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Zero Breach — local, read-only scanner that checks a computer for indicators of the AdFection / Candiru ad-delivered spyware campaign. No network, no admin, no dependencies.

Prepare v0.1.8: correct the self-reported version and guard it

interplains89db75a5f882
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index ecaf298..c1d7234 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
# Zero Breach
-> Release v0.1.6 fixes COM file-path parsing when a folder name contains an
-> executable extension, and limits historical coverage statements to evidence
-> actually examined. Optional Candiru patterns still need the pinned YARA-X engine;
+> Release v0.1.8 corrects the version the download reports (v0.1.7 shipped
+> reporting itself as 0.1.6) and refuses network paths given to `--iocs`/`--json`
+> in the single-file build. Optional Candiru patterns still need the pinned YARA-X engine;
> see [pattern validation](DETECTION-UPGRADE.md). Default checks remain standard-library-only.
[![tests](https://github.com/interplains/zero-breach/actions/workflows/tests.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/interplains/zero-breach/actions/workflows/tests.yml)
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ set up (e.g. a bad indicator file).
Use the official repository above and check the downloaded file before running it.
-**1. Verify the publisher's signature.** Release v0.1.6 includes detached GPG
+**1. Verify the publisher's signature.** Release v0.1.8 includes detached GPG
signatures for the scanner and its checksum manifest, using ArchiveGenocide's
established release key. Follow [SIGNING.md](SIGNING.md), and compare the full
key fingerprint with [ArchiveGenocide's verification page](https://archivegenocide.com/verify.html).
@@ -169,11 +169,11 @@ you do not have to trust the download at all; you can reproduce it:
```
git clone https://github.com/interplains/zero-breach.git
cd zero-breach
-git checkout v0.1.6
+git checkout v0.1.8
python build/build.py # writes dist/zero-breach.py and prints its SHA-256
```
-These commands reproduce v0.1.6; substitute the matching tag for another release.
+These commands reproduce v0.1.8; substitute the matching tag for another release.
On macOS or Linux use `python3` for the build command.
Compare the hash with that release's published hash. The development branch may
contain later changes and is not expected to reproduce an earlier release.
diff --git a/SIGNING.md b/SIGNING.md
index 628a94b..867f3f0 100644
--- a/SIGNING.md
+++ b/SIGNING.md
@@ -1,17 +1,17 @@
# Verifying ArchiveGenocide release signatures
-Zero Breach v0.1.7 supplies detached GPG signatures for the exact released
+Zero Breach v0.1.8 supplies detached GPG signatures for the exact released
scanner and its SHA256SUMS.txt manifest. They use ArchiveGenocide's existing
Ed25519 release-signing key, also published on the archive's verification page.
Official repository: https://github.com/interplains/zero-breach
-Official release: https://github.com/interplains/zero-breach/releases/tag/v0.1.7
+Official release: https://github.com/interplains/zero-breach/releases/tag/v0.1.8
Independent publisher page: https://archivegenocide.com/scan/#verify-download
Established key identity: https://archivegenocide.com/verify.html
## Check the publisher and file
-Download these three files from the v0.1.7 release into one directory:
+Download these three files from the v0.1.8 release into one directory:
- zero-breach.py
- zero-breach.py.asc
@@ -36,9 +36,9 @@ Verification must succeed using the expected ArchiveGenocide key. A warning
that the key is not certified by your own web of trust is different from a
bad signature; do not ignore a fingerprint mismatch or failed verification.
-The expected SHA-256 of zero-breach.py v0.1.7 is:
+The expected SHA-256 of zero-breach.py v0.1.8 is:
- 9431426a940a3a9bdea617017030e0fa7b155693c3b2d25d97960d1eb262ae4e
+ 74740af20f609f82dc6e50d66f234d0c39a20f516caa35731c2d19c11684ef44
A signature verifies which key signed these exact bytes. It does not establish
that the program has no bugs. A checksum alone is not publisher authentication.
@@ -58,14 +58,14 @@ The manifest lists the fifteen release-content files, including the optional
requirements file and Candiru rule attribution and licence records. The manifest itself and
the added public key/signatures are not self-listed.
-Public verification artifacts are also retained in release-signatures/v0.1.7/.
+Public verification artifacts are also retained in release-signatures/v0.1.8/.
No private key is stored in this repository or in its project backups.
## Indicator updates are a separate trust path
The manually run scan/update-iocs.py still checks HTTPS, a published SHA-256,
and indicator-file validity. It does not automatically verify GPG signatures.
-The signed release manifest covers the indicator file shipped with v0.1.7;
+The signed release manifest covers the indicator file shipped with v0.1.8;
it does not authenticate later files fetched from the development branch.
## Maintainer release procedure
diff --git a/build/build.py b/build/build.py
index 9ed5da0..9287fa0 100644
--- a/build/build.py
+++ b/build/build.py
@@ -49,8 +49,27 @@ def main(argv=None):
p = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Rebuild all generated artifacts.")
p.add_argument("--check", action="store_true",
help="exit non-zero if any artifact changed (for CI)")
+ p.add_argument("--expect-version", metavar="X.Y.Z",
+ help="fail unless the package __version__ equals this. Run "
+ "with the release's own number when cutting a release, "
+ "so the single file can never again ship reporting a "
+ "different version than the tag (as v0.1.7 did).")
args = p.parse_args(argv)
+ if args.expect_version:
+ init = io.open(os.path.join(ROOT, "scan", "adint_scan", "__init__.py"),
+ encoding="utf-8").read()
+ import re as _re
+ found = _re.search(r'__version__\s*=\s*"([^"]+)"', init)
+ found = found.group(1) if found else "(unreadable)"
+ if found != args.expect_version:
+ print("\nERROR: package __version__ is {!r} but the release "
+ "being cut is {!r}. Update scan/adint_scan/__init__.py "
+ "before building.".format(found, args.expect_version),
+ file=sys.stderr)
+ return 1
+ print("version check: package reports {} as expected.".format(found))
+
if not os.path.isdir(DIST):
os.makedirs(DIST)
diff --git a/build/bundle.py b/build/bundle.py
index 8c27ce6..9b6cf0b 100644
--- a/build/bundle.py
+++ b/build/bundle.py
@@ -26,6 +26,20 @@ OUT = (sys.argv[2] if len(sys.argv) > 2
PKG = os.path.join(SRC, "scan", "adint_scan")
IOC = os.path.join(SRC, "iocs", "adfection_iocs.txt")
+# Single source of truth for the version. Read it from the package rather than
+# repeating it here: the two silently drifted once and the download shipped
+# reporting the wrong version (it said 0.1.6 while it was v0.1.7). Derive it, so
+# that can never happen again.
+def _package_version():
+ init = io.open(os.path.join(PKG, "__init__.py"), encoding="utf-8").read()
+ m = re.search(r'__version__\s*=\s*"([^"]+)"', init)
+ if not m:
+ raise SystemExit("bundle: could not read __version__ from the package")
+ return m.group(1)
+
+
+VERSION = _package_version()
+
def read(path):
return io.open(path, encoding="utf-8").read()
@@ -161,7 +175,7 @@ A('import datetime')
A('import sys')
A('import time')
A('')
-A('__version__ = "0.1.6 (single-file build)"')
+A('__version__ = "{} (single-file build)"'.format(VERSION))
A('')
A('# --- embedded indicator data ------------------------------------------------')
A('# The real file is iocs/adfection_iocs.txt in the project. Its provenance')
diff --git a/scan/adint_scan/__init__.py b/scan/adint_scan/__init__.py
index 19b16f7..8eb5811 100644
--- a/scan/adint_scan/__init__.py
+++ b/scan/adint_scan/__init__.py
@@ -4,4 +4,4 @@ A clean result from this tool means "no known indicators were found in the place
that can be checked." It does NOT mean the device is clean. See SPEC-scanner.md.
"""
-__version__ = "0.1.6"
+__version__ = "0.1.8"
diff --git a/scan/tests/test_bundle_release.py b/scan/tests/test_bundle_release.py
index be52174..5ce25e8 100644
--- a/scan/tests/test_bundle_release.py
+++ b/scan/tests/test_bundle_release.py
@@ -230,3 +230,14 @@ class TestStixDriverWithdrawal(unittest.TestCase):
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
+
+
+ def test_bundle_reports_the_package_version(self):
+ # v0.1.7 shipped a single file that reported "0.1.6" because the version
+ # was hardcoded in build/bundle.py and drifted from the package. The
+ # bundle now derives it, so the two can never disagree again.
+ from adint_scan import __version__ as pkg_version
+ self.assertTrue(
+ self.bundle.__version__.startswith(pkg_version),
+ "bundle reports {!r}, package is {!r}".format(
+ self.bundle.__version__, pkg_version))