, capture_output=True, text=True,
+ encoding="utf-8", errors="replace", timeout=timeout)
+ return proc.returncode, (proc.stdout or ""), (proc.stderr or "")
+
+
+def _load_state() -> Dict[str, Any]:
+ try:
+ with open(_state_path(), encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+ return json.load(fh)
+ except (OSError, ValueError):
+ return {"actions": []}
+
+
+def _save_state(state: Dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+ os.makedirs(state_dir(), exist_ok=True)
+ with open(_state_path(), "w", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n") as fh:
+ json.dump(state, fh, indent=2)
+ fh.write("\n")
+
+
+def _journal(state: Dict[str, Any], action: Dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+ action["at"] = datetime.datetime.now().replace(microsecond=0).isoformat()
+ state.setdefault("actions", []).append(action)
+ _save_state(state)
+
+
+# --- step 1: DNS-Client operational logging ---------------------------------
+
+
+def dns_log_state() -> Dict[str, Any]:
+ """Read the log's current config with wevtutil, so --undo can restore it."""
+ rc, out, err = _run(["wevtutil", "gl", DNS_LOG])
+ if rc != 0:
+ return {"present": False, "error": (err or out).strip()}
+ cfg: Dict[str, Any] = {"present": True, "enabled": None, "maxsize": None}
+ for line in out.splitlines():
+ line = line.strip()
+ if line.startswith("enabled:"):
+ cfg["enabled"] = line.split(":", 1)[1].strip().lower() == "true"
+ elif line.startswith("maxSize:"):
+ try:
+ cfg["maxsize"] = int(line.split(":", 1)[1].strip())
+ except ValueError:
+ pass
+ return cfg
+
+
+def enable_dns_log(state: Dict[str, Any], apply: bool) -> List[str]:
+ msgs: List[str] = []
+ before = dns_log_state()
+ if not before.get("present"):
+ msgs.append(" [dns-log] log not present on this system: {}"
+ .format(before.get("error", "unknown")))
+ return msgs
+
+ msgs.append(" [dns-log] WILL CHANGE: enable {}".format(DNS_LOG))
+ msgs.append(" current: enabled={} maxSize={}"
+ .format(before.get("enabled"), before.get("maxsize")))
+ msgs.append(" after : enabled=True maxSize={}".format(DNS_LOG_SIZE_BYTES))
+ msgs.append(" needs administrator: YES")
+ msgs.append(" undo : restores the two values printed above")
+ if not apply:
+ return msgs
+
+ if not is_admin():
+ msgs.append(" [dns-log] SKIPPED — needs an elevated shell. Re-run the same "
+ "command from an Administrator prompt.")
+ return msgs
+
+ rc, out, err = _run(["wevtutil", "sl", DNS_LOG, "/e:true",
+ "/ms:{}".format(DNS_LOG_SIZE_BYTES)])
+ if rc != 0:
+ msgs.append(" [dns-log] FAILED: {}".format((err or out).strip()))
+ return msgs
+ _journal(state, {"action": "dns_log", "prior": before})
+ after = dns_log_state()
+ msgs.append(" [dns-log] DONE — enabled={} maxSize={}"
+ .format(after.get("enabled"), after.get("maxsize")))
+ msgs.append(" From now on this machine keeps DNS query history. That "
+ "is what makes a future check possible at all.")
+ return msgs
+
+
+def undo_dns_log(prior: Dict[str, Any]) -> str:
+ if not is_admin():
+ return " [dns-log] SKIPPED — needs an elevated shell."
+ enabled = "true" if prior.get("enabled") else "false"
+ argv = ["wevtutil", "sl", DNS_LOG, "/e:{}".format(enabled)]
+ if prior.get("maxsize"):
+ argv.append("/ms:{}".format(prior["maxsize"]))
+ rc, out, err = _run(argv)
+ if rc != 0:
+ return " [dns-log] undo FAILED: {}".format((err or out).strip())
+ return " [dns-log] restored enabled={} maxSize={}".format(
+ enabled, prior.get("maxsize"))
+
+
+# --- step 2: persistence baseline -------------------------------------------
+#
+# A list of persistence entries is noise (D4: the reference machine had 37
+# per-user COM registrations, every one legitimate). A DIFF against a known-good
+# baseline is signal. This records the inventory now so a later run can say
+# "these three things appeared since", which is a question worth answering.
+
+
+def _sha256_file(path: str) -> Optional[str]:
+ try:
+ h = hashlib.sha256()
+ with open(path, "rb") as fh:
+ while True:
+ chunk = fh.read(1024 * 1024)
+ if not chunk:
+ break
+ h.update(chunk)
+ return h.hexdigest()
+ except OSError:
+ return None
+
+
+def _iter_com_registrations() -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
+ """Per-user COM servers — the documented Candiru persistence technique."""
+ if platform.system() != "Windows":
+ return []
+ import winreg
+
+ found: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
+ for sub in (r"Software\Classes\CLSID", r"Software\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID"):
+ try:
+ root = winreg.OpenKey(winreg.HKEY_CURRENT_USER, sub)
+ except OSError:
+ continue
+ with root:
+ i = 0
+ while True:
+ try:
+ clsid = winreg.EnumKey(root, i)
+ except OSError:
+ break
+ i += 1
+ for kind in ("InprocServer32", "LocalServer32", "InprocHandler32"):
+ try:
+ with winreg.OpenKey(root, clsid + "\\" + kind) as k:
+ val, _ = winreg.QueryValueEx(k, "")
+ except OSError:
+ continue
+ if not val:
+ continue
+ target = os.path.expandvars(str(val)).strip('"')
+ found.append({
+ "kind": "com",
+ "id": "{}\\{}[{}]".format(sub, clsid, kind),
+ "target": target,
+ "sha256": _sha256_file(target) if os.path.isfile(target) else None,
+ })
+ return found
+
+
+def _iter_run_keys() -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
+ if platform.system() != "Windows":
+ return []
+ import winreg
+
+ hives = [
+ (winreg.HKEY_CURRENT_USER, r"Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"),
+ (winreg.HKEY_CURRENT_USER, r"Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce"),
+ (winreg.HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, r"Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"),
+ (winreg.HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, r"Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce"),
+ ]
+ out: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
+ for hive, sub in hives:
+ try:
+ key = winreg.OpenKey(hive, sub)
+ except OSError:
+ continue
+ with key:
+ i = 0
+ while True:
+ try:
+ name, val, _ = winreg.EnumValue(key, i)
+ except OSError:
+ break
+ i += 1
+ out.append({
+ "kind": "run",
+ "id": "{}\\{}::{}".format(
+ "HKCU" if hive == winreg.HKEY_CURRENT_USER else "HKLM",
+ sub, name),
+ "target": str(val),
+ "sha256": None,
+ })
+ return out
+
+
+def _iter_scheduled_tasks() -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
+ if platform.system() != "Windows":
+ return []
+ rc, out, _err = _run(["schtasks", "/query", "/fo", "csv", "/nh"], timeout=180)
+ if rc != 0:
+ return []
+ tasks: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
+ for line in out.splitlines():
+ line = line.strip()
+ if not line:
+ continue
+ parts = [p.strip('"') for p in line.split('","')]
+ if not parts:
+ continue
+ name = parts[0].strip('"')
+ if not name or name.lower() == "taskname":
+ continue
+ tasks.append({"kind": "task", "id": name, "target": None, "sha256": None})
+ return tasks
+
+
+def collect_inventory() -> Dict[str, Any]:
+ entries = _iter_com_registrations() + _iter_run_keys() + _iter_scheduled_tasks()
+ entries.sort(key=lambda e: (e["kind"], e["id"]))
+ return {
+ "taken_at": datetime.datetime.now().replace(microsecond=0).isoformat(),
+ "host": platform.node(),
+ "counts": {
+ "com": sum(1 for e in entries if e["kind"] == "com"),
+ "run": sum(1 for e in entries if e["kind"] == "run"),
+ "task": sum(1 for e in entries if e["kind"] == "task"),
+ },
+ "entries": entries,
+ }
+
+
+def write_baseline(state: Dict[str, Any], apply: bool) -> List[str]:
+ msgs: List[str] = []
+ path = _baseline_path()
+ existed = os.path.exists(path)
+ msgs.append(" [baseline] WILL CHANGE: write a persistence inventory to")
+ msgs.append(" {}".format(path))
+ msgs.append(" (this writes only inside the tool's own state dir — "
+ "nothing on the system is modified)")
+ msgs.append(" needs administrator: NO")
+ msgs.append(" undo : {}".format(
+ "restores the previous baseline" if existed else "deletes that file"))
+ if not apply:
+ return msgs
+
+ prior = None
+ if existed:
+ try:
+ with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+ prior = fh.read()
+ except OSError:
+ prior = None
+
+ inv = collect_inventory()
+ os.makedirs(state_dir(), exist_ok=True)
+ with open(path, "w", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n") as fh:
+ json.dump(inv, fh, indent=2)
+ fh.write("\n")
+ _journal(state, {"action": "baseline", "path": path, "prior_contents": prior})
+ msgs.append(" [baseline] DONE — {} COM, {} Run, {} scheduled tasks recorded"
+ .format(inv["counts"]["com"], inv["counts"]["run"],
+ inv["counts"]["task"]))
+ msgs.append(" A later `--arm --baseline-diff` now reports what "
+ "APPEARED since, instead of dumping a list you cannot judge.")
+ return msgs
+
+
+def baseline_diff() -> List[str]:
+ path = _baseline_path()
+ try:
+ with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+ old = json.load(fh)
+ except (OSError, ValueError):
+ return [" [baseline-diff] no baseline recorded yet — run `--arm --baseline` "
+ "first. Without one there is nothing to compare against, and this "
+ "tool does not guess."]
+ new = collect_inventory()
+ old_map = {e["id"]: e for e in old.get("entries", [])}
+ new_map = {e["id"]: e for e in new.get("entries", [])}
+
+ added = [i for i in new_map if i not in old_map]
+ removed = [i for i in old_map if i not in new_map]
+ changed = [i for i in new_map
+ if i in old_map and new_map[i].get("sha256") != old_map[i].get("sha256")]
+
+ msgs = [" [baseline-diff] baseline taken {}".format(old.get("taken_at", "?"))]
+ if not (added or removed or changed):
+ msgs.append(" [baseline-diff] no change in the persistence set since then.")
+ return msgs
+ for i in sorted(added):
+ msgs.append(" !! APPEARED : {} -> {}".format(i, new_map[i].get("target")))
+ for i in sorted(changed):
+ msgs.append(" !! REPLACED : {} (binary hash changed)".format(i))
+ for i in sorted(removed):
+ msgs.append(" gone : {}".format(i))
+ msgs.append(" Appeared/replaced entries are worth READING, not panicking about: "
+ "software updates legitimately change these.")
+ return msgs
+
+
+# --- step 3: periodic re-scan ----------------------------------------------
+
+
+def register_rescan(state: Dict[str, Any], apply: bool) -> List[str]:
+ msgs: List[str] = []
+ launcher = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(
+ os.path.abspath(__file__))), "adint-scan.py")
+ cmd = '"{}" -X utf8 "{}"'.format(sys.executable, launcher)
+ msgs.append(" [rescan] WILL CHANGE: create a weekly Scheduled Task named "
+ "'{}'".format(RESCAN_TASK_NAME))
+ msgs.append(" running: {}".format(cmd))
+ msgs.append(" needs administrator: NO (per-user task)")
+ msgs.append(" undo : deletes that scheduled task")
+ if not apply:
+ return msgs
+
+ rc, out, err = _run(["schtasks", "/create", "/tn", RESCAN_TASK_NAME,
+ "/tr", cmd, "/sc", "weekly", "/f"])
+ if rc != 0:
+ msgs.append(" [rescan] FAILED: {}".format((err or out).strip()))
+ return msgs
+ _journal(state, {"action": "rescan_task", "name": RESCAN_TASK_NAME})
+ msgs.append(" [rescan] DONE — re-runs weekly against whatever indicator set is "
+ "on disk at that time.")
+ return msgs
+
+
+def undo_rescan(name: str) -> str:
+ rc, out, err = _run(["schtasks", "/delete", "/tn", name, "/f"])
+ if rc != 0:
+ return " [rescan] undo FAILED: {}".format((err or out).strip())
+ return " [rescan] scheduled task '{}' deleted".format(name)
+
+
+# --- step 4: Sysmon, detected but deliberately NOT installed ----------------
+
+
+def sysmon_status() -> List[str]:
+ msgs: List[str] = []
+ rc, out, _err = _run(["sc", "query", "Sysmon64"])
+ if rc != 0:
+ rc, out, _err = _run(["sc", "query", "Sysmon"])
+ if rc == 0 and "RUNNING" in out.upper():
+ msgs.append(" [sysmon] already installed and running — good. Its process and "
+ "network events are the best retrospective record you can have.")
+ else:
+ msgs.append(" [sysmon] not installed. This tool deliberately does NOT download "
+ "it: fetching a binary at arm time is the supply-chain exposure")
+ msgs.append(" DESIGN.md warns about, and we will not add a network "
+ "fetch to a tool used by targeted people.")
+ msgs.append(" To do it yourself: get Sysmon from Microsoft "
+ "Sysinternals and a vetted config (e.g. SwiftOnSecurity's or")
+ msgs.append(" olafhartong's), then `Sysmon64.exe -accepteula -i "
+ "sysmonconfig.xml` from an elevated prompt.")
+ return msgs
+
+
+# --- dispatch ---------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def _print(lines: List[str]) -> None:
+ for line in lines:
+ print(line)
+
+
+def dispatch(args) -> int:
+ if platform.system() != "Windows":
+ print("--arm is Windows-only for now (the confirmed sample is a Windows DLL "
+ "and the documented persistence is a Windows COM hijack).",
+ file=sys.stderr)
+ return 1
+
+ if getattr(args, "undo", False):
+ return _do_undo()
+
+ if getattr(args, "baseline_diff", False):
+ _print(baseline_diff())
+ return 0
+
+ want_dns = getattr(args, "enable_dns_log", False) or getattr(args, "all", False)
+ want_base = getattr(args, "baseline", False) or getattr(args, "all", False)
+ want_rescan = getattr(args, "rescan", False) or getattr(args, "all", False)
+ apply = want_dns or want_base or want_rescan
+
+ print("=" * 72)
+ print(" adint-scan --arm {}".format(
+ "APPLYING the steps selected below" if apply else "DRY RUN — nothing will change"))
+ print("=" * 72)
+ print("Administrator: {}".format("yes" if is_admin() else "no"))
+ print("State/undo journal: {}".format(_state_path()))
+ print("")
+
+ state = _load_state()
+
+ print("Step 1 — DNS query logging (the one that matters most)")
+ _print(enable_dns_log(state, apply and want_dns))
+ print("")
+ print("Step 2 — persistence baseline, so later runs can show a diff")
+ _print(write_baseline(state, apply and want_base))
+ print("")
+ print("Step 3 — periodic re-scan")
+ _print(register_rescan(state, apply and want_rescan))
+ print("")
+ print("Step 4 — Sysmon (informational only)")
+ _print(sysmon_status())
+ print("")
+
+ if not apply:
+ print("-" * 72)
+ print("Nothing was changed. Opt into steps explicitly, e.g.:")
+ print(" adint-scan --arm --baseline (no admin needed)")
+ print(" adint-scan --arm --enable-dns-log (needs admin)")
+ print(" adint-scan --arm --all (all of the above)")
+ print("Reverse everything later with: adint-scan --undo")
+ else:
+ print("-" * 72)
+ print("Applied. Undo everything with: adint-scan --undo")
+ print("Enabling DNS logging does not protect you — it only means that next "
+ "time,\nthere is something to look at. That is the whole point.")
+ print("=" * 72)
+ return 0
+
+
+def _do_undo() -> int:
+ state = _load_state()
+ actions = state.get("actions", [])
+ if not actions:
+ print("Nothing to undo — no recorded --arm actions in {}"
+ .format(_state_path()))
+ return 0
+
+ print("Reversing {} recorded action(s), most recent first:".format(len(actions)))
+ remaining: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
+ for action in reversed(actions):
+ kind = action.get("action")
+ if kind == "dns_log":
+ print(undo_dns_log(action.get("prior", {})))
+ elif kind == "baseline":
+ path = action.get("path", _baseline_path())
+ prior = action.get("prior_contents")
+ try:
+ if prior is None:
+ if os.path.exists(path):
+ os.remove(path)
+ print(" [baseline] {} deleted".format(path))
+ else:
+ with open(path, "w", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n") as fh:
+ fh.write(prior)
+ print(" [baseline] previous baseline restored")
+ except OSError as exc:
+ print(" [baseline] undo FAILED: {}".format(exc))
+ remaining.append(action)
+ elif kind == "rescan_task":
+ print(undo_rescan(action.get("name", RESCAN_TASK_NAME)))
+ else:
+ print(" (unknown action {!r}, left alone)".format(kind))
+ remaining.append(action)
+
+ state["actions"] = list(reversed(remaining))
+ _save_state(state)
+ if remaining:
+ print("\n{} action(s) could not be reversed and remain journalled — most "
+ "likely they need an elevated shell.".format(len(remaining)))
+ return 1
+ print("\nAll recorded changes reversed.")
+ return 0
diff --git a/scan/adint_scan/cli.py b/scan/adint_scan/cli.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..844cf41
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scan/adint_scan/cli.py
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+"""Command-line entry point and orchestration.
+
+ adint-scan [--deep] [--quick] [--json <path>] [--iocs <path>]
+
+Default behaviour (no flags): read-only tier-1 IOC match across the browser, hash
+and host modules, under the no-network guard. Requires no administrator (D7).
+
+The system-writing tier-5 feature (--arm / --undo) is HELD BACK from this release.
+Its code is in arm.py but is not wired to the CLI: a review found its --undo path
+could, from a journal file any program can write, delete every scheduled task on
+the machine and still report success, and could shrink the DNS log and destroy the
+history it had collected. None of that is acceptable in a tool at-risk people run,
+and the one thing it was for - turning on DNS history - is a single manual command
+the report already prints. It returns once the undo path has been rewritten with
+the write-ahead journal and per-step safety the review specifies.
+
+Exit codes: 0 = no indicators found (CLEAN or with gaps); 2 = indicators matched;
+1 = the scan could not be set up (bad IOC file, etc.).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import datetime
+import os
+import sys
+import time
+from typing import List
+
+from . import __version__
+from .context import ScanContext
+from .iocs import IocError, load
+from .netguard import no_network
+from .report import V_HITS, build_document, render_human, write_json
+from .result import ModuleResult
+
+
+def _force_utf8_io() -> None:
+ """Make stdout/stderr encode UTF-8 regardless of the console code page.
+
+ On a stock Windows Python the streams default to the legacy code page (cp1252
+ in much of the world). Printing a non-Latin browser-profile name or username -
+ Arabic, Hebrew, Persian, Cyrillic, CJK, i.e. exactly this tool's users - then
+ raises UnicodeEncodeError and the whole scan dies with a traceback instead of
+ a report, and worst of all when writing the report file AFTER the work is
+ done. Reconfiguring here fixes it without depending on the caller remembering
+ `-X utf8`. errors='backslashreplace' guarantees output can never crash."""
+ for stream in (sys.stdout, sys.stderr):
+ try:
+ stream.reconfigure(encoding="utf-8", errors="backslashreplace")
+ except (AttributeError, ValueError):
+ pass # very old Python, or a stream that is not reconfigurable
+
+
+def _default_ioc_path() -> str:
+ # scan/adint_scan/cli.py -> repo root is two levels up; IOCs live in iocs/.
+ here = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
+ repo = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(here))
+ return os.path.join(repo, "iocs", "adfection_iocs.txt")
+
+
+def _parse(argv: List[str]) -> argparse.Namespace:
+ p = argparse.ArgumentParser(
+ prog="adint-scan",
+ description="Local, read-only check for AdFection / Candiru indicators. "
+ "A clean result is NOT a clean bill of health.")
+ p.add_argument("--quick", action="store_true",
+ help="skip fingerprinting every file (roughly halves the "
+ "runtime). The skipped check is reported as a gap, not "
+ "as clean.")
+ p.add_argument("--deep", action="store_true",
+ help="tier 2: full persistence sweep (noisy; most hits are "
+ "legitimate). Opens with a warning.")
+ p.add_argument("--json", metavar="PATH",
+ help="also write the machine-readable report to PATH.")
+ p.add_argument("--iocs", metavar="PATH", default=_default_ioc_path(),
+ help="indicator file (default: bundled adfection_iocs.txt).")
+ p.add_argument("--version", action="version",
+ version="adint-scan {}".format(__version__))
+ return p.parse_args(argv)
+
+
+def _run_modules(ctx: ScanContext) -> List[ModuleResult]:
+ # Imported lazily so a platform-specific import error degrades to UNKNOWN
+ # rather than killing the whole run.
+ from .modules import browser, hashscan, host
+
+ results: List[ModuleResult] = []
+ # The entire scan runs inside the no-network guard (D2).
+ with no_network():
+ for mod in (browser, hashscan, host):
+ # --quick drops the file-fingerprint check. It costs ~45% of the
+ # whole scan (345s of 774s measured) to look for ONE published file
+ # hash, and Candiru compiles a fresh build per target, so another
+ # victim's file would not match it anyway. Skipping is reported as a
+ # GAP, never as clean (D3) - a check that did not run has not
+ # cleared anything.
+ if mod is hashscan and ctx.quick:
+ r = ModuleResult(hashscan.NAME)
+ r.could_not_run(
+ "file-fingerprints",
+ "skipped by --quick. No file on this machine was "
+ "fingerprinted, so a known sample sitting on disk would "
+ "not have been found. Re-run without --quick to include it")
+ results.append(r)
+ ctx.emit("[*] skipping file fingerprints (--quick)")
+ continue
+ ctx.emit("[*] running check: {}".format(mod.NAME))
+ started = time.time()
+ try:
+ result = mod.run(ctx)
+ except Exception as exc: # a module must never crash the whole tool
+ result = ModuleResult(mod.NAME)
+ result.could_not_run(mod.NAME, "module error: {}".format(exc))
+ result.duration_s = time.time() - started
+ ctx.emit("[*] {} finished in {:.0f}s".format(
+ mod.NAME, result.duration_s))
+ results.append(result)
+ if ctx.deep:
+ # Tier 2 is the last item in the build order and is not written yet.
+ # An advertised flag must not crash, and it must not quietly report
+ # a clean sweep it never performed: the honest result is UNKNOWN.
+ try:
+ from .modules import deep as deepmod
+ except ImportError:
+ r = ModuleResult("deep")
+ r.could_not_run(
+ "persistence-sweep",
+ "tier 2 (--deep) is not implemented yet — no full "
+ "persistence sweep was performed. Use --arm --baseline and "
+ "--arm --baseline-diff, which answer a sharper question: "
+ "what changed since a known-good inventory")
+ results.append(r)
+ else:
+ ctx.emit("[*] running module: {}".format(deepmod.NAME))
+ try:
+ results.append(deepmod.run(ctx))
+ except Exception as exc:
+ r = ModuleResult(deepmod.NAME)
+ r.could_not_run(deepmod.NAME, "module error: {}".format(exc))
+ results.append(r)
+ return results
+
+
+def main(argv: List[str] = None) -> int:
+ _force_utf8_io()
+ args = _parse(sys.argv[1:] if argv is None else argv)
+
+ try:
+ iocs = load(args.iocs)
+ except IocError as exc:
+ print("error: {}".format(exc), file=sys.stderr)
+ return 1
+
+ if args.deep:
+ print("WARNING (--deep): a full persistence sweep lists many legitimate\n"
+ "entries. Most findings are NOT malicious. Read each one; do not\n"
+ "panic at an unsigned binary in a user-writable path.\n",
+ file=sys.stderr)
+
+ ctx = ScanContext(iocs=iocs, deep=args.deep, quick=args.quick)
+ started = datetime.datetime.now()
+ results = _run_modules(ctx)
+
+ document = build_document(iocs, results, started)
+ print(render_human(document))
+
+ if args.json:
+ try:
+ write_json(document, args.json)
+ print("\n[wrote JSON report to {}]".format(args.json), file=sys.stderr)
+ except OSError as exc:
+ # The human report already printed; a failed JSON write must not bury
+ # it under a traceback. Report the failure and keep the verdict code.
+ print("\n[could not write JSON report to {}: {}]".format(
+ args.json, exc), file=sys.stderr)
+
+ return 2 if document["verdict"]["status"] == V_HITS else 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+ raise SystemExit(main())
diff --git a/scan/adint_scan/context.py b/scan/adint_scan/context.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b9b3a48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scan/adint_scan/context.py
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+"""ScanContext — what every module receives. Keeps modules decoupled from the CLI."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import sys
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from typing import Callable
+
+from .iocs import IocSet
+
+
+@dataclass
+class ScanContext:
+ iocs: IocSet
+ deep: bool = False
+ # Skip the file-fingerprinting check, which is the slowest part of the scan
+ # by far and the weakest signal in it. See cli.py for why.
+ quick: bool = False
+ verbose: bool = True
+ # progress sink; defaults to stderr so stdout stays the clean human report
+ emit: Callable[[str], None] = field(
+ default=lambda msg: print(msg, file=sys.stderr))
diff --git a/scan/adint_scan/iocs.py b/scan/adint_scan/iocs.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8cfbbf7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scan/adint_scan/iocs.py
@@ -0,0 +1,405 @@
+"""IOC loading, type inference and freshness.
+
+Data contract (SPEC-scanner.md, matching iocs/adfection_iocs.txt):
+
+ indicator <TAB> tier <TAB> confidence
+
+ tier = cc | validator | delivery | historical | sample
+ confidence = primary | secondary
+
+`#` lines are comments. The schema deliberately carries more than AdFection: the
+threat is the ADINT *technique*, so the same file holds other vendors (NSO,
+Intellexa/Predator, Paragon, Cytrox) and sample hashes as they are added. A hit
+without a citation is unusable, so the provenance (confidence) column is required.
+
+Indicator *type* is inferred from shape, not stored, so the file stays 3 columns:
+ - 64 hex chars -> sha256 sample hash
+ - looks like an IPv4/IPv6 -> ip
+ - otherwise -> domain
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import io
+import os
+import re
+import datetime
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from typing import Dict, List, Optional, Tuple
+
+VALID_TIERS = {
+ "cc", # Candiru command-and-control (Citizen Lab, named in body)
+ "validator", # Candiru validator / target-selection servers
+ "delivery", # Discover-Tech / Controlium ad infrastructure
+ "historical", # older, separate Candiru campaigns
+ "sample", # file hashes
+ # Candiru-attributed server infrastructure whose individual ROLE is not stated
+ # by the source. Recorded Future's Aug 2025 DevilsTongue report lists 8
+ # clusters mixing victim-facing C2 and higher-tier operator infrastructure,
+ # without saying which domain is which. Treating these as `cc` would claim
+ # precision the source does not give, so they get their own tier.
+ "candiru",
+ # Same, but IP addresses. Separate because an IP indicator decays in a way a
+ # domain does not: almost all of these are Vultr / DigitalOcean addresses
+ # that are very likely reassigned to innocent tenants by now. A hit is only
+ # meaningful if it is DATED (a DNS log entry from the period), which is why
+ # the tier is distinguishable rather than mixed in with the domains.
+ "candiru-ip",
+}
+VALID_CONFIDENCE = {"primary", "secondary"}
+
+# Characters that may not sit immediately beside a match. Without this the
+# matching is plain substring, so 52.174.65.77 matches inside 152.174.65.771 and
+# controlium.net matches inside notcontrolium.net or controlium.network. With 100+
+# IP indicators that stops being theoretical.
+#
+# A dot on the RIGHT is the subtle case. "controlium.net." (the fully-qualified
+# form, or the end of a sentence) is the indicator; "controlium.net.evil.example"
+# is a different domain that merely starts with it. So a trailing dot is allowed
+# only when what follows it does not continue the name (the `cont` sets below).
+_LABEL = set("abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789-")
+_LEFT_BAD = _LABEL | {"_"}
+_RIGHT_BAD = _LABEL | {"_"}
+_DIGIT = set("0123456789")
+_DIGIT_DOT = _DIGIT | {"."}
+_HEX = set("0123456789abcdef")
+_HEX_COLON = _HEX | {":"}
+
+TYPE_DOMAIN = "domain"
+TYPE_IP = "ip"
+TYPE_SHA256 = "sha256"
+
+_SHA256_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
+_IPV4_RE = re.compile(r"^\d{1,3}(\.\d{1,3}){3}$")
+
+
+def infer_type(indicator: str) -> str:
+ s = indicator.strip().lower()
+ if _SHA256_RE.match(s):
+ return TYPE_SHA256
+ if _IPV4_RE.match(s) or (":" in s and all(c in "0123456789abcdef:" for c in s)):
+ return TYPE_IP
+ return TYPE_DOMAIN
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class Indicator:
+ value: str # normalised: lower-case for domains/ips/hashes
+ tier: str
+ confidence: str
+ type: str
+ # Which published report this came from. Optional 4th column. With more than
+ # one source in the file, "a hit without a citation is unusable" means the
+ # citation has to travel per indicator, not per file.
+ source: str = ""
+
+ def to_dict(self) -> Dict[str, str]:
+ return {
+ "indicator": self.value,
+ "tier": self.tier,
+ "confidence": self.confidence,
+ "type": self.type,
+ "source": self.source,
+ }
+
+
+def _char_at(hay, pos):
+ """One character of a str or bytes haystack, as a str, or None if out of range."""
+ if pos < 0 or pos >= len(hay):
+ return None
+ c = hay[pos]
+ return c if isinstance(c, str) else chr(c)
+
+
+def _char_at16(hay: bytes, pos: int):
+ """One UTF-16LE code unit of a bytes haystack starting at byte `pos`.
+
+ Only ASCII matters for boundary decisions, so anything else comes back as a
+ placeholder that is in none of the boundary sets.
+ """
+ if pos < 0 or pos + 1 >= len(hay):
+ return None
+ lo, hi = hay[pos], hay[pos + 1]
+ return chr(lo) if hi == 0 and lo < 0x80 else "￿"
+
+
+def _bad_sets(needle: str, ind_type: str):
+ """(left_bad, right_bad, continues) for one indicator. `continues` is what
+ may not follow a trailing dot - see the comment on _LABEL."""
+ if ind_type == TYPE_IP:
+ if ":" in needle: # IPv6
+ return _HEX_COLON | {"."}, _HEX_COLON, _HEX
+ return _DIGIT_DOT, _DIGIT, _DIGIT # IPv4
+ return _LEFT_BAD, _RIGHT_BAD, _LABEL
+
+
+def _positions(hay, needle, ind_type: str, display: str, wide: bool = False):
+ """Every offset at which `needle` occurs in `hay` as a whole indicator rather
+ than as part of a longer name or number.
+
+ Domains: the character before must not continue a label (so notcontrolium.net
+ does not match controlium.net) and the character after must not either (so
+ controlium.network does not match).
+ IPs: neither side may continue the number, so 152.174.65.771 does not match
+ 52.174.65.77, and an IPv6 address may not sit inside a longer one.
+
+ `display` is the indicator as text (for choosing boundary sets); `needle` is
+ what is searched for, which differs when `wide` (UTF-16LE bytes).
+ """
+ left_bad, right_bad, cont = _bad_sets(display, ind_type)
+ at = _char_at16 if wide else _char_at
+ unit = 2 if wide else 1
+ out = []
+ start = 0
+ while True:
+ idx = hay.find(needle, start)
+ if idx == -1:
+ return out
+ before = at(hay, idx - unit)
+ after = at(hay, idx + len(needle))
+ ok = before is None or before not in left_bad
+ if ok and after is not None:
+ if after in right_bad:
+ ok = False
+ elif after == ".":
+ nxt = at(hay, idx + len(needle) + unit)
+ ok = nxt is None or nxt not in cont
+ if ok:
+ out.append(idx)
+ start = idx + 1
+
+
+def _boundaries_ok(hay, needle, ind_type: str) -> bool:
+ """True if `needle` occurs in `hay` at least once as a whole indicator."""
+ display = needle if isinstance(needle, str) else needle.decode("ascii", "replace")
+ return bool(_positions(hay, needle, ind_type, display))
+
+
+def _prune_parents(found, hay) -> list:
+ """Drop a parent domain whose every occurrence is just the tail of a matched
+ child. "noas.powerium.net" in a cookie also contains "powerium.net", and both
+ are indicators - but it is ONE contact, and reporting it as two servers that
+ reached the device doubles the alarm for no reason. A parent that also occurs
+ on its own somewhere in the same artifact is kept."""
+ by_value = {ind.value: (ind, occ) for ind, occ in found}
+ keep = []
+ for ind, occ in found:
+ children = [c for c in by_value
+ if c != ind.value and c.endswith("." + ind.value)]
+ if ind.type != TYPE_DOMAIN or not children:
+ keep.append(ind)
+ continue
+ standalone = False
+ for enc, pos in occ:
+ tail_of_child = False
+ for child in children:
+ extra = len(child) - len(ind.value)
+ if enc == "wide":
+ start = pos - 2 * extra
+ seg = hay[start:pos + 2 * len(ind.value)] if start >= 0 else b""
+ tail_of_child = seg == child.encode("utf-16-le")
+ else:
+ start = pos - extra
+ seg = hay[start:pos + len(ind.value)] if start >= 0 else ""
+ want = child if isinstance(hay, str) else child.encode("ascii")
+ tail_of_child = seg == want
+ if tail_of_child:
+ break
+ if not tail_of_child:
+ standalone = True
+ break
+ if standalone:
+ keep.append(ind)
+ return keep
+
+
+class IocSet:
+ def __init__(self, indicators: List[Indicator], source_path: str,
+ source_mtime: Optional[float]):
+ self.indicators = indicators
+ self.source_path = source_path
+ self.source_mtime = source_mtime
+ self._by_value = {i.value: i for i in indicators}
+ self._net_cache = None
+ self._needle_cache = {}
+ self._gate_text_re = None
+ self._gate_bytes_re = None
+
+ # --- views used by modules ---------------------------------------------
+
+ @property
+ def domains(self) -> List[Indicator]:
+ return [i for i in self.indicators if i.type == TYPE_DOMAIN]
+
+ @property
+ def ips(self) -> List[Indicator]:
+ return [i for i in self.indicators if i.type == TYPE_IP]
+
+ @property
+ def hashes(self) -> List[Indicator]:
+ return [i for i in self.indicators if i.type == TYPE_SHA256]
+
+ @property
+ def network_strings(self) -> List[str]:
+ """Lower-case domain + IP strings, for substring matching in artifacts.
+ Sorted for deterministic output. Never used to RESOLVE anything."""
+ return sorted({i.value for i in self.indicators
+ if i.type in (TYPE_DOMAIN, TYPE_IP)})
+
+ def lookup(self, value: str) -> Optional[Indicator]:
+ return self._by_value.get(value.strip().lower())
+
+ # --- matching -----------------------------------------------------------
+ #
+ # All matching goes through here so the boundary rules exist in exactly one
+ # place. Both methods take an ALREADY LOWER-CASED haystack, and neither ever
+ # resolves or contacts anything: this is text comparison only.
+
+ @property
+ def _net_indicators(self) -> List[Indicator]:
+ if self._net_cache is None:
+ self._net_cache = [i for i in self.indicators
+ if i.type in (TYPE_DOMAIN, TYPE_IP)]
+ return self._net_cache
+
+ # MEASURED, do not "optimise" this back into a regex.
+ #
+ # The obvious speedup is to compile one alternation of all 263 literals and
+ # make a single pass per file instead of one pass per indicator. It was tried
+ # and it is 4x SLOWER (10.7s vs 2.5s over 300 x 125 KB buffers): `in` on
+ # bytes/str dispatches to an optimised C substring search, while Python's
+ # `re` has to walk a large alternation itself. A genuine single-pass win
+ # would need an Aho-Corasick implementation, which is not in the standard
+ # library, and the tool has a hard no-dependencies rule.
+ #
+ # The boundary check runs only on candidates that already matched, so it
+ # costs nothing on the overwhelming majority of files.
+
+ def search(self, haystack_lower: str) -> List[Indicator]:
+ """Indicators genuinely present in the text, with type-aware boundaries."""
+ found = []
+ for ind in self._net_indicators:
+ if ind.value in haystack_lower:
+ pos = _positions(haystack_lower, ind.value, ind.type, ind.value)
+ if pos:
+ found.append((ind, [("str", p) for p in pos]))
+ return _prune_parents(found, haystack_lower)
+
+ def search_bytes(self, haystack_lower: bytes) -> List[Indicator]:
+ """As search(), for raw binary artifacts (HTTP cache, LevelDB).
+
+ Searches both single-byte text and UTF-16LE, because Chromium's storage
+ and many Windows artifacts keep strings as UTF-16 - "c\\0o\\0n\\0..." -
+ which a plain byte search walks straight past. bytes.lower() lower-cases
+ the ASCII letters in both encodings, so the caller's lower-casing holds.
+ """
+ found = []
+ for ind in self._net_indicators:
+ occ = []
+ narrow, wide = self._needles(ind)
+ if narrow in haystack_lower:
+ occ += [("narrow", p) for p in
+ _positions(haystack_lower, narrow, ind.type, ind.value)]
+ if wide in haystack_lower:
+ occ += [("wide", p) for p in
+ _positions(haystack_lower, wide, ind.type, ind.value,
+ wide=True)]
+ if occ:
+ found.append((ind, occ))
+ return _prune_parents(found, haystack_lower)
+
+ def _needles(self, ind: Indicator):
+ cache = self._needle_cache
+ if ind.value not in cache:
+ # Indicator values are ASCII by construction (load() converts IDN
+ # domains to punycode), so this encode is exact, never lossy.
+ cache[ind.value] = (ind.value.encode("ascii"),
+ ind.value.encode("utf-16-le"))
+ return cache[ind.value]
+
+ def most_specific(self, matched: List[Indicator]) -> List[Indicator]:
+ """For ONE record (a cookie, an HSTS entry, a URL) that matched several
+ indicators: keep only the most specific. A cookie for noas.powerium.net
+ matches both noas.powerium.net and powerium.net, but it is one contact."""
+ values = {i.value for i in matched}
+ return [i for i in matched
+ if not (i.type == TYPE_DOMAIN and
+ any(v != i.value and v.endswith("." + i.value)
+ for v in values))]
+
+ def __len__(self) -> int:
+ return len(self.indicators)
+
+ # --- freshness ----------------------------------------------------------
+
+ def age_days(self, now: Optional[datetime.datetime] = None) -> Optional[int]:
+ if self.source_mtime is None:
+ return None
+ now = now or datetime.datetime.now()
+ delta = now - datetime.datetime.fromtimestamp(self.source_mtime)
+ return max(0, delta.days)
+
+ def is_stale(self, threshold_days: int = 30) -> bool:
+ age = self.age_days()
+ return age is not None and age > threshold_days
+
+
+class IocError(Exception):
+ pass
+
+
+def load(path: str) -> IocSet:
+ if not os.path.exists(path):
+ raise IocError("IOC file not found: {}".format(path))
+ seen: Dict[str, Indicator] = {}
+ # utf-8-sig, not utf-8: Windows editors save a byte-order mark, and U+FEFF is
+ # not whitespace to str.strip(). With plain utf-8 the first indicator in a
+ # user's own list silently became "controlium.net", matched nothing,
+ # and the scan then reported finding nothing without ever having looked.
+ with io.open(path, encoding="utf-8-sig") as fh:
+ for lineno, raw in enumerate(fh, 1):
+ line = raw.strip()
+ if not line or line.startswith("#"):
+ continue
+ parts = [p.strip() for p in line.split("\t") if p.strip() != ""]
+ if len(parts) < 3:
+ raise IocError(
+ "line {}: expected 3 or 4 tab-separated columns, got {!r}"
+ .format(lineno, line))
+ value, tier, confidence = parts[0].lower(), parts[1], parts[2]
+ # 4th column is an optional source tag; files written before it
+ # existed stay valid.
+ source = parts[3] if len(parts) > 3 else ""
+ if tier not in VALID_TIERS:
+ raise IocError("line {}: unknown tier {!r}".format(lineno, tier))
+ if confidence not in VALID_CONFIDENCE:
+ raise IocError(
+ "line {}: unknown confidence {!r}".format(lineno, confidence))
+ if value.startswith("") or any(
+ c in value for c in "​‌‍⁠"):
+ raise IocError("line {}: invisible character in {!r} - the "
+ "file was probably re-saved by an editor".format(
+ lineno, value))
+ kind = infer_type(value)
+ if kind == TYPE_DOMAIN:
+ value = value.rstrip(".")
+ if not value.isascii():
+ # Store internationalised names in the punycode form that
+ # browsers and DNS actually record, so matching is exact.
+ try:
+ value = value.encode("idna").decode("ascii")
+ except UnicodeError:
+ raise IocError("line {}: {!r} is not a valid domain "
+ "name".format(lineno, value))
+ seen[value] = Indicator(value, tier, confidence, kind, source)
+ if not seen:
+ # An empty list must never produce a report. A truncated download or an
+ # emptied file would otherwise run a full scan, search for nothing, and
+ # print a result that reads as reassurance.
+ raise IocError("indicator file contains no indicators: {}".format(path))
+ try:
+ mtime = os.path.getmtime(path)
+ except OSError:
+ mtime = None
+ return IocSet(sorted(seen.values(), key=lambda i: i.value),
+ os.path.abspath(path), mtime)
diff --git a/scan/adint_scan/modules/__init__.py b/scan/adint_scan/modules/__init__.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c2606af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scan/adint_scan/modules/__init__.py
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+"""Scan modules. Each module file defines:
+
+ NAME: str
+ def run(ctx: adint_scan.context.ScanContext) -> adint_scan.result.ModuleResult
+
+and records every sub-check with result.ModuleResult.ran() / .could_not_run()
+so that CLEAN is never reported for something that did not actually execute (D3).
+"""
diff --git a/scan/adint_scan/modules/browser.py b/scan/adint_scan/modules/browser.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..50ca1f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scan/adint_scan/modules/browser.py
@@ -0,0 +1,1041 @@
+"""Search this machine's browser artifacts for AdFection / Candiru IOC domains.
+
+Why several artifact types and not just history: browser HISTORY only records
+top-level navigations, and an ad is a subresource inside an iframe. A real
+AdFection impression would almost certainly never appear in history. The HTTP
+cache, the cookie stores and the local-storage LevelDB files do record
+subresource origins, so they are where a retrospective trace would actually
+survive.
+
+Read-only. Databases are copied before being opened, because a running browser
+holds a write lock on them; the copy is opened and the temp dir is always
+cleaned up. No network, ever (CONTRACT D2) - needles are matched as plain
+substrings and never resolved.
+
+Honest gaps (CONTRACT D3). A browser's databases are often locked because the
+browser is running. That is NOT a clean result, it is a gap: there was somewhere
+to look and we could not look there. So this module tracks, per (browser label,
+artifact kind), whether at least one profile could actually be read. A kind that
+was present somewhere but could never be read is reported with
+`r.could_not_run(...)`, which the verdict reads as a gap - rather than being
+silently swallowed into a clean roll-up. A kind that is simply ABSENT (the
+browser never created that artifact) is not a gap and is recorded as nothing at
+all. A browser whose every database was locked therefore rolls up to
+PARTIAL/UNKNOWN with those gaps named, never to CLEAN.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import datetime
+import hashlib
+import io
+import json
+import os
+import shutil
+import sqlite3
+import sys
+import tempfile
+
+from ..result import (Hit, ModuleResult, EV_ON_DISK, EV_PERSISTENCE,
+ EV_CONTACTED, EV_ATTEMPTED, EV_CONFIGURED, EV_REFERENCED)
+
+NAME = "browser"
+
+LOCAL = os.environ.get("LOCALAPPDATA", "")
+ROAMING = os.environ.get("APPDATA", "")
+
+
+def _chromium_roots():
+ """Chromium user-data roots as (label, path), chosen by platform.
+
+ The label names the browser in each per-artifact sub-check, so an
+ installed-but-clean browser is recorded distinctly from an absent one, and a
+ locked artifact names the browser it belongs to. Windows roots are derived
+ from the module globals LOCAL/ROAMING, which the test-suite overrides; the
+ macOS and Linux branches never run on a Windows machine, so the real profile
+ is never read under test.
+ """
+ home = os.path.expanduser("~")
+ if sys.platform == "win32":
+ return [
+ ("chrome", os.path.join(LOCAL, "Google", "Chrome", "User Data")),
+ ("edge", os.path.join(LOCAL, "Microsoft", "Edge", "User Data")),
+ ("brave", os.path.join(LOCAL, "BraveSoftware", "Brave-Browser",
+ "User Data")),
+ ("chromium", os.path.join(LOCAL, "Chromium", "User Data")),
+ ]
+ if sys.platform == "darwin":
+ asup = os.path.join(home, "Library", "Application Support")
+ return [
+ ("chrome", os.path.join(asup, "Google", "Chrome")),
+ ("edge", os.path.join(asup, "Microsoft Edge")),
+ ("brave", os.path.join(asup, "BraveSoftware", "Brave-Browser")),
+ ("chromium", os.path.join(asup, "Chromium")),
+ ]
+ if sys.platform.startswith("linux"):
+ cfg = os.path.join(home, ".config")
+ return [
+ ("chrome", os.path.join(cfg, "google-chrome")),
+ ("chromium", os.path.join(cfg, "chromium")),
+ ("brave", os.path.join(cfg, "BraveSoftware", "Brave-Browser")),
+ ]
+ return []
+
+
+# Computed at import so the test-suite can monkeypatch this attribute directly.
+CHROMIUM_ROOTS = _chromium_roots()
+
+
+def _firefox_roots():
+ """Firefox (profiles_dir, cache_dir) pairs by platform.
+
+ Evaluated at run() time so the Windows pair reflects the current LOCAL /
+ ROAMING globals (which the tests override to neutralise it). Returns [] on a
+ platform with no known Firefox location.
+ """
+ home = os.path.expanduser("~")
+ if sys.platform == "win32":
+ return [(os.path.join(ROAMING, "Mozilla", "Firefox", "Profiles"),
+ os.path.join(LOCAL, "Mozilla", "Firefox", "Profiles"))]
+ if sys.platform == "darwin":
+ return [(os.path.join(home, "Library", "Application Support", "Firefox",
+ "Profiles"),
+ os.path.join(home, "Library", "Caches", "Firefox", "Profiles"))]
+ if sys.platform.startswith("linux"):
+ return [
+ (os.path.join(home, ".mozilla", "firefox"),
+ os.path.join(home, ".cache", "mozilla", "firefox")),
+ # snap packaging
+ (os.path.join(home, "snap", "firefox", "common", ".mozilla",
+ "firefox"),
+ os.path.join(home, "snap", "firefox", "common", ".cache", "mozilla",
+ "firefox")),
+ # flatpak packaging
+ (os.path.join(home, ".var", "app", "org.mozilla.firefox", ".mozilla",
+ "firefox"),
+ os.path.join(home, ".var", "app", "org.mozilla.firefox", ".cache",
+ "mozilla", "firefox")),
+ ]
+ return []
+
+
+def copy_locked(path):
+ """Copy a possibly-locked SQLite db (plus -wal/-shm/-journal) to a temp dir.
+
+ A running browser holds a write lock on the live file, so we snapshot it and
+ its write-ahead-log / journal siblings into the system temp dir and open the
+ copy read-only. The caller removes the temp dir in a finally once it has the
+ returned path; if the snapshot itself fails the caller never receives a path,
+ so this function removes its own temp dir before re-raising (no leak)."""
+ tmpdir = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="bscan_")
+ try:
+ base = os.path.join(tmpdir, os.path.basename(path))
+ shutil.copy2(path, base)
+ for suffix in ("-wal", "-shm", "-journal"):
+ if os.path.exists(path + suffix):
+ try:
+ shutil.copy2(path + suffix, base + suffix)
+ except OSError:
+ pass
+ return base
+ except BaseException:
+ # The one place that makes the temp dir is also the one place that
+ # removes it when it never hands it over.
+ shutil.rmtree(tmpdir, ignore_errors=True)
+ raise
+
+
+def _chromium_profile_names(user_data):
+ """Map profile folder -> display name, from the browser's own Local State.
+
+ Chromium calls profile folders "Default", "Profile 1", "Profile 7"..., which
+ is meaningless to a person with several accounts. Local State holds the name
+ they actually see in the browser, which is what makes a finding
+ actionable: "the cookie is in Bubbles" rather than "the cookie is in
+ Profile 1".
+
+ Only the display name is read. The signed-in email address is in the same
+ structure and is deliberately left alone - the name is enough to identify
+ the account, and a report may be forwarded to other people.
+ """
+ out = {}
+ path = os.path.join(user_data, "Local State")
+ try:
+ with io.open(path, encoding="utf-8", errors="replace") as fh:
+ data = json.load(fh)
+ except (OSError, ValueError):
+ return out
+ cache = ((data.get("profile") or {}).get("info_cache") or {}
+ ) if isinstance(data, dict) else {}
+ for folder, info in cache.items():
+ if isinstance(info, dict) and info.get("name"):
+ out[folder] = str(info["name"])
+ return out
+
+
+def _firefox_profile_names(profiles_dir):
+ """Same idea for Firefox, whose names live in profiles.ini one level up."""
+ out = {}
+ ini = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(profiles_dir), "profiles.ini")
+ section = {}
+
+ def flush(sec):
+ path, name = sec.get("Path"), sec.get("Name")
+ if path and name:
+ out[os.path.basename(path.replace("/", os.sep).rstrip(os.sep))] = name
+
+ try:
+ with io.open(ini, encoding="utf-8", errors="replace") as fh:
+ for raw in fh:
+ line = raw.strip()
+ if line.startswith("["):
+ flush(section)
+ section = {}
+ elif "=" in line:
+ key, value = line.split("=", 1)
+ section[key.strip()] = value.strip()
+ flush(section)
+ except OSError:
+ pass
+ return out
+
+
+def _fmt_time(conv, raw):
+ """Render an artifact timestamp, or "" if it is missing or unreadable."""
+ if not raw:
+ return ""
+ try:
+ return conv(int(raw)).isoformat(timespec="seconds")
+ except (TypeError, ValueError, OverflowError, OSError):
+ return ""
+
+
+def _locked_note(path, exc):
+ """A locked database is the most common non-error a user will see, so say
+ what it means and what to do rather than printing a raw errno.
+
+ A running browser causes this two ways: the OS refuses the snapshot with a
+ sharing violation (PermissionError / errno 13 on Windows), or SQLite reports
+ "database is locked" when the copy is opened. Both mean the same thing to the
+ person reading the report: close the browser and run again."""
+ browser_name = "the browser"
+ for marker, label in (("BraveSoftware", "Brave"), ("Google", "Chrome"),
+ ("Microsoft", "Edge"), ("Mozilla", "Firefox")):
+ if marker in path:
+ browser_name = label
+ break
+ if (isinstance(exc, PermissionError) or getattr(exc, "errno", None) == 13
+ or "locked" in str(exc).lower()):
+ return ("{} was running, so one of its databases was locked and could "
+ "not be checked ({}). Close {} and run again to cover it."
+ .format(browser_name, os.path.basename(path), browser_name))
+ return "could not read {}: {}".format(path, exc)
+
+
+def _is_schema_drift(exc):
+ """True for the benign "this browser version lacks that table/column" error,
+ as opposed to real corruption or a lock. Only the former is safe to skip."""
+ msg = str(exc).lower()
+ return "no such table" in msg or "no such column" in msg
+
+
+def _hsts_fingerprint(host):
+ """Chromium stores HSTS hostnames as base64(sha256(DNS wire form)).
+
+ The wire form is each label prefixed by its length, terminated by a zero
+ byte: "a.example" -> b"\\x01a\\x07example\\x00". Hashing our indicators the
+ same way lets us match an EXACT hostname without ever learning any other
+ host the person visited - the file is deliberately a one-way set, and this
+ respects that. It also means zero substring false positives.
+
+ The length byte must count the BYTES that are hashed, not the str length.
+ Indicator domains are ASCII (punycode) at load time, so ascii-encoding each
+ label is exact; a stray non-ASCII label is idna-encoded instead, so the
+ prefix and the payload always agree.
+ """
+ wire = b""
+ for label in host.strip(".").lower().split("."):
+ try:
+ payload = label.encode("ascii")
+ except UnicodeEncodeError:
+ payload = label.encode("idna")
+ wire += bytes([len(payload)]) + payload
+ wire += b"\x00"
+ return base64.b64encode(hashlib.sha256(wire).digest()).decode("ascii")
+
+
+def _host_of(origin):
+ """Host part of an origin like "https://example.org:443"."""
+ s = str(origin)
+ if "://" in s:
+ s = s.split("://", 1)[1]
+ s = s.split("/", 1)[0]
+ if s.startswith("["): # IPv6 literal
+ return s.split("]", 1)[0].lstrip("[").lower()
+ return s.split(":", 1)[0].lower()
+
+
+def _host_matches(host, ioc_set):
+ """Exact host match, or a subdomain of an indicator. Not a substring test:
+ these artifacts give us a real hostname, so we can compare properly."""
+ host = host.lower().strip(".")
+ ind = ioc_set.lookup(host)
+ if ind is not None:
+ return ind
+ for candidate in ioc_set.indicators:
+ if candidate.type == "domain" and host.endswith("." + candidate.value):
+ return candidate
+ return None
+
+
+def chromium_profiles(user_data):
+ """Every Default / Guest / Profile* directory under a Chromium user-data root.
+
+ Raises OSError if the root exists but cannot be enumerated (a bad ACL); the
+ caller turns that into a gap for this one root rather than aborting the whole
+ module."""
+ if not os.path.isdir(user_data):
+ return []
+ out = []
+ for name in os.listdir(user_data):
+ p = os.path.join(user_data, name)
+ if os.path.isdir(p) and (name == "Default" or name == "Guest Profile"
+ or name.startswith("Profile")):
+ out.append(p)
+ return out
+
+
+def run(ctx) -> ModuleResult:
+ r = ModuleResult(NAME)
+ r.submetrics["sqlite"] = 0
+ r.submetrics["blob"] = 0
+
+ # Matching itself lives in IocSet.search / search_bytes, so the boundary
+ # rules (a domain must not match inside a longer name, an IP must not match
+ # inside a longer number) exist in exactly one place for every module.
+
+ # Modification times of every cache/LevelDB file searched, used at the end to
+ # report the actual age of the oldest surviving artifact.
+ seen_mtimes = []
+ # Creation times of the oldest cookie in each cookie store. Cookies outlive the
+ # cache by a long way, so leaving them out would understate the window.
+ cookie_times = []
+ # How many cookie STORES were actually read. The reach "basis" count must be
+ # the number of stores, not len(cookie_times) (which is inflated by one entry
+ # per matching cookie plus one per store).
+ cookie_stores = [0]
+ # Whether any history query actually returned rows. reach["history"] is only
+ # populated when it did, so an empty result never advertises a window the
+ # scan did not actually observe.
+ history_rows = [False]
+
+ # Which profile is currently being scanned, so every hit can name the
+ # account it came from. Updated as the walk moves between profiles.
+ current = {"name": ""}
+
+ # --- per (browser label, artifact kind) outcome ------------------------
+ #
+ # Each (label, kind) records whether ANY profile could read that artifact.
+ # ok - at least one profile read this artifact successfully (a lock in
+ # a different profile is a note, not a whole-kind gap)
+ # fail - present but unreadable, and no profile has read it yet
+ # absent - never recorded; the browser never created it (not a gap)
+ # Insertion order is preserved so the checks list is stable.
+ kinds = {}
+
+ def _touch(label, kind):
+ key = (label, kind)
+ if key not in kinds:
+ kinds[key] = {"ok": False, "reason": ""}
+ return kinds[key]
+
+ def mark_ok(label, kind):
+ _touch(label, kind)["ok"] = True
+
+ def mark_fail(label, kind, reason):
+ entry = _touch(label, kind)
+ if not entry["reason"]:
+ entry["reason"] = reason
+
+ def chrome_time(us):
+ # Chromium stores microseconds since 1601-01-01 (the Windows epoch).
+ return datetime.datetime(1601, 1, 1) + datetime.timedelta(microseconds=us)
+
+ def unix_us_time(us):
+ # Firefox stores microseconds since 1970-01-01.
+ return datetime.datetime.fromtimestamp(us / 1e6)
+
+ def record_hit(path, ind, detail, evidence=EV_REFERENCED, observed=""):
+ # Attach tier/confidence/source provenance from the IOC set to every hit,
+ # plus how strong the artifact makes it (see Hit.evidence).
+ r.add_hit(Hit(indicator=ind.value, location=path, detail=detail,
+ tier=ind.tier, confidence=ind.confidence,
+ source=ind.source, evidence=evidence, observed=observed,
+ profile=current["name"]))
+
+ def open_db(path, label, kind):
+ """Snapshot and open a possibly-locked SQLite db read-only.
+
+ Returns (con, tmp) on success, or None. A truly absent file (artifact not
+ present for this profile) is NOT a gap and returns None silently; every
+ other failure records a could-not-read for this (label, kind) - which is
+ promoted to a gap only if no profile ever reads it. The db is not counted
+ as checked here; that happens only once rows are actually read."""
+ try:
+ os.stat(path)
+ except FileNotFoundError:
+ return None # artifact simply absent for this profile
+ except OSError as exc:
+ r.skipped += 1
+ note = _locked_note(path, exc)
+ r.note(note)
+ mark_fail(label, kind, note)
+ return None
+ try:
+ tmp = copy_locked(path)
+ except OSError as exc:
+ # A locked db we could not even snapshot is a gap, not a clean item.
+ r.skipped += 1
+ note = _locked_note(path, exc)
+ r.note(note)
+ mark_fail(label, kind, note)
+ return None
+ try:
+ con = sqlite3.connect(tmp)
+ except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+ shutil.rmtree(os.path.dirname(tmp), ignore_errors=True)
+ r.skipped += 1
+ note = _locked_note(path, exc)
+ r.note(note)
+ mark_fail(label, kind, note)
+ return None
+ con.text_factory = lambda b: b.decode("utf-8", "replace")
+ return con, tmp
+
+ def _count_db():
+ r.submetrics["sqlite"] += 1
+ r.checked += 1
+
+ def scan_history(label, path, flavour):
+ """History / moz_places, host-graded.
+
+ A history row whose URL HOST is the indicator means the browser actually
+ went there, so it grades as contacted and carries the row's own visit
+ date as the observed time (when the schema records it). A match only in
+ the query string or page title is a reference - often a search for the
+ name - so it stays referenced. Chromium's download records live in the
+ same db and stay referenced (a saved path/URL, not proof of contact)."""
+ kind = "history"
+ opened = open_db(path, label, kind)
+ if opened is None:
+ return
+ con, tmp = opened
+ read_ok = False
+ failed = False
+ try:
+ if flavour == "chromium":
+ table, visit_col, conv = "urls", "last_visit_time", chrome_time
+ else:
+ table, visit_col, conv = ("moz_places", "last_visit_date",
+ unix_us_time)
+ try:
+ present = {row[1] for row in
+ con.execute("PRAGMA table_info({})".format(table))}
+ except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+ present = set()
+ if not _is_schema_drift(exc):
+ mark_fail(label, kind, _locked_note(path, exc))
+ failed = True
+
+ if not failed and "url" in present:
+ cols = ["url"]
+ if "title" in present:
+ cols.append("title")
+ if visit_col in present:
+ cols.append(visit_col)
+ try:
+ rows = con.execute("SELECT {} FROM {}".format(
+ ", ".join(cols), table)).fetchall()
+ except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+ rows = None
+ if not _is_schema_drift(exc):
+ mark_fail(label, kind, _locked_note(path, exc))
+ failed = True
+ if rows is not None:
+ read_ok = True
+ if rows:
+ history_rows[0] = True
+ for row in rows:
+ rec = dict(zip(cols, row))
+ url = str(rec.get("url") or "")
+ title = str(rec.get("title") or "")
+ blob = (url + " " + title).lower()
+ observed = _fmt_time(conv, rec.get(visit_col))
+ host_ind = _host_matches(_host_of(url), ctx.iocs)
+ for ind in ctx.iocs.most_specific(ctx.iocs.search(blob)):
+ if host_ind is not None and host_ind.value == ind.value:
+ record_hit(path, ind, "history: " + blob[:160],
+ EV_CONTACTED, observed)
+ else:
+ record_hit(path, ind, "history: " + blob[:160],
+ EV_REFERENCED)
+
+ if flavour == "chromium" and not failed:
+ try:
+ rows = con.execute(
+ "SELECT current_path, tab_url, referrer "
+ "FROM downloads").fetchall()
+ except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+ rows = None
+ if not _is_schema_drift(exc):
+ mark_fail(label, kind, _locked_note(path, exc))
+ failed = True
+ if rows is not None:
+ read_ok = True
+ for row in rows:
+ blob = " ".join(str(c) for c in row
+ if c is not None).lower()
+ for ind in ctx.iocs.most_specific(ctx.iocs.search(blob)):
+ record_hit(path, ind, "download: " + blob[:160],
+ EV_REFERENCED)
+
+ if not failed:
+ # Opened and queried without corruption: this artifact was read.
+ mark_ok(label, kind)
+ if read_ok:
+ _count_db()
+ finally:
+ shutil.rmtree(os.path.dirname(tmp), ignore_errors=True)
+
+ def scan_favicons(label, path, flavour):
+ """Favicons. For Chromium, a favicon URL whose stored bitmap is present
+ and non-empty means the browser actually fetched the icon from that host
+ (contacted); a row with no image is only a reference. For Firefox the
+ presence of a moz_icons entry already means the icon was fetched, so it
+ grades as contacted."""
+ kind = "favicons"
+ opened = open_db(path, label, kind)
+ if opened is None:
+ return
+ con, tmp = opened
+ try:
+ if flavour == "chromium":
+ sql = ("SELECT favicons.url, "
+ "CASE WHEN favicon_bitmaps.image_data IS NOT NULL "
+ "AND length(favicon_bitmaps.image_data) > 0 "
+ "THEN 1 ELSE 0 END "
+ "FROM favicons "
+ "LEFT JOIN favicon_bitmaps "
+ "ON favicons.id = favicon_bitmaps.icon_id")
+ graded = True
+ else:
+ sql = "SELECT icon_url FROM moz_icons"
+ graded = False
+ try:
+ rows = con.execute(sql).fetchall()
+ except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+ if not _is_schema_drift(exc):
+ mark_fail(label, kind, _locked_note(path, exc))
+ return
+ mark_ok(label, kind)
+ _count_db()
+ for row in rows:
+ if graded:
+ url, has_bitmap = row[0], row[1]
+ ev = EV_CONTACTED if has_bitmap else EV_REFERENCED
+ else:
+ url, ev = row[0], EV_CONTACTED
+ blob = str(url or "").lower()
+ for ind in ctx.iocs.most_specific(ctx.iocs.search(blob)):
+ record_hit(path, ind, "favicon: " + blob[:160], ev)
+ finally:
+ shutil.rmtree(os.path.dirname(tmp), ignore_errors=True)
+
+ def scan_cookies(label, path, flavour):
+ """Cookies get their own reader because they are the richest artifact
+ here, and the generic row-to-string match throws away the two things a
+ person actually needs: WHEN the cookie was set, and WHICH page they were
+ on when it happened.
+
+ Chromium partitions third-party cookies by top-level site, so
+ `top_frame_site_key` names the site that was being visited when an ad
+ tracker set its cookie. For an ad-delivered indicator that is the single
+ most useful field in the whole scan - it turns "something was contacted"
+ into "this happened on that site, on that date".
+
+ The store is not counted as checked until rows are in hand: every early
+ exit (unreadable schema, no usable columns, a failed SELECT) is a gap, so
+ a locked cookie store - the common case, because the browser is open -
+ shows up as such rather than as a clean, empty result.
+ """
+ kind = "cookies"
+ opened = open_db(path, label, kind)
+ if opened is None:
+ return
+ con, tmp = opened
+ try:
+ # Only ask for columns this database actually has. Cookie schemas
+ # differ across browser versions and forks, and a single missing
+ # column would otherwise fail the whole query and silently lose the
+ # richest artifact in the scan.
+ table = "cookies" if flavour == "chromium" else "moz_cookies"
+ try:
+ present = {row[1] for row in
+ con.execute("PRAGMA table_info({})".format(table))}
+ except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+ r.skipped += 1
+ mark_fail(label, kind, _locked_note(path, exc))
+ return
+ if flavour == "chromium":
+ candidates = ["host_key", "name", "creation_utc",
+ "last_access_utc", "top_frame_site_key"]
+ conv = chrome_time
+ else:
+ candidates = ["host", "name", "creationTime", "lastAccessed"]
+ conv = unix_us_time
+ wanted = [c for c in candidates if c in present]
+ if not wanted:
+ r.skipped += 1
+ mark_fail(label, kind,
+ "the cookie store {} had none of the expected columns "
+ "(host/name/timestamps), so it could not be read"
+ .format(os.path.basename(path)))
+ return
+ sql = "SELECT {} FROM {}".format(", ".join(wanted), table)
+ try:
+ rows = con.execute(sql).fetchall()
+ except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+ r.skipped += 1
+ mark_fail(label, kind, _locked_note(path, exc))
+ return
+
+ # Rows are in hand: now the store genuinely counts as read.
+ mark_ok(label, kind)
+ _count_db()
+ cookie_stores[0] += 1
+
+ for row in rows:
+ record = dict(zip(wanted, row))
+ host = str(record.get("host_key") or record.get("host") or "")
+ for ind in ctx.iocs.most_specific(ctx.iocs.search(host.lower())):
+ created = _fmt_time(conv, record.get("creation_utc")
+ or record.get("creationTime"))
+ seen = _fmt_time(conv, record.get("last_access_utc")
+ or record.get("lastAccessed"))
+ partition = str(record.get("top_frame_site_key") or "").strip()
+ bits = ["cookie set by {}".format(host),
+ "name {}".format(record.get("name") or "?")]
+ if partition:
+ bits.append("set while visiting {}".format(partition))
+ if created:
+ bits.append("first set {}".format(created))
+ if seen and seen != created:
+ bits.append("last used {}".format(seen))
+ elif seen:
+ bits.append("never used again after that")
+ record_hit(path, ind, "; ".join(bits), EV_CONTACTED,
+ created or seen)
+ if created:
+ cookie_times.append(conv(int(
+ record.get("creation_utc")
+ or record.get("creationTime"))))
+ # Oldest cookie overall, for the time-coverage section.
+ col = "creation_utc" if flavour == "chromium" else "creationTime"
+ if col in present:
+ try:
+ raw = con.execute(
+ "SELECT MIN({0}) FROM {1} WHERE {0} > 0".format(
+ col, table)).fetchone()
+ if raw and raw[0]:
+ cookie_times.append(conv(int(raw[0])))
+ except (sqlite3.Error, ValueError, OverflowError, OSError):
+ pass
+ finally:
+ shutil.rmtree(os.path.dirname(tmp), ignore_errors=True)
+
+ def scan_blobs(label, root, evidence):
+ """Substring-search binary files (HTTP cache, LevelDB) for the needles.
+
+ `evidence` is how strong a match in THIS store is: Local Storage, Session
+ Storage and Service Worker CacheStorage are keyed by origin, so a match
+ there means the origin executed (contacted); the HTTP cache and Code
+ Cache are response bodies that may merely mention a name (referenced).
+
+ A directory that exists and can be walked is a successful check of the
+ "blobs" kind, even if it holds no files (a present-but-empty cache is a
+ legitimately clean cache). A subtree that could not be walked at all, or a
+ file too large to hold in memory, is a gap - never dropped silently."""
+ kind = "blobs"
+ try:
+ os.stat(root)
+ except FileNotFoundError:
+ return # artifact absent for this profile — not a gap
+ except OSError as exc:
+ r.skipped += 1
+ r.note(_locked_note(root, exc))
+ mark_fail(label, kind, _locked_note(root, exc))
+ return
+
+ walk_errors = []
+
+ def onerror(exc):
+ # os.walk swallows directory errors unless we catch them here.
+ walk_errors.append(exc)
+ r.skipped += 1
+ r.note("could not enumerate {}: {}".format(
+ getattr(exc, "filename", root), exc))
+
+ read_any = False
+ for dirpath, _dirs, files in os.walk(root, onerror=onerror):
+ for fn in files:
+ full = os.path.join(dirpath, fn)
+ try:
+ st = os.stat(full)
+ except OSError as exc:
+ r.skipped += 1
+ r.note("could not read {}: {}".format(full, exc))
+ continue
+ if st.st_size > 400 * 1024 * 1024:
+ r.skipped += 1 # too large to search — a gap, not clean
+ r.note("{} is larger than 400 MB and was not searched"
+ .format(full))
+ continue
+ try:
+ with io.open(full, "rb") as fh:
+ data = fh.read()
+ except MemoryError:
+ # read() then .lower() needs two copies; a file that will not
+ # fit is recorded as a gap, not pretended to be searched.
+ r.skipped += 1
+ mark_fail(label, kind,
+ "{} was too large to load into memory and could "
+ "not be searched".format(full))
+ continue
+ except OSError as exc:
+ r.skipped += 1 # unreadable file — a gap, not clean
+ r.note("could not read {}: {}".format(full, exc))
+ continue
+ # Oldest cache artifact = how far back this check can possibly see.
+ # Browsers recycle the cache continuously, so this is a measured
+ # window, not a guess, and it is usually far shorter than people
+ # assume.
+ seen_mtimes.append(st.st_mtime)
+ r.submetrics["blob"] += 1
+ r.checked += 1
+ read_any = True
+ for ind in ctx.iocs.search_bytes(data.lower()):
+ record_hit(full, ind, "binary match in cache/leveldb",
+ evidence)
+
+ if read_any:
+ mark_ok(label, kind)
+ elif walk_errors:
+ mark_fail(label, kind,
+ "nothing under {} could be read ({} directory error(s))"
+ .format(root, len(walk_errors)))
+ else:
+ # Present and walkable, just empty: a clean cache, not a gap.
+ mark_ok(label, kind)
+
+ def scan_connection_records(label, prof):
+ """The two long-lived records of hosts the browser actually CONNECTED to.
+
+ Why these matter more than the cache: the HTTP cache is recycled within
+ weeks and a byte match in it may only be page content mentioning a name.
+ These two files instead record that a connection happened, they survive
+ far longer, and HSTS even carries the date it was observed.
+
+ TransportSecurity - HSTS state. An entry exists because that host served
+ an HSTS header over HTTPS. Hostnames are stored hashed, so we hash our
+ indicators and compare; we never learn anything about other hosts.
+
+ Network Persistent State - plaintext origins of servers the browser has
+ connected to, plus hosts with broken alternative services.
+ """
+ net_dir = os.path.join(prof, "Network")
+
+ ts_path = os.path.join(net_dir, "TransportSecurity")
+ ts_present = True
+ try:
+ os.stat(ts_path)
+ except FileNotFoundError:
+ ts_present = False
+ except OSError as exc:
+ r.skipped += 1
+ mark_fail(label, "hsts", _locked_note(ts_path, exc))
+ ts_present = False
+ if ts_present:
+ try:
+ with io.open(ts_path, encoding="utf-8", errors="replace") as fh:
+ data = json.load(fh)
+ entries = data.get("sts", []) if isinstance(data, dict) else []
+ r.submetrics["hsts_entries"] = (
+ r.submetrics.get("hsts_entries", 0) + len(entries))
+ r.checked += len(entries)
+ mark_ok(label, "hsts")
+ if entries:
+ held = {}
+ for e in entries:
+ if isinstance(e, dict) and e.get("host"):
+ held[e["host"]] = e
+ for ind in ctx.iocs.indicators:
+ if ind.type != "domain":
+ continue
+ e = held.get(_hsts_fingerprint(ind.value))
+ if e is None:
+ continue
+ when = ""
+ try:
+ when = datetime.datetime.fromtimestamp(
+ float(e.get("sts_observed"))).isoformat(
+ timespec="seconds")
+ except (TypeError, ValueError, OSError):
+ pass
+ record_hit(
+ ts_path, ind,
+ "HSTS state recorded for this exact host - the "
+ "browser received an HSTS header from it over HTTPS"
+ + (" (observed {})".format(when[:10]) if when else ""),
+ EV_CONTACTED, when)
+ except (OSError, ValueError) as exc:
+ r.skipped += 1
+ mark_fail(label, "hsts", _locked_note(ts_path, exc))
+
+ nps_path = os.path.join(net_dir, "Network Persistent State")
+ nps_present = True
+ try:
+ os.stat(nps_path)
+ except FileNotFoundError:
+ nps_present = False
+ except OSError as exc:
+ r.skipped += 1
+ mark_fail(label, "connection-records", _locked_note(nps_path, exc))
+ nps_present = False
+ if nps_present:
+ try:
+ with io.open(nps_path, encoding="utf-8", errors="replace") as fh:
+ data = json.load(fh)
+ hsp = ((data.get("net") or {}).get("http_server_properties") or {}
+ ) if isinstance(data, dict) else {}
+ origins = []
+ for row in hsp.get("servers") or []:
+ if isinstance(row, dict) and row.get("server"):
+ origins.append((_host_of(row["server"]), "connected server"))
+ for row in hsp.get("broken_alternative_services") or []:
+ if isinstance(row, dict) and row.get("host"):
+ origins.append((_host_of(row["host"]),
+ "broken alternative service"))
+ r.submetrics["connection_records"] = (
+ r.submetrics.get("connection_records", 0) + len(origins))
+ r.checked += len(origins)
+ mark_ok(label, "connection-records")
+ for host, kind in origins:
+ ind = _host_matches(host, ctx.iocs)
+ if ind is not None:
+ record_hit(
+ nps_path, ind,
+ "{}: the browser has a connection record for {}"
+ .format(kind, host), EV_CONTACTED)
+ except (OSError, ValueError) as exc:
+ r.skipped += 1
+ mark_fail(label, "connection-records",
+ _locked_note(nps_path, exc))
+
+ def scan_firefox_hsts(label, path):
+ """Firefox's HSTS store, SiteSecurityServiceState.txt.
+
+ Like Chromium's TransportSecurity, every hostname here is one the browser
+ connected to over HTTPS and received an HSTS header from, so a match is
+ proof of contact. Unlike Chromium's, Firefox keeps the hostnames in
+ PLAINTEXT, so we read the file as text and run the shared matcher over it;
+ only our indicators are searched for, so no other host from the file ever
+ reaches the output.
+ """
+ try:
+ os.stat(path)
+ except FileNotFoundError:
+ return
+ except OSError as exc:
+ r.skipped += 1
+ mark_fail(label, "hsts", _locked_note(path, exc))
+ return
+ try:
+ with io.open(path, encoding="utf-8", errors="replace") as fh:
+ text = fh.read()
+ except OSError as exc:
+ r.skipped += 1
+ mark_fail(label, "hsts", _locked_note(path, exc))
+ return
+ entries = text.count(":HSTS")
+ r.submetrics["hsts_entries"] = (
+ r.submetrics.get("hsts_entries", 0) + entries)
+ r.checked += entries
+ mark_ok(label, "hsts")
+ for ind in ctx.iocs.search(text.lower()):
+ record_hit(
+ path, ind,
+ "Firefox HSTS state recorded for this host - the browser "
+ "received an HSTS header from it over HTTPS", EV_CONTACTED)
+
+ # No browser profile location is known for this platform at all: say so as a
+ # gap rather than returning an empty, falsely-clean result.
+ ff_roots = _firefox_roots()
+ if not CHROMIUM_ROOTS and not ff_roots:
+ r.could_not_run("browser", "no browser profile locations are known for "
+ "{}".format(sys.platform))
+ return r
+
+ # --- Chromium family: Chrome, Edge, Brave, Chromium ---------------------
+ for label, root in CHROMIUM_ROOTS:
+ if not os.path.isdir(root):
+ continue # browser not installed — absent, so no sub-check for it
+ try:
+ profs = chromium_profiles(root)
+ except OSError as exc:
+ # One bad ACL on the user-data root must not abort the whole module.
+ r.could_not_run(label + ":profiles", _locked_note(root, exc))
+ continue
+ names = _chromium_profile_names(root)
+ ctx.emit("[*] {} ({} profile(s))".format(root, len(profs)))
+ for prof in profs:
+ folder = os.path.basename(prof)
+ display = names.get(folder, "")
+ # Name the account in the hit, falling back to the folder when the
+ # browser has no display name recorded for it.
+ current["name"] = ("{} ({})".format(display, folder) if display
+ else folder)
+ ctx.emit("[*] profile: {}".format(current["name"]))
+ scan_history(label, os.path.join(prof, "History"), "chromium")
+ scan_cookies(label, os.path.join(prof, "Network", "Cookies"),
+ "chromium")
+ scan_cookies(label, os.path.join(prof, "Cookies"), "chromium")
+ scan_favicons(label, os.path.join(prof, "Favicons"), "chromium")
+ scan_connection_records(label, prof)
+ for sub, evidence in (
+ (("Cache", "Cache_Data"), EV_REFERENCED),
+ (("Code Cache", "js"), EV_REFERENCED),
+ (("Local Storage", "leveldb"), EV_CONTACTED),
+ (("Session Storage",), EV_CONTACTED),
+ (("Service Worker", "CacheStorage"), EV_CONTACTED)):
+ scan_blobs(label, os.path.join(prof, *sub), evidence)
+
+ # --- Firefox: roaming profiles for the dbs, local cache for the cache ---
+ # A stray cross-profile hit must never be stamped with the last Chrome
+ # profile, so reset attribution before the Firefox walk and keep it
+ # per-profile inside the loop (the cache lives in a sibling tree whose
+ # profile folders share the same names - the old code swept it ONCE, outside
+ # the loop, stamping every Firefox cache hit with the last Chrome profile).
+ current["name"] = ""
+ for profiles_dir, cache_dir in ff_roots:
+ prof_is_dir = os.path.isdir(profiles_dir)
+ cache_is_dir = os.path.isdir(cache_dir)
+ if not prof_is_dir and not cache_is_dir:
+ continue
+ ff_names = _firefox_profile_names(profiles_dir) if prof_is_dir else {}
+ ctx.emit("[*] {}".format(profiles_dir if prof_is_dir else cache_dir))
+
+ folders = set()
+ if prof_is_dir:
+ try:
+ folders.update(os.listdir(profiles_dir))
+ except OSError as exc:
+ r.could_not_run("firefox:profiles",
+ _locked_note(profiles_dir, exc))
+ if cache_is_dir:
+ try:
+ folders.update(os.listdir(cache_dir))
+ except OSError as exc:
+ r.could_not_run("firefox:cache-dir", _locked_note(cache_dir, exc))
+
+ for name in sorted(folders):
+ prof = os.path.join(profiles_dir, name)
+ cprof = os.path.join(cache_dir, name)
+ if not os.path.isdir(prof) and not os.path.isdir(cprof):
+ continue
+ display = ff_names.get(name, "")
+ current["name"] = ("{} ({})".format(display, name) if display
+ else name)
+ ctx.emit("[*] profile: {}".format(current["name"]))
+ if os.path.isdir(prof):
+ scan_history("firefox", os.path.join(prof, "places.sqlite"),
+ "firefox")
+ scan_cookies("firefox", os.path.join(prof, "cookies.sqlite"),
+ "firefox")
+ scan_favicons("firefox", os.path.join(prof, "favicons.sqlite"),
+ "firefox")
+ scan_firefox_hsts(
+ "firefox",
+ os.path.join(prof, "SiteSecurityServiceState.txt"))
+ if os.path.isdir(cprof):
+ scan_blobs("firefox", cprof, EV_REFERENCED)
+
+ # Nothing written after this point should inherit a stale profile name.
+ current["name"] = ""
+
+ # --- roll each (browser, kind) up into a check the verdict can read -----
+ #
+ # A kind that at least one profile read is a check that ran (and, with no hit,
+ # is clean). A kind that was present but could never be read is a check that
+ # could_not_run, which the verdict surfaces as a gap - never folded into a
+ # clean result.
+ for (label, kind), state in kinds.items():
+ check_name = "{}:{}".format(label, kind)
+ if state["ok"]:
+ r.ran(check_name)
+ else:
+ r.could_not_run(check_name, state["reason"] or "could not be read")
+
+ # Report the measured window. Without this, "browser: CLEAN" invites the reader
+ # to assume it means "clean for as long as I have owned this computer", which is
+ # never true — and for a campaign that ran in 2024-2025, the gap between the two
+ # readings is the whole answer.
+ if seen_mtimes:
+ earliest = min(seen_mtimes)
+ # The oldest surviving file is survivorship, not coverage: ONE artifact
+ # from 2023 does not mean a usable record of 2023. So report the
+ # distribution by year as well, and let the report say how much evidence
+ # actually falls inside the period being asked about.
+ by_year = {}
+ for m in seen_mtimes:
+ y = datetime.datetime.fromtimestamp(m).year
+ by_year[y] = by_year.get(y, 0) + 1
+ r.reach["cache"] = {
+ "earliest": datetime.datetime.fromtimestamp(earliest).isoformat(
+ timespec="seconds"),
+ "days": max(0, (datetime.datetime.now()
+ - datetime.datetime.fromtimestamp(earliest)).days),
+ "basis": "oldest of {:,} cache/LevelDB/Service-Worker files "
+ "searched".format(len(seen_mtimes)),
+ "note": "The HTTP cache is recycled within weeks, but Local Storage, "
+ "LevelDB and Service Worker files can persist for years - "
+ "which is why this date is often much older than the cache "
+ "alone. It is the oldest SURVIVOR, not proof of a continuous "
+ "record since then.",
+ "by_year": by_year,
+ }
+ if cookie_times:
+ oldest = min(cookie_times)
+ r.reach["cookies"] = {
+ "earliest": oldest.isoformat(timespec="seconds"),
+ "days": max(0, (datetime.datetime.now() - oldest).days),
+ "basis": "oldest surviving cookie across {} cookie store(s)".format(
+ cookie_stores[0]),
+ "note": "Cookies are the strongest evidence the browser keeps: one "
+ "exists only if the browser actually got a response from that "
+ "site. But this is the oldest SURVIVOR, not a full record back "
+ "to that date. Cookies expire (Chrome caps them at 400 days) "
+ "or get cleared, so most cookies from that time are gone.",
+ }
+ if history_rows[0]:
+ r.reach["history"] = {
+ "earliest": None,
+ "days": None,
+ "basis": "browser history was searched, but records only top-level "
+ "navigations",
+ "note": "History reaches back further than the cache but CANNOT record "
+ "an ad: ads load as a sub-resource inside a page, and only the "
+ "page itself is recorded. The long record cannot see ads; the "
+ "record that sees ads is not long.",
+ }
+ return r
diff --git a/scan/adint_scan/modules/hashscan.py b/scan/adint_scan/modules/hashscan.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cb9d83c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scan/adint_scan/modules/hashscan.py
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+"""Hunt known sample hashes across the user-writable parts of this machine.
+
+Citizen Lab (and others) publish SHA-256 hashes for the Windows payloads this
+infrastructure delivers. Hashing every file on C: would take hours, so this
+scans the locations an implant DLL actually lands in, plus anything the user
+downloaded, and compares each file's digest against the sample hashes carried in
+the IOC set.
+
+A clean result means "none of these exact files are in these locations" - nothing
+more. Each sample is one build; another victim's payload would hash differently,
+which is why a clean hash scan is never a clean bill of health (D1/D3).
+
+Contract: defines NAME and run(ctx) -> ModuleResult. Read-only, stdlib only, no
+network (D2) - hashing a local file resolves nothing.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import io
+import os
+
+from ..result import Hit, ModuleResult, EV_ON_DISK
+
+NAME = "hash"
+
+# Only file types a payload plausibly ships as. Keeps the walk cheap and avoids
+# hashing the user's documents and media for no reason.
+EXTS = (".dll", ".exe", ".sys", ".ocx", ".cpl", ".scr", ".tmp", ".dat", ".bin", ".ax")
+
+# Files larger than this are almost certainly not the implant; skipping them
+# (counted as skipped, never as clean) keeps the scan from stalling on big blobs.
+MAX_BYTES = 120 * 1024 * 1024
+
+# Directory names pruned from the walk: browser/code caches, dependency trees and
+# the Windows component store - huge, noisy, and not where an implant DLL lands.
+PRUNE_DIRS = (
+ "cache", "cache_data", "gpucache", "code cache", "node_modules",
+ ".git", "servicepackfiles", "winsxs",
+)
+
+
+def _roots():
+ """The user-writable locations an implant actually drops into, filtered to
+ those that exist on this host. Matches the proof-of-concept exactly."""
+ user = os.path.expanduser("~")
+ roots = [
+ os.environ.get("APPDATA", ""),
+ os.environ.get("LOCALAPPDATA", ""),
+ os.environ.get("PROGRAMDATA", ""),
+ os.environ.get("TEMP", ""),
+ os.path.join(os.environ.get("SystemRoot", r"C:\Windows"), "Temp"),
+ os.path.join(user, "Downloads"),
+ os.path.join(user, "Desktop"),
+ os.path.join(user, "Documents"),
+ r"C:\Users\Public",
+ ]
+ # De-duplicate by resolved, case-normalised path, then drop any root that is
+ # nested inside another. %TEMP% is %LOCALAPPDATA%\Temp on a default install,
+ # so without this every file under Temp is hashed twice - inflating the
+ # coverage counts and reporting one real sample as two separate hits.
+ resolved = []
+ for raw in roots:
+ if not raw or not os.path.isdir(raw):
+ continue
+ norm = os.path.normcase(os.path.realpath(raw))
+ if norm not in resolved:
+ resolved.append(norm)
+ kept = []
+ for r1 in resolved:
+ if any(r1 != r2 and r1.startswith(r2 + os.sep) for r2 in resolved):
+ continue # r1 lives inside another root; walking that one covers it
+ kept.append(r1)
+ return kept
+
+
+def _sha256(full):
+ """SHA-256 of a file, read in 1 MiB chunks so a large file never loads whole
+ into memory. Returns (hex_digest, size) or raises OSError for the caller to
+ count as skipped."""
+ size = os.path.getsize(full)
+ h = hashlib.sha256()
+ with io.open(full, "rb") as fh:
+ while True:
+ chunk = fh.read(1024 * 1024)
+ if not chunk:
+ break
+ h.update(chunk)
+ return h.hexdigest(), size
+
+
+def run(ctx) -> ModuleResult:
+ r = ModuleResult(NAME)
+
+ # Build the hex-digest -> Indicator map once so each file is a single dict
+ # lookup. The hashes come from the IOC set, never hardcoded (ctx.iocs.hashes).
+ targets = {ind.value: ind for ind in ctx.iocs.hashes}
+
+ # D3: with nothing to compare against we cannot claim CLEAN. State the gap
+ # and stop - an empty target set is UNKNOWN for this check, not clean.
+ if not targets:
+ r.could_not_run("hash-compare", "no sample hashes in the indicator set")
+ return r
+
+ ctx.emit("[hash] looking for {} known sample hash(es)".format(len(targets)))
+
+ for root in _roots():
+ # Each root actually walked is a sub-check that ran (even if it hashes
+ # nothing), so a clean root is reported as a check that truly executed.
+ # The full path, not the basename: %TEMP% and %SystemRoot%\Temp both end
+ # in "Temp", and two roots collapsing to one name would make the check
+ # list lie about what was actually covered.
+ r.ran("root:" + root)
+ ctx.emit("[hash] scanning {} ...".format(root))
+
+ def _walk_err(exc, _r=r):
+ # An unreadable subtree would otherwise vanish silently from os.walk.
+ _r.skipped += 1
+
+ for dirpath, dirs, files in os.walk(root, onerror=_walk_err):
+ # Prune noisy / huge subtrees in place so os.walk never descends them.
+ dirs[:] = [d for d in dirs if d.lower() not in PRUNE_DIRS]
+ for fn in files:
+ if not fn.lower().endswith(EXTS):
+ continue
+ full = os.path.join(dirpath, fn)
+ try:
+ size = os.path.getsize(full)
+ # Over the size cap: skipped, not clean (D-never-crash).
+ if size > MAX_BYTES:
+ r.skipped += 1
+ continue
+ digest, size = _sha256(full)
+ except OSError:
+ # Locked / permission-denied / unreadable: skip and continue.
+ r.skipped += 1
+ continue
+
+ r.checked += 1
+ r.submetrics["files_hashed"] = r.submetrics.get("files_hashed", 0) + 1
+ r.submetrics["bytes_hashed"] = r.submetrics.get("bytes_hashed", 0) + size
+
+ ind = targets.get(digest)
+ if ind is not None:
+ # EV_ON_DISK is the whole point: a file whose fingerprint
+ # matches a published sample is conclusive. Without an
+ # evidence grade the report defaulted it to "referenced" and
+ # told the reader it was "probably not a sign of compromise" -
+ # over a known spyware binary sitting on their disk.
+ r.add_hit(Hit(
+ indicator=digest,
+ location=full,
+ detail="this file's SHA-256 matches a published sample: "
+ + ind.value,
+ tier=ind.tier,
+ confidence=ind.confidence,
+ source=ind.source,
+ evidence=EV_ON_DISK,
+ ))
+ ctx.emit("[hash] !! MATCH {} ({})".format(full, ind.value))
+
+ return r
diff --git a/scan/adint_scan/modules/host.py b/scan/adint_scan/modules/host.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..12cf2f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scan/adint_scan/modules/host.py
@@ -0,0 +1,684 @@
+"""Host module — per-user COM persistence, DNS cache, DNS history, hosts file.
+
+Ported from scripts/scan_host.ps1. Four checks, and the reason each one exists:
+
+ 1. com-persistence. Citizen Lab's write-up of this Candiru chain says it
+ persists via a COM hijack. The technique registers a CLSID under HKCU,
+ and Windows resolves HKCU\\Software\\Classes before the machine-wide HKLM
+ registration — so a *per-user* InprocServer32 pointing at a DLL in a
+ user-writable directory gets loaded into every process that instantiates
+ that class, with no admin rights and no service or Run key to find.
+ That is the whole appeal of the technique, and it is why this check looks
+ at HKCU and not HKLM.
+ Legitimate per-user COM registrations absolutely do exist (the reference
+ machine had 37 of them), so this check LISTS them for review; it does not
+ call them malicious. Per D4 (precision over coverage) an unsigned DLL in
+ %LOCALAPPDATA% is not a finding on its own — plenty of honest software
+ ships exactly that — so a Hit is emitted only when a registered path
+ contains an actual indicator string.
+
+ 2. dns-cache. The local resolver cache, which is a record of what this boot
+ has already looked up. Reading it resolves nothing: the entries are
+ answers the OS kept from queries that already happened (D2).
+
+ 3. dns-log. This is the check that matters most in the whole project, and it
+ usually FAILS. Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client/Operational is disabled by
+ default on Windows, so on a typical machine there is no DNS history to
+ query at all — meaning past contact with a C&C domain cannot be ruled out
+ retrospectively, only *future* contact can. Reporting that gap out loud is
+ the point; silently reporting "clean" here would be a lie (D3). The report
+ prints the one manual command that turns the log on for next time.
+
+ 4. hosts-file. Cheap. An indicator pointed at a sink address is a deliberate
+ *block* (protective, not reported as a hit); only a mapping to a real
+ address is a finding.
+
+Read-only throughout: this module never writes the registry, never enables the
+log, and needs no administrator (D7). (A system-writing "arm" helper exists in
+arm.py but is deliberately not wired to the CLI in this release.)
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import io
+import json
+import os
+import platform
+import subprocess
+
+from ..result import (Hit, ModuleResult, EV_CONTACTED, EV_PERSISTENCE,
+ EV_CONFIGURED, EV_REFERENCED)
+
+NAME = "host"
+
+# winreg is Windows-only; a non-Windows import must not break the package.
+try:
+ import winreg # type: ignore
+except ImportError: # pragma: no cover - non-Windows
+ winreg = None # type: ignore
+
+_PS = ["powershell", "-NoProfile", "-NonInteractive",
+ "-ExecutionPolicy", "Bypass", "-Command"]
+
+_DNS_LOG = "Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client/Operational"
+
+# The sub-keys under a CLSID that name a server binary, in the order the PoC
+# checks them. InprocHandler32 is included because it is loaded the same way
+# and is the quieter of the three.
+_SERVER_KINDS = ("InprocServer32", "LocalServer32", "InprocHandler32")
+
+# HKCU CLSID. Both the 64-bit and 32-bit registry views must be read, and the
+# right way is explicit KEY_WOW64_*KEY flags on the ONE logical path - not two
+# literal paths. Opening the literal "...\WOW6432Node\CLSID" works only from a
+# 64-bit interpreter; from a 32-bit one the plain path is itself redirected into
+# WOW6432Node and the literal WOW6432Node path becomes a doubly-nested key that
+# does not exist, so the native view - where a hijack lives on a 64-bit box - goes
+# unread. winreg may lack the flags on a 32-bit-only build, hence the getattr.
+_CLSID_PATH = r"Software\Classes\CLSID"
+_REG_VIEWS = [("native", getattr(winreg, "KEY_WOW64_64KEY", 0)),
+ ("wow6432", getattr(winreg, "KEY_WOW64_32KEY", 0))]
+# ERROR_NO_MORE_ITEMS: the only winerror that means "enumeration finished" rather
+# than "enumeration failed". Anything else mid-walk is a truncation, not an end.
+_ERROR_NO_MORE_ITEMS = 259
+
+# Exact text required when there is no DNS history to query. Do not reword:
+# this gap is the single most important finding the tool can report.
+_DNS_LOG_GAP = (
+ "DNS-Client/Operational log is disabled (the Windows default) — there is "
+ "no queryable DNS history, so past activity cannot be checked "
+ "retrospectively from this host")
+
+_ARM_HINT = ("dns-log: Windows is not recording DNS history on this machine. See "
+ "\"HOW TO TURN ON DNS HISTORY\" below to start a record a future scan "
+ "can search. It cannot answer the question for the past.")
+
+# Spelled out, because "enable DNS logging" is not an instruction most people can
+# act on, and this is the single highest-value thing a reader can actually do.
+# One manual command only: the tool deliberately does not write to the system in
+# this release, so there is nothing here that could get the step wrong or need an
+# undo. Turn it off again with the same command and /e:false.
+_HOW_TO_ENABLE = [
+ "HOW TO TURN ON DNS HISTORY (so a future scan can answer this):",
+ " One command, in an Administrator PowerShell:",
+ " 1. Click Start, type \"PowerShell\", right-click it, \"Run as administrator\".",
+ " 2. Paste this line and press Enter:",
+ " wevtutil sl Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client/Operational /e:true /ms:67108864",
+ " (/e:true turns the log on; /ms sets it to 64 MB so it holds months, not",
+ " hours. To turn it back off later, run the same line with /e:false.)",
+ " This does NOT protect you and tells you nothing about the past. It means that",
+ " next time, there is a record to search instead of an empty attic.",
+]
+
+
+# --- PowerShell plumbing ----------------------------------------------------
+
+def _ps(cmd: str, timeout: int = 60):
+ """Run one PowerShell command. Returns (returncode, stdout, stderr).
+ Never raises for a non-zero exit; callers decide what a failure means.
+
+ errors="replace" is load-bearing, not defensive dressing. PowerShell writes
+ in the console's code page, not UTF-8, and a certificate subject with an
+ accented character in it (Proton AG's, for one) emits a byte that is not
+ valid UTF-8. With strict decoding that raises inside subprocess's own reader
+ thread, the whole check degrades to could_not_run, and the tool reports a gap
+ it does not actually have. A mangled character in a signer name is a far
+ better outcome than a phantom gap.
+ """
+ # Ask PowerShell to actually write UTF-8, so the decode above usually has
+ # nothing to repair in the first place.
+ cmd = "[Console]::OutputEncoding=[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8; " + cmd
+ proc = subprocess.run(_PS + [cmd], capture_output=True, text=True,
+ encoding="utf-8", errors="replace", timeout=timeout)
+ return proc.returncode, (proc.stdout or ""), (proc.stderr or "")
+
+
+def _ps_json(cmd: str, timeout: int = 60):
+ """Run a PowerShell command whose output is ConvertTo-Json.
+
+ Returns (rows, error). `rows` is always a list: ConvertTo-Json emits a bare
+ object (not an array) for a single result and nothing at all for an empty
+ one, so both shapes are normalised here. `error` is "" on success.
+ """
+ try:
+ rc, out, err = _ps(cmd, timeout=timeout)
+ except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
+ return [], "PowerShell timed out after {}s".format(timeout)
+ except OSError as exc:
+ return [], "PowerShell could not be launched: {}".format(exc)
+
+ text = out.strip()
+ if rc != 0:
+ reason = err.strip().splitlines()
+ return [], (reason[0] if reason else
+ "PowerShell exited {}".format(rc))
+ if not text or text == "null":
+ return [], ""
+ try:
+ data = json.loads(text)
+ except ValueError as exc:
+ return [], "unparseable JSON from PowerShell: {}".format(exc)
+ if isinstance(data, dict): # single object, not a list
+ return [data], ""
+ if isinstance(data, list):
+ return data, ""
+ return [], "unexpected JSON shape from PowerShell: {}".format(type(data))
+
+
+def _ps_literal(value: str) -> str:
+ """Quote a path for a PowerShell single-quoted string literal."""
+ return "'{}'".format(value.replace("'", "''"))
+
+
+def _str(row, *names) -> str:
+ """Pull the first present, non-null field from a ConvertTo-Json row."""
+ if not isinstance(row, dict):
+ return "" if row is None else str(row)
+ for name in names:
+ val = row.get(name)
+ if val not in (None, ""):
+ return val if isinstance(val, str) else str(val)
+ return ""
+
+
+# --- shared matching --------------------------------------------------------
+
+def _match(r: ModuleResult, ctx, haystack: str, location: str,
+ detail_fmt: str, evidence: str = EV_REFERENCED,
+ observed: str = "") -> int:
+ """Case-insensitive substring match of every network IOC against one blob
+ of local text. Each hit carries its own tier/confidence provenance.
+
+ `detail_fmt` is substituted with a plain replace rather than str.format so
+ that artifact text containing braces can never break the detail line."""
+ found = 0
+ low = (haystack or "").lower()
+ if not low:
+ return 0
+ for ind in ctx.iocs.search(low):
+ r.add_hit(Hit(indicator=ind.value, location=location,
+ detail=detail_fmt.replace("{ioc}", ind.value),
+ tier=ind.tier, confidence=ind.confidence,
+ source=ind.source, evidence=evidence, observed=observed))
+ found += 1
+ return found
+
+
+# --- 1. per-user COM registrations -----------------------------------------
+
+def _boot_time():
+ """Last boot time, which is the entire window the DNS resolver cache covers.
+ Returns (iso_string_or_None, error)."""
+ rows, err = _ps_json(
+ "Get-CimInstance Win32_OperatingSystem"
+ " | Select-Object @{n='Boot';e={$_.LastBootUpTime.ToString('o')}}"
+ " | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 2 -Compress", timeout=60)
+ if err or not rows:
+ return None, err or "no result"
+ boot = _str(rows[0], "Boot")
+ return (boot or None), ""
+
+
+def _user_writable_dirs():
+ """Directories a normal user can drop a DLL into without elevation. A COM
+ server living under one of these is the shape the Candiru hijack takes."""
+ home = os.path.expanduser("~")
+ candidates = [
+ os.environ.get("APPDATA"),
+ os.environ.get("LOCALAPPDATA"),
+ os.environ.get("TEMP"),
+ os.environ.get("PROGRAMDATA"),
+ os.path.join(home, "Downloads") if home else None,
+ ]
+ return [d.rstrip("\\/").lower() for d in candidates if d]
+
+
+def _enum_com_registrations(r: ModuleResult):
+ """Walk HKCU CLSID (both views) and collect every registered server path.
+
+ Uses winreg rather than PowerShell: this is thousands of key opens and
+ spawning a shell for it would dominate the module's runtime.
+ """
+ entries = []
+ partial = [] # views where the walk could not be completed
+ for view_name, view_flag in _REG_VIEWS:
+ access = winreg.KEY_READ | view_flag
+ try:
+ base = winreg.OpenKey(winreg.HKEY_CURRENT_USER, _CLSID_PATH, 0, access)
+ except FileNotFoundError:
+ continue # this view genuinely has no CLSID key - not a failure
+ except OSError as exc:
+ partial.append("{} view could not be opened ({})".format(
+ view_name, exc))
+ continue
+ try:
+ index = 0
+ while True:
+ try:
+ clsid = winreg.EnumKey(base, index)
+ except OSError as exc:
+ if getattr(exc, "winerror", None) not in (None, _ERROR_NO_MORE_ITEMS):
+ # ACCESS_DENIED / KEY_DELETED / transient: the list was
+ # ABORTED, not exhausted. Record how far we got so the
+ # check cannot pass off a truncated walk as complete.
+ partial.append("{} view enumeration stopped after {} "
+ "keys ({})".format(view_name, index, exc))
+ break
+ index += 1
+ for kind in _SERVER_KINDS:
+ sub = "{}\\{}".format(clsid, kind)
+ try:
+ with winreg.OpenKey(base, sub, 0, access) as key:
+ value, _type = winreg.QueryValueEx(key, "")
+ except OSError:
+ continue # no such sub-key, or no default value
+ if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.strip():
+ continue
+ entries.append({
+ "clsid": clsid,
+ "kind": kind,
+ "raw": value,
+ "view": view_name,
+ })
+ finally:
+ base.Close()
+ return entries, partial
+
+
+def _server_path(raw: str, kind: str) -> str:
+ """Turn a registered server value into the path of the binary it names.
+
+ InprocServer32/InprocHandler32 hold a bare DLL path. LocalServer32 holds a
+ COMMAND LINE: `"C:\\...\\App.exe" -Embedding`. The PoC only trimmed outer
+ quotes, which leaves the switches attached and makes every such entry test
+ as "not on disk" — three false review entries on the reference machine. The
+ binary is extracted properly here so the on-disk and signature answers are
+ about the real file.
+ """
+ s = os.path.expandvars(raw).strip()
+ if s.startswith('"'):
+ end = s.find('"', 1)
+ if end > 1:
+ return s[1:end].strip()
+ s = s.strip('"').strip()
+ if kind == "LocalServer32" and s:
+ try:
+ if os.path.exists(s): # unquoted path with spaces, no switches
+ return s
+ except OSError:
+ pass
+ low = s.lower()
+ for ext in (".exe", ".com", ".bat", ".cmd"):
+ idx = low.find(ext)
+ if idx != -1:
+ return s[:idx + len(ext)].strip()
+ return s
+
+
+def _signature_status(paths, timeout: int = 180):
+ """Authenticode status for many files in ONE PowerShell call.
+
+ Get-AuthenticodeSignature takes an array for -LiteralPath, so the whole
+ inventory costs a single subprocess instead of one per file. The reference
+ machine had 37 registrations; a process per file is the module's hot path.
+ Status is cast to [string] because ConvertTo-Json renders a bare .NET enum
+ as its integer value.
+ """
+ out = {}
+ if not paths:
+ return out, ""
+ ordered = sorted(set(paths))
+ error = ""
+ # Chunked only to keep the command line well inside its length limit.
+ for start in range(0, len(ordered), 100):
+ chunk = ordered[start:start + 100]
+ cmd = (
+ "$p = @({});"
+ " Get-AuthenticodeSignature -LiteralPath $p -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue"
+ " | Select-Object @{{n='Path';e={{[string]$_.Path}}}},"
+ " @{{n='Status';e={{[string]$_.Status}}}},"
+ " @{{n='Signer';e={{[string]$_.SignerCertificate.Subject}}}}"
+ " | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 3 -Compress"
+ ).format(",".join(_ps_literal(p) for p in chunk))
+ rows, err = _ps_json(cmd, timeout=timeout)
+ if err and not rows:
+ error = err
+ continue
+ for row in rows:
+ path = _str(row, "Path")
+ if path:
+ out[path.lower()] = (_str(row, "Status") or "Unknown",
+ _str(row, "Signer"))
+ return out, error
+
+
+def _check_com(r: ModuleResult, ctx) -> None:
+ ctx.emit("[host] enumerating per-user COM registrations (HKCU CLSID)")
+ entries, partial = _enum_com_registrations(r)
+
+ # Expand, de-quote and test each registered path before asking about
+ # signatures, so the batched call only covers files that exist on disk.
+ writable = _user_writable_dirs()
+ on_disk = []
+ for e in entries:
+ expanded = _server_path(e["raw"], e["kind"])
+ e["path"] = expanded
+ low = expanded.lower()
+ try:
+ e["exists"] = bool(expanded) and os.path.exists(expanded)
+ except OSError:
+ e["exists"] = False
+ e["user_writable"] = any(low.startswith(d) for d in writable)
+ if e["exists"]:
+ on_disk.append(expanded)
+
+ sigs, sig_err = _signature_status(on_disk)
+ if sig_err:
+ r.note("com-persistence: Authenticode status unavailable for some "
+ "entries ({}); treat their signature as unknown".format(sig_err))
+
+ user_writable = 0
+ reviewable = []
+ for e in entries:
+ if e["exists"]:
+ status, signer = sigs.get(e["path"].lower(), ("Unknown", ""))
+ else:
+ status, signer = "n/a (not on disk)", ""
+ e["sig"] = status
+ e["signer"] = signer
+ if e["user_writable"]:
+ user_writable += 1
+
+ location = "HKCU\\{}\\{}\\{}".format(
+ "Software\\Classes\\WOW6432Node\\CLSID" if e["view"] == "wow6432"
+ else "Software\\Classes\\CLSID", e["clsid"], e["kind"])
+
+ # D4: the only COM finding worth calling a Hit is a registered path
+ # that actually contains an indicator. "Unsigned DLL in AppData" is a
+ # description of a lot of legitimate software, not of this implant.
+ _match(r, ctx, "{} {}".format(e["raw"], e["path"]), location,
+ "per-user COM server registration references indicator "
+ "{ioc} — a COM hijack is this chain's documented persistence; "
+ "investigate the registration and the binary",
+ EV_PERSISTENCE)
+
+ # Reviewable inventory, deliberately narrowed: an entry is only worth a
+ # human's attention if it is BOTH in a user-writable directory AND not
+ # validly signed. Collected rather than noted inline, so the list can be
+ # capped - 8 full-width "not validly signed" lines in the DETAIL channel
+ # read as 8 alarms next to the real hits.
+ if e["user_writable"] and status != "Valid":
+ reviewable.append((location, e))
+
+ if reviewable:
+ r.note("com-persistence: {} per-user COM registration(s) are in a folder "
+ "you can write to and are not validly signed. Legitimate software "
+ "does this too - these are pointers for a reviewer, NOT findings, "
+ "and none of them matched an indicator.".format(len(reviewable)))
+ for location, e in reviewable[:3]:
+ r.note(" - {} -> {} [on disk: {}; signature: {}{}]".format(
+ location, e["path"] or "(empty)",
+ "yes" if e["exists"] else "no", e["sig"],
+ "; signer: " + e["signer"] if e["signer"] else ""))
+ if len(reviewable) > 3:
+ r.note(" - ... and {} more, listed in full in the JSON report."
+ .format(len(reviewable) - 3))
+
+ r.checked += len(entries)
+ r.submetrics["com_registrations"] = len(entries)
+ r.submetrics["com_user_writable"] = user_writable
+
+ # A truncated enumeration must not pass as a complete one (D3). If a registry
+ # view could not be fully walked, the COM surface was only partly checked.
+ if partial:
+ r.could_not_run("com-persistence",
+ "the registry could not be fully enumerated, so an "
+ "auto-start entry may have been missed: {}".format(
+ "; ".join(partial)))
+ else:
+ r.ran("com-persistence")
+ ctx.emit("[host] COM registrations: {} ({} in user-writable dirs)"
+ .format(len(entries), user_writable))
+
+
+# --- 2. DNS resolver cache --------------------------------------------------
+
+def _check_dns_cache(r: ModuleResult, ctx) -> None:
+ ctx.emit("[host] reading local DNS resolver cache")
+ # Reads the cache the OS already holds. It issues no query and resolves
+ # nothing, which is exactly why D2 permits it.
+ rows, err = _ps_json(
+ "Get-DnsClientCache -ErrorAction Stop"
+ " | Select-Object Entry,Name,Data,Type"
+ " | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 3 -Compress", timeout=60)
+ if err:
+ r.could_not_run("dns-cache", "Get-DnsClientCache unavailable: {}".format(err))
+ return
+
+ hits = 0
+ for row in rows:
+ entry = _str(row, "Entry")
+ name = _str(row, "Name")
+ data = _str(row, "Data")
+ hits += _match(
+ r, ctx, " ".join((entry, name, data)),
+ "DNS resolver cache",
+ "indicator {ioc} is in this boot's DNS resolver cache "
+ "(Entry=" + (entry or "-") + " Name=" + (name or "-") +
+ " Data=" + (data or "-") + ") — something on this host resolved "
+ "it since the last reboot",
+ EV_CONTACTED)
+
+ r.checked += len(rows)
+ r.submetrics["dns_cache_entries"] = len(rows)
+
+ # The resolver cache is wiped by a reboot, so its whole window is "since last
+ # boot". Stating that plainly stops a clean cache being read as a clean history.
+ boot, boot_err = _boot_time()
+ r.reach["dns-cache"] = {
+ "earliest": boot,
+ "days": None,
+ "basis": "the resolver cache holds only this boot session"
+ + ("" if boot else " (boot time unavailable: {})".format(boot_err)),
+ "note": "Rebooting empties this entirely. It can say what was looked up "
+ "since you last restarted, and nothing before that.",
+ }
+ r.ran("dns-cache")
+ ctx.emit("[host] DNS cache entries: {} ({} indicator matches)"
+ .format(len(rows), hits))
+
+
+# --- 3. retrospective DNS history ------------------------------------------
+
+def _check_dns_log(r: ModuleResult, ctx) -> None:
+ ctx.emit("[host] checking whether DNS-Client/Operational history exists")
+ rows, err = _ps_json(
+ "Get-WinEvent -ListLog '{}' -ErrorAction Stop"
+ " | Select-Object @{{n='IsEnabled';e={{[bool]$_.IsEnabled}}}},"
+ " @{{n='RecordCount';e={{[int]$_.RecordCount}}}}"
+ " | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 3 -Compress".format(_DNS_LOG), timeout=60)
+
+ if err or not rows:
+ # Log absent or unreadable: the consequence for the user is identical
+ # to it being disabled, so it is reported as the same gap, not as an
+ # incidental error.
+ r.submetrics["dns_log_enabled"] = 0
+ r.submetrics["dns_log_records"] = 0
+ r.could_not_run("dns-log", _DNS_LOG_GAP)
+ r.note("dns-log: {} could not be queried ({})".format(
+ _DNS_LOG, err or "log not present on this host"))
+ r.note(_ARM_HINT)
+ r.reach["dns-log"] = {
+ "earliest": None,
+ "days": 0,
+ "basis": "no DNS history exists on this host",
+ "note": "Nothing was ever recorded, so there is no window at all — "
+ "not a short one.",
+ "how_to_enable": _HOW_TO_ENABLE,
+ }
+ return
+
+ row = rows[0]
+ enabled = bool(row.get("IsEnabled"))
+ try:
+ records = int(row.get("RecordCount") or 0)
+ except (TypeError, ValueError):
+ records = 0
+ r.submetrics["dns_log_enabled"] = 1 if enabled else 0
+ r.submetrics["dns_log_records"] = records
+
+ if not enabled or records <= 0:
+ # The important branch, and the common one. This must never read clean.
+ r.could_not_run("dns-log", _DNS_LOG_GAP)
+ r.note("dns-log: {} enabled={} records={} — forward-looking checks are "
+ "possible, retrospective ones are not.".format(
+ _DNS_LOG, enabled, records))
+ r.note(_ARM_HINT)
+ r.reach["dns-log"] = {
+ "earliest": None,
+ "days": 0,
+ "basis": "DNS logging is {} and holds {} records".format(
+ "enabled" if enabled else "disabled", records),
+ "note": "Nothing was ever recorded, so there is no window at all — "
+ "not a short one. This is the Windows default, on every PC.",
+ "how_to_enable": _HOW_TO_ENABLE,
+ }
+ return
+
+ ctx.emit("[host] DNS-Client/Operational is enabled ({} records); "
+ "scanning messages".format(records))
+ # -ErrorAction Stop, not SilentlyContinue: with SilentlyContinue a failure to
+ # read the channel (ACL, corrupt .evtx, Event Log service degraded) exits 0
+ # with no output, so `events` is [] and `ev_err` is "" - and the log, which is
+ # ENABLED and holds records, gets reported as a check that ran and found
+ # nothing. That rolls up to CLEAN: the one check the whole tool exists for,
+ # silently certifying an unread log as clean history. ToString('o') gives ISO
+ # 8601 so min()/max() sort chronologically rather than by locale date string.
+ events, ev_err = _ps_json(
+ "Get-WinEvent -LogName '{}' -MaxEvents 20000"
+ " -ErrorAction Stop"
+ " | Select-Object @{{n='Time';e={{$_.TimeCreated.ToString('o')}}}},"
+ " @{{n='Message';e={{[string]$_.Message}}}}"
+ " | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 3 -Compress".format(_DNS_LOG), timeout=300)
+ if (ev_err and not events) or (records > 0 and not events):
+ reason = ("log is enabled with {} records but none could be read{} - this "
+ "machine's DNS history was NOT searched, so nothing here is "
+ "cleared".format(records, ": " + ev_err if ev_err else ""))
+ r.could_not_run("dns-log", reason)
+ r.note(_ARM_HINT)
+ return
+
+ hits = 0
+ times = [t for t in (_str(ev, "Time") for ev in events) if t]
+ if times:
+ # The log IS on, so there is a real window. Report its true extent rather
+ # than implying the whole history of the machine.
+ r.reach["dns-log"] = {
+ "earliest": min(times),
+ "days": None,
+ "basis": "oldest of {:,} DNS events read (cap 20,000)".format(
+ len(times)),
+ "note": "Queries before this are either rotated out of the log or "
+ "beyond the 20,000-event read cap.",
+ }
+ for ev in events:
+ when = _str(ev, "Time")
+ hits += _match(
+ r, ctx, _str(ev, "Message"),
+ "{} @ {}".format(_DNS_LOG, when or "unknown time"),
+ "indicator {ioc} appears in a DNS-Client/Operational event" +
+ (" at " + when if when else "") +
+ " — this host queried that name",
+ EV_CONTACTED, when)
+
+ r.checked += len(events)
+ r.submetrics["dns_log_events_scanned"] = len(events)
+ r.ran("dns-log")
+ if records > len(events):
+ # Honest about the window actually examined (D3): a capped read is not
+ # the same as having read the whole log.
+ r.note("dns-log: examined the most recent {} of {} records (cap is "
+ "20000); older entries were not checked.".format(
+ len(events), records))
+ ctx.emit("[host] DNS log events scanned: {} ({} indicator matches)"
+ .format(len(events), hits))
+
+
+# --- 4. hosts file ----------------------------------------------------------
+
+def _check_hosts(r: ModuleResult, ctx) -> None:
+ root = os.environ.get("SystemRoot", r"C:\Windows")
+ path = os.path.join(root, "System32", "drivers", "etc", "hosts")
+ ctx.emit("[host] reading {}".format(path))
+ if not os.path.exists(path):
+ r.could_not_run("hosts-file", "no hosts file at {}".format(path))
+ return
+ try:
+ with io.open(path, encoding="utf-8", errors="replace") as fh:
+ raw = fh.readlines()
+ except OSError as exc:
+ r.could_not_run("hosts-file", "could not read {}: {}".format(path, exc))
+ return
+
+ active = [ln.strip() for ln in raw
+ if ln.strip() and not ln.strip().startswith("#")]
+ # A hosts line is "<address> <hostname...>". Pointing an indicator at one of
+ # these sink addresses is a deliberate BLOCK - protective, the OPPOSITE of a
+ # compromise - so it is not reported as a hit at all, only counted. Only a
+ # mapping to a REAL address is a finding (EV_CONFIGURED).
+ _SINKS = {"0.0.0.0", "127.0.0.1", "::1", "::", "0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1"}
+ hits = 0
+ blocked = 0
+ for line in active:
+ parts = line.split()
+ addr = parts[0] if parts else ""
+ if addr in _SINKS:
+ # Still check it DOES contain an indicator, for the block count, but
+ # never raise a hit on a protective entry.
+ if ctx.iocs.search(line.lower()):
+ blocked += 1
+ continue
+ hits += _match(
+ r, ctx, line, path,
+ "indicator {ioc} is mapped in the hosts file to " + addr +
+ " (line: " + line + "). This is NOT a sink/block address, so the "
+ "name has been pointed at a real host on this machine - unusual, "
+ "and worth checking who added it.",
+ EV_CONFIGURED)
+
+ r.checked += 1
+ r.submetrics["hosts_entries"] = len(active)
+ if blocked:
+ r.submetrics["hosts_blocked_indicators"] = blocked
+ r.note("hosts-file: {} indicator(s) are BLOCKED in the hosts file "
+ "(pointed at a sink address). That is protective, not a finding."
+ .format(blocked))
+ r.ran("hosts-file")
+ ctx.emit("[host] active hosts entries: {} ({} indicator matches, {} blocked)"
+ .format(len(active), hits, blocked))
+
+
+# --- module entry point -----------------------------------------------------
+
+def run(ctx) -> ModuleResult:
+ r = ModuleResult(NAME)
+
+ system = platform.system()
+ if system != "Windows" or winreg is None:
+ # Never a fake CLEAN on a platform where nothing was observed.
+ reason = "not supported on {}".format(system or "unknown platform")
+ for name in ("com-persistence", "dns-cache", "dns-log", "hosts-file"):
+ r.could_not_run(name, reason)
+ return r
+
+ # Each check is isolated: one failure must not cost the other three.
+ for name, fn in (("com-persistence", _check_com),
+ ("dns-cache", _check_dns_cache),
+ ("dns-log", _check_dns_log),
+ ("hosts-file", _check_hosts)):
+ try:
+ fn(r, ctx)
+ except Exception as exc:
+ r.skipped += 1
+ r.could_not_run(name, "{}: {}".format(type(exc).__name__, exc))
+
+ return r
diff --git a/scan/adint_scan/netguard.py b/scan/adint_scan/netguard.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cfa6b7f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scan/adint_scan/netguard.py
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+"""Runtime enforcement of doctrine D2: never contact an indicator.
+
+D2 is the most important rule in the project. Resolving a C&C domain, or opening
+any connection, would announce a possible victim to the people running the
+infrastructure. The tool is a local string-matching tool; it has no reason to
+touch the network at all.
+
+We do not merely *intend* not to resolve anything — we make it impossible. While a
+scan runs inside `no_network()`, every name-resolution and outbound-connection
+entry point in the `socket` module raises `NetworkContactAttempt`. A bug that tried
+to resolve an IOC would crash loudly instead of leaking a signal.
+
+This does NOT block `subprocess` (OS pipes, not Python sockets), so the host
+module can still read the LOCAL DNS resolver cache via PowerShell — reading an
+already-cached entry resolves nothing.
+
+The IOC-update path (not implemented here) is the one explicitly-invoked network
+operation the spec allows; it must run OUTSIDE this guard and verify a signature.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import contextlib
+import socket
+from typing import List
+
+
+class NetworkContactAttempt(RuntimeError):
+ """Raised when scan code tries to resolve a name or open a connection."""
+
+
+# Functions on the socket module that perform resolution or egress.
+_BLOCKED = (
+ "getaddrinfo",
+ "gethostbyname",
+ "gethostbyname_ex",
+ "gethostbyaddr",
+ "getnameinfo",
+ "create_connection",
+)
+
+
+class _Recorder:
+ def __init__(self) -> None:
+ self.attempts: List[str] = []
+
+ def trip(self, what: str) -> None:
+ self.attempts.append(what)
+ raise NetworkContactAttempt(
+ "D2 violation: scan code attempted network contact via {}. "
+ "The scanner must never resolve or connect to an indicator.".format(what))
+
+
+def no_network():
+ """Context manager that disables all socket-level resolution and egress."""
+ recorder = _Recorder()
+ saved = {}
+
+ for name in _BLOCKED:
+ if hasattr(socket, name):
+ saved[name] = getattr(socket, name)
+
+ def make(fn_name):
+ def blocked(*_a, **_k):
+ recorder.trip("socket." + fn_name)
+ return blocked
+ setattr(socket, name, make(name))
+
+ # Methods on the socket OBJECT that open a connection or send egress. sendto
+ # and sendmsg matter because a UDP datagram needs no prior connect(): without
+ # them a bug could still push bytes to a resolver or a C&C over UDP.
+ _SOCK_METHODS = ("connect", "connect_ex", "sendto", "sendmsg", "sendall",
+ "send")
+ saved_methods = {}
+ for mname in _SOCK_METHODS:
+ if hasattr(socket.socket, mname):
+ saved_methods[mname] = getattr(socket.socket, mname)
+
+ def make_method(m):
+ def blocked(self, *_a, **_k):
+ recorder.trip("socket.socket." + m)
+ return blocked
+ setattr(socket.socket, mname, make_method(mname))
+
+ try:
+ yield recorder
+ finally:
+ for name, fn in saved.items():
+ setattr(socket, name, fn)
+ for mname, fn in saved_methods.items():
+ setattr(socket.socket, mname, fn)
diff --git a/scan/adint_scan/report.py b/scan/adint_scan/report.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a781ea1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scan/adint_scan/report.py
@@ -0,0 +1,677 @@
+"""Human-readable + machine-readable reporting, and the overall verdict.
+
+Doctrine enforced here:
+ D1 Every run that finds nothing prints, verbatim, the mandatory closing line.
+ D3 A module that could not run is UNKNOWN, never CLEAN; gaps are stated out
+ loud in the interface, not buried.
+ The verdict for a hit is "investigate", never "you are compromised" — an ad
+ impression is not proof of infection (README / the IOC file header).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import datetime
+import json
+import platform as _platform
+from typing import Any, Dict, List
+
+from . import __version__
+from .iocs import IocSet
+from .result import (CLEAN, HITS, PARTIAL, UNKNOWN, ModuleResult, is_serious,
+ EV_ON_DISK, EV_PERSISTENCE, EV_CONTACTED, EV_ATTEMPTED,
+ EV_CONFIGURED, EV_REFERENCED)
+
+# The exact text required by D1. Do not reword.
+D1_LINE = ("No known indicators were found in the places that can be checked. "
+ "This is not a clean bill of health.")
+
+V_HITS = "INDICATORS_FOUND"
+V_NONE_WITH_GAPS = "NO_KNOWN_INDICATORS_WITH_GAPS"
+V_NONE = "NO_KNOWN_INDICATORS"
+
+
+def _windows_release(release: str, version: str) -> str:
+ """Correct Python's release string on Windows 11.
+
+ platform.release() reports "10" on Windows 11, because the underlying
+ GetVersionEx still reports major version 10 for compatibility. Windows 11 is
+ build 22000 and up, so the build number in platform.version() is what
+ actually distinguishes them. This matters because the JSON report is meant to
+ be evidence: a report that names the wrong OS is a report someone has to
+ double-check by hand.
+ """
+ if release != "10":
+ return release
+ try:
+ build = int(version.split(".")[2])
+ except (IndexError, ValueError):
+ return release
+ return "11" if build >= 22000 else release
+
+
+def _platform_info() -> Dict[str, str]:
+ system = _platform.system()
+ release = _platform.release()
+ version = _platform.version()
+ if system == "Windows":
+ release = _windows_release(release, version)
+ return {
+ "system": system,
+ "release": release,
+ "version": version,
+ "machine": _platform.machine(),
+ "python": _platform.python_version(),
+ }
+
+
+def build_document(iocs: IocSet, modules: List[ModuleResult],
+ started: datetime.datetime) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+ hits_total = sum(len(m.hits) for m in modules)
+ gaps: List[str] = []
+ for m in modules:
+ for c in m.checks:
+ if not c.ran:
+ gaps.append("{}/{}: {}".format(m.name, c.name, c.reason))
+ # A module that produced NO checks at all is UNKNOWN - it observed
+ # nothing - but has no failed Check to turn into a gap, so without this it
+ # is invisible to the verdict and a "nothing found" reads as clean. The
+ # common cause is a browser module on a machine where no supported browser
+ # is installed, or on macOS/Linux before the platform paths existed.
+ if m.status == UNKNOWN and not m.checks:
+ gaps.append("{}: nothing in this check could run, so it cleared "
+ "nothing".format(m.name))
+
+ if hits_total > 0:
+ status = V_HITS
+ elif gaps:
+ status = V_NONE_WITH_GAPS
+ else:
+ status = V_NONE
+
+ age = iocs.age_days()
+ return {
+ "tool": {"name": "adint-scan", "version": __version__},
+ "timestamp": started.replace(microsecond=0).isoformat(),
+ "platform": _platform_info(),
+ "ioc_set": {
+ "path": iocs.source_path,
+ "count": len(iocs),
+ "age_days": age,
+ "stale": iocs.is_stale(),
+ },
+ "modules": {m.name: m.to_dict() for m in modules},
+ "verdict": {
+ "status": status,
+ "hits_total": hits_total,
+ "gaps": gaps,
+ },
+ # D1 line is present whenever nothing was found (CLEAN or with gaps).
+ "doctrine_line": None if hits_total > 0 else D1_LINE,
+ # Whether a "HOW TO TURN ON DNS HISTORY" block will actually be rendered,
+ # so the summary's pointer to it does not dangle on a host where no reach
+ # entry carried how_to_enable (e.g. a non-Windows machine).
+ "_dns_howto": any(
+ info.get("how_to_enable")
+ for m in modules for info in (m.reach or {}).values()),
+ }
+
+
+def write_json(document: Dict[str, Any], path: str) -> None:
+ # The internal rendering flag is not part of the evidence record.
+ doc = {k: v for k, v in document.items() if not k.startswith("_")}
+ with open(path, "w", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n") as fh:
+ json.dump(doc, fh, indent=2, ensure_ascii=False)
+ fh.write("\n")
+
+
+# --- human-readable rendering ----------------------------------------------
+
+_RULE = "=" * 72
+
+
+def _fmt_count(n: int) -> str:
+ return "{:,}".format(n)
+
+
+# Raw metric keys are developer shorthand. Say what each number is, in words,
+# because "com_registrations=37" tells a reader nothing about whether 37 is bad.
+_METRIC_LABELS = {
+ "sqlite": "browser databases read",
+ "blob": "cache / stored-data files searched",
+ "hsts_entries": "HSTS security records checked (proof of past connections)",
+ "connection_records": "saved connection records checked",
+ "files_hashed": "files fingerprinted",
+ "com_registrations": "auto-start COM registrations reviewed",
+ "com_user_writable": " of those, in a folder you can write to",
+ "dns_cache_entries": "names in the DNS cache since last reboot",
+ "dns_log_records": "DNS history records available",
+ "dns_log_events_scanned": "DNS history events searched",
+ "hosts_entries": "entries in the hosts file",
+ "hosts_blocked_indicators": " of those, indicators you are BLOCKING (good)",
+}
+
+
+def _describe_metrics(metrics: Dict[str, int]) -> List[str]:
+ out = []
+ for key, value in metrics.items():
+ if key == "bytes_hashed":
+ out.append("{:,.1f} GB of files read".format(value / 1e9))
+ continue
+ if key == "dns_log_enabled":
+ out.append("Windows DNS history logging: {}".format(
+ "ON" if value else "OFF (the Windows default)"))
+ continue
+ label = _METRIC_LABELS.get(key)
+ if label is None:
+ out.append("{}: {}".format(key, _fmt_count(value)))
+ else:
+ out.append("{}: {}".format(label, _fmt_count(value)))
+ return out
+
+
+def render_human(document: Dict[str, Any]) -> str:
+ out: List[str] = []
+ w = out.append
+
+ w(_RULE)
+ w(" adint-scan {} — AdFection / Candiru indicator check".format(
+ document["tool"]["version"]))
+ w(" {} {} {}".format(document["timestamp"],
+ document["platform"]["system"],
+ document["platform"]["release"]))
+ w(_RULE)
+ w("")
+
+ # The answer first. Everything after it is the supporting evidence.
+ out.extend(render_summary(document).split("\n"))
+
+ ioc = document["ioc_set"]
+ age = ioc["age_days"]
+ age_txt = "unknown age" if age is None else "{} day(s) old".format(age)
+ w("Indicator set : {} indicators, {}".format(ioc["count"], age_txt))
+ if ioc["stale"]:
+ w(" ** WARNING: this indicator set is more than 30 days old. Update it "
+ "before trusting a clean result. **")
+ w("")
+
+ w("DETAIL — what was examined, and the evidence behind the summary")
+ w("")
+ for name, m in document["modules"].items():
+ took = (" in {:.0f}s".format(m["duration_s"])
+ if m.get("duration_s") else "")
+ w("--- {} check [{}]{} ---".format(name, m["status"], took))
+ w(" examined: {} could not read: {}".format(
+ _fmt_count(m["checked"]), _fmt_count(m["skipped"])))
+ if m["submetrics"]:
+ for line in _describe_metrics(m["submetrics"]):
+ w(" {}".format(line))
+ for note in m["notes"]:
+ w(" note : {}".format(note))
+ if m["hits"]:
+ # Strongest evidence first: someone reading this should see a sample
+ # on disk or a proven contact before a string that merely appeared in
+ # cached page text.
+ order = {EV_ON_DISK: 0, EV_PERSISTENCE: 1, EV_CONTACTED: 2,
+ EV_ATTEMPTED: 3, EV_CONFIGURED: 4, EV_REFERENCED: 5, "": 0}
+ for h in sorted(m["hits"], key=lambda x: order.get(x.get("evidence", ""), 0)):
+ prov = "{}/{}".format(h["tier"], h["confidence"]) if h["tier"] else "?"
+ ev = h.get("evidence") or "unclassified"
+ w(" !! HIT {} [{}] evidence: {}".format(
+ _defang(h["indicator"]), prov, ev.upper()))
+ gloss = EVIDENCE_MEANING.get(ev)
+ if gloss:
+ w(" meaning: {}".format(gloss))
+ if h.get("profile"):
+ w(" account: {}".format(h["profile"]))
+ w(" at : {}".format(h["location"]))
+ w(" detail : {}".format(h["detail"]))
+ if h.get("observed"):
+ w(" when : {}".format(h["observed"]))
+ if h.get("source"):
+ w(" source : {}".format(h["source"]))
+ w("")
+
+ _render_reach(w, document)
+
+ v = document["verdict"]
+ w(_RULE)
+ if v["status"] == V_HITS:
+ w("VERDICT: {} indicator(s) matched.".format(v["hits_total"]))
+ w("")
+ counts = {}
+ for m in document["modules"].values():
+ for h in m["hits"]:
+ key = h.get("evidence") or "unclassified"
+ counts[key] = counts.get(key, 0) + 1
+ serious_n = sum(n for k, n in counts.items() if is_serious(k))
+ w(" By evidence strength: " + ", ".join(
+ "{} {}".format(n, k) for k, n in sorted(counts.items())))
+ w("")
+ if serious_n:
+ w(" {} of these {} SERIOUS - a file on disk, an auto-start entry, a".format(
+ serious_n, "is" if serious_n == 1 else "are"))
+ w(" proven connection, or a blocked attempt. Read those first; they")
+ w(" are marked >> in the summary above. The rest are reference-only.")
+ else:
+ w(" ALL of these are reference-only: a string in cached page content,")
+ w(" history or a blocklist - most often a page ABOUT this campaign (a")
+ w(" news article, a report, this tool's own documentation) rather than")
+ w(" any contact with the infrastructure. Check what the page was,")
+ w(" without opening it, before drawing a conclusion.")
+ w("")
+ w("A match means INVESTIGATE, not 'you are compromised'. An ad impression")
+ w("from this infrastructure is not proof of infection — the validator server")
+ w("decided per device whether to proceed. If you have any concrete reason to")
+ w("suspect this machine, the right answer is expert forensics, not this tool:")
+ _referrals(w)
+ else:
+ if v["gaps"]:
+ w("VERDICT: no known indicators found IN WHAT COULD BE CHECKED.")
+ w("")
+ w("Checks that could NOT run (a gap is not a clean result):")
+ for g in v["gaps"]:
+ w(" - {}".format(g))
+ w("")
+ else:
+ w("VERDICT: no known indicators found in any check that ran.")
+ w("")
+ # D1: the mandatory closing line, verbatim.
+ w(document["doctrine_line"])
+ w("")
+ w("This grade of spyware is purpose-built to defeat exactly this class of")
+ w("check. If you are at risk, contact people who do this properly:")
+ _referrals(w)
+ w(_RULE)
+ return "\n".join(out)
+
+
+# The window the AdFection campaign was actually active, from the Citizen Lab
+# report: 45 compromised Windows devices at Al Jazeera during 2024-2025. If the
+# evidence on this machine does not reach back that far, the honest thing is to say
+# the check could not have covered it, rather than let a clean result imply it did.
+CAMPAIGN_FROM = datetime.date(2024, 1, 1)
+CAMPAIGN_TO = datetime.date(2025, 12, 31)
+CAMPAIGN_LABEL = "2024-2025 (the period in which the confirmed compromises happened)"
+
+
+def overlap_statement(earliest: datetime.date, source: str) -> List[str]:
+ """What the oldest surviving evidence means for the campaign window. Three
+ cases, and the middle one is the common one: evidence that starts INSIDE the
+ window covers only its tail, and only through whichever record reached it."""
+ if earliest > CAMPAIGN_TO:
+ return [
+ "** The oldest evidence of any kind on this machine dates from {}.".format(
+ earliest.isoformat()),
+ " The campaign this tool searches for was active in {}.".format(
+ CAMPAIGN_LABEL),
+ " Those windows DO NOT OVERLAP. For that period this machine holds no",
+ " evidence either way, so a clean result above says nothing about it. **",
+ ]
+ if earliest > CAMPAIGN_FROM:
+ return [
+ "** The oldest evidence on this machine is {} ({}).".format(
+ source, earliest.isoformat()),
+ " That reaches PART of the campaign period ({}),".format(CAMPAIGN_LABEL),
+ " from {} onwards, and only through that one kind of record.".format(
+ earliest.isoformat()),
+ " Everything before it, and every other kind of record, is gone. A clean",
+ " result covers that partial window thinly - it does not cover 2024-2025. **",
+ ]
+ return [
+ "** The oldest evidence on this machine is {} ({}), which predates".format(
+ source, earliest.isoformat()),
+ " the campaign period. That record type spans the whole window - but only",
+ " for whatever survived in it, which is never everything. **",
+ ]
+
+
+def _render_reach(w, document: Dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+ """Say how far back the evidence reaches. A clean result over 11 weeks and a
+ clean result over 3 years are different findings, and the reader cannot tell
+ them apart unless the tool says which one it just produced."""
+ entries = []
+ for mod_name, m in document["modules"].items():
+ for label, info in (m.get("reach") or {}).items():
+ entries.append((mod_name, label, info))
+ if not entries:
+ return
+
+ w(_RULE)
+ w("HOW FAR BACK THIS SCAN COULD SEE")
+ w("")
+ w(" A clean result only covers the window the evidence survives in. These are")
+ w(" the measured windows on THIS machine, not general estimates:")
+ w("")
+
+ earliest_overall = None
+ earliest_source = ""
+ for mod_name, label, info in entries:
+ earliest = info.get("earliest")
+ days = info.get("days")
+ when = "nothing recorded" if not earliest else earliest[:10]
+ age = ""
+ if isinstance(days, int) and earliest:
+ age = " ({} days ago)".format(days)
+ w(" {}/{}".format(mod_name, label))
+ w(" reaches back to : {}{}".format(when, age))
+ w(" basis : {}".format(info.get("basis", "")))
+ if info.get("note"):
+ w(" {}".format(info["note"]))
+ w("")
+ if earliest:
+ try:
+ d = datetime.date.fromisoformat(earliest[:10])
+ if earliest_overall is None or d < earliest_overall:
+ earliest_overall = d
+ earliest_source = "{}/{}".format(mod_name, label)
+ except ValueError:
+ pass
+
+ # How many artifacts actually date from inside the campaign window. This is
+ # the number that answers "could this scan have seen it?", where the oldest
+ # surviving file only answers "how far back does anything reach?".
+ in_window = 0
+ total_dated = 0
+ for _mod_name, _label, info in entries:
+ by_year = info.get("by_year") or {}
+ for year, count in by_year.items():
+ year = int(year)
+ total_dated += count
+ if CAMPAIGN_FROM.year <= year <= CAMPAIGN_TO.year:
+ in_window += count
+
+ if earliest_overall is not None:
+ for line in overlap_statement(earliest_overall, earliest_source):
+ w(" " + line)
+ w("")
+
+ # Does ANY reach record - cookie ages, DNS, not just the cache files that
+ # carry by_year - reach into the campaign window? This decides whether the
+ # absolute "nothing dates from the campaign period" sentence is even true.
+ something_in_window = False
+ for _mod_name, _label, info in entries:
+ earliest = info.get("earliest")
+ if earliest:
+ try:
+ d = datetime.date.fromisoformat(earliest[:10])
+ if d <= CAMPAIGN_TO:
+ something_in_window = True
+ except ValueError:
+ pass
+
+ if total_dated:
+ merged = {}
+ for _mod_name, _label, info in entries:
+ for year, count in (info.get("by_year") or {}).items():
+ year = int(year)
+ merged[year] = merged.get(year, 0) + count
+
+ w(" Age of the browser cache files searched, by year (cache files only,")
+ w(" not cookies or DNS - those are summarised above):")
+ w(" " + " ".join("{}: {:,}".format(y, merged[y])
+ for y in sorted(merged)))
+ w("")
+ pct = 100.0 * in_window / total_dated
+ w(" Of those cache files, dating from the campaign period ({}-{}): "
+ "{:,} of {:,} ({:.1f}%).".format(
+ CAMPAIGN_FROM.year, CAMPAIGN_TO.year, in_window, total_dated, pct))
+
+ # A per-year floor matters more than the total: the campaign ran across
+ # several years, and a year with almost nothing left is a year this scan
+ # cannot speak about, however healthy the overall percentage looks.
+ sparse = [y for y in range(CAMPAIGN_FROM.year, CAMPAIGN_TO.year + 1)
+ if merged.get(y, 0) < 100]
+ if in_window == 0 and not something_in_window:
+ # Only make the absolute claim when NOTHING of any kind - no cookie,
+ # no cache file, no DNS record - reaches the window. Otherwise it
+ # would contradict the overlap statement printed just above.
+ w(" NOTHING on this machine dates from the campaign period. A clean")
+ w(" result cannot speak to it at all.")
+ elif in_window == 0 and something_in_window:
+ w(" No browser CACHE file dates from the campaign period, though some")
+ w(" older evidence (shown above) does. Cache is the thinnest record;")
+ w(" the window above is the one to read.")
+ elif sparse:
+ w(" BUT cache coverage is uneven. These campaign years have almost no")
+ w(" surviving cache, so a clean result says little about them:")
+ for y in sparse:
+ w(" {}: {:,} cache file(s)".format(y, merged.get(y, 0)))
+ w("")
+
+ # The actionable part: if any check reported how to extend its window, print it.
+ for _mod_name, _label, info in entries:
+ for line in info.get("how_to_enable") or []:
+ w(" " + line)
+ w("")
+
+
+# What a hit in each tier actually MEANS, in plain language. The tier is the
+# whole point of curating the indicator set: contact with an ad tracker and
+# contact with a command-and-control server are different events, and a report
+# that renders them identically has failed the person reading it.
+TIER_MEANING = {
+ "delivery": ("An advertising/tracking server belonging to this network "
+ "reached this device. That is the mass-profiling layer: it "
+ "happened to millions of people. It is NOT evidence of "
+ "infection."),
+ "cc": ("A Candiru command-and-control server. This is the most serious "
+ "class of indicator - it is the address an active implant talks to."),
+ "validator": ("A Candiru validator server. These profiled a device and "
+ "decided, per device, whether to deliver an exploit. Contact "
+ "suggests this device was being assessed as a target."),
+ "candiru": ("A server attributed to Candiru by Recorded Future. Its exact "
+ "role is not published, so treat it as serious but unspecified."),
+ "candiru-ip": ("An IP address attributed to Candiru infrastructure in 2025. "
+ "Weak on its own: cloud IP addresses are reassigned to "
+ "unrelated, innocent customers within months."),
+ "historical": ("Infrastructure from the separate, older 2021 Candiru "
+ "campaign. A hit would still be significant."),
+ "sample": ("The file fingerprint of a published Candiru sample. A match "
+ "here is conclusive, not circumstantial."),
+}
+
+EVIDENCE_MEANING = {
+ EV_ON_DISK: ("a file on this machine has the fingerprint of a published "
+ "spyware sample - this is conclusive, not circumstantial"),
+ EV_PERSISTENCE: ("the name is registered to run automatically on this "
+ "machine - a hallmark of installed spyware"),
+ EV_CONTACTED: "this device demonstrably communicated with it",
+ EV_ATTEMPTED: ("something on this device looked the name up, but a filter "
+ "blocked the connection"),
+ EV_CONFIGURED: ("the name is in local configuration pointing at a real "
+ "address (a protective block entry is not reported at all)"),
+ EV_REFERENCED: ("the name appeared in saved page content - most often a page "
+ "ABOUT this campaign, not contact with it"),
+}
+
+# A short imperative headline per grade, used in the summary. The ones that are
+# not EV_REFERENCED are serious and each gets its own, so a sample on disk and a
+# persistence entry can never be rendered as "probably nothing".
+EVIDENCE_HEADLINE = {
+ EV_ON_DISK: "A KNOWN SPYWARE FILE IS ON THIS MACHINE",
+ EV_PERSISTENCE: "SOMETHING IS SET TO RUN AUTOMATICALLY FROM THIS INFRASTRUCTURE",
+ EV_CONTACTED: "THIS DEVICE CONTACTED THIS INFRASTRUCTURE",
+ EV_ATTEMPTED: "THIS DEVICE TRIED TO REACH THIS INFRASTRUCTURE (a filter blocked it)",
+ EV_CONFIGURED: "THIS INFRASTRUCTURE IS CONFIGURED ON THIS MACHINE",
+}
+
+
+def _defang(indicator: str) -> str:
+ """Make an indicator safe to paste into an email or chat without a client,
+ gateway or link scanner auto-fetching it. The report is designed to be
+ forwarded to Access Now / Amnesty, and the tool's own rule is never to
+ contact an indicator - so it must not ship them in a fetchable form. The JSON
+ report keeps the raw value; only the human text is defanged."""
+ out = indicator.replace("http://", "hxxp://").replace("https://", "hxxps://")
+ # Neuter the last dot (domains) or wrap every dot (IPs) so nothing resolves.
+ if any(c.isalpha() for c in indicator) and "." in out:
+ head, _, tail = out.rpartition(".")
+ return "{}[.]{}".format(head, tail)
+ return out.replace(".", "[.]")
+
+
+def render_summary(document: Dict[str, Any]) -> str:
+ """The part a person actually reads. Answers, in order: what was found, what
+ it means, what to do, and what this scan could not check.
+
+ Everything below this in the report is the evidence for these few lines."""
+ out: List[str] = []
+ w = out.append
+ v = document["verdict"]
+
+ all_hits = [h for _m, m in document["modules"].items() for h in m["hits"]]
+ serious = [h for h in all_hits if is_serious(h.get("evidence", ""))]
+ benign = [h for h in all_hits if not is_serious(h.get("evidence", ""))]
+
+ w(_RULE)
+ w(" SUMMARY — read this part")
+ w(_RULE)
+
+ if not all_hits:
+ w(" RESULT: no known indicator was found in anything that could be")
+ w(" checked.")
+ w("")
+ w(" This is NOT a clean bill of health. See the two sections below for")
+ w(" what was searched and, more importantly, what could not be.")
+ elif serious:
+ n = len(serious)
+ w(" RESULT: {} serious finding{} that need{} a person to look.".format(
+ n, "" if n == 1 else "s", "s" if n == 1 else ""))
+ if benign:
+ nb = len(benign)
+ w(" ({} further match{} {} only {} in saved page "
+ "content.)".format(
+ nb, "" if nb == 1 else "es", "is" if nb == 1 else "are",
+ "a reference" if nb == 1 else "references"))
+ w("")
+ w(" WHAT WAS FOUND")
+ # Strongest grade first; collapse repeats of the same indicator+grade so
+ # one domain in three cache files is not three lines.
+ for h in _dedup_serious(serious):
+ headline = EVIDENCE_HEADLINE.get(h["evidence"], "A SERIOUS INDICATOR MATCHED")
+ w(" >> {}".format(headline))
+ w(" {} [{}]".format(_defang(h["indicator"]), h["tier"]))
+ meaning = TIER_MEANING.get(h["tier"])
+ if meaning:
+ for line in _wrap(meaning, 64):
+ w(" " + line)
+ if h.get("profile"):
+ w(" Account: {}".format(h["profile"]))
+ if h.get("observed"):
+ w(" When: {}".format(h["observed"][:19].replace("T", " ")))
+ w(" Where: {}".format(_short_path(h["location"])))
+ w("")
+ w(" WHAT TO DO")
+ w(" 1. Do NOT delete, move or \"clean\" anything named above. It is the")
+ w(" evidence a forensic examiner would need, and deleting it cannot")
+ w(" be undone.")
+ w(" 2. Do NOT open, visit or look up any name above - not even to")
+ w(" check it. Contacting it tells whoever runs it that someone is")
+ w(" looking. The names are written with [.] so they cannot be")
+ w(" clicked by accident; keep them that way if you forward this.")
+ w(" 3. Contact one of the organisations at the end of this report. A")
+ w(" serious finding here is a reason to get expert help, not a")
+ w(" verdict this tool can give on its own.")
+ w("")
+ w(" Before you forward this report: it contains your Windows username,")
+ w(" your browser profile names, and the web addresses of matching")
+ w(" records - personal information. That is fine to send to the help")
+ w(" organisations below, who need it; think before posting it in public.")
+ if benign:
+ n_b = len(benign)
+ w("")
+ w(" The {} reference-only match{} {} listed in the detail section "
+ "below; {} most likely {} you read about this campaign.".format(
+ n_b, "" if n_b == 1 else "es", "is" if n_b == 1 else "are",
+ "it is" if n_b == 1 else "they are",
+ "a page" if n_b == 1 else "pages"))
+ else:
+ n = len(benign)
+ w(" RESULT: {} match{} found, all of them reference-only.".format(
+ n, "" if n == 1 else "es"))
+ w("")
+ w(" WHAT THIS PROBABLY IS")
+ for line in _wrap(
+ "Every match is a string found in saved page content - no sign "
+ "that this device ever contacted the infrastructure, ran a "
+ "sample, or was configured to. The usual cause is reading about "
+ "this campaign: a news article, a research report, a blocklist "
+ "or this tool's own documentation puts these names in a browser "
+ "cache. Check the page's own title in the DETAIL section below - "
+ "do not open the page - before drawing any conclusion. This is "
+ "probably not a sign of compromise.", 68):
+ w(" " + line)
+
+ gaps = v.get("gaps") or []
+ if gaps:
+ w("")
+ w(" WHAT COULD NOT BE CHECKED ({} gap{})".format(
+ len(gaps), "" if len(gaps) == 1 else "s"))
+ shown = gaps[:4]
+ for g in shown:
+ for i, line in enumerate(_wrap(g, 66)):
+ w(" " + ("- " if i == 0 else " ") + line)
+ if len(gaps) > len(shown):
+ w(" ... and {} more, listed in full at the end of this report."
+ .format(len(gaps) - len(shown)))
+ # The DNS gap is the one a reader can actually close - but only point at
+ # the instructions if they were actually rendered (they are not on a
+ # non-Windows host), or the pointer dangles.
+ if document.get("_dns_howto") and any("dns" in g.lower() for g in gaps):
+ w("")
+ w(" -> You can fix the DNS gap for next time, in one command.")
+ w(" See \"HOW TO TURN ON DNS HISTORY\" further down. It tells you")
+ w(" nothing about the past, but it means a future check can")
+ w(" actually answer the question.")
+ w(_RULE)
+ w("")
+ return "\n".join(out)
+
+
+def _dedup_serious(hits: List[Dict[str, Any]]) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
+ """Collapse repeats of the same indicator at the same grade, strongest grade
+ first, so one domain found in three cache files is one line, not three."""
+ order = {g: i for i, g in enumerate(
+ [EV_ON_DISK, EV_PERSISTENCE, EV_CONTACTED, EV_ATTEMPTED, EV_CONFIGURED])}
+ seen = {}
+ for h in hits:
+ key = (h["indicator"], h.get("evidence", ""))
+ if key not in seen:
+ seen[key] = h
+ return sorted(seen.values(),
+ key=lambda h: order.get(h.get("evidence", ""), 99))
+
+
+def _wrap(text: str, width: int) -> List[str]:
+ words, lines, cur = text.split(), [], ""
+ for word in words:
+ if cur and len(cur) + 1 + len(word) > width:
+ lines.append(cur)
+ cur = word
+ else:
+ cur = (cur + " " + word).strip()
+ if cur:
+ lines.append(cur)
+ return lines
+
+
+def _short_path(path: str) -> str:
+ """Keep a path readable without losing which browser or profile it came from.
+ The old version cut at "User Data", so Chrome, Edge and Brave all rendered as
+ "...\\Default\\Network\\Cookies" and the reader could not tell them apart."""
+ p = str(path)
+ for marker in ("User Data", "Profiles"):
+ if marker in p:
+ head, _, tail = p.partition(marker)
+ # Keep the last directory before the marker - the vendor folder, e.g.
+ # "...\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default\\...".
+ lead = [part for part in head.replace("/", "\\").split("\\") if part]
+ vendor = ("\\".join(lead[-2:]) + "\\") if len(lead) >= 2 else ""
+ return "...\\" + vendor + marker + tail
+ return p if len(p) < 70 else "..." + p[-67:]
+
+
+def _referrals(w) -> None:
+ w(" - Access Now Digital Security Helpline https://www.accessnow.org/help/")
+ w(" - Amnesty International Security Lab https://securitylab.amnesty.org/")
+ w(" - The Citizen Lab https://citizenlab.ca/")
diff --git a/scan/adint_scan/result.py b/scan/adint_scan/result.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..628c348
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scan/adint_scan/result.py
@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+"""Shared result types — the contract every scan module implements.
+
+Doctrine baked into these types (SPEC-scanner.md):
+
+ D3 Measured, never inferred. A module reports CLEAN only for checks that
+ actually ran and found nothing. A check that could not run is UNKNOWN,
+ which is a DISTINCT outcome from CLEAN. Never collapse the two.
+
+Status values
+ CLEAN every check this module was meant to run, ran, and found no hit
+ HITS at least one indicator matched
+ UNKNOWN no check in this module could run (nothing was actually observed)
+ PARTIAL some checks ran clean, at least one could not run (gaps remain)
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import dataclasses
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from typing import Any, Dict, List
+
+CLEAN = "CLEAN"
+HITS = "HITS"
+UNKNOWN = "UNKNOWN"
+PARTIAL = "PARTIAL"
+
+# Evidence grades, strongest first. See Hit.evidence for what each one means.
+EV_ON_DISK = "on-disk" # a known sample's fingerprint matched a file
+EV_PERSISTENCE = "persistence" # named in an auto-start registration
+EV_CONTACTED = "contacted" # the device demonstrably talked to the host
+EV_ATTEMPTED = "attempted" # a lookup happened but a filter blocked it
+EV_CONFIGURED = "configured" # named in local config, NOT as a block
+EV_REFERENCED = "referenced" # the string appeared in saved content
+
+EVIDENCE_ORDER = [EV_ON_DISK, EV_PERSISTENCE, EV_CONTACTED, EV_ATTEMPTED,
+ EV_CONFIGURED, EV_REFERENCED]
+
+# Everything except `referenced` is a finding that needs a person to look at it.
+# This is deliberately a DENY-list of the one benign grade rather than an
+# allow-list of serious ones: a hit whose grade is missing or misspelled is then
+# treated as serious, never as harmless. The opposite default is how a known
+# sample on disk once came to be reported as "probably not a sign of compromise".
+BENIGN_EVIDENCE = {EV_REFERENCED}
+
+
+def is_serious(evidence: str) -> bool:
+ return evidence not in BENIGN_EVIDENCE
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Hit:
+ """A single indicator match. `indicator` is the IOC string that matched
+ (domain, IP or hash); the tier/confidence come from the IOC set so every
+ hit carries its own provenance, never a bare 'found something'."""
+
+ indicator: str
+ location: str
+ detail: str
+ tier: str = ""
+ confidence: str = ""
+ # Which published report this indicator came from. The file now carries more
+ # than one source, so the citation has to travel with the hit.
+ source: str = ""
+ # How strong this hit is as evidence. The single most important field for
+ # anyone triaging a result, because the artifact decides the meaning:
+ #
+ # on-disk - a file on this machine has the fingerprint of a published
+ # sample. Conclusive.
+ # persistence- the name appears in an auto-start/COM registration. Serious.
+ # contacted - the browser or OS demonstrably talked to this host. A cookie
+ # it set, an HSTS header it sent, a connection record, a DNS
+ # resolution. Serious.
+ # attempted - something on the device looked the name up, but a DNS filter
+ # answered with a block address, so no connection was made.
+ # configured - the name appears in local configuration (e.g. the hosts
+ # file) pointing somewhere REAL. A block entry (0.0.0.0) is
+ # protective and is not reported as a hit at all.
+ # referenced - the string appeared in cached page content or history text.
+ # That is often just a page ABOUT the indicator - a news
+ # article, a report, a blocklist. Usually NOT contact.
+ #
+ # Collapsing these would be the tool's most harmful bug in either direction:
+ # over-grading sends people who merely read about this campaign to a
+ # human-rights helpline; under-grading tells a real victim it is nothing.
+ # Use the EV_* constants. An empty or unknown grade is treated as SERIOUS.
+ evidence: str = ""
+ # When the artifact says the contact happened, if it records that at all.
+ observed: str = ""
+
+ # Which browser profile / account this came from, by its DISPLAY name (e.g.
+ # "Bubbles"), not just the folder name ("Profile 1"). On a machine with
+ # several profiles the folder number tells the reader nothing, and whoever
+ # triages a finding needs to know whose browser it was.
+ #
+ # The signed-in email address is deliberately NOT collected: the display
+ # name already answers "which account", and reports get forwarded.
+ profile: str = ""
+
+ @property
+ def is_contact(self) -> bool:
+ return self.evidence == EV_CONTACTED
+
+ @property
+ def is_serious(self) -> bool:
+ return is_serious(self.evidence)
+
+ def to_dict(self) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+ return dataclasses.asdict(self)
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Check:
+ """One named sub-check inside a module (e.g. 'dns-cache'). `ran` records
+ whether it actually executed; `reason` explains why it did not. This is how
+ D3 (CLEAN != UNKNOWN) is enforced at the finest granularity."""
+
+ name: str
+ ran: bool
+ reason: str = ""
+
+ def to_dict(self) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+ return dataclasses.asdict(self)
+
+
+@dataclass
+class ModuleResult:
+ name: str
+ checked: int = 0
+ skipped: int = 0
+ hits: List[Hit] = field(default_factory=list)
+ checks: List[Check] = field(default_factory=list)
+ notes: List[str] = field(default_factory=list)
+ submetrics: Dict[str, int] = field(default_factory=dict)
+ # Wall-clock seconds this module took. Shown to the user because a scan that
+ # prints nothing for ten minutes looks hung, and because it tells anyone
+ # tuning the tool where the time actually goes.
+ duration_s: float = 0.0
+ # How far back in time this module's evidence actually reaches. A clean result
+ # is only as meaningful as the window it covers: browser caches are recycled
+ # within weeks, and the DNS log does not exist unless somebody turned it on.
+ # Each entry is {label: {"earliest": ISO date or None, "basis": str,
+ # "note": str}}. Reported to the user verbatim, because "we found nothing"
+ # and "we could only look back 11 weeks" are the same sentence.
+ reach: Dict[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
+
+ # --- builder helpers used by modules ------------------------------------
+
+ def add_hit(self, hit: Hit) -> None:
+ self.hits.append(hit)
+
+ def ran(self, name: str) -> None:
+ self.checks.append(Check(name, True))
+
+ def could_not_run(self, name: str, reason: str) -> None:
+ self.checks.append(Check(name, False, reason))
+ self.notes.append("{}: could not run ({})".format(name, reason))
+
+ def note(self, text: str) -> None:
+ self.notes.append(text)
+
+ # --- status rollup ------------------------------------------------------
+
+ @property
+ def status(self) -> str:
+ if self.hits:
+ return HITS
+ if not self.checks:
+ return UNKNOWN
+ ran = [c for c in self.checks if c.ran]
+ if not ran:
+ return UNKNOWN
+ if len(ran) == len(self.checks):
+ return CLEAN
+ return PARTIAL
+
+ def to_dict(self) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+ return {
+ "name": self.name,
+ "status": self.status,
+ "checked": self.checked,
+ "skipped": self.skipped,
+ "hits": [h.to_dict() for h in self.hits],
+ "checks": [c.to_dict() for c in self.checks],
+ "notes": list(self.notes),
+ "submetrics": dict(self.submetrics),
+ "reach": dict(self.reach),
+ "duration_s": round(self.duration_s, 1),
+ }
diff --git a/scan/run-scan.cmd b/scan/run-scan.cmd
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9a9687b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scan/run-scan.cmd
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+@echo off
+setlocal enabledelayedexpansion
+
+rem Launcher behind the desktop shortcut. Runs the default read-only scan only:
+rem no --arm, no --deep, nothing that writes to the system. The window is kept
+rem open at the end, because a report that flashes past and closes is no report.
+
+title adint-scan - spyware indicator check
+
+rem Run from this script's own folder, so the default IOC path resolves.
+cd /d "%~dp0"
+
+rem Find Python: the PATH first, then the py launcher.
+set "PY="
+where python >nul 2>&1
+if %errorlevel%==0 set "PY=python"
+if not defined PY (
+ where py >nul 2>&1
+ if !errorlevel!==0 set "PY=py"
+)
+if not defined PY (
+ echo.
+ echo Python was not found on this PC.
+ echo.
+ echo Install Python from https://www.python.org/downloads/ and tick
+ echo "Add python.exe to PATH" in the installer, then run this again.
+ echo.
+ pause
+ exit /b 1
+)
+
+rem Timestamp for the saved report, via Python so the format is not locale-dependent.
+set "STAMP="
+for /f "delims=" %%T in ('%PY% -c "import datetime;print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime('%%Y%%m%%d-%%H%%M%%S'))"') do set "STAMP=%%T"
+if not defined STAMP set "STAMP=latest"
+
+rem Resolve ..\findings to a real absolute path, so the "Saved:" lines printed at
+rem the end read as a path someone can actually copy, not one containing "..".
+for %%I in ("%~dp0..\findings") do set "OUTDIR=%%~fI"
+if not exist "%OUTDIR%" mkdir "%OUTDIR%"
+set "TXT=%OUTDIR%\scan-%STAMP%.txt"
+set "JSON=%OUTDIR%\scan-%STAMP%.json"
+
+cls
+echo ========================================================================
+echo adint-scan - checking this PC for published spyware indicators
+echo ========================================================================
+echo.
+echo This only READS your files. It changes nothing, needs no administrator,
+echo and never contacts anything over the internet.
+echo.
+echo It takes a while - it fingerprints tens of thousands of files. Progress
+echo appears below as it goes. You can close this window at any time without
+echo any harm, since nothing is being modified.
+echo.
+echo ========================================================================
+echo.
+
+rem Human report to a file (shown below when done); progress streams to screen.
+%PY% -X utf8 adint-scan.py --json "%JSON%" > "%TXT%"
+set "RC=%errorlevel%"
+
+echo.
+type "%TXT%"
+echo.
+echo ========================================================================
+if "%RC%"=="2" (
+ echo RESULT: something matched. Read the report above - a match means
+ echo INVESTIGATE, not "you are infected". The referral links above are
+ echo the right next step.
+) else if "%RC%"=="0" (
+ echo RESULT: no known indicators found. Read the closing line above -
+ echo it is not a clean bill of health.
+) else (
+ echo The scan could not run properly. The report above says why.
+)
+echo.
+echo Saved: %TXT%
+echo %JSON%
+echo ========================================================================
+echo.
+pause
+endlocal
diff --git a/scan/tests/test_arm_undo.py b/scan/tests/test_arm_undo.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e2d8095
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scan/tests/test_arm_undo.py
@@ -0,0 +1,386 @@
+"""Tier 5 — verify `--undo` restores every change `--arm` made.
+
+SPEC-scanner.md, testing requirements: "Verify --undo restores every change
+--arm made." Doctrine under test:
+
+ D5 Read-only by default. `--arm` with no step selected is a DRY RUN: it
+ states exactly what WOULD change, whether administrator is needed, and
+ how to undo it, and it changes nothing at all.
+ D3 Every change is journalled with its PRIOR value, so undo restores the
+ previous state instead of guessing a default. A missing baseline is not
+ invented; it is reported as "run --arm --baseline first".
+
+SAFETY — this test suite must not change the real machine.
+ * `enable_dns_log(..., apply=True)` and `register_rescan(..., apply=True)` are
+ NEVER called: they need administrator / create a real Scheduled Task. Only
+ the dry-run paths of those two steps are exercised.
+ * The one step applied for real is the baseline, and only after
+ `LOCALAPPDATA` has been redirected to a temp dir, so every file written
+ lands under that temp dir. `arm.state_dir()` reads the variable at call
+ time (asserted below), so patching os.environ is sufficient and no module
+ attribute caches the path.
+ * The dry-run tests additionally replace `arm._run` with a tripwire that
+ fails the test if anything shells out, so a dry run provably cannot touch
+ wevtutil or schtasks.
+ * The real `collect_inventory()` shells out to schtasks, so it runs in exactly
+ one test (a shape check); the round-trip tests use a fixed stub.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import contextlib
+import io
+import json
+import os
+import shutil
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+
+sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))))
+
+from adint_scan import arm # noqa: E402
+
+_SENTINEL = object()
+
+
+def stub_inventory(tag="one"):
+ return {
+ "taken_at": "2025-01-01T00:00:0" + ("0" if tag == "one" else "1"),
+ "host": "test-host",
+ "counts": {"com": 1, "run": 1, "task": 1},
+ "entries": [
+ {"kind": "com", "id": "CLSID/{test}[InprocServer32]",
+ "target": r"C:\fake\benign.dll", "sha256": "ab" * 32},
+ {"kind": "run", "id": "HKCU\\...\\Run::thing",
+ "target": r"C:\fake\thing.exe", "sha256": None},
+ {"kind": "task", "id": "\\test\\task", "target": None,
+ "sha256": None},
+ ],
+ }
+
+
+class ArmSandbox(unittest.TestCase):
+ """Redirects the tool's state dir into a temp dir for every test."""
+
+ def setUp(self):
+ self.tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="adint_arm_")
+ self._saved_local = os.environ.get("LOCALAPPDATA", _SENTINEL)
+ os.environ["LOCALAPPDATA"] = self.tmp
+ # Prove the redirection actually took effect before anything is run:
+ # if state_dir() were resolved at import time this would fail loudly
+ # instead of writing to the user's real AppData.
+ self.assertTrue(
+ os.path.abspath(arm.state_dir()).startswith(os.path.abspath(self.tmp)),
+ "arm.state_dir() must honour LOCALAPPDATA at call time; refusing to "
+ "run a test that would write to the real machine")
+ self.state_path = arm._state_path()
+ self.baseline_path = arm._baseline_path()
+
+ def tearDown(self):
+ if self._saved_local is _SENTINEL:
+ os.environ.pop("LOCALAPPDATA", None)
+ else:
+ os.environ["LOCALAPPDATA"] = self._saved_local
+ shutil.rmtree(self.tmp, ignore_errors=True)
+
+ # --- helpers -----------------------------------------------------------
+
+ @contextlib.contextmanager
+ def no_subprocess(self):
+ """Any shell-out during the block fails the test."""
+ def tripwire(*a, **k):
+ self.fail("a dry run must not shell out; got {!r}".format(a))
+ saved_run, saved_ps = arm._run, arm._ps
+ arm._run, arm._ps = tripwire, tripwire
+ try:
+ yield
+ finally:
+ arm._run, arm._ps = saved_run, saved_ps
+
+ @contextlib.contextmanager
+ def stubbed_inventory(self, tag="one"):
+ saved = arm.collect_inventory
+ arm.collect_inventory = lambda: stub_inventory(tag)
+ try:
+ yield
+ finally:
+ arm.collect_inventory = saved
+
+ def undo(self):
+ """Run _do_undo() with its printing captured; returns (rc, output)."""
+ buf = io.StringIO()
+ with contextlib.redirect_stdout(buf):
+ rc = arm._do_undo()
+ return rc, buf.getvalue()
+
+ def files_under_state_dir(self):
+ d = arm.state_dir()
+ if not os.path.isdir(d):
+ return []
+ return sorted(os.listdir(d))
+
+
+class TestStateDirRedirection(ArmSandbox):
+ def test_state_dir_is_read_from_the_environment_at_call_time(self):
+ self.assertEqual(os.path.dirname(arm.state_dir()),
+ os.path.abspath(self.tmp))
+ self.assertTrue(arm.state_dir().endswith(arm.STATE_DIRNAME))
+ other = os.path.join(self.tmp, "second")
+ os.environ["LOCALAPPDATA"] = other
+ self.assertEqual(arm.state_dir(),
+ os.path.join(other, arm.STATE_DIRNAME))
+ os.environ["LOCALAPPDATA"] = self.tmp
+
+ def test_sandbox_starts_with_no_state(self):
+ self.assertEqual(self.files_under_state_dir(), [])
+ self.assertEqual(arm._load_state(), {"actions": []})
+
+
+class TestDryRunChangesNothing(ArmSandbox):
+ """D5: `--arm` without an explicit step must change nothing, and must say
+ what it would change, whether admin is needed, and how to undo it."""
+
+ def setUp(self):
+ super().setUp()
+ self.state = {"actions": []}
+ # dns_log_state() only *reads* config via wevtutil, but stubbing it
+ # keeps the message contract deterministic on any Windows build and
+ # lets the no-subprocess tripwire stay armed.
+ self._saved_dns_state = arm.dns_log_state
+ arm.dns_log_state = lambda: {"present": True, "enabled": False,
+ "maxsize": 1052672}
+
+ def tearDown(self):
+ arm.dns_log_state = self._saved_dns_state
+ super().tearDown()
+
+ def _assert_dry_run_contract(self, msgs, label):
+ text = "\n".join(msgs).lower()
+ self.assertIn("will change", text,
+ "{}: a dry run must state what WOULD change".format(label))
+ self.assertIn("administrator", text,
+ "{}: a dry run must say whether admin is needed"
+ .format(label))
+ self.assertIn("undo", text,
+ "{}: a dry run must say how to undo it".format(label))
+
+ def _assert_nothing_happened(self):
+ self.assertEqual(self.state.get("actions", []), [],
+ "a dry run must journal no action")
+ self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(self.state_path),
+ "a dry run must not write the state/journal file")
+ self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(self.baseline_path),
+ "a dry run must not write a baseline")
+ self.assertEqual(self.files_under_state_dir(), [],
+ "a dry run must create no files at all")
+
+ def test_dns_log_dry_run(self):
+ with self.no_subprocess():
+ msgs = arm.enable_dns_log(self.state, apply=False)
+ self._assert_dry_run_contract(msgs, "dns-log")
+ self.assertIn("yes", "\n".join(msgs).lower().split(
+ "needs administrator:")[1][:8],
+ "dns-log must say administrator is required")
+ self.assertIn(arm.DNS_LOG, "\n".join(msgs))
+ self._assert_nothing_happened()
+
+ def test_baseline_dry_run(self):
+ with self.no_subprocess():
+ msgs = arm.write_baseline(self.state, apply=False)
+ self._assert_dry_run_contract(msgs, "baseline")
+ joined = "\n".join(msgs)
+ self.assertIn(self.baseline_path, joined,
+ "the dry run must name the exact file it would write")
+ self.assertIn("needs administrator: NO", joined)
+ self._assert_nothing_happened()
+
+ def test_rescan_dry_run(self):
+ with self.no_subprocess():
+ msgs = arm.register_rescan(self.state, apply=False)
+ self._assert_dry_run_contract(msgs, "rescan")
+ joined = "\n".join(msgs)
+ self.assertIn(arm.RESCAN_TASK_NAME, joined,
+ "the dry run must name the task it would create")
+ self._assert_nothing_happened()
+
+ def test_all_three_dry_runs_together_still_change_nothing(self):
+ with self.no_subprocess():
+ arm.enable_dns_log(self.state, apply=False)
+ arm.write_baseline(self.state, apply=False)
+ arm.register_rescan(self.state, apply=False)
+ self._assert_nothing_happened()
+
+
+class TestBaselineRoundTrip(ArmSandbox):
+ def test_apply_then_undo_removes_the_file_and_empties_the_journal(self):
+ state = {"actions": []}
+ with self.stubbed_inventory():
+ msgs = arm.write_baseline(state, apply=True)
+ self.assertIn("DONE", "\n".join(msgs))
+ self.assertTrue(os.path.exists(self.baseline_path))
+
+ # Exactly one journalled action, carrying the prior value (none).
+ self.assertEqual(len(state["actions"]), 1)
+ action = state["actions"][0]
+ self.assertEqual(action["action"], "baseline")
+ self.assertIsNone(action["prior_contents"],
+ "there was no previous baseline, so the prior value "
+ "must be recorded as None")
+ self.assertEqual(action["path"], self.baseline_path)
+ self.assertIn("at", action, "every action must be timestamped")
+ self.assertEqual(arm._load_state()["actions"], state["actions"],
+ "the journal must be persisted, or undo cannot work")
+
+ # baseline_diff against the same inventory reports no change.
+ with self.stubbed_inventory():
+ diff = "\n".join(arm.baseline_diff())
+ self.assertIn("no change in the persistence set", diff)
+ self.assertNotIn("APPEARED", diff)
+
+ rc, out = self.undo()
+ self.assertEqual(rc, 0)
+ self.assertIn("deleted", out)
+ self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(self.baseline_path),
+ "--undo must remove the baseline it created")
+ self.assertEqual(arm._load_state()["actions"], [],
+ "a reversed action must leave the journal empty")
+
+ def test_baseline_diff_reports_what_appeared(self):
+ state = {"actions": []}
+ with self.stubbed_inventory("one"):
+ arm.write_baseline(state, apply=True)
+
+ def grown():
+ inv = stub_inventory("two")
+ inv["entries"].append({"kind": "com", "id": "CLSID/{new}[Inproc]",
+ "target": r"C:\fake\new.dll",
+ "sha256": "cd" * 32})
+ return inv
+
+ saved = arm.collect_inventory
+ arm.collect_inventory = grown
+ try:
+ diff = "\n".join(arm.baseline_diff())
+ finally:
+ arm.collect_inventory = saved
+ self.assertIn("APPEARED", diff)
+ self.assertIn("CLSID/{new}[Inproc]", diff)
+
+ def test_undo_restores_the_previous_baseline_rather_than_deleting_it(self):
+ # Two armed sessions. Each caller passes its own freshly-loaded journal;
+ # here the second session's journal holds only its own action, which is
+ # the case that must RESTORE the prior file instead of removing it.
+ with self.stubbed_inventory("one"):
+ arm.write_baseline({"actions": []}, apply=True)
+ with open(self.baseline_path, encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+ first = fh.read()
+
+ with self.stubbed_inventory("two"):
+ second_state = {"actions": []}
+ arm.write_baseline(second_state, apply=True)
+ with open(self.baseline_path, encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+ second = fh.read()
+ self.assertNotEqual(first, second, "the two baselines must differ, or "
+ "the restore proves nothing")
+ self.assertEqual(second_state["actions"][0]["prior_contents"], first,
+ "the journal must record the PRIOR contents")
+
+ rc, out = self.undo()
+ self.assertEqual(rc, 0)
+ self.assertIn("previous baseline restored", out)
+ self.assertTrue(os.path.exists(self.baseline_path),
+ "undo of an overwrite must restore, not delete")
+ with open(self.baseline_path, encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+ self.assertEqual(fh.read(), first,
+ "undo must restore the FIRST baseline byte for "
+ "byte, not just delete the file")
+ self.assertEqual(json.loads(first)["taken_at"],
+ stub_inventory("one")["taken_at"])
+
+ def test_undoing_every_journalled_action_returns_to_the_pristine_state(self):
+ # Both writes journalled in one session: reversing EVERY recorded action
+ # (newest first) restores the file to the first baseline and then
+ # removes it, because before --arm ran there was no baseline at all.
+ state = {"actions": []}
+ with self.stubbed_inventory("one"):
+ arm.write_baseline(state, apply=True)
+ with self.stubbed_inventory("two"):
+ arm.write_baseline(state, apply=True)
+ self.assertEqual(len(state["actions"]), 2)
+
+ rc, out = self.undo()
+ self.assertEqual(rc, 0)
+ self.assertIn("previous baseline restored", out)
+ self.assertIn("deleted", out)
+ self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(self.baseline_path),
+ "undoing every change must leave the machine as it was "
+ "before --arm ran: no baseline file")
+ self.assertEqual(arm._load_state()["actions"], [])
+
+
+class TestUndoEdgeCases(ArmSandbox):
+ def test_undo_with_an_empty_journal_is_a_no_op(self):
+ rc, out = self.undo()
+ self.assertEqual(rc, 0)
+ self.assertIn("Nothing to undo", out)
+ self.assertEqual(self.files_under_state_dir(), [],
+ "a no-op undo must not create state of its own")
+
+ def test_undo_leaves_an_unknown_action_alone_and_reports_it(self):
+ arm._save_state({"actions": [{"action": "something-new-and-unknown"}]})
+ rc, out = self.undo()
+ self.assertEqual(rc, 1, "an action that could not be reversed must not "
+ "be reported as success")
+ self.assertIn("unknown action", out)
+ self.assertEqual(len(arm._load_state()["actions"]), 1,
+ "an unreversed action must stay journalled")
+
+ def test_baseline_diff_without_a_baseline_does_not_invent_a_result(self):
+ def tripwire():
+ self.fail("baseline_diff must not collect an inventory when there "
+ "is no baseline to compare it against")
+ saved = arm.collect_inventory
+ arm.collect_inventory = tripwire
+ try:
+ msgs = arm.baseline_diff()
+ finally:
+ arm.collect_inventory = saved
+ text = "\n".join(msgs)
+ self.assertIn("no baseline recorded yet", text)
+ self.assertIn("--arm --baseline", text,
+ "the user must be told the exact command to run")
+ self.assertNotIn("no change", text,
+ "absence of a baseline must never be reported as 'no "
+ "change' — that would be an inferred result (D3)")
+ self.assertNotIn("APPEARED", text)
+
+
+class TestRealInventoryShape(ArmSandbox):
+ """The only test that runs the real collector (it shells out to schtasks,
+ so it runs exactly once). Read-only: it enumerates registry keys and tasks
+ and hashes files, and changes nothing."""
+
+ def test_collect_inventory_returns_the_documented_shape(self):
+ inv = arm.collect_inventory()
+ self.assertEqual(sorted(inv), ["counts", "entries", "host", "taken_at"])
+ self.assertIsInstance(inv["taken_at"], str)
+ self.assertIsInstance(inv["host"], str)
+ self.assertEqual(sorted(inv["counts"]), ["com", "run", "task"])
+ for key in ("com", "run", "task"):
+ self.assertIsInstance(inv["counts"][key], int)
+ self.assertIsInstance(inv["entries"], list)
+ for e in inv["entries"]:
+ self.assertIn(e["kind"], ("com", "run", "task"))
+ self.assertIn("id", e)
+ self.assertIn("target", e)
+ self.assertIn("sha256", e)
+ self.assertEqual(
+ sum(inv["counts"].values()), len(inv["entries"]),
+ "the counts must describe the entries actually collected")
+ # Collecting an inventory is read-only: nothing is written anywhere.
+ self.assertEqual(self.files_under_state_dir(), [])
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+ unittest.main(verbosity=2)
diff --git a/scan/tests/test_browser_launch.py b/scan/tests/test_browser_launch.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8bc8fd3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scan/tests/test_browser_launch.py
@@ -0,0 +1,301 @@
+"""A locked browser database is a GAP, not a clean result.
+
+This is the pre-launch bug these tests were written for. The old browser module
+called `r.ran(...)` the instant a browser folder existed and then only bumped
+`r.skipped` when a database was locked. The verdict is built from `r.checks`, so
+a browser whose databases were ALL locked - the normal state of a browser that
+is currently open - rolled up to CLEAN with no gap. For a journalist who happens
+to have Chrome running, that is the tool saying "nothing found" having been
+unable to look: exactly the false "all clear" the whole project exists to avoid.
+
+The fix tracks, per (browser, artifact kind), whether any profile could actually
+be read, and turns that into a check that ran (clean) or a check that
+could_not_run (a gap the verdict surfaces). These tests pin that behaviour:
+
+ - all artifacts locked -> UNKNOWN, never CLEAN, with gaps
+ - one kind readable, one locked -> PARTIAL, naming the locked kind
+ - absent artifacts -> NOT gaps (nothing to look at is not a gap)
+ - one profile OK, one locked -> the kind ran; the lock is a note, not a gap
+ - the temp copy is always cleaned up, including when the copy itself fails
+ - the new Firefox favicons / HSTS artifacts are found and graded contacted
+
+Hermetic: reserved-TLD indicator, every path inside a temp dir, the browser
+module's import-time path globals monkeypatched directly (patching os.environ
+would be too late). A lock is simulated by making `browser.copy_locked` raise
+PermissionError, the same OSError the real lock path raises - no real browser is
+needed and nothing on the real machine is touched.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import glob
+import os
+import shutil
+import sqlite3
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+
+sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))))
+
+from adint_scan import iocs as iocmod # noqa: E402
+from adint_scan import report # noqa: E402
+from adint_scan.context import ScanContext # noqa: E402
+from adint_scan.modules import browser # noqa: E402
+from adint_scan.result import CLEAN, HITS, PARTIAL, UNKNOWN # noqa: E402
+
+TEST_DOMAIN = "synthetic-test-indicator.invalid"
+
+
+def chromium_cookie_db(path, host="." + TEST_DOMAIN):
+ """A minimal but real Chromium-shaped Cookies database."""
+ os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(path), exist_ok=True)
+ con = sqlite3.connect(path)
+ con.execute("CREATE TABLE cookies (host_key TEXT, name TEXT, "
+ "creation_utc INTEGER)")
+ con.execute("INSERT INTO cookies VALUES (?, 'sid', 13300000000000000)",
+ (host,))
+ con.commit()
+ con.close()
+
+
+def chromium_history_db(path, url="https://example.org/ordinary-page"):
+ os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(path), exist_ok=True)
+ con = sqlite3.connect(path)
+ con.execute("CREATE TABLE urls (url TEXT, title TEXT)")
+ con.execute("INSERT INTO urls VALUES (?, 'a page')", (url,))
+ con.commit()
+ con.close()
+
+
+class BrowserLaunchBase(unittest.TestCase):
+ def setUp(self):
+ self.tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="blaunch_")
+ self.empty = os.path.join(self.tmp, "empty")
+ os.makedirs(self.empty)
+ ioc_path = os.path.join(self.tmp, "iocs.txt")
+ with open(ioc_path, "w", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n") as fh:
+ fh.write("{}\tdelivery\tprimary\ttest-source\n".format(TEST_DOMAIN))
+ self.ctx = ScanContext(iocs=iocmod.load(ioc_path), emit=lambda _m: None)
+ self._saved = (browser.CHROMIUM_ROOTS, browser.ROAMING, browser.LOCAL,
+ browser.copy_locked)
+
+ def tearDown(self):
+ (browser.CHROMIUM_ROOTS, browser.ROAMING, browser.LOCAL,
+ browser.copy_locked) = self._saved
+ shutil.rmtree(self.tmp, ignore_errors=True)
+
+ def run_chromium(self, root):
+ browser.CHROMIUM_ROOTS = [("test", root)]
+ browser.ROAMING = self.empty
+ browser.LOCAL = self.empty
+ return browser.run(self.ctx)
+
+ def lock(self, predicate):
+ """Make copy_locked raise PermissionError for paths matching predicate,
+ exactly as the real locked-database path does, and copy normally for the
+ rest."""
+ real = self._saved[3]
+
+ def faux(path):
+ if predicate(path):
+ raise PermissionError(13, "database is locked")
+ return real(path)
+
+ browser.copy_locked = faux
+
+
+class TestAllLockedIsAGapNotClean(BrowserLaunchBase):
+ def test_every_database_locked_rolls_up_to_unknown_with_gaps(self):
+ prof = os.path.join(self.tmp, "User Data", "Default")
+ chromium_history_db(os.path.join(prof, "History"))
+ chromium_cookie_db(os.path.join(prof, "Network", "Cookies"))
+ self.lock(lambda p: True) # nothing can be snapshotted
+
+ r = self.run_chromium(os.path.join(self.tmp, "User Data"))
+
+ self.assertEqual(r.hits, [], "a locked db must not somehow produce a hit")
+ self.assertEqual(r.status, UNKNOWN,
+ "a browser whose every database was locked observed "
+ "nothing; that is UNKNOWN, never CLEAN")
+ self.assertNotEqual(r.status, CLEAN)
+ self.assertTrue(any(not c.ran for c in r.checks),
+ "the locked databases must be recorded as checks that "
+ "could NOT run")
+ # And the gap must reach the verdict, which is what the user reads.
+ import datetime
+ doc = report.build_document(self.ctx.iocs, [r], datetime.datetime.now())
+ self.assertTrue(doc["verdict"]["gaps"],
+ "the locked-database gap must surface in the verdict - "
+ "this is the bug: it used to roll up to a clean result")
+
+
+class TestPartialWhenSomeLocked(BrowserLaunchBase):
+ def test_readable_history_and_locked_cookies_is_partial(self):
+ prof = os.path.join(self.tmp, "User Data", "Default")
+ chromium_history_db(os.path.join(prof, "History"))
+ chromium_cookie_db(os.path.join(prof, "Network", "Cookies"))
+ self.lock(lambda p: "Cookies" in p)
+
+ r = self.run_chromium(os.path.join(self.tmp, "User Data"))
+
+ self.assertEqual(r.hits, [])
+ self.assertEqual(r.status, PARTIAL,
+ "one kind ran clean and one could not run: PARTIAL")
+ ran = {c.name for c in r.checks if c.ran}
+ gaps = {c.name for c in r.checks if not c.ran}
+ self.assertIn("test:history", ran)
+ self.assertIn("test:cookies", gaps,
+ "the locked cookie store is the gap")
+ self.assertTrue(any("locked" in c.reason.lower()
+ for c in r.checks if not c.ran),
+ "the gap must carry a reason the user can act on")
+
+
+class TestAbsentArtifactsAreNotGaps(BrowserLaunchBase):
+ def test_a_browser_with_only_a_readable_history_has_no_gaps(self):
+ prof = os.path.join(self.tmp, "User Data", "Default")
+ chromium_history_db(os.path.join(prof, "History"))
+
+ r = self.run_chromium(os.path.join(self.tmp, "User Data"))
+
+ self.assertEqual(r.hits, [])
+ self.assertEqual(r.status, CLEAN,
+ "nothing was locked and the one present artifact was "
+ "read; an absent cookie store is not a gap")
+ self.assertTrue(all(c.ran for c in r.checks))
+ self.assertIn("test:history", [c.name for c in r.checks])
+ self.assertNotIn("test:cookies", [c.name for c in r.checks],
+ "a cookie store the browser never created must not be "
+ "reported as a check at all")
+
+
+class TestOneProfileSucceedsRollsUpToRan(BrowserLaunchBase):
+ def test_kind_read_in_one_profile_is_not_a_gap_because_another_was_locked(self):
+ ud = os.path.join(self.tmp, "User Data")
+ chromium_cookie_db(os.path.join(ud, "Default", "Network", "Cookies"),
+ host="." + TEST_DOMAIN)
+ chromium_cookie_db(os.path.join(ud, "Profile 1", "Network", "Cookies"),
+ host=".example.net")
+ # The second profile's cookie store is locked; the first reads fine.
+ self.lock(lambda p: "Profile 1" in p)
+
+ r = self.run_chromium(ud)
+
+ # The cookies kind was read in at least one profile, so it is a check
+ # that ran - not a gap - even though another profile was locked.
+ self.assertTrue(any(c.name == "test:cookies" and c.ran for c in r.checks))
+ self.assertFalse(any(c.name == "test:cookies" and not c.ran
+ for c in r.checks))
+ # The lock is still visible: it is counted and noted, just not promoted
+ # to a whole-kind gap.
+ self.assertGreaterEqual(r.skipped, 1)
+ self.assertTrue(any("locked" in n.lower() for n in r.notes))
+ # The readable profile's indicator cookie is still found.
+ self.assertEqual(r.status, HITS)
+ self.assertTrue(any(h.indicator == TEST_DOMAIN and h.evidence == "contacted"
+ for h in r.hits))
+
+
+class TestTempCopyIsAlwaysCleanedUp(BrowserLaunchBase):
+ def _bscan_dirs(self):
+ return set(glob.glob(os.path.join(tempfile.gettempdir(), "bscan_*")))
+
+ def test_copy_locked_cleans_its_temp_dir_when_the_copy_fails(self):
+ # Point copy_locked at a path that exists but cannot be copied (a
+ # directory where a file is expected). It must raise, and it must not
+ # leave its own temp dir behind.
+ not_a_file = os.path.join(self.tmp, "a-directory")
+ os.makedirs(not_a_file)
+ before = self._bscan_dirs()
+ with self.assertRaises(OSError):
+ self._saved[3](not_a_file) # the real copy_locked
+ after = self._bscan_dirs()
+ self.assertEqual(before, after,
+ "copy_locked leaked a temp dir on the failure path")
+
+ def test_run_leaves_no_temp_dir_behind_when_a_db_cannot_be_copied(self):
+ prof = os.path.join(self.tmp, "User Data", "Default")
+ # A real file, but copy_locked is forced to fail on it mid-copy.
+ chromium_cookie_db(os.path.join(prof, "Network", "Cookies"))
+ self.lock(lambda p: "Cookies" in p)
+ before = self._bscan_dirs()
+ self.run_chromium(os.path.join(self.tmp, "User Data"))
+ after = self._bscan_dirs()
+ self.assertEqual(before, after,
+ "a failed snapshot must not leave a temp dir behind")
+
+
+class FirefoxArtifactBase(unittest.TestCase):
+ def setUp(self):
+ self.tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="bff_")
+ self.roaming = os.path.join(self.tmp, "Roaming")
+ self.prof = os.path.join(self.roaming, "Mozilla", "Firefox", "Profiles",
+ "abc123.default-release")
+ os.makedirs(self.prof)
+ ioc_path = os.path.join(self.tmp, "iocs.txt")
+ with open(ioc_path, "w", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n") as fh:
+ fh.write("{}\tdelivery\tprimary\ttest-source\n".format(TEST_DOMAIN))
+ self.ctx = ScanContext(iocs=iocmod.load(ioc_path), emit=lambda _m: None)
+ self._saved = (browser.CHROMIUM_ROOTS, browser.ROAMING, browser.LOCAL)
+ browser.CHROMIUM_ROOTS = [] # no Chromium browsers at all
+ browser.ROAMING = self.roaming
+ browser.LOCAL = os.path.join(self.tmp, "Local") # no Firefox cache there
+ os.makedirs(browser.LOCAL)
+
+ def tearDown(self):
+ (browser.CHROMIUM_ROOTS, browser.ROAMING, browser.LOCAL) = self._saved
+ shutil.rmtree(self.tmp, ignore_errors=True)
+
+
+class TestFirefoxFavicons(FirefoxArtifactBase):
+ def test_favicon_for_an_indicator_is_contacted(self):
+ con = sqlite3.connect(os.path.join(self.prof, "favicons.sqlite"))
+ con.execute("CREATE TABLE moz_icons (id INTEGER, icon_url TEXT)")
+ con.execute("INSERT INTO moz_icons VALUES (1, ?)",
+ ("https://" + TEST_DOMAIN + "/favicon.ico",))
+ con.execute("INSERT INTO moz_icons VALUES (2, 'https://unrelated.example/f.ico')")
+ con.commit()
+ con.close()
+
+ r = browser.run(self.ctx)
+
+ fav = [h for h in r.hits if h.detail.startswith("favicon")]
+ self.assertEqual(len(fav), 1, "the indicator favicon must be found once")
+ self.assertEqual(fav[0].indicator, TEST_DOMAIN)
+ self.assertEqual(fav[0].evidence, "contacted",
+ "a stored favicon means the browser fetched it from "
+ "that host")
+ self.assertIn("firefox:favicons", [c.name for c in r.checks])
+
+
+class TestFirefoxHsts(FirefoxArtifactBase):
+ def test_hsts_entry_for_an_indicator_is_contacted(self):
+ # SiteSecurityServiceState.txt keeps hostnames in plaintext, one entry
+ # per line, keyed "<host>:HSTS". The value columns are irrelevant to us.
+ with open(os.path.join(self.prof, "SiteSecurityServiceState.txt"),
+ "w", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n") as fh:
+ fh.write("unrelated.example:HSTS\t0\t17\t18000,1,0\n")
+ fh.write("{}:HSTS\t0\t17\t18000,1,0\n".format(TEST_DOMAIN))
+
+ r = browser.run(self.ctx)
+
+ hits = [h for h in r.hits if h.evidence == "contacted"]
+ self.assertEqual(len(hits), 1, "the HSTS entry should be one contacted hit")
+ self.assertEqual(hits[0].indicator, TEST_DOMAIN)
+ self.assertIn("firefox:hsts", [c.name for c in r.checks])
+ # No other hostname from the file may reach the output.
+ self.assertNotIn("unrelated.example", repr(r.to_dict()))
+
+ def test_hsts_file_with_no_indicator_is_clean_not_a_hit(self):
+ with open(os.path.join(self.prof, "SiteSecurityServiceState.txt"),
+ "w", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n") as fh:
+ fh.write("unrelated.example:HSTS\t0\t17\t18000,1,0\n")
+ r = browser.run(self.ctx)
+ self.assertEqual(r.hits, [])
+ self.assertIn("firefox:hsts", [c.name for c in r.checks if c.ran])
+ self.assertEqual(r.status, CLEAN)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+ unittest.main(verbosity=2)
diff --git a/scan/tests/test_doctrine.py b/scan/tests/test_doctrine.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..34058cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scan/tests/test_doctrine.py
@@ -0,0 +1,369 @@
+"""D1 / D3 — the doctrine contract, asserted against the literal wording.
+
+SPEC-scanner.md, "The doctrine":
+
+ D1 Every run that finds nothing prints EXACTLY the mandatory closing line.
+ A reword is a doctrine regression, so the sentence is asserted here as a
+ literal, not by referring to report.D1_LINE alone.
+ D3 Measured, never inferred. A check that could not run is UNKNOWN, which is
+ a DISTINCT outcome from CLEAN, and a gap must be stated out loud in the
+ interface rather than rolled into a clean verdict.
+
+Also asserted here: a hit renders as "investigate" and never as a claim of
+compromise, and the IOC-freshness rule from "IOC freshness" (older than 30 days
+must be said prominently).
+
+Hermetic: nothing here touches the real machine. IOC sets are built in temp
+files or in memory; no module is run.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import datetime
+import os
+import shutil
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+
+sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))))
+
+from adint_scan import iocs as iocmod # noqa: E402
+from adint_scan import report # noqa: E402
+from adint_scan.result import (CLEAN, HITS, PARTIAL, UNKNOWN, # noqa: E402
+ Hit, ModuleResult)
+
+# The sentence D1 requires, written out by hand. If report.D1_LINE is ever
+# reworded this literal is what fails the suite.
+D1_LITERAL = ("No known indicators were found in the places that can be checked. "
+ "This is not a clean bill of health.")
+
+STARTED = datetime.datetime(2025, 1, 1, 12, 0, 0)
+
+
+def empty_iocset(path="<test>", mtime=None):
+ """An IocSet with no indicators; enough for build_document/render_human."""
+ return iocmod.IocSet([], path, mtime)
+
+
+def clean_module(name="browser", checks=("history", "cache")):
+ m = ModuleResult(name)
+ m.checked = 10
+ for c in checks:
+ m.ran(c)
+ return m
+
+
+class TestD1ClosingLine(unittest.TestCase):
+ def test_d1_line_constant_is_the_required_sentence(self):
+ self.assertEqual(report.D1_LINE, D1_LITERAL,
+ "D1: the mandatory closing line must not be reworded")
+
+ def test_d1_line_present_in_document_and_rendered_text_when_nothing_found(self):
+ doc = report.build_document(empty_iocset(), [clean_module()], STARTED)
+ self.assertEqual(doc["doctrine_line"], D1_LITERAL)
+ text = report.render_human(doc)
+ self.assertIn(D1_LITERAL, text,
+ "D1: the exact sentence must appear in the human report")
+
+ def test_d1_line_absent_when_there_is_a_hit(self):
+ m = ModuleResult("browser")
+ m.ran("history")
+ m.add_hit(Hit("fearevolve.com", r"C:\fake\History", "history: x",
+ tier="delivery", confidence="primary"))
+ doc = report.build_document(empty_iocset(), [m], STARTED)
+ self.assertIsNone(doc["doctrine_line"],
+ "D1 is the closing line for a run that found NOTHING")
+ text = report.render_human(doc)
+ self.assertNotIn(D1_LITERAL, text,
+ "the 'nothing was found' sentence must not be printed "
+ "alongside a match")
+
+ def test_d1_line_present_even_when_there_are_gaps(self):
+ gapped = ModuleResult("host")
+ gapped.ran("hosts-file")
+ gapped.could_not_run("dns-log", "log disabled")
+ doc = report.build_document(empty_iocset(), [clean_module(), gapped],
+ STARTED)
+ self.assertEqual(doc["doctrine_line"], D1_LITERAL)
+ self.assertIn(D1_LITERAL, report.render_human(doc))
+
+
+class TestD3StatusRollup(unittest.TestCase):
+ """CLEAN and UNKNOWN must stay distinct outcomes."""
+
+ def test_unknown_is_not_clean(self):
+ self.assertNotEqual(UNKNOWN, CLEAN,
+ "D3: UNKNOWN must be a distinct outcome from CLEAN")
+
+ def test_zero_checks_is_unknown(self):
+ m = ModuleResult("host")
+ self.assertEqual(m.status, UNKNOWN)
+ self.assertNotEqual(m.status, CLEAN,
+ "a module that observed nothing is not clean")
+
+ def test_all_checks_ran_is_clean(self):
+ m = ModuleResult("host")
+ m.ran("hosts-file")
+ m.ran("dns-cache")
+ self.assertEqual(m.status, CLEAN)
+
+ def test_mixed_ran_and_could_not_run_is_partial(self):
+ m = ModuleResult("host")
+ m.ran("hosts-file")
+ m.could_not_run("dns-log", "Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client/Operational "
+ "is disabled")
+ self.assertEqual(m.status, PARTIAL)
+ self.assertNotEqual(m.status, CLEAN)
+
+ def test_no_check_ran_is_unknown(self):
+ m = ModuleResult("host")
+ m.could_not_run("dns-log", "disabled")
+ m.could_not_run("com", "access denied")
+ self.assertEqual(m.status, UNKNOWN)
+
+ def test_any_hit_is_hits_even_with_gaps(self):
+ m = ModuleResult("browser")
+ m.ran("chromium:chrome")
+ m.could_not_run("firefox", "profile locked")
+ m.add_hit(Hit("fearevolve.com", "loc", "detail"))
+ self.assertEqual(m.status, HITS)
+
+ def test_could_not_run_is_recorded_as_a_visible_note(self):
+ m = ModuleResult("host")
+ m.could_not_run("dns-log", "disabled")
+ self.assertTrue(any("dns-log" in n and "could not run" in n
+ for n in m.notes),
+ "a gap must be surfaced, not silently swallowed")
+
+
+class TestVerdictRollup(unittest.TestCase):
+ def test_all_clean_is_v_none(self):
+ doc = report.build_document(
+ empty_iocset(), [clean_module("browser"), clean_module("hash")],
+ STARTED)
+ self.assertEqual(doc["verdict"]["status"], report.V_NONE)
+ self.assertEqual(doc["verdict"]["gaps"], [])
+ self.assertEqual(doc["verdict"]["hits_total"], 0)
+
+ def test_clean_plus_gap_is_v_none_with_gaps_and_names_the_gap(self):
+ gapped = ModuleResult("host")
+ gapped.ran("hosts-file")
+ gapped.could_not_run("dns-log", "log is disabled by default")
+ doc = report.build_document(empty_iocset(),
+ [clean_module("browser"), gapped], STARTED)
+ v = doc["verdict"]
+ self.assertEqual(v["status"], report.V_NONE_WITH_GAPS)
+ self.assertTrue(v["gaps"], "a gap must be reported in the verdict")
+ joined = " | ".join(v["gaps"])
+ self.assertIn("host", joined, "the gap must name the module")
+ self.assertIn("dns-log", joined, "the gap must name the check")
+ self.assertIn("log is disabled by default", joined,
+ "the gap must carry the reason")
+ text = report.render_human(doc)
+ self.assertIn("could NOT run", text)
+ self.assertIn("dns-log", text)
+
+ def test_any_hit_is_v_hits(self):
+ m = ModuleResult("hash")
+ m.ran("root:C:/fake")
+ m.add_hit(Hit("a" * 64, r"C:\fake\payload.dll", "known sample",
+ tier="sample", confidence="primary"))
+ doc = report.build_document(empty_iocset(),
+ [clean_module("browser"), m], STARTED)
+ self.assertEqual(doc["verdict"]["status"], report.V_HITS)
+ self.assertEqual(doc["verdict"]["hits_total"], 1)
+
+
+class TestHitRendersAsInvestigate(unittest.TestCase):
+ """A match means INVESTIGATE. The tool must never tell someone they are
+ compromised — an ad impression is not proof of infection."""
+
+ def setUp(self):
+ m = ModuleResult("browser")
+ m.ran("chromium:chrome")
+ m.add_hit(Hit("fearevolve.com", r"C:\fake\Default\History",
+ "history: http://fearevolve.com/x",
+ tier="delivery", confidence="primary"))
+ self.text = report.render_human(
+ report.build_document(empty_iocset(), [m], STARTED))
+
+ def test_says_investigate(self):
+ self.assertIn("investigate", self.text.lower())
+ self.assertIn("INVESTIGATE", self.text)
+
+ def test_never_claims_compromise(self):
+ low = self.text.lower()
+ # report.py deliberately prints the phrase as a NEGATION:
+ # "A match means INVESTIGATE, not 'you are compromised'."
+ # That wording is doctrine, so this test bans only AFFIRMATIVE claims.
+ for affirmative in ("this device is compromised",
+ "your machine is compromised",
+ "you have been infected",
+ "you are infected"):
+ self.assertNotIn(affirmative, low)
+ # Every occurrence of "compromised" must sit inside a negation: the word
+ # "not" has to appear within the 30 characters immediately before it.
+ start = 0
+ while True:
+ idx = low.find("compromised", start)
+ if idx < 0:
+ break
+ window = low[max(0, idx - 30):idx]
+ self.assertIn("not", window,
+ "'compromised' at offset {} is not negated: {!r}"
+ .format(idx, low[max(0, idx - 40):idx + 20]))
+ start = idx + 1
+ self.assertEqual(low.count("you are compromised"),
+ low.count("not 'you are compromised'"),
+ "the only permitted use of 'you are compromised' is "
+ "the explicit denial of it")
+
+ def test_carries_provenance_and_location(self):
+ self.assertIn("fearevolve.com", self.text)
+ self.assertIn("delivery/primary", self.text)
+ self.assertIn(r"C:\fake\Default\History", self.text)
+
+ def test_offers_the_referrals(self):
+ for url in ("accessnow.org", "securitylab.amnesty.org", "citizenlab.ca"):
+ self.assertIn(url, self.text,
+ "a hit must hand the user to people who do this "
+ "properly")
+
+ def test_clean_run_also_offers_the_referrals(self):
+ text = report.render_human(
+ report.build_document(empty_iocset(), [clean_module()], STARTED))
+ for url in ("accessnow.org", "securitylab.amnesty.org", "citizenlab.ca"):
+ self.assertIn(url, text)
+
+
+class TestIocFreshness(unittest.TestCase):
+ def setUp(self):
+ self.tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="iocfresh_")
+ self.path = os.path.join(self.tmp, "iocs.txt")
+ with open(self.path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+ fh.write("# test set\nfearevolve.com\tdelivery\tprimary\n")
+
+ def tearDown(self):
+ shutil.rmtree(self.tmp, ignore_errors=True)
+
+ def _age(self, days):
+ when = datetime.datetime.now() - datetime.timedelta(days=days)
+ ts = when.timestamp()
+ os.utime(self.path, (ts, ts))
+
+ def test_fresh_set_is_not_stale(self):
+ self._age(1)
+ s = iocmod.load(self.path)
+ self.assertFalse(s.is_stale())
+ self.assertLessEqual(s.age_days(), 2)
+ text = report.render_human(
+ report.build_document(s, [clean_module()], STARTED))
+ self.assertNotIn("more than 30 days old", text)
+
+ def test_set_older_than_30_days_is_stale_and_warned_about(self):
+ self._age(45)
+ s = iocmod.load(self.path)
+ self.assertTrue(s.is_stale(),
+ "IOC freshness: older than 30 days must be flagged")
+ self.assertGreaterEqual(s.age_days(), 44)
+ doc = report.build_document(s, [clean_module()], STARTED)
+ self.assertTrue(doc["ioc_set"]["stale"])
+ text = report.render_human(doc)
+ self.assertIn("WARNING", text)
+ self.assertIn("more than 30 days old", text)
+
+ def test_exactly_30_days_is_not_yet_stale(self):
+ # threshold is "older than 30 days"; 30 days exactly is the boundary.
+ self._age(30)
+ self.assertFalse(iocmod.load(self.path).is_stale())
+
+ def test_unknown_age_is_reported_as_unknown_not_as_fresh(self):
+ s = iocmod.IocSet([], "<memory>", None)
+ self.assertIsNone(s.age_days())
+ self.assertFalse(s.is_stale())
+ text = report.render_human(
+ report.build_document(s, [clean_module()], STARTED))
+ self.assertIn("unknown age", text)
+
+
+class TestIocLoaderRejectsMalformedData(unittest.TestCase):
+ def setUp(self):
+ self.tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="iocbad_")
+
+ def tearDown(self):
+ shutil.rmtree(self.tmp, ignore_errors=True)
+
+ def _write(self, body, name="iocs.txt"):
+ p = os.path.join(self.tmp, name)
+ with open(p, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+ fh.write(body)
+ return p
+
+ def test_two_column_line_is_rejected(self):
+ p = self._write("fearevolve.com\tdelivery\n")
+ with self.assertRaises(iocmod.IocError):
+ iocmod.load(p)
+
+ def test_unknown_tier_is_rejected(self):
+ p = self._write("fearevolve.com\tnot-a-tier\tprimary\n")
+ with self.assertRaises(iocmod.IocError):
+ iocmod.load(p)
+
+ def test_unknown_confidence_is_rejected(self):
+ p = self._write("fearevolve.com\tdelivery\tmaybe\n")
+ with self.assertRaises(iocmod.IocError):
+ iocmod.load(p)
+
+ def test_missing_file_is_rejected(self):
+ with self.assertRaises(iocmod.IocError):
+ iocmod.load(os.path.join(self.tmp, "nope.txt"))
+
+ def test_comments_and_blank_lines_are_ignored(self):
+ p = self._write("# header\n\nfearevolve.com\tdelivery\tprimary\n\n")
+ s = iocmod.load(p)
+ self.assertEqual(len(s), 1)
+
+ def test_valid_set_keeps_tier_and_confidence_provenance(self):
+ p = self._write("fearevolve.com\tcc\tsecondary\n")
+ ind = iocmod.load(p).lookup("fearevolve.com")
+ self.assertIsNotNone(ind)
+ self.assertEqual((ind.tier, ind.confidence), ("cc", "secondary"))
+
+
+class TestIocTypeInference(unittest.TestCase):
+ def setUp(self):
+ self.tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="ioctype_")
+ self.path = os.path.join(self.tmp, "iocs.txt")
+ with open(self.path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+ fh.write("{}\tsample\tprimary\n".format("ab12cd34" * 8))
+ fh.write("185.181.8.155\tcc\tprimary\n")
+ fh.write("fearevolve.com\tdelivery\tprimary\n")
+ self.set = iocmod.load(self.path)
+
+ def tearDown(self):
+ shutil.rmtree(self.tmp, ignore_errors=True)
+
+ def test_64_hex_is_sha256(self):
+ self.assertEqual(iocmod.infer_type("ab12cd34" * 8), iocmod.TYPE_SHA256)
+ self.assertEqual(self.set.lookup("ab12cd34" * 8).type,
+ iocmod.TYPE_SHA256)
+ self.assertEqual([i.value for i in self.set.hashes], ["ab12cd34" * 8])
+
+ def test_dotted_quad_is_ip(self):
+ self.assertEqual(iocmod.infer_type("185.181.8.155"), iocmod.TYPE_IP)
+ self.assertEqual([i.value for i in self.set.ips], ["185.181.8.155"])
+
+ def test_name_is_domain(self):
+ self.assertEqual(iocmod.infer_type("fearevolve.com"), iocmod.TYPE_DOMAIN)
+ self.assertEqual([i.value for i in self.set.domains], ["fearevolve.com"])
+
+ def test_network_strings_hold_domains_and_ips_but_no_hashes(self):
+ net = self.set.network_strings
+ self.assertIn("fearevolve.com", net)
+ self.assertIn("185.181.8.155", net)
+ self.assertNotIn("ab12cd34" * 8, net)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+ unittest.main(verbosity=2)
diff --git a/scan/tests/test_evidence.py b/scan/tests/test_evidence.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..595a92c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scan/tests/test_evidence.py
@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
+"""Evidence grading is the field that stops this tool doing harm.
+
+Collapsing "the browser connected to this host" and "this string appeared in a
+cached web page" would be the tool's most damaging bug. Anyone who reads a news
+article about AdFection, or who reads this project's own documentation, has those
+domain names sitting in their browser cache. If that reported identically to a
+real connection, the tool would send people who merely READ about the campaign to
+a human-rights helpline that exists for actual victims.
+
+So: connection-grade artifacts must grade as `contacted`, page content must grade
+as `referenced`, and the report must say so plainly in both directions.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import datetime
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import sqlite3
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+
+sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))))
+
+from adint_scan import iocs as iocmod # noqa: E402
+from adint_scan import report # noqa: E402
+from adint_scan.context import ScanContext # noqa: E402
+from adint_scan.modules import browser # noqa: E402
+from adint_scan.result import Hit, ModuleResult # noqa: E402
+
+TEST_DOMAIN = "synthetic-test-indicator.invalid"
+
+
+def make_ctx(tmp):
+ path = os.path.join(tmp, "iocs.txt")
+ with open(path, "w", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n") as fh:
+ fh.write("{}\tdelivery\tprimary\ttest-source\n".format(TEST_DOMAIN))
+ return ScanContext(iocs=iocmod.load(path), emit=lambda _m: None)
+
+
+def run_browser_on(tmp, root):
+ ctx = make_ctx(tmp)
+ empty = os.path.join(tmp, "empty")
+ os.makedirs(empty, exist_ok=True)
+ saved = (browser.CHROMIUM_ROOTS, browser.ROAMING, browser.LOCAL)
+ try:
+ browser.CHROMIUM_ROOTS = [("test", root)]
+ browser.ROAMING = empty
+ browser.LOCAL = empty
+ return browser.run(ctx)
+ finally:
+ browser.CHROMIUM_ROOTS, browser.ROAMING, browser.LOCAL = saved
+
+
+class TestHstsIsContactedGrade(unittest.TestCase):
+ def test_hsts_entry_for_an_indicator_is_contacted_with_a_date(self):
+ tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="ev_")
+ net = os.path.join(tmp, "User Data", "Default", "Network")
+ os.makedirs(net)
+ observed = datetime.datetime(2025, 3, 4, 12, 0, 0)
+ wire = b""
+ for label in TEST_DOMAIN.split("."):
+ wire += bytes([len(label)]) + label.encode()
+ wire += b"\x00"
+ digest = base64.b64encode(hashlib.sha256(wire).digest()).decode()
+ with open(os.path.join(net, "TransportSecurity"), "w",
+ encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+ json.dump({"version": 2, "sts": [
+ {"host": digest, "mode": "force-https",
+ "sts_observed": observed.timestamp(),
+ "expiry": observed.timestamp() + 31536000,
+ "sts_include_subdomains": False},
+ {"host": "someOtherHashThatIsNotOurs=", "mode": "force-https",
+ "sts_observed": observed.timestamp(), "expiry": 0,
+ "sts_include_subdomains": False},
+ ]}, fh)
+
+ r = run_browser_on(tmp, os.path.join(tmp, "User Data"))
+ hits = [h for h in r.hits if h.evidence == "contacted"]
+ self.assertEqual(len(hits), 1, "the HSTS entry should be one contacted hit")
+ self.assertEqual(hits[0].indicator, TEST_DOMAIN)
+ self.assertTrue(hits[0].observed.startswith("2025-03-04"),
+ "HSTS records when it was observed; that date is the "
+ "most useful thing about this artifact")
+ self.assertEqual(r.submetrics.get("hsts_entries"), 2)
+
+ def test_unrelated_hsts_entries_do_not_match(self):
+ tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="ev_")
+ net = os.path.join(tmp, "User Data", "Default", "Network")
+ os.makedirs(net)
+ with open(os.path.join(net, "TransportSecurity"), "w",
+ encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+ json.dump({"sts": [{"host": "notOurHash=", "sts_observed": 0,
+ "expiry": 0}]}, fh)
+ r = run_browser_on(tmp, os.path.join(tmp, "User Data"))
+ self.assertEqual(r.hits, [])
+
+
+class TestConnectionRecordsAreContactedGrade(unittest.TestCase):
+ def test_connected_server_origin_is_contacted(self):
+ tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="ev_")
+ net = os.path.join(tmp, "User Data", "Default", "Network")
+ os.makedirs(net)
+ with open(os.path.join(net, "Network Persistent State"), "w",
+ encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+ json.dump({"net": {"http_server_properties": {
+ "servers": [
+ {"server": "https://{}:443".format(TEST_DOMAIN),
+ "supports_spdy": True},
+ {"server": "https://unrelated.example:443"},
+ ],
+ "broken_alternative_services": [
+ {"host": "sub.{}".format(TEST_DOMAIN), "port": 443,
+ "protocol_str": "quic"},
+ ]}}}, fh)
+ r = run_browser_on(tmp, os.path.join(tmp, "User Data"))
+ self.assertEqual(len(r.hits), 2,
+ "the connected origin and the subdomain in broken "
+ "alternative services should both be found")
+ self.assertTrue(all(h.evidence == "contacted" for h in r.hits))
+ self.assertEqual(r.submetrics.get("connection_records"), 3)
+
+ def test_a_similar_but_different_host_does_not_match(self):
+ tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="ev_")
+ net = os.path.join(tmp, "User Data", "Default", "Network")
+ os.makedirs(net)
+ with open(os.path.join(net, "Network Persistent State"), "w",
+ encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+ # A host that merely ENDS with the indicator text, and one that
+ # extends it. Neither is the indicator.
+ json.dump({"net": {"http_server_properties": {"servers": [
+ {"server": "https://not{}:443".format(TEST_DOMAIN)},
+ {"server": "https://{}.evil.example:443".format(TEST_DOMAIN)},
+ ]}}}, fh)
+ r = run_browser_on(tmp, os.path.join(tmp, "User Data"))
+ self.assertEqual(r.hits, [],
+ "host matching must be exact-or-subdomain, never a "
+ "substring")
+
+
+class TestCacheContentIsOnlyReferenced(unittest.TestCase):
+ def test_blob_match_is_referenced_not_contacted(self):
+ tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="ev_")
+ cache = os.path.join(tmp, "User Data", "Default", "Cache", "Cache_Data")
+ os.makedirs(cache)
+ with open(os.path.join(cache, "f_000001"), "wb") as fh:
+ fh.write(b"an article discussing " + TEST_DOMAIN.encode() + b" at length")
+ r = run_browser_on(tmp, os.path.join(tmp, "User Data"))
+ self.assertTrue(r.hits)
+ self.assertTrue(all(h.evidence == "referenced" for h in r.hits),
+ "page content mentioning a domain is not contact with it")
+
+ def test_cookie_is_contacted(self):
+ tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="ev_")
+ net = os.path.join(tmp, "User Data", "Default", "Network")
+ os.makedirs(net)
+ con = sqlite3.connect(os.path.join(net, "Cookies"))
+ con.execute("CREATE TABLE cookies (host_key TEXT, name TEXT, "
+ "creation_utc INTEGER)")
+ con.execute("INSERT INTO cookies VALUES (?, 'uid', 13300000000000000)",
+ ("." + TEST_DOMAIN,))
+ con.commit()
+ con.close()
+ r = run_browser_on(tmp, os.path.join(tmp, "User Data"))
+ self.assertTrue(r.hits)
+ self.assertTrue(any(h.evidence == "contacted" for h in r.hits),
+ "a cookie exists only because that host responded")
+
+
+class TestReportWording(unittest.TestCase):
+ def doc(self, hits):
+ m = ModuleResult("browser")
+ m.ran("chromium:test")
+ for h in hits:
+ m.add_hit(h)
+ s = iocmod.load(os.path.join(
+ os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(
+ os.path.abspath(__file__)))), "iocs", "adfection_iocs.txt"))
+ return report.build_document(s, [m], datetime.datetime.now())
+
+ def test_referenced_only_result_is_explained_as_probably_not_compromise(self):
+ text = report.render_human(self.doc([
+ Hit("x.example", "cache", "binary match", "delivery", "primary",
+ "s", "referenced")]))
+ flat = " ".join(text.split())
+ self.assertIn("reference-only", flat)
+ self.assertIn("probably not a sign of compromise", flat)
+
+ def test_contacted_result_is_called_out_first(self):
+ text = report.render_human(self.doc([
+ Hit("a.example", "cache", "binary", "delivery", "primary", "s",
+ "referenced"),
+ Hit("b.example", "hsts", "HSTS", "cc", "primary", "s", "contacted")]))
+ self.assertIn("SERIOUS", text)
+ # The contacted hit is the one surfaced in the summary; it must appear
+ # before the merely-referenced one anywhere in the report.
+ self.assertLess(text.index("b[.]example"), text.index("a[.]example"),
+ "the contacted hit must be listed before the merely "
+ "referenced one")
+
+ def test_sample_on_disk_is_never_reported_as_harmless(self):
+ """The whole reason the evidence contract exists: a file on disk whose
+ fingerprint matches a published sample must be a SERIOUS finding with the
+ preserve-the-evidence instructions, never 'probably not a sign of
+ compromise'. This regressed once (hashscan set no evidence grade)."""
+ from adint_scan.result import EV_ON_DISK
+ text = report.render_human(self.doc([
+ Hit("deadbeef" * 8, r"C:\Users\x\AppData\Roaming\evil.dll",
+ "sample", "sample", "primary", "s", EV_ON_DISK)]))
+ self.assertIn("serious", text.lower())
+ self.assertIn("KNOWN SPYWARE FILE", text)
+ self.assertNotIn("probably not a sign of compromise", text)
+ self.assertIn("Do NOT delete", text)
+
+ def test_persistence_is_never_reported_as_harmless(self):
+ from adint_scan.result import EV_PERSISTENCE
+ text = report.render_human(self.doc([
+ Hit("b.example", r"HKCU\...\InprocServer32", "COM", "cc", "primary",
+ "s", EV_PERSISTENCE)]))
+ self.assertIn("serious", text.lower())
+ self.assertNotIn("probably not a sign of compromise", text)
+ self.assertIn("Do NOT delete", text)
+
+ def test_unknown_evidence_grade_is_treated_as_serious(self):
+ """A hit whose grade is missing or misspelled must default to SERIOUS,
+ not harmless - the deny-list-of-benign design in result.is_serious."""
+ text = report.render_human(self.doc([
+ Hit("b.example", "somewhere", "d", "cc", "primary", "s", "")]))
+ self.assertNotIn("probably not a sign of compromise", text)
+ self.assertIn("serious", text.lower())
+
+ def test_evidence_grade_is_shown_on_every_hit(self):
+ text = report.render_human(self.doc([
+ Hit("a.example", "loc", "d", "cc", "primary", "s", "contacted")]))
+ self.assertIn("evidence: CONTACTED", text)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+ unittest.main(verbosity=2)
diff --git a/scan/tests/test_matching.py b/scan/tests/test_matching.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0106ccf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scan/tests/test_matching.py
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+"""Matching must not fire on a longer name or number that merely contains an
+indicator.
+
+This is the false-positive direction, and it became urgent when the file grew to
+109 IP indicators: plain substring matching reports 52.174.65.77 as present in
+152.174.65.771, and controlium.net as present in notcontrolium.net. A tool that
+sends people to a human-rights helpline must not do that.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+
+sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))))
+
+from adint_scan import iocs as iocmod # noqa: E402
+
+
+def make_set(lines):
+ path = os.path.join(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="match_"), "iocs.txt")
+ with open(path, "w", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n") as fh:
+ fh.write("\n".join(lines) + "\n")
+ return iocmod.load(path)
+
+
+class TestIpBoundaries(unittest.TestCase):
+ def setUp(self):
+ self.s = make_set(["52.174.65.77\tcc\tprimary\ttest"])
+
+ def hits(self, text):
+ return [i.value for i in self.s.search(text)]
+
+ def test_exact_ip_matches(self):
+ self.assertEqual(self.hits("connected to 52.174.65.77 today"),
+ ["52.174.65.77"])
+
+ def test_ip_at_string_edges_matches(self):
+ self.assertEqual(self.hits("52.174.65.77"), ["52.174.65.77"])
+
+ def test_longer_number_does_not_match(self):
+ self.assertEqual(self.hits("x 152.174.65.771 y"), [],
+ "an IP must not match inside a longer number")
+
+ def test_trailing_digit_does_not_match(self):
+ self.assertEqual(self.hits("52.174.65.771"), [])
+
+ def test_leading_digit_does_not_match(self):
+ self.assertEqual(self.hits("152.174.65.77"), [])
+
+ def test_further_octet_does_not_match(self):
+ self.assertEqual(self.hits("52.174.65.77.9"), [])
+
+ def test_ip_with_port_matches(self):
+ self.assertEqual(self.hits("52.174.65.77:443"), ["52.174.65.77"])
+
+ def test_real_occurrence_found_even_after_a_near_miss(self):
+ # The near miss must not stop the scan finding the genuine one later.
+ self.assertEqual(self.hits("152.174.65.771 and also 52.174.65.77"),
+ ["52.174.65.77"])
+
+
+class TestDomainBoundaries(unittest.TestCase):
+ def setUp(self):
+ self.s = make_set(["controlium.net\tdelivery\tprimary\ttest"])
+
+ def hits(self, text):
+ return [i.value for i in self.s.search(text)]
+
+ def test_exact_domain_matches(self):
+ self.assertEqual(self.hits("https://controlium.net/x"), ["controlium.net"])
+
+ def test_subdomain_matches(self):
+ self.assertEqual(self.hits("noas.controlium.net"), ["controlium.net"],
+ "a subdomain of an indicator is still that indicator")
+
+ def test_prefixed_name_does_not_match(self):
+ self.assertEqual(self.hits("notcontrolium.net"), [],
+ "a different domain that merely ends with the indicator "
+ "must not match")
+
+ def test_longer_tld_does_not_match(self):
+ self.assertEqual(self.hits("controlium.network"), [])
+
+ def test_hyphenated_name_does_not_match(self):
+ self.assertEqual(self.hits("safe-controlium.net"), [])
+
+
+class TestBytesPathAgrees(unittest.TestCase):
+ """The binary cache scan must apply the same rules as the text scan."""
+
+ def test_bytes_and_text_agree(self):
+ s = make_set(["52.174.65.77\tcc\tprimary\ttest",
+ "controlium.net\tdelivery\tprimary\ttest"])
+ for text in ("152.174.65.771 notcontrolium.net",
+ "52.174.65.77 noas.controlium.net",
+ "controlium.network"):
+ self.assertEqual(
+ sorted(i.value for i in s.search(text)),
+ sorted(i.value for i in s.search_bytes(text.encode())),
+ "text and binary matching disagree on {!r}".format(text))
+
+
+class TestSourceColumn(unittest.TestCase):
+ def test_optional_fourth_column_is_read(self):
+ s = make_set(["a.example\tcc\tprimary\tsome-report-2025"])
+ self.assertEqual(s.lookup("a.example").source, "some-report-2025")
+
+ def test_three_column_file_still_loads(self):
+ s = make_set(["b.example\tcc\tprimary"])
+ self.assertEqual(s.lookup("b.example").source, "")
+
+ def test_new_tiers_accepted(self):
+ s = make_set(["c.example\tcandiru\tprimary\tr",
+ "1.2.3.4\tcandiru-ip\tprimary\tr"])
+ self.assertEqual(len(s), 2)
+
+ def test_unknown_tier_still_rejected(self):
+ with self.assertRaises(iocmod.IocError):
+ make_set(["d.example\tnot-a-tier\tprimary\tr"])
+
+
+class TestLoaderRobustness(unittest.TestCase):
+ """The loader's failure modes are silent false negatives - the worst class.
+ A list that fails to load a line, or loads it mangled, makes the scan report
+ 'nothing found' for an indicator it never actually searched for."""
+
+ def _write(self, text, encoding):
+ path = os.path.join(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="load_"), "iocs.txt")
+ with open(path, "w", encoding=encoding, newline="\n") as fh:
+ fh.write(text)
+ return path
+
+ def test_utf8_bom_does_not_corrupt_first_indicator(self):
+ # A Windows editor saves a BOM; U+FEFF is not whitespace to strip().
+ p = self._write("controlium.net\tdelivery\tprimary\tt\n", "utf-8-sig")
+ s = iocmod.load(p)
+ self.assertEqual(s.indicators[0].value, "controlium.net")
+ self.assertFalse(s.indicators[0].value.startswith(""))
+ self.assertTrue(s.search("go to controlium.net now"))
+
+ def test_empty_file_is_refused(self):
+ p = self._write("# only a comment\n\n", "utf-8")
+ with self.assertRaises(iocmod.IocError):
+ iocmod.load(p)
+
+ def test_zero_width_character_in_indicator_is_rejected(self):
+ p = self._write("contro​lium.net\tdelivery\tprimary\tt\n", "utf-8")
+ with self.assertRaises(iocmod.IocError):
+ iocmod.load(p)
+
+ def test_internationalised_domain_is_stored_as_punycode(self):
+ p = self._write("müller.example\tdelivery\tprimary\tt\n", "utf-8")
+ s = iocmod.load(p)
+ self.assertEqual(s.indicators[0].value, "xn--mller-kva.example")
+
+ def test_trailing_dot_is_normalised_at_load(self):
+ p = self._write("controlium.net.\tdelivery\tprimary\tt\n", "utf-8")
+ s = iocmod.load(p)
+ self.assertEqual(s.indicators[0].value, "controlium.net")
+
+
+class TestUtf16AndIpv6(unittest.TestCase):
+ def test_utf16le_bytes_match(self):
+ s = make_set(["controlium.net\tdelivery\tprimary\tt"])
+ buf = "visited controlium.net today".encode("utf-16-le")
+ self.assertEqual([i.value for i in s.search_bytes(buf.lower())],
+ ["controlium.net"])
+
+ def test_utf16le_respects_boundaries(self):
+ s = make_set(["controlium.net\tdelivery\tprimary\tt"])
+ buf = "notcontrolium.network".encode("utf-16-le")
+ self.assertEqual(s.search_bytes(buf.lower()), [])
+
+ def test_ipv6_exact_and_boundary(self):
+ s = make_set(["2a02:db8::1\tcandiru-ip\tprimary\tt"])
+ self.assertTrue(s.search("peer 2a02:db8::1 seen"))
+ self.assertEqual(s.search("2a02:db8::1a"), [])
+
+ def test_suffix_trap_domain_does_not_match(self):
+ s = make_set(["controlium.net\tdelivery\tprimary\tt"])
+ self.assertEqual(s.search("controlium.net.evil.example"), [])
+
+ def test_parent_and_child_one_record_collapses(self):
+ s = make_set(["powerium.net\tdelivery\tprimary\tt",
+ "noas.powerium.net\tdelivery\tprimary\tt"])
+ got = sorted(i.value for i in s.search("cookie for .noas.powerium.net"))
+ self.assertEqual(got, ["noas.powerium.net"])
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+ unittest.main(verbosity=2)
diff --git a/scan/tests/test_netguard.py b/scan/tests/test_netguard.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a5f0f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scan/tests/test_netguard.py
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+"""D2 — the tool must never contact an indicator. Asserted, not merely intended.
+
+SPEC-scanner.md, testing requirements: "Verify no module ever performs DNS
+resolution of an indicator — assert this in a test, do not merely intend it."
+
+Three layers of assertion here:
+ 1. the guard itself blocks every resolution / egress entry point
+ 2. a real full scan, run with socket instrumented, performs ZERO resolutions
+ 3. no module even imports a network library (a static check, so a future edit
+ that adds `import requests` fails the suite rather than shipping)
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import re
+import socket
+import sys
+import unittest
+
+sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))))
+
+from adint_scan.netguard import NetworkContactAttempt, no_network # noqa: E402
+
+
+class TestGuardBlocks(unittest.TestCase):
+ def test_getaddrinfo_blocked(self):
+ with no_network():
+ with self.assertRaises(NetworkContactAttempt):
+ socket.getaddrinfo("fearevolve.com", 443)
+
+ def test_gethostbyname_blocked(self):
+ with no_network():
+ with self.assertRaises(NetworkContactAttempt):
+ socket.gethostbyname("keyadapter.com")
+
+ def test_create_connection_blocked(self):
+ with no_network():
+ with self.assertRaises(NetworkContactAttempt):
+ socket.create_connection(("controlium.net", 80), timeout=1)
+
+ def test_socket_connect_blocked(self):
+ with no_network():
+ s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+ try:
+ with self.assertRaises(NetworkContactAttempt):
+ s.connect(("185.181.8.155", 80))
+ finally:
+ s.close()
+
+ def test_guard_restores_socket_afterwards(self):
+ original = socket.getaddrinfo
+ with no_network():
+ self.assertIsNot(socket.getaddrinfo, original)
+ self.assertIs(socket.getaddrinfo, original,
+ "the guard must restore socket on exit, or it would break "
+ "the IOC-update path that is allowed to use the network")
+
+ def test_attempt_is_recorded(self):
+ with no_network() as recorder:
+ try:
+ socket.gethostbyname("jobmarcher.com")
+ except NetworkContactAttempt:
+ pass
+ self.assertEqual(recorder.attempts, ["socket.gethostbyname"])
+
+
+class TestRealScanResolvesNothing(unittest.TestCase):
+ """Run the actual modules and prove no resolution happened. This is the
+ assertion that matters: the guard could be bypassed by a module that uses
+ something other than `socket`, so we also count real resolution calls."""
+
+ def test_full_scan_performs_no_resolution(self):
+ from adint_scan import iocs as iocmod
+ from adint_scan.context import ScanContext
+ from adint_scan.modules import host
+
+ ioc_path = os.path.join(
+ os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(
+ os.path.abspath(__file__)))),
+ "iocs", "adfection_iocs.txt")
+ ioc_set = iocmod.load(ioc_path)
+
+ calls = []
+ real_getaddrinfo = socket.getaddrinfo
+ real_gethostbyname = socket.gethostbyname
+
+ def spy_getaddrinfo(*a, **k):
+ calls.append(("getaddrinfo", a))
+ return real_getaddrinfo(*a, **k)
+
+ def spy_gethostbyname(*a, **k):
+ calls.append(("gethostbyname", a))
+ return real_gethostbyname(*a, **k)
+
+ socket.getaddrinfo = spy_getaddrinfo
+ socket.gethostbyname = spy_gethostbyname
+ try:
+ # The host module is the one with real resolution risk: it is the
+ # only module that shells out to the OS network stack (reading the
+ # local DNS cache and the DNS event log), so it is the one worth
+ # running live against the real indicator set. The browser and hash
+ # modules only read files; they are covered by the static import and
+ # shell-out checks below, and running them live here would walk tens
+ # of thousands of real cache files and make the suite unusable.
+ ctx = ScanContext(iocs=ioc_set, emit=lambda _m: None)
+ try:
+ host.run(ctx)
+ except Exception:
+ # A module failing is a separate concern; this test is only
+ # ever about whether anything was resolved.
+ pass
+ finally:
+ socket.getaddrinfo = real_getaddrinfo
+ socket.gethostbyname = real_gethostbyname
+
+ self.assertEqual(
+ calls, [],
+ "D2 VIOLATION: the scan resolved {} name(s). Resolving an indicator "
+ "announces a possible victim to the people running the "
+ "infrastructure.".format(len(calls)))
+
+
+class TestNoNetworkImports(unittest.TestCase):
+ """Static guard: a module must not even import a network library."""
+
+ FORBIDDEN = ("import requests", "import urllib", "from urllib",
+ "import http.client", "import httpx", "import socket",
+ "import ftplib", "import telnetlib", "dns.resolver")
+
+ def test_modules_import_nothing_networked(self):
+ mod_dir = os.path.join(
+ os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))),
+ "adint_scan", "modules")
+ offenders = []
+ for fn in os.listdir(mod_dir):
+ if not fn.endswith(".py"):
+ continue
+ with open(os.path.join(mod_dir, fn), encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+ text = fh.read()
+ for needle in self.FORBIDDEN:
+ if needle in text:
+ offenders.append("{}: {}".format(fn, needle))
+ self.assertEqual(offenders, [],
+ "scan modules must not import network libraries: {}"
+ .format(offenders))
+
+ def test_no_module_shells_out_to_a_resolver(self):
+ """Blocks the other way to resolve a name: handing it to a system tool."""
+ mod_dir = os.path.join(
+ os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))),
+ "adint_scan", "modules")
+ # Word-boundary matched, not plain substring: "ping" as a substring also
+ # occurs inside "skipping", which would fail the suite for no reason.
+ forbidden = ("resolve-dnsname", "nslookup", "ping", "curl", "wget",
+ "invoke-webrequest", "test-netconnection", "whois",
+ "tnc", "portqry")
+ pattern = re.compile(
+ r"\b(" + "|".join(re.escape(f) for f in forbidden) + r")\b")
+ offenders = []
+ for fn in os.listdir(mod_dir):
+ if not fn.endswith(".py"):
+ continue
+ with open(os.path.join(mod_dir, fn), encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+ text = fh.read().lower()
+ for found in sorted(set(pattern.findall(text))):
+ offenders.append("{}: {}".format(fn, found))
+ self.assertEqual(offenders, [],
+ "a module appears to shell out to a name resolver or "
+ "HTTP client: {}".format(offenders))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+ unittest.main(verbosity=2)
diff --git a/scan/tests/test_not_infostealer.py b/scan/tests/test_not_infostealer.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7aa7843
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scan/tests/test_not_infostealer.py
@@ -0,0 +1,269 @@
+"""This tool must stay distinguishable from the malware it resembles.
+
+The scanner opens browser cookie databases, fingerprints tens of thousands of
+files and enumerates the registry. An infostealer does all three. The difference
+is one specific thing: an infostealer DECRYPTS the cookie values, because the
+values are the credentials it is stealing. This tool only ever reads cookie
+HOST NAMES and metadata, which is all that indicator matching needs.
+
+That distinction is the whole basis on which an antivirus analyst, a reviewer, or
+a cautious user can tell us apart from a credential thief - so it is asserted
+here rather than merely promised in a README. If a future change starts reading
+encrypted values or calling Windows' decryption APIs, this suite fails.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import re
+import sys
+import unittest
+
+sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))))
+
+PKG = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))),
+ "adint_scan")
+
+
+def source_files():
+ for root, _dirs, files in os.walk(PKG):
+ for fn in files:
+ if fn.endswith(".py"):
+ path = os.path.join(root, fn)
+ with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+ yield os.path.relpath(path, PKG), fh.read()
+
+
+class TestNeverDecryptsSecrets(unittest.TestCase):
+ def test_no_module_reads_encrypted_cookie_values(self):
+ offenders = []
+ for name, text in source_files():
+ low = text.lower()
+ for needle in ("encrypted_value", "encrypted_key", "value_encrypted"):
+ if needle in low:
+ offenders.append("{}: {}".format(name, needle))
+ self.assertEqual(
+ offenders, [],
+ "reading encrypted cookie/credential values is what an infostealer "
+ "does; indicator matching only needs the host name: {}".format(offenders))
+
+ def test_no_module_calls_a_decryption_api(self):
+ # DPAPI and the AES-GCM unwrap of Chromium's local state key are the
+ # specific mechanisms credential stealers use on Windows.
+ # NOTE on "Local State": that file is read, deliberately, for profile
+ # DISPLAY NAMES. It is also where Chromium keeps the encrypted master
+ # key for cookie values, so reading the file is step one of credential
+ # theft - which is why `os_crypt` and `encrypted_key` stay banned below,
+ # and why test_local_state_master_key_is_never_read asserts
+ # behaviourally that the key never reaches the output. Reading the file
+ # is allowed; reading the key is not.
+ forbidden = ("cryptunprotectdata", "dpapi", "win32crypt", "protect_data",
+ "aesgcm", "aes_gcm", "unprotect", "os_crypt",
+ "encrypted_key")
+ offenders = []
+ for name, text in source_files():
+ low = text.lower()
+ for needle in forbidden:
+ if needle in low:
+ offenders.append("{}: {}".format(name, needle))
+ self.assertEqual(offenders, [],
+ "no module may touch a credential-decryption path: {}"
+ .format(offenders))
+
+ def test_no_crypto_library_imported(self):
+ pattern = re.compile(
+ r"^\s*(?:import|from)\s+(cryptography|Crypto|nacl|pycryptodome)\b",
+ re.MULTILINE)
+ offenders = [name for name, text in source_files() if pattern.search(text)]
+ self.assertEqual(offenders, [],
+ "the scanner has no legitimate need to decrypt anything: "
+ "{}".format(offenders))
+
+ ALLOWED_COOKIE_COLUMNS = {
+ "host_key", "name", "host", "creation_utc", "creationtime",
+ "top_frame_site_key", "last_access_utc", "lastaccessed", "expires_utc",
+ }
+
+ def test_cookie_column_allowlist_is_narrow(self):
+ """The columns the module is willing to ask for are built from literal
+ lists, so those lists are the thing to pin. Widening them has to be a
+ deliberate act that fails this test first."""
+ import ast
+
+ path = os.path.join(PKG, "modules", "browser.py")
+ with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+ tree = ast.parse(fh.read())
+ found = []
+ for node in ast.walk(tree):
+ if not isinstance(node, ast.Assign):
+ continue
+ if not any(getattr(t, "id", "") == "candidates" for t in node.targets):
+ continue
+ if not isinstance(node.value, ast.List):
+ continue
+ cols = [e.value.lower() for e in node.value.elts
+ if isinstance(e, ast.Constant) and isinstance(e.value, str)]
+ found.append(cols)
+ for col in cols:
+ self.assertIn(
+ col, self.ALLOWED_COOKIE_COLUMNS,
+ "cookie column {!r} is not on the allow-list - reading more "
+ "of a cookie store than host/name/timestamps needs a "
+ "deliberate decision".format(col))
+ self.assertGreaterEqual(
+ len(found), 2,
+ "expected the Chromium and Firefox cookie column lists")
+
+ def test_an_encrypted_cookie_value_is_never_read(self):
+ """Behavioural proof, which is stronger than reading the source: give the
+ module a cookie database whose encrypted_value holds a sentinel, and the
+ sentinel must appear nowhere in anything the module produces."""
+ import sqlite3
+ import sys
+ import tempfile
+
+ sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(PKG))
+ from adint_scan import iocs as iocmod
+ from adint_scan.context import ScanContext
+ from adint_scan.modules import browser
+
+ sentinel = b"SENTINEL-SECRET-VALUE-DO-NOT-READ"
+ tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="nostealer_")
+ net = os.path.join(tmp, "User Data", "Default", "Network")
+ os.makedirs(net)
+ con = sqlite3.connect(os.path.join(net, "Cookies"))
+ con.execute("CREATE TABLE cookies (host_key TEXT, name TEXT, "
+ "encrypted_value BLOB, value TEXT, creation_utc INTEGER)")
+ con.execute("INSERT INTO cookies VALUES (?, 'sid', ?, ?, 13300000000000000)",
+ (".synthetic-test-indicator.invalid", sentinel,
+ sentinel.decode()))
+ con.commit()
+ con.close()
+
+ ioc_path = os.path.join(tmp, "iocs.txt")
+ with open(ioc_path, "w", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n") as fh:
+ fh.write("synthetic-test-indicator.invalid\tdelivery\tprimary\tt\n")
+ ctx = ScanContext(iocs=iocmod.load(ioc_path), emit=lambda _m: None)
+
+ empty = os.path.join(tmp, "empty")
+ os.makedirs(empty)
+ saved = (browser.CHROMIUM_ROOTS, browser.ROAMING, browser.LOCAL)
+ try:
+ browser.CHROMIUM_ROOTS = [("test", os.path.join(tmp, "User Data"))]
+ browser.ROAMING = empty
+ browser.LOCAL = empty
+ result = browser.run(ctx)
+ finally:
+ browser.CHROMIUM_ROOTS, browser.ROAMING, browser.LOCAL = saved
+
+ # The indicator must still be found - we are not testing that it reads
+ # nothing, only that it never reads the secret.
+ self.assertTrue(result.hits, "the cookie host should still match")
+ blob = repr(result.to_dict())
+ self.assertNotIn(sentinel.decode(), blob,
+ "the cookie's encrypted_value leaked into the result")
+ self.assertNotIn("SENTINEL", blob.upper(),
+ "no part of a cookie's value may reach the output")
+
+
+class TestLocalStateMasterKey(unittest.TestCase):
+ """Local State is read for profile display names. The same file holds the
+ encrypted master key for cookie values, so prove the key is never taken."""
+
+ def test_local_state_master_key_is_never_read(self):
+ import json
+ import sqlite3
+ import sys
+ import tempfile
+
+ sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(PKG))
+ from adint_scan import iocs as iocmod
+ from adint_scan.context import ScanContext
+ from adint_scan.modules import browser
+
+ key_sentinel = "MASTER-KEY-SENTINEL-MUST-NOT-APPEAR"
+ tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="localstate_")
+ ud = os.path.join(tmp, "User Data")
+ net = os.path.join(ud, "Profile 1", "Network")
+ os.makedirs(net)
+
+ with open(os.path.join(ud, "Local State"), "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+ json.dump({
+ "os_crypt": {"encrypted_key": key_sentinel},
+ "profile": {"info_cache": {
+ "Profile 1": {"name": "Bubbles",
+ "user_name": "[email protected]",
+ "gaia_name": "Someone Real"}}},
+ }, fh)
+
+ con = sqlite3.connect(os.path.join(net, "Cookies"))
+ con.execute("CREATE TABLE cookies (host_key TEXT, name TEXT, "
+ "creation_utc INTEGER)")
+ con.execute("INSERT INTO cookies VALUES "
+ "('.synthetic-test-indicator.invalid', 'uid', 13300000000000000)")
+ con.commit()
+ con.close()
+
+ ioc_path = os.path.join(tmp, "iocs.txt")
+ with open(ioc_path, "w", encoding="utf-8", newline="\n") as fh:
+ fh.write("synthetic-test-indicator.invalid\tdelivery\tprimary\tt\n")
+ ctx = ScanContext(iocs=iocmod.load(ioc_path), emit=lambda _m: None)
+
+ empty = os.path.join(tmp, "empty")
+ os.makedirs(empty)
+ saved = (browser.CHROMIUM_ROOTS, browser.ROAMING, browser.LOCAL)
+ try:
+ browser.CHROMIUM_ROOTS = [("test", ud)]
+ browser.ROAMING = empty
+ browser.LOCAL = empty
+ result = browser.run(ctx)
+ finally:
+ browser.CHROMIUM_ROOTS, browser.ROAMING, browser.LOCAL = saved
+
+ blob = repr(result.to_dict())
+ self.assertNotIn(key_sentinel, blob,
+ "the cookie-decryption master key leaked into the result")
+ # The display name is the thing we DO want, so prove it arrived.
+ self.assertTrue(any(h.profile and "Bubbles" in h.profile
+ for h in result.hits),
+ "the profile display name should be attached to the hit")
+ # And the signed-in email must not be collected along with it.
+ self.assertNotIn("[email protected]", blob,
+ "the signed-in email address must not be collected")
+ self.assertNotIn("Someone Real", blob,
+ "only the profile display name is collected")
+
+
+class TestReadOnly(unittest.TestCase):
+ def test_no_module_opens_a_file_for_writing(self):
+ """Modules may only read. The one legitimate write - a temp copy of a
+ locked database - goes through shutil.copy2, not an open-for-write."""
+ pattern = re.compile(r"""open\([^)]*['"][rwax+b]*[wa+]['"]""")
+ offenders = []
+ for name, text in source_files():
+ if not name.startswith("modules"):
+ continue
+ if pattern.search(text):
+ offenders.append(name)
+ self.assertEqual(offenders, [],
+ "scan modules must not write files: {}".format(offenders))
+
+ def test_no_module_writes_to_the_registry(self):
+ forbidden = ("setvalue", "createkey", "deletekey", "deletevalue",
+ "savekey", "set-itemproperty", "new-itemproperty",
+ "remove-item")
+ offenders = []
+ for name, text in source_files():
+ if not name.startswith("modules"):
+ continue
+ low = text.lower()
+ for needle in forbidden:
+ if needle in low:
+ offenders.append("{}: {}".format(name, needle))
+ self.assertEqual(offenders, [],
+ "scan modules are read-only; writing belongs to --arm "
+ "alone: {}".format(offenders))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+ unittest.main(verbosity=2)
diff --git a/scan/tests/test_reach.py b/scan/tests/test_reach.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a18b298
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scan/tests/test_reach.py
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+"""The time-window statement must be true, because users act on it.
+
+An earlier version printed "windows DO NOT OVERLAP" whenever the oldest evidence
+post-dated the campaign's START — which is false whenever evidence begins inside
+the campaign. The reference machine's Chrome cookie store reached back to
+2024-11-18, inside 2024-2025, so it printed exactly that false statement. These
+tests pin all three cases and prove the cookie window is actually measured.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import datetime
+import os
+import sqlite3
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+
+sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))))
+
+from adint_scan import iocs as iocmod # noqa: E402
+from adint_scan import report # noqa: E402
+from adint_scan.context import ScanContext # noqa: E402
+from adint_scan.modules import browser # noqa: E402
+
+
+class TestOverlapStatement(unittest.TestCase):
+ def text(self, d):
+ return " ".join(report.overlap_statement(d, "browser/cookies"))
+
+ def test_evidence_after_campaign_end_says_no_overlap(self):
+ t = self.text(datetime.date(2026, 6, 21))
+ self.assertIn("DO NOT OVERLAP", t)
+
+ def test_evidence_starting_inside_campaign_is_partial_not_none(self):
+ t = self.text(datetime.date(2024, 11, 18))
+ self.assertNotIn("DO NOT OVERLAP", t,
+ "evidence from inside 2024-2025 must not be reported as "
+ "having no overlap with it")
+ self.assertIn("PART of the campaign period", t)
+ self.assertIn("browser/cookies", t, "must name which record reached back")
+
+ def test_evidence_before_campaign_still_hedged(self):
+ t = self.text(datetime.date(2023, 5, 1))
+ self.assertNotIn("DO NOT OVERLAP", t)
+ self.assertIn("never everything", t,
+ "even full-window coverage is survivorship, not a full record")
+
+ def test_boundary_days(self):
+ self.assertIn("DO NOT OVERLAP", self.text(datetime.date(2026, 1, 1)))
+ self.assertNotIn("DO NOT OVERLAP", self.text(datetime.date(2025, 12, 31)))
+
+
+class TestCookieWindowMeasured(unittest.TestCase):
+ """A real Chromium-shaped cookie DB with a known oldest creation time."""
+
+ def test_browser_reports_oldest_cookie(self):
+ tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="reach_")
+ root = os.path.join(tmp, "User Data")
+ net = os.path.join(root, "Default", "Network")
+ os.makedirs(net)
+ # 2024-11-18 in Chromium time: microseconds since 1601-01-01.
+ target = datetime.datetime(2024, 11, 18, 12, 0, 0)
+ us = int((target - datetime.datetime(1601, 1, 1)).total_seconds() * 1e6)
+ con = sqlite3.connect(os.path.join(net, "Cookies"))
+ con.execute("CREATE TABLE cookies (host_key TEXT, name TEXT, creation_utc INTEGER)")
+ con.execute("INSERT INTO cookies VALUES ('.example.org', 'a', ?)", (us,))
+ con.execute("INSERT INTO cookies VALUES ('.example.net', 'b', ?)", (us + 10**12,))
+ con.commit()
+ con.close()
+
+ ioc_path = os.path.join(tmp, "iocs.txt")
+ with open(ioc_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+ fh.write("synthetic-test-indicator.invalid\tdelivery\tprimary\n")
+ ctx = ScanContext(iocs=iocmod.load(ioc_path), emit=lambda _m: None)
+
+ saved = (browser.CHROMIUM_ROOTS, browser.ROAMING, browser.LOCAL)
+ empty = os.path.join(tmp, "empty")
+ os.makedirs(empty)
+ try:
+ browser.CHROMIUM_ROOTS = [("test", root)]
+ browser.ROAMING = empty
+ browser.LOCAL = empty
+ r = browser.run(ctx)
+ finally:
+ browser.CHROMIUM_ROOTS, browser.ROAMING, browser.LOCAL = saved
+
+ self.assertIn("cookies", r.reach,
+ "the cookie store reaches furthest back; omitting it "
+ "understates what the scan can see")
+ self.assertEqual(r.reach["cookies"]["earliest"][:10], "2024-11-18")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+ unittest.main(verbosity=2)
diff --git a/scan/tests/test_synthetic.py b/scan/tests/test_synthetic.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d937ed9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scan/tests/test_synthetic.py
@@ -0,0 +1,277 @@
+"""A synthetic positive must be detected by each module.
+
+SPEC-scanner.md, testing requirements: "A synthetic positive (place a benign
+file whose hash is in a test IOC set; add a test domain to a browser cache) must
+be detected by each module."
+
+A clean-machine test only proves the modules return without finding anything,
+which a `return ModuleResult(NAME)` stub would also do. These tests plant a
+known indicator in a fake tree and assert each module actually finds it, with
+its provenance attached and the status rolled up to HITS.
+
+Hermetic: the indicator is a reserved-TLD domain (`.invalid`, RFC 2606) that can
+never resolve, the hash is of a file this test created, and every path is inside
+a temp dir. Nothing on the real machine is read or written:
+ - the hash module is pointed at the temp tree by monkeypatching `_roots`
+ - the browser module reads `LOCALAPPDATA`/`APPDATA` into module-level globals
+ at IMPORT time, so its `CHROMIUM_ROOTS` / `ROAMING` / `LOCAL` attributes are
+ monkeypatched directly; patching os.environ would be too late to matter.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import os
+import shutil
+import sqlite3
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+
+sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))))
+
+from adint_scan import iocs as iocmod # noqa: E402
+from adint_scan.context import ScanContext # noqa: E402
+from adint_scan.modules import browser, hashscan # noqa: E402
+from adint_scan.result import CLEAN, HITS, ModuleResult # noqa: E402
+
+# RFC 2606 reserved TLD: it is unregistrable, so even a bug that tried to
+# resolve this could not reach anyone.
+TEST_DOMAIN = "synthetic-test-indicator.invalid"
+PAYLOAD_BYTES = b"MZ\x90\x00 synthetic adint-scan test payload, not malware\n"
+PAYLOAD_SHA256 = hashlib.sha256(PAYLOAD_BYTES).hexdigest()
+
+
+def write_ioc_file(path, domain=TEST_DOMAIN, sha256=PAYLOAD_SHA256):
+ with open(path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+ fh.write("# synthetic test indicator set\n")
+ fh.write("{}\tdelivery\tprimary\n".format(domain))
+ fh.write("{}\tsample\tprimary\n".format(sha256))
+ return iocmod.load(path)
+
+
+def quiet_ctx(ioc_set):
+ return ScanContext(iocs=ioc_set, emit=lambda _m: None)
+
+
+class SyntheticBase(unittest.TestCase):
+ def setUp(self):
+ self.tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="adint_syn_")
+ self.iocs = write_ioc_file(os.path.join(self.tmp, "iocs.txt"))
+
+ def tearDown(self):
+ shutil.rmtree(self.tmp, ignore_errors=True)
+
+ def assert_hit_implies_hits_status(self, result):
+ """No module may ever report CLEAN for a run that found something."""
+ self.assertIsInstance(result, ModuleResult)
+ if result.hits:
+ self.assertEqual(result.status, HITS)
+ self.assertNotEqual(result.status, CLEAN)
+
+
+class TestHashModuleSyntheticPositive(SyntheticBase):
+ def setUp(self):
+ super().setUp()
+ self.scan_root = os.path.join(self.tmp, "fakeroot")
+ os.makedirs(self.scan_root)
+ self.payload = os.path.join(self.scan_root, "payload.dll")
+ with open(self.payload, "wb") as fh:
+ fh.write(PAYLOAD_BYTES)
+ # Point the module at the fake tree only — never at the real machine.
+ self._real_roots = hashscan._roots
+ hashscan._roots = lambda: [self.scan_root]
+
+ def tearDown(self):
+ hashscan._roots = self._real_roots
+ super().tearDown()
+
+ def test_sanity_extension_is_one_the_module_hashes(self):
+ self.assertTrue(self.payload.lower().endswith(hashscan.EXTS))
+
+ def test_known_sample_hash_is_detected_exactly_once(self):
+ r = hashscan.run(quiet_ctx(self.iocs))
+ self.assertEqual(len(r.hits), 1,
+ "the synthetic sample must be found, exactly once")
+ hit = r.hits[0]
+ self.assertEqual(hit.indicator, PAYLOAD_SHA256)
+ self.assertEqual(os.path.normcase(hit.location),
+ os.path.normcase(self.payload))
+ # Provenance comes from the IOC set, not from the module.
+ self.assertEqual(hit.tier, "sample")
+ self.assertEqual(hit.confidence, "primary")
+ self.assertIn(PAYLOAD_SHA256, hit.detail)
+ self.assertEqual(r.status, HITS)
+ self.assertEqual(r.status, "HITS")
+ self.assert_hit_implies_hits_status(r)
+
+ def test_root_that_was_walked_is_recorded_as_a_check_that_ran(self):
+ r = hashscan.run(quiet_ctx(self.iocs))
+ self.assertTrue(any(c.ran and self.scan_root in c.name
+ for c in r.checks))
+ self.assertGreaterEqual(r.checked, 1)
+ self.assertGreaterEqual(r.submetrics.get("files_hashed", 0), 1)
+
+ def test_non_matching_file_is_clean_not_a_hit(self):
+ with open(os.path.join(self.scan_root, "benign.dll"), "wb") as fh:
+ fh.write(b"something else entirely")
+ r = hashscan.run(quiet_ctx(self.iocs))
+ self.assertEqual(len(r.hits), 1)
+ self.assertEqual(r.submetrics["files_hashed"], 2)
+
+ def test_empty_hash_target_set_is_unknown_not_clean(self):
+ # D3: nothing to compare against is a gap, never a clean result.
+ domain_only = write_ioc_file(
+ os.path.join(self.tmp, "domains.txt"), sha256="a" * 64)
+ domain_only.indicators = [i for i in domain_only.indicators
+ if i.type != iocmod.TYPE_SHA256]
+ r = hashscan.run(quiet_ctx(domain_only))
+ self.assertEqual(r.status, "UNKNOWN")
+ self.assertNotEqual(r.status, CLEAN)
+
+
+class TestBrowserModuleSyntheticPositive(SyntheticBase):
+ def setUp(self):
+ super().setUp()
+ self.root = os.path.join(self.tmp, "User Data")
+ self.profile = os.path.join(self.root, "Default")
+ cache_dir = os.path.join(self.profile, "Cache", "Cache_Data")
+ os.makedirs(cache_dir)
+
+ # (1) blob path: the HTTP cache entry, where a subresource ad impression
+ # would actually survive (history only records top-level navigations).
+ self.cache_file = os.path.join(cache_dir, "f_000001")
+ with open(self.cache_file, "wb") as fh:
+ fh.write(b"\x00\x01HTTP/1.1 200 OK\nhost: " +
+ TEST_DOMAIN.encode("ascii") + b"\n\x00\x02")
+
+ # (2) sqlite path: a real History database with the urls table.
+ self.history = os.path.join(self.profile, "History")
+ con = sqlite3.connect(self.history)
+ con.execute("CREATE TABLE urls (url TEXT, title TEXT)")
+ con.execute("INSERT INTO urls VALUES (?, ?)",
+ ("https://" + TEST_DOMAIN + "/ad?id=1", "synthetic page"))
+ con.commit()
+ con.close()
+
+ # Redirect every module-level path global at the fake tree. These are
+ # read from the environment AT IMPORT TIME, so os.environ is useless.
+ self.empty = os.path.join(self.tmp, "empty")
+ os.makedirs(self.empty)
+ self._saved = (browser.CHROMIUM_ROOTS, browser.ROAMING, browser.LOCAL)
+ browser.CHROMIUM_ROOTS = [("test", self.root)]
+ browser.ROAMING = self.empty
+ browser.LOCAL = self.empty
+
+ def tearDown(self):
+ (browser.CHROMIUM_ROOTS, browser.ROAMING,
+ browser.LOCAL) = self._saved
+ super().tearDown()
+
+ def test_detects_the_domain_in_both_sqlite_and_blob_artifacts(self):
+ r = browser.run(quiet_ctx(self.iocs))
+ self.assertTrue(r.hits, "the synthetic domain must be detected")
+
+ sqlite_hits = [h for h in r.hits if h.detail.startswith("history:")]
+ blob_hits = [h for h in r.hits if "binary match" in h.detail]
+ self.assertGreaterEqual(len(sqlite_hits), 1,
+ "the sqlite (History) path must detect it")
+ self.assertGreaterEqual(len(blob_hits), 1,
+ "the cache-blob path must detect it")
+
+ self.assertEqual(os.path.normcase(sqlite_hits[0].location),
+ os.path.normcase(self.history))
+ self.assertEqual(os.path.normcase(blob_hits[0].location),
+ os.path.normcase(self.cache_file))
+ for h in r.hits:
+ self.assertEqual(h.indicator, TEST_DOMAIN)
+ self.assertEqual((h.tier, h.confidence), ("delivery", "primary"))
+
+ # Counts scanned, not just hits, so a result is auditable.
+ self.assertGreaterEqual(r.submetrics["sqlite"], 1)
+ self.assertGreaterEqual(r.submetrics["blob"], 1)
+ self.assertEqual(r.status, HITS)
+ self.assert_hit_implies_hits_status(r)
+
+ def test_installed_root_is_recorded_as_a_check_that_ran(self):
+ # Checks are now recorded per (browser label, artifact kind) rather than
+ # one blanket check per installed browser, so that a locked artifact
+ # becomes a visible gap instead of being swallowed into a clean result.
+ # This fake tree has a readable History and a readable cache blob, so the
+ # "history" and "blobs" kinds for the "test" browser must both have run.
+ r = browser.run(quiet_ctx(self.iocs))
+ names = [c.name for c in r.checks]
+ self.assertIn("test:history", names)
+ self.assertIn("test:blobs", names)
+ self.assertTrue(any(c.name.startswith("test:") for c in r.checks))
+ self.assertTrue(all(c.ran for c in r.checks),
+ "nothing in this readable tree should be a gap")
+
+ def test_clean_tree_finds_nothing_and_stays_clean(self):
+ empty_root = os.path.join(self.tmp, "Empty User Data", "Default")
+ os.makedirs(os.path.join(empty_root, "Cache", "Cache_Data"))
+ browser.CHROMIUM_ROOTS = [("test", os.path.dirname(empty_root))]
+ r = browser.run(quiet_ctx(self.iocs))
+ self.assertEqual(r.hits, [])
+ self.assertEqual(r.status, CLEAN)
+
+ def test_corrupt_sqlite_file_does_not_crash_the_module(self):
+ # A path that exists but is not a database. sqlite may notice at connect
+ # or at first query, so the only contract asserted is "did not raise"
+ # and "still returned a ModuleResult".
+ with open(os.path.join(self.profile, "Favicons"), "wb") as fh:
+ fh.write(os.urandom(4096))
+ try:
+ r = browser.run(quiet_ctx(self.iocs))
+ except Exception as exc: # pragma: no cover
+ self.fail("browser.run raised on a corrupt sqlite file: {!r}"
+ .format(exc))
+ self.assertIsInstance(r, ModuleResult)
+ # The real positives must still be found despite the bad file.
+ self.assertTrue(r.hits)
+ self.assert_hit_implies_hits_status(r)
+
+
+class TestNoModuleReportsCleanWhenItFoundSomething(SyntheticBase):
+ """Cross-module invariant, stated once more as its own assertion."""
+
+ def test_every_module_with_a_hit_reports_hits(self):
+ results = []
+
+ scan_root = os.path.join(self.tmp, "h")
+ os.makedirs(scan_root)
+ with open(os.path.join(scan_root, "payload.dll"), "wb") as fh:
+ fh.write(PAYLOAD_BYTES)
+ real_roots = hashscan._roots
+ hashscan._roots = lambda: [scan_root]
+ try:
+ results.append(hashscan.run(quiet_ctx(self.iocs)))
+ finally:
+ hashscan._roots = real_roots
+
+ root = os.path.join(self.tmp, "ud")
+ cache = os.path.join(root, "Default", "Cache", "Cache_Data")
+ os.makedirs(cache)
+ with open(os.path.join(cache, "f_000001"), "wb") as fh:
+ fh.write(TEST_DOMAIN.encode("ascii"))
+ empty = os.path.join(self.tmp, "none")
+ os.makedirs(empty)
+ saved = (browser.CHROMIUM_ROOTS, browser.ROAMING, browser.LOCAL)
+ browser.CHROMIUM_ROOTS = [("test", root)]
+ browser.ROAMING = empty
+ browser.LOCAL = empty
+ try:
+ results.append(browser.run(quiet_ctx(self.iocs)))
+ finally:
+ (browser.CHROMIUM_ROOTS, browser.ROAMING, browser.LOCAL) = saved
+
+ for r in results:
+ self.assertTrue(r.hits, "{}: synthetic positive not detected"
+ .format(r.name))
+ self.assertEqual(r.status, HITS,
+ "{}: reported {} despite {} hit(s)"
+ .format(r.name, r.status, len(r.hits)))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+ unittest.main(verbosity=2)